

Illiberal Practices

Territorial Variance within Large Federal Democracies

Edited by

Jacqueline Behrend & Laurence Whitehead



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Edited by
JACQUELINE BEHREND
and
LAURENCE WHITEHEAD

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To Pablo, Ciro, and Emilio
To Linette

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Illiberal Practices

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CHAPTER 1

Setting the Comparative Agenda

Territorially Uneven Democratization Processes in Large Federations

JACQUELINE BEHREND AND LAURENCE WHITEHEAD

This volume offers a comparative historical analysis of the nature and scope of variations in political rights at the subnational level in the world's six largest federal democracies—Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and the United States in the Americas, as well as India and Russia—thus covering federations that underwent democratic transitions in the first, second, and third waves of democratization. The aim is to demonstrate and explain the marked divergences in the extent and quality of political rights held by citizens in different subunits of these democracies.

There is a growing literature on the persistence after the transition to democracy of illiberal or authoritarian politics at the subnational level that has emphasized the uneven spread of democratic practices in different federal states. It shows that the existence of "brown areas" (O'Donnell 1993), "authoritarian enclaves" (Gibson 2012; Mickey 2015), "hybrid regimes" (McMann 2006) or "closed games" (Behrend 2011) lead to the partial or incomplete application of democratic norms that are supposed to prevail nationally. This subject has received increased scholarly attention under the rubric of "subnational authoritarianism," and building on that, we extend our coverage to a wider range of analogous cases under the rubric of subnational "illiberal structures and practices."

Democratization is not a smooth or linear process, and it is even less so in federal or multilevel countries, where there are different regional jurisdictions with varying degrees of autonomy. This volume provides detailed case studies that show the persistence of a diverse range of illiberal—or less than democratic—practices that may add up to authoritarian structures in some subnational units. The studies also illuminate various strategies of "boundary control" (Gibson 2012) and of political alliances between the

subnational and federal levels of government that allow this situation to persist. The volume further contains large-*n* comparisons that pinpoint how and where the different subnational political systems vary within a single country.

Subnational illiberal structures and practices in federally democratic countries are not comparable to the authoritarian national regimes that ruled some of those countries in the past. These illiberal structures and practices occur within the framework of a federally democratic political regime that, while flawed, nonetheless guarantees a series of rights and institutions that can potentially be activated to ensure minimum standards of democracy. In this view, subnational democratization in nationally democratic countries is more fruitfully understood as part of the research agenda on democratic deepening (Morlino 2012) and challenges to democracy, not as a process of regime change or transition to democracy.

Although this volume considers only 6 countries (of the 117 that Freedom House classified as "electoral democracies" in 2012 and from which Russia is excluded), the selected cases are far more important for those interested in "bottom-up" perspectives on democratization (Morlino 2012) than that proportion suggests. From the perspective adopted in this volume, these six cases are not just a handful of "reporting units" in a universe of democratic nation-states. Among them they contain about half the voters in all the electoral democracies in the world (and this without including voters in another score of large federations, including Australia, Canada, Nigeria, and South Africa). Most people living under democratic forms of rule in the contemporary world can be found in large federal states, not in the compact unitary systems that are implicitly taken as the norm in most large-*n* comparative studies of democratization. For most democratic citizens in the contemporary world, national political representatives are remote, and access to them is filtered through a divided form of sovereignty. This is the context for the exploration presented in this volume of the illiberal structures and practices that can arise at the subnational level in many large democratic federations—notably in the six compared in this volume.

In addition to accounting for half of the voters in electoral democracies worldwide, these six countries cover over a quarter of the world's total land surface, contain 30 percent of its population, and produce one-third of global output. Each country contributes to these proportions in different ways. Russia has the most territory, India the greatest number of people, and the United States the highest per capita income. All six feature among the world's top

nations in terms of size, and they all display the crucial feature at the core of the analysis: their national leadership is quite remote from much of the citizenry, and an intervening level of subnational semisovereign authority stands between voters and national-level rulers.

The inclusion of the United States and the Russian Federation within the set of federal regimes displaying marked subnational divergences in access to political rights extends the range of the comparative work presented. The volume does not consider a number of other federal democracies in which the formal political system is particularly robust and internal variations in responsiveness are correspondingly low (Australia, Canada, and Germany), and it also does not include unitary countries, although recent research on countries such as Colombia and the Philippines suggests that democratic variance at the subnational level may be just as relevant in highly decentralized unitary countries as it is in federal countries.[1] The analytical framework we develop may therefore be extended in future research to decentralized unitary countries. The Russian Federation is included as a revealing limit case, in part because of useful comparative work on its striking subnational variations and in part because it is an important latecomer that could eventually gain democratic momentum.

The Analytical Framework

Not all existing federations are large, and not all large federations are democratic.[2] But there is a degree of elective affinity between federal institutions and key features of liberal democratic governance because for a federation to operate effectively there has to be a separation of powers and areas of rule neutrality and political leaders have to rule through some system of representation and external accountability (at the very least between federal and subnational levels of authority).

A Bottom-Up Perspective

From the "bottom-up" standpoint of citizenship voice and representation, large federal systems raise additional problems beyond those present in any large modern democratic polity: not only does a larger population weaken the voice of the individual citizen but also the geographical dispersion of powers involves addressing more than one level of representation. More fundamentally, if the demos is understood as a collective sovereign body, in federal systems or multilevel polities there is more than one demos. The central or federal level of government may, in principle, be answerable to the

entirety of the national electorate, but it is also accountable to a collective of subnational units (provinces or states with their own autonomy and "rights"), and each of these, in turn, is answerable to its own regional fraction of the citizenry, constituted as another level of the sovereign demos.

The fundamental difference between unitary and federal democracies arises from this multilevel split. "One citizen, one vote" is the clear democratic principle when sovereignty and the demos are unitary. But democratic federalism requires that to be balanced against a rival decision rule: one province, one vote. The same balance is necessary for amendments to a democratic federal constitution, for a federal intervention to suspend sovereignty in a subnational unit, or (where this is allowed at all) for the creation of new units within the federation. In addition, these normative legal and institutional complexities apply only to the formal level of governance in large federal democracies.

Beyond that, at the informal (social) level, as our case studies show, there are almost invariably powerful extrainstitutional dynamics at work that complicate the processes of participation and representation at the subnational level. Historical legacies, elite families, societal cleavages (see Amoretti and Bermeo 2004), uneven enforcement procedures, and uneven state capacities all add further layers of interference between the expression of citizen preferences for public policies and the decisions actually enacted. Levitsky and Murillo (2013, 97) argue that institutions and formal rules in Latin America often fail to take root because there is a "disjuncture between rule writers and informal power holders." Formal institutions therefore become vulnerable to displacement or what they term "serial replacement." At the informal level, powerful actors who were not included in the rule-making process often seek to undermine and prevent the enforcement of these rules. This could explain why, despite federal intervention and reform of institutions, subnational illiberal structures and practices can prove deeply embedded. We also draw on Migdal (2001), whose approach is similar, although he believes that informal practices are deeply rooted in society and reflect chronic contestation over competing sets of rules.[3] These two contributions direct attention to how informal practices shape and modify political institutions (this is the bottom-up approach) and not simply how formal institutions shape political behavior.

Subnational Authoritarianism and Illiberal Structures and Practices

Much of the existing literature on what has become known as "subnational authoritarianism" and on variations in subnational democracy concentrates on the formal aspects involved—notably, the institutional, electoral, budgetary, fiscal, and rule-of-law dimensions. These issues are important in our cases, but our comparative analysis draws attention to the informal counterparts that reinforce—or in some cases overwhelm—the narrower procedural issues. We build on Gibson's work on subnational authoritarianism and expand it to include cases that fall short of institutionalized subnational authoritarian regimes but nonetheless constitute an important challenge to democracy. The concept of "illiberal structures and practices" provides a more inclusive rubric for these cases and allows us to accommodate the wider array of local factors that generate variations between subnational outcomes within a given federal democratic framework.

Our concern is with lasting political structures and practices that can reproduce themselves over time, as in the case of discriminatory local justice systems or captured provincial media. From a "bottom-up" perspective, such subnational political features can restrict choice, limit debate, and exclude or distort democratic participation to such an extent that they negate the principles of federal democracy proclaimed at the national level; they can severely qualify the democratic status of a particular province or subnational jurisdiction without openly manifesting the full panoply of authoritarian regime characteristics.

There is some parallel here with the various intermediate—neither fully democratic nor outright authoritarian—regime categories that have been developed in recent comparative politics scholarship (hybrid, electoral authoritarian, and competitive authoritarian are cases in point).[4] But most of these illiberal structures and practices neither are unambiguously authoritarian nor amount to fully fledged regimes. This is because they have to operate within the constraints of an overarching democratic federal structure and must coexist with other more genuinely open provincial competitors. Our concern is with *political illiberalism*, because comparativists should be aware that not all forms of illiberalism are necessarily incompatible with political democracy (although the dividing line may be contested). Some locally rooted illiberal structures (such as those based on religious affiliation or ethnic identity) have been known to coexist with a level institutional playing field, citizen inclusion, and the free exercise of political choice even

by minorities. Similarly, comparativists should also allow for conceptions of democracy that are republican (participatory) as well as individual rights–based. The political illiberalism that concerns us here involves actively discriminatory features of subnational politics that severely limit or render ineffective formal citizenship claims. This involves not just the absence of democratic guarantees but also, more important, the active presence of structures and practices that serve to obstruct the emergence of challengers and of contestations.

This substitution is particularly warranted for those cases in which poor democratic performance is mostly explained not by the concentration of power in the hands of state governors as a result of formal rules but by that which derives from informal political practices or by the weakness of legally designated authorities in comparison to informal power holders, be they traditional rulers, faction leaders, business elites or, indeed, criminal bands. Multiple examples of such weakness (and, in some cases, even local "state failure") can be extracted from our case studies, notably those set in Chechnya in the Russian Federation, Kashmir in India, Oaxaca in Mexico, and Santiago del Estero in Argentina. The latter are extreme cases, but they evince in exaggerated form important tendencies with a broader relevance. Our claim is that these illiberal structures and practices merit as much attention as more explicitly authoritarian institutional features when accounting for the variability of democratic performance within large federal democracies. A "bottom-up" or citizen-focused conception of democratization helps to uncover how these variations are experienced by each local demos and what effects they have on the overall federal level of democratic performance.

Brown Areas and Boundary Control

Guillermo O'Donnell (1993) paved the way for this research by invoking the image of "brown areas": local jurisdictions within democratic regimes that are not fully controlled by the political and institutional forces that secured the rules of the game nationally. His core insight was that, within a given democratic system, just as within an ecological setting, the essential flow of inputs needed for democratic flourishing may well be unevenly distributed. Even if all parts of a society are subject to the same set of regulatory principles, it does not follow that those principles are uniformly effective. Of course O'Donnell's analysis was not limited to the subset of democracies considered here, and there are also many examples of what he called "brown areas" within unitary democratic regimes. However, the more restricted and

highly specified cases analysed in this volume provide particularly vivid confirmations of O'Donnell's broader intuition. This field of inquiry was effectively promoted by Richard Snyder (2001) in his pioneering article "Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method."

Edward Gibson's (2012) framework develops the more institutionally specific conception of "boundary control." His idea of subnational authoritarianism draws on the literature on territorial politics as well as on democratization studies. The comparative evidence assembled in this volume falls between these two positions and requires an alternative framing of the issues. In contrast to O'Donnell's "brown areas," our cases are more specifically anchored in subnational institutional arrangements, and the focus is on actively organized, well-entrenched local formal and informal structures and practices that serve to resist or deflect nationally promoted democratic standards and to perpetuate exclusionary and undemocratic political arrangements. And these practices, in contrast to "subnational authoritarian regimes," need not be so holistic and defiant that they clash directly with national-level democracy. They can be more partial, fragmentary, and fluid and can thus avoid outright confrontation with federal authorities. For that same reason, they may also pass "under the radar" when observance of constitutional standards is at issue. But even so, they can persist and even reproduce themselves over time, notwithstanding pressure and perhaps intervention from the center; and they "tilt the playing field" and restrict competition and participation to an extent that durably negates the democratic architecture of the overall regime.

The citizen's-eye view of representation in these systems highlights the large spatial variations that can be found within each national polity. As Gibson (2012) has demonstrated, contrasts between one subnational unit and another can be insightfully explored using an institutional focus on boundary control. The editors of this volume endorse this perspective but also draw attention to other, extrainstitutional, factors that can restrict or enhance citizens' influence over their elected representatives.

The subnational authoritarian aspect of these variations arises mostly when federal powers to intervene against local abuses are limited and when provincial elected authorities possess a wide array of formal powers to resist the exercise of local citizen and voter autonomy. The Jim Crow laws in the post-Reconstruction South of the United States provide one classic example of this, as documented in chapter 2 by Edward L. Gibson and Desmond King. The federal authorities in Brazil's and Mexico's constitutional democracies

have also been quite constrained in their scope to intervene when local oligarchical interests or longstanding state-level party machines have obstructed the dissemination of the rights and freedoms unfurled at the national level.

What all these cases have in common is the strength of established subnational institutional arrangements and their capacity to fend off democratizing reforms instigated at the center. But the case studies presented in this volume indicate that other impediments to effective subnational articulation of citizen rights can matter. The second tier of representative government may be institutionally insecure and even vulnerable to capture by informal local power groups or factions; it can also be subject to destabilizing interference, both from neighboring local jurisdictions and even from factionalism at the national level. In such cases, citizens may find that access to elected representatives is severely impaired, not because they are up against a subnational authoritarian power structure but, on the contrary, because the local-level democratic order is too weak, disorganized, or demoralized. The bottom-up approach requires a broader interpretative scheme if it is to account for these sources of democratic variability within large federations and for the strongly institutionalized boundary control cases: it must map the very unevenly distributed incidence of illiberal structures and practices within large federal democracies.

This schema needs to be differentiated from Zakaria's (2003) far more top-down and centralized conception of illiberal democracies at the national level (in which the spatial differentiation is between states, not within them). Although this analytical contrast is clear-cut, in practical terms there is a degree of overlap between the two categories. Studies of Vladimir Putin's Russia, for example, commonly highlight the illiberal structures and practices that the president has promoted at the federal level. Where this occurs, it is only to be expected that similar features will tend to be replicated at the subnational level.[5] But the focus here is on the large variations that can be found within an overall nationally "liberal" context. These are expressions of the federal nature of the regimes and of the still important divergence between the degrees of citizen freedoms and of political responsiveness to citizen demands to be encountered in some local jurisdictions in contrast to others.

One example is the contrast between Moscow or the Samara oblast (at least in 1998) and the Ulyanovsk oblast (McMann 2006) or, for a more extreme contrast, Chechnya. Another is the comparison between Novgorod and the

adjacent and structurally similar Pskov (Bilev, in progress). Likewise, in the Argentine democracy examined in chapters 4 and 5 there remains a significant difference between the exercise of local citizenship rights in oil-rich Santa Cruz and in Catamarca, for example, and between that in the Federal Capital and interior jurisdictions such as the provinces of Santa Fe and Mendoza. The illiberal structures and practices of central concern in this volume are those that account for levels of provincial democratic responsiveness well below the national norm in a substantial set of subnational units.

The failure to protect basic rights in any part of a democratic system is liable to contaminate the exercise of those rights by all. In the real world it is not unusual for such deficiencies to arise in nonfederal democracies. The United Kingdom has long been a reasonably effective democracy for a large majority of its citizens, notwithstanding deeply entrenched illiberal practices in Northern Ireland, and Corsica deviates from the rest of France without significant broader consequences. But in large federal democracies (as the example of the Solid South in the United States illustrates) it is possible for such shortfalls to extend far beyond individual islands or isolated peripheral areas and to provide the basis for interprovincial coalitions and alliances strong enough to exert a stranglehold on national-level democratic authority.

Once a critical minimum number of units band together in defense of a set of illiberal structures and practices, their combined leverage at the federal level becomes sufficient to block or distort nationwide democratic responsiveness. This is how the Solid South reinforced racial segregation and obstructed African American political participation in the entire US system for almost a century after the Civil War (see chapter 2 in this volume by Edward L. Gibson and Desmond King). Similar tipping points can arise from other illiberal practices—for example, where locally powerful oligarchical interests establish broad enough self-preservation fronts or formerly dominant party structures coalesce to regain control at the federal level, without ever being submitted to genuine multiparty competition locally. In such cases, instead of conceiving boundary control as a defensive instrument for preserving subnational authoritarian rule within an otherwise democratic federal system, the concept can be recast as an offensive instrument for resurgent illiberal coalitions to deploy at the federal level. Both possibilities merit equal consideration, especially for those who view democratization processes as long-term, open-ended, and potentially partially reversible.

Territorial Variance and Prospects for Democratization

It is unlikely that a "democratic transition" can take the form of a brief and irreversible single-step change in a large federal system. Even if a foundational election has broken with the past (as in Mexico in 2000), or a new constitution has been ratified (as in Brazil in 1988), the democratic consequences will not automatically take effect in all subnational units, as André Borges (chapter 6), Celina Souza (chapter 7), and Julián Durazo Herrmann (chapter 8) demonstrate. At best, the resulting regime change may gradually filter down, but, on the basis of our case studies, it is also plausible to envisage extended periods of long-term foot-dragging, noncompliance, and even backlash.

Such experiences fit best within a framework that understands democratization in terms of historical struggles, contentious politics, and long-term efforts at resocialization. It may be that a solid and uniform democratic consensus gradually emerges, based on a homogeneous national demos. On the other hand, in at least one of our cases (Russia), movement has clearly been in the opposite direction, and in others (such as India and Mexico), there are still substantial countervailing tendencies.

If this is the correct way to analyse processes of democratization in most or all large federal democracies, historical trajectories require more thorough examination than has been the norm in much of the contemporary literature. In particular, it means that provincial or subnational divergences in historical development can be crucial in accounting for the strong and sustained geographical variability displayed in all our six countries.

Most of the chapters in this collection are inscribed in the tradition of comparative historical analysis. To explain how subnational democratization processes unfold, their authors construct causal narratives that offer historically grounded explanations of large-scale processes. They seek to answer "big" questions about how subnational democratization occurs in different contexts. In chapter 10 we compare these processes and develop a framework of pathways toward subnational democratization that enables us to incorporate the findings of the different case studies.

The case of India examined in chapter 3 indicates the value of a multigenerational perspective, and chapter 2 on the United States takes a particularly long view. Although the other four cases concern more recent democratic transitions, they also benefit from attention to the pre-transition roots of subnational variability. The illiberal structures and practices that most

effectively distort or suppress citizen autonomy are durable and persistent. They are operated and controlled by local interests, which can mobilize their resources and adapt their strategies in order to secure the reproduction of their ascendancy over time.

Good work has been done tracing particular features of these resources: elite family connections, ownership of provincial communications media, penetration or capture of local justice structures, local political machines, provision of selective benefits to dependent clienteles, and even the promotion of provincial patriotisms.[6] All such informal arrangements reinforce the controls that can be operated through the formal power resources that federations confer on their second-tier jurisdictions. This historically rooted synergy between formal and informal elements makes it appropriate to trace illiberal structures and practices that explain second-tier failings in the area of citizen responsiveness rather than focusing exclusively on the formal subnational authoritarian features of political systems.

Inevitably, the adoption of a broad comparative framing device involves drawbacks as well as advantages. The theoretical approach developed in this chapter and in chapter 10 is built on the analytical narratives included in the other chapters; it therefore focuses on theory development rather than theory testing. Moreover, process tracing draws on multiple types of evidence that cannot be easily replicated across cases.

An illustrative list of illiberal structures—including oligarchic families, controlled media, captured courts, and municipal machines, among others—demonstrates the diversity of entrenched informal power brokers that require consideration under this rubric. Both within and between federal countries, each local system for restricting citizen participation displays its own particular mix of illiberal ingredients. This invalidates comparison on the basis of separate components alone.

For example, it may be possible to measure the integrity of local courts and to rank second-tier jurisdictions accordingly. But local police forces are also of variable integrity, and the rankings for them may well differ from those for the courts. So comparisons of illiberal justice systems require consideration of both components. On a larger scale, comparisons of illiberal structures and practices require integrated or holistic assessments of how the integrity of the justice system interacts with the openness of the communications media and the responsiveness of the political parties, among other factors.

To some extent, expert assessments may manage to capture these variations in the overall (holistic or gestalt) "quality of democracy" in different

jurisdictions, and objective rankings are always worth pursuing, but this broad way of framing the comparisons raises problems of measurement. As in other areas of comparative politics, the most reliable metrics may be of limited use for explanatory purposes.

Fortunately, progress is being made in addressing these difficulties. In this volume, Carlos Gervasoni (chapter 5) and Inga A.-L. Saikkonen (chapter 9) provide well-elaborated databases that address such concerns. More generally, the recent proliferation of empirical studies about the quality of democracy and subnational authoritarianism provide a more solid basis for comparative research. From our bottom-up perspective, which focuses on political responsiveness to citizen demands, it is particularly useful to examine what survey research reveals about public opinion on illiberal local political practices and to combine these findings with cross-jurisdictional evidence about the relative integrity of competitive electoral processes.

Another important strand of evidence is provided by the growing availability of paired comparisons and within-case comparisons, which use structural and comparative historical techniques to identify and explain contrasts in democratic responsiveness between similarly placed second-tier units within a single large federal system; the chapters by Maya Tudor and Adam Ziegfeld (chapter 3), Jacqueline Behrend (chapter 4), André Borges (chapter 6), Celina Souza (chapter 7), and Julián Durazo Herrmann (chapter 8) provide examples of this. Such case studies engage in historically grounded causal analysis, including analytical narrative and process-tracing techniques and more comparative "configurational" approaches.[7] Their focus on political development over time provides rich sources for hypothesis formation and offers evidence that narrows the range of explanatory factors.[8] To proceed further in the search for validation it is necessary to examine a larger number of cases, so it helps when these single case studies or small-*n* comparisons can be placed within the total field through an overall ranking of all the units under consideration. Our six large federal democracies constitute an inclusive and diverse set of cases (especially considering the scores of subnational units within each country), but a set not so large as to become intractable in terms of comparative or configurational causal analysis.

Case Selection

Some of the cases included in this volume require justification. Compared to the other five large democratic federations examined here, Russia clearly

belongs at or near the boundary for inclusion. Indeed, much of the current (post-Yeltsin) literature avoids the designation of Russia as a "democracy" and questions the federal nature of the system.

The best argument for Russia's inclusion refers to the decade between 1994 and 2004, from the plebiscite that ratified the current constitution to the suppression of the direct election of governors. As Inga A.-L. Saikkonen's chapter documents, during that short decade the Russian Federation displayed quite as much—if not greater—internal variability than was in evidence in any of the other countries considered here. However, by the time of the 2004 election, the national backlash was making itself felt even in St. Petersburg.

Since then, the Putin-led regime has reconcentrated powers nationally in a broadly authoritarian manner and has curbed or suppressed many of the features of second-tier autonomy that are essential to a genuinely federal polity. A decade after the replacement of elected governors by centrally selected and approved nominees (78 out of the 83 belonging to the ruling United Russia party in 2010), it is generally accepted that neither central nor local power is being exercised in a pro-democratic manner and that antidemocratic excesses in various second-tier jurisdictions are protected and reinforced rather than curbed by the center.

From a comparative perspective, however, Russia's democratic federal experiment is sufficiently coherent and significant to merit inclusion in the set of cases presented in this volume. In fact, it serves a valuable function by highlighting features that are less visible but also present (or potentially so) in other cases. In particular, with the renewed national and subnational ascendancy of the Mexican PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) in the 2012 elections, it is instructive to conduct a paired comparison between these cases. How much more of an outlier is Putin's Russia than Peña Nieto's Mexico? And what would it take either for the former to migrate in a more democratic direction or for the latter to gravitate toward a more Putinesque centralized and managed federal system operating behind a democratic façade?

If the inclusion of Russia is sufficiently contentious to require justification, the inclusion of U.S. democracy in the sample presented in this volume—a crucial feature of this comparative project in not just empirical but also analytical or theoretical terms—is bound to elicit queries, albeit for entirely different reasons. There is a longstanding and still intense debate about U.S. "exceptionalism" that obstructs any straightforward comparison

between this political system and all others. Further, in contrast to the constitutions of other large federal democracies, the U.S. Constitution is older and more widely venerated. These are serious considerations but not, in our view, sufficient grounds for omitting the United States from this comparative analysis.

Although on some indicators this may be classified as the world's oldest democracy, it was not until the Civil War that slavery was abolished and not until a century later that African American voting rights were formally guaranteed nationwide, and even now, indirect obstacles remain a source of contention in some arenas. Given the focus on deeply entrenched illiberal structures and practices at the subnational level, this extended history of racial discrimination represents a major corrective to the idea of the United States as the world's pristine federal democracy. Beyond that, leading authorities on US federalism such as Riker (1964) and Dahl (2001) have drawn attention to the not-so-democratic aspects of this constitutional order, as was highlighted by the process and outcome of the presidential election of 2000. Taken together, these points provide confirmation that this case does belong in this set, and they show that the United States is not so exempt from inner tensions and historical ambiguities as the "pristine" terminology would suggest.

The case for including India is different again, although this is not so hard to justify once Russia and the United States have been added to the usual Latin American cluster of federal democracies. Despite regular predictions that India's regime would fall apart, this "coming-together" model of democratic federalism (Stepan 2004) has not only survived but also become stronger over time. Certainly there is a centralizing fiscal and bureaucratic backbone to the system, but there is also a good case to be made that it was only through reliable and effective federal arrangements that India could achieve its present state of democratic stability and inclusiveness. At the same time, it still displays extremely large territorial variations in democratic governance, as is only to be expected given its continentwide scale and its vast linguistic, religious, socioeconomic, caste, and broader sociohistorical differences. It therefore adds to the range and depth of our comparisons, and they, in turn, provide external criteria that put India's democratic evolution into a broader perspective.

Conclusion

Summing up, the large territorial variations in citizenship rights that have persisted for extended periods in all the cases presented in this volume cannot be attributed uniformly to "subnational authoritarian" regimes. An account of illiberal structures and practices that recognizes their shifting and fragmentary characteristics is needed. This would draw attention to episodes of conflict and contentious politics that can at least temporarily shift the balance of democratic entitlements both toward and away from prevailing federal-level norms without necessarily reaching a new stable equilibrium. There are "family resemblances" between these local democracy-constraining forces, but the anatomy of each case must be examined separately. Local and national judiciaries, media, security forces, party machines, entrenched local elites, and societal cleavages can all contribute to this variability, which is sometimes reinforced from the center, sometimes defensively entrenched at the subnational level and even cloaked in local patriotism. Any adequate explanation of this reality must be open to the appropriate level of "thick description" and process tracing.

This volume is global in coverage, but the number of countries included is too few to allow us to uncover any strong statistical regularities. The two main justifications for this approach are, first, that even with only six case studies the set encompasses a large proportion of the world's population of democratic citizens in a way that has not previously been undertaken. And second, the granularity of the country studies more than compensates for the small sample size. If all the cases are large and significant for the universe as a whole, and if the comparisons between them are in many cases novel or little known, then a "scoping" approach can add more value than would be provided by a superficial exercise in decontextualized quantification.

Following substantial work comparing the Latin American cases, there has been a more recent explosion of comparative studies of subnational authoritarianism. But it is rare for the United States to be included as one among many reporting units, and studies of India are seldom comparative. Russia is even more of an outlier. So what follows is an unusually inclusive exercise, the aim of which is to challenge overly narrow comparative criteria and assumptions. Even so, placing these cases together permits an examination of their scope for convergence and an exploration of the alternative routes through which democratization can proceed, including recognition

that this is likely to involve various degrees of conflict and therefore to display nonlinearity.

The elimination of subnational authoritarian forms of politics and the modification or marginalization of illiberal structures and practices may be a permanent subject of contestation, but it involves multiple dimensions and is just as likely to give rise to sequential disequilibria as to some "end-of-history" unified outcome. At any rate, the six cases included in this volume encompass a considerable diversity of paths and different understandings about desirable and attainable objectives, and they highlight the persistence of marked variations of outcomes both within and between these large federal democracies. In consequence, what political rights their citizens experience—and what they can reasonably hope for—is by no means a given and is far from the same in all settings. This matters greatly, because the citizens in question make up a majority of all those currently experiencing "democratic" government in the world.

This academic field is rapidly expanding, and the political realities to which it relates are also still in considerable flux. This contribution highlights the great contemporary importance of issues of uneven citizen representation and exercise of rights in large federal democracies. It includes India, Russia, and the United States, thus extending the analysis well beyond the usual Latin American focus. It attempts to specify more precisely the important intuition that lay behind O'Donnell's discussion of "brown areas." It builds on and expands the relatively formal features highlighted by Gibson's work on boundary control. It specifies the key areas that help to explain subnational variations in responsiveness to a democratic demos.

In this respect, this volume reinforces the work of recent scholars who have highlighted the importance of informal political structures and practices while always also considering how they interact with formal rules.[9] This crucial dimension of democratization requires the use of multiple methods, including comparative historical analysis, process tracing, expert surveys, and public opinion evidence, as well as institutional analysis and electoral studies. From the normative standpoint, the emphasis here is on bottom-up or citizen-based concerns, not just on large-*n* comparisons of national democracies. The processes highlighted are long-term, contentious, and by no means unilinear. Given the vastness, complexity, and split sovereignty that characterize large federal democracies in the twenty-first century, how could it be otherwise?

NOTES

1. On variations in subnational democracy in the Philippines, see Sidel (2014), and on Colombia, see Eaton and Prieto (2013).

2. Indeed, St. Kitts and Nevis, with a population of 50,000, is a federation, and so are Comoros and Micronesia. Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo both have technically federal constitutions, and most authorities do not currently classify the Russian Federation as a democracy.

3. In the words of Migdal (2001, 11), "No single, integrated set of rules . . . exists anywhere."

4. Recent examples of this literature include Levitsky and Way (2010) and Schedler (2013).

5. From a more "top-down" perspective that highlights federal illiberal practices, Agustina Giraudy (2015) shows that presidents in nationally democratic countries may help sustain subnational undemocratic leaders if they are political allies.

6. See, for example, Hagopian (1996), Cornelius, Eisenstadt, and Hindley (1999), Snyder (1999), Bill Chávez (2004), Behrend (2008, 2011), Durazo Herrmann (2010), Borges (2011), Gibson (2012), and Montero (2012).

7. On configurational approaches, see, for example, Ragin (2008).

8. On the benefits and challenges of this type of research, see Hall (2003), Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003), Pierson (2004), George and Bennett (2005), Gerring (2007), Ragin (2008), and Collier (2011).

9. For example, O'Donnell (1993) and Levitsky and Murillo (2005, 2013).

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PART I

The UNITED STATES and INDIA in HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Federalism and Subnational Democratization in the United States

The South in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

EDWARD L. GIBSON AND DESMOND KING

This chapter examines two massive transitions to democracy in the United States that were separated by nearly a century. They were subnational transitions to democracy of a regionwide nature, transforming the political systems of more than a dozen states that contained between one-fourth and one-third of the national population. One transition failed, but the other succeeded. The first was the late nineteenth-century experience known as Reconstruction, the failed attempt after the 1861–65 Civil War to create democratic political regimes in the southern states. The failure of this transition led to the creation of the "Solid South," an authoritarian assembly of states that lasted well into the middle of the twentieth century. The second democratic transition, commonly known in the United States as the "civil rights struggles," spanned three decades in the middle of the twentieth century and led to the dismantling of authoritarian state regimes of the Solid South.

These two momentous instances of subnational democratization struggles have been studied in great detail by scholars of US history and American political development. However, the study of their theoretical implications for the fields of comparative politics and democratization is a new endeavor.[1] In this chapter we mine these experiences for insights into national institutional determinants of subnational political change. Specifically, we explore how subnational democratization is shaped by the changing contours of national federal systems.

Our general claim is that subnational democratization struggles cannot be understood without attention to the national institutional context in which they unfold. Political dynamics in states or provinces are fundamentally different from their national counterparts in that they are subsystems of a

national political system. Provincial units are subject to regular and substantive interactions with the national state, and they relate to national politics through institutional and legal linkages that shape strategic options available to local political actors. Thus, how the national state is organized territorially is critical to processes of change and continuity in subnational political regimes. Our focus on federalism sheds new light on links between state and regime by revealing how the state's territorial organization, rather than its bureaucratic or coercive organization, shapes the ebbs and flows of democracy across a country's jurisdictions (Stepan and Linz 2011).

We advance two claims about federalism and its relationship to democratization in the United States. The first is that the long struggle over the democratization of US southern states was very much a struggle over the structure of US federalism. Fights about federalism are inseparable from fights about democracy in US political history because federalism impedes reform. Our second claim is that the contrasting outcomes of nineteenth-century Reconstruction and the twentieth-century civil rights struggles were linked to the fact that each took place under a different federal structure. The local regime outcomes in each case followed a resolution of a battle over the nature of the national federal system. During Reconstruction the battle ended favorably for political actors bent on establishing state-level authoritarian regimes and decapitating the national authority of the federal system. In the middle of the twentieth century, political actors found themselves in a federal system that was far more propitious to subnational democratization—one whereby the federal government was endowed with powers that it had lacked in the late nineteenth century to define and enforce political rights in the states. These powers were gained gradually, the result of both jurisprudential and statutory struggles over a long period of time. The democratization of the US South in the twentieth century—the most momentous instance of subnational democratization in democratic history and therefore of the US polity as a whole—was a direct outgrowth of the political centralization of federalism.

In this chapter we describe the political processes of both periods and thread our narratives analytically around the interaction of national territorial regime change and subnational political change. We reveal that Reconstruction was first and foremost a fight to grant the central government powers to define and enforce rights in all jurisdictions of the American federal system. This fight was first settled in favor of centralizing coalitions in the national government that then embarked on a campaign to democra-

tize the southern states. The tables were turned on the centralizers, however, when a series of US Supreme Court decisions struck down Reconstruction-era statutes and reestablished a federal political order that gave precedence to states over national authorities in the definition and enforcement of political and civil rights in the states. Federal troops withdrew, and Freedmen's Bureaus closed. Massive disenfranchisement of local voters (mostly newly enfranchised former slaves) ensued, and the Solid South was built. Key aspects of this segregationist order were replicated outside the South, too, across the twentieth century, including nominally "separate but equal" facilities for public employment, residential housing, and schools.[2]

By the mid-twentieth century, however, events in the legal arena had gradually created, in the words of Richard Valelly (2004, 158), "a textually based national rights jurisprudence that would apply not only to the federal government but also to state and local governments." This jurisprudence of national rights laid the groundwork for subsequent legislative and administrative action that made the political centralization of federalism effective and empowered advocates of democratization gradually to dismantle the exclusionary and authoritarian structures of the Solid South. A national sequential and iterative process of "jurisprudence-building" and statutory action by the national legislature thus characterized the gradual transformation of federalism over time. And even though much of this action by courts and legislatures in the decades preceding the mid-twentieth century was not concerned with local democratization or the rights of disenfranchised black and poor white voters, it would nevertheless have major consequences for both. This experience has yielded valuable (but as yet unnoted) comparative insights into how federalism changes over time, the central role of law and politics in that process, and its consequences for whether democracy spreads across the jurisdictions of countries governed by federal territorial regimes.

The Struggle over Federalism and Its Consequences for Subnational Democratization

Nineteenth-Century Federalism and Citizenship in the United States

In 1833 the US Supreme Court ruled in *Barron v. Baltimore* that the Bill of Rights restrained the powers of only the national government.[3] State governments were under no legal obligation to provide its protections under their constitutions. At stake in the court case was the answer to a question

that has shaped the evolution of federalism in the United States profoundly: are civil and political rights defined nationally, or is their substantive content to be decided by the states? Put in more general terms, does the central government have the power to define and enforce a uniform standard of citizenship throughout the country? The 1833 Supreme Court decision settled the question unambiguously. Under the US Constitution the central government's power to do so was limited. The power to define the substantive content of local inhabitants' rights in their dealings with state authorities was a power delegated to the individual states. Therefore, by today's standards—indeed, by the standards incorporated in the national constitution—state power holders had the legal power to craft and enforce nondemocratic subnational political regimes.

This historical fact reveals a great deal about the relationship between federalism and the development of democracy in the United States. In their landmark volume on democratization, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, volume 4: *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986) note that the basic underlying principle of democracy is that of citizenship. The "citizenship principle" is one of political equality, and "democratization" is the process by which political equality is extended to broader segments of the population. In nineteenth-century American federalism, a basic principle of constitutional law was one of *dual citizenship*. Individuals were at once citizens of the nation and citizens of the state. National and state authorities, however, could have different concepts of citizenship. Bizarrely, individuals could be subject to two separate standards of citizenship at the same time within a single nation-state. The federal government could guarantee a range of citizen rights, but the state could deny those same rights in its own dealings with people. Given the proximity of state governments to the daily lives of people, it was clearly the state concept of citizenship that was of greatest relevance to one's "citizen experience."

Establishing a nationally uniform standard of citizenship required, therefore, a radical change in territorial organization of the state. A uniform standard would be possible only if the central government were given the power to impose its definition of citizenship on all units of the federation—in other words, to impose it via the political centralization of federalism.

Altering Federalism: The Institutional Topography of US Federalism

In the universe of federal countries, the US Constitution is one of the hardest to change. Arend Lijphart (1999) classifies the United States as possessing one of the most "rigid" constitutions in the world. Rigid constitutions require the approval of supermajorities to be amended (and the US Constitution requires the approval of a supermajority of Congress as well as a supermajority of states to be amended; we thus have two hurdles blocking change, legislative minorities and territorial minorities). In case that were not enough, the United States is also marked by the tradition of "judicial review." In such a system it is the court (ultimately a supreme or constitutional court) that decides on the constitutionality of laws passed by the national legislature. In countries without judicial review it is usually the parliament that decides on the constitutionality of its own laws. Federal countries tend to have judicial review, but not always (Switzerland is very federal but has no judicial review).

This arrangement means that any significant process of change in US federalism will likely involve the courts. Federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court, thus become key actors in any long-term study of changes in federalism. Therefore, in addition to its political dimension, the battle to alter federalism also has an important jurisprudential component.[4]

The Struggle for National Rights: Centralizing Federalism in Pursuit of Democratization

After the Northern states' victory in the Civil War, a "nationalist" (meaning pro–central government) coalition in the Republican Party controlled Congress. The main bastions of states' rights, the southern states, were physically and politically subjugated. The chief protagonists of the centralizing movement were known as the "Radical Republicans" in Congress, and they had major plans for the political transformation of the political systems of the southern states. Whether these designs were noble (democratizing the region, destroying the plantocracy, granting full citizenship to blacks) or strategic (building a southern Republican Party and empowering its new constituencies) is immaterial.[5] Either plan required the democratization of the states (massive enfranchisement, voting rights, and civil rights).

These architects of radical (or congressional) reconstruction in the mid-1860s first actively sought a constitutional basis for their designs on the South. The federal regime of the first half of the nineteenth century stood in their

way. The radical reconstructionists needed to find and develop the rationale on grounds of federalism for granting the national government the power to intervene in the states and reshape their local political systems. The first battle in the struggle over democracy in the states was thus to be a battle over federalism.

THE THEORETICAL PRINCIPLE

Radical Republicans were proponents of what Valelly calls "Reconstruction Constitutionalism." Doctrinally, Reconstruction Constitutionalism held that "the constitution was not simply a set of limits on government but a source of sovereign, positive, regulatory government *able to establish and enforce national rights*" (Valelly 2004, 105).[6]

According to the historian Eric Foner (1988, 231–232), Radical Republicans were committed to African American emancipation and suffrage and saw the central government as the instrument of their realization: "The driving force of Radical ideology was the utopian vision of a nation whose citizens enjoyed equality of civil and political rights, secured by a powerful and beneficent national state." Foner adds: "To this egalitarianism, the Civil War wedded a new conception of the powers and potentialities of the national state. More fully than other Republicans, the Radicals embraced the wartime expansion of federal authority, *carrying into Reconstruction the conviction that federalism and state rights must not obstruct a sweeping national effort to define and protect the rights of citizens.*"[7]

MAKING THE PRINCIPLE EFFECTIVE: THE STATUTORY BATTLE TO CENTRALIZE FEDERALISM

The first big statutory move to make the principle effective was the Civil Rights Bill of 1866. The bill did many things, paramount among them redefining the traditional concept of "dual citizenship" in American federalism. The bill defined all persons born in the United States as national citizens and outlined the rights they would enjoy regardless of race. As Foner (1988, 244) writes, "No state law or custom could deprive any citizen of what Trumbull [the bill's author] called these 'fundamental rights belonging to every man as a free man.'" Foner then goes on to note the bill's implications for federalism: "As the first statutory definition of the rights of American citizenship, the Civil Rights Bill embodied a profound change in federal–state relations."

The Civil Rights Act and some accompanying measures were the first major statutory actions by Congress to make the national regulation of

southern political regimes effective. Congress followed this up with a flurry of institutional changes. Two constitutional amendments were passed, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment, granting civil and political rights to blacks and imposing them on the states. The power to pass constitutional amendments—in one of Lijphart's "rigid" constitutional systems—reflects the power of the Radical Republican coalition at that time. These amendments then led to major statutory action to nail the whole thing down. Valelly (2004, 78) writes that "after the Fifteenth Amendment's ratification (March 30, 1870), Reconstruction constitutionalism truly burst forth, as congressional Republicans passed major enforcement and civil rights statutes." The most important of these was the "Enforcement Act" of 1870, which stated that "all citizens of the United States are entitled and allowed to vote . . . *any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Territory . . . to the contrary notwithstanding.*" The act also gave broad powers of federal enforcement (King and Tuck 2007, 213–253; authors' emphasis).

Centralization of Federalism and the Democratic Transition in the Southern States

The centralizing measures enacted by national Republicans revealed the enormous consequences of enhanced federal powers for territorial democratization in the United States. They unleashed a wave of enfranchisement, party-building, and rights enforcement throughout the South, and they stand as catalysts to the most dramatic case of territorial democratization in history. In the initial phases of Reconstruction more than 700,000 blacks were registered as new voters, as well as over 600,000 whites (Franklin 1961). The number of black voters grew steadily in subsequent years, exceeding one million in the early 1870s (Cobb and Jenkins 2001; Valelly 2004, 73). However, most of the new voters were registered during the summer of 1867, a period of major political mobilization and enfranchisement labeled by one historian as a "registration summer" (Saville 1996, 160). Richard Valelly (2004) reports that between December 1866 and December 1867 the proportion of blacks eligible to vote in the United States soared from 0.5 percent to 80.5 percent. All this increase took place in the former Confederate states.

The pace and scope of political mobilization throughout the South in 1867 was dizzying. Historian Eric Foner (1988, 282) characterizes it as an "annus mirabilis," in which the demise of local authority "opened the door for political mobilization to sweep across the black belt." National actors—Republican Party agents, soldiers, central government bureaucrats, clergymen,

and civic leaders—flooded the states to enfranchise blacks and poor whites, forge cross-sectional associations, build party organizations, and organize biracial cadres of new political leaders and activists. Valelly (2004, 41) documents the frantic pace of outside involvement in southern political mobilization and infrastructure-building during this period. In the "registration summer" of 1867, he reports, up to 135 Republican Party organizers toured the southern states seeking to bolster local party-building. Military-appointed registrars, a significant proportion of them black, traveled in every county in ten of the former Confederate states to register voters. The Republican Party embarked on a crash program to establish "Union Leagues" throughout the South. The leagues were Republican-affiliated clubs that had been developed in the North (and clandestinely in the South) to support the Union cause during the Civil War. They now spread throughout the region as a vehicle for the political organization of former slaves. The "Freedmen's Bureau," the central government agency charged with providing social assistance to newly freed blacks, now ratcheted up its political activities as a vehicle for the identification, training, and organization of black political leaders with the intent of promoting "the rise of an entirely new political class" (Lowe 1993, 990), as well as setting up schools.

The historic outcasts of the southern political order responded in kind. Recent historiography on the Reconstruction period has revealed the extent to which African Americans were not merely the objects of outside political mobilization. They actively exercised their rights and challenged local authorities. Black political mobilization also provided a social and institutional infrastructure to advance the democratizing potential of Reconstruction to the South's remotest corners. Veterans of black Union army regiments volunteered as voter registrars and members of armed militias that protected black political activity. Church congregations poured their energies into civic activism and education for illiterate former slaves. Civil society organizations saw their memberships swell and brought instances of malfeasance by local authorities to the attention of federal officials. Valelly (2004, 39) documents that by the summer of 1867 the Union League organizations in the South reported having 200,000 to 300,000 members, most of them black, and they were organized into about two to three thousand local chapters. Eric Foner (1988, 283) also writes that "by the end of 1867, it seemed, virtually every black voter in the South had enrolled in the Union League or some equivalent political organization." Black office-holding was also a hallmark

of the period, not only at the local level, where blacks formed electoral majorities, but also in state legislatures and in the national Congress.[8]

The centralization of federalism shattered the parochial confines of southern state politics (King and Smith 2011, chap. 1). Under the federal government's protection, Republican-led cross-regional coalitions moved to transform the Southern states' constitutional orders. In 1867 and 1868, new biracial electorates in state after state convened constitutional conventions, staffed them, gave them the voter ratification required by federal law, and took control of the postconvention political orders. The new constitutions they wrote affirmed their state governments' commitment to political equality and full citizenship rights, contained provisions for unrestricted access to the ballot box by registered voters, and mandated the election of judges and local administrators. They also struck down restrictions on office-holding and political organization, guaranteed equal access to public services and accommodations, and in many cases also expanded state roles in the provision of social services and workplace regulation.[9]

In sum, this experiment in territorial redesign unleashed one of the most sweeping enfranchisements of citizen populations in the history of modern democracy, and it may stand as one of the first momentous instances of territorial democratization. However, the redesign of federalism by Republican "boundary openers" had tremendous jurisprudential implications that had yet to be tested in the courts. Foner (1988, 245) notes that because the 1866 Civil Rights Bill reflected "the conviction that the federal government possessed the authority to define and protect citizens' rights," it "represented a striking departure from American jurisprudence." And as a striking departure from the legal status quo, its legal test was only a matter of time. The outcome of this test in the US Supreme Court would shatter the remapping of American federalism crafted by Radical Republicans (Tarrow 2015, chap. 3). It handed a major victory to southern "boundary closers" in the battle over federalism's design. Its consequences for democracy in the southern states would be devastating and long-lasting (Mickey 2015).

The Jurisprudential Battle and the Collapse of Reconstruction Federalism

In the mid-1870s a string of Supreme Court decisions reaffirmed early nineteenth-century views of federalism, struck down key laws passed by Congress, and interpreted the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments so

narrowly that the central government's power to shape the substantive content of subnational political regimes was effectively defanged. The first jurisprudential blow came in 1873 with a Supreme Court decision known as the "Slaughterhouse Cases." It was not a decision about voting rights (it was about whether Louisiana could regulate sanitary conditions in slaughterhouses), but its repercussions extended widely to national enforcement of civil and political rights. In the decision the Court "flatly rejected the idea that the 14th amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights" into state constitutions (Kutler 1969, 192). The Court also reaffirmed the concept of "dual citizenship" under federalism and asserted that there were very few "national" rights. To construe the Reconstruction amendments as establishing a wide array of "national" rights would mean "a great departure from the structure and spirit of our institutions." The Court stated further that it felt compelled to defend, "with a steady and even hand, the *balance between state and federal power*" (ibid., 225).[10]

This decision was followed by two other key decisions (*Cruikshank* and *Reese*) that narrowed the interpretation of the national government's powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. *Cruikshank* confirmed the restricted powers of civil rights enforcement of the national government, and *Reese* struck down key aspects of the 1870 Enforcement Acts that were intended to protect voting rights.[11] The cumulative effect was devastating to northern boundary openers' redefinition of federalism. As political scientist Rick Valelly (2004, 119) concludes, "By 1876 the Supreme Court had obviously damaged Reconstruction constitutionalism." The expansive implications of a rights-based jurisprudence led by the Republicans "frightened the Court. For one thing, Reconstruction constitutionalism betokened a fundamental change in federalism."

It was a change in federalism that the late nineteenth-century Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional, and the Court's decisions undermined the strategic terrain that was critical to Republican Party boundary openers' strategies in the South. By undoing Reconstruction Constitutionalism's remapping of US federalism, the Supreme Court decisions greatly weakened the coalition-building and political activities of the Republican Party in the South. Soon thereafter the coalition fell apart, and an 1876 "deal" to permit the presidential election of Rutherford Hayes ended Reconstruction. Federal military forces withdrew from the states. The subsystemic autonomy of the states that the court decisions had reaffirmed legally became a political

reality, and "home rule" was reestablished in the southern states. State-level power holders began the process of reversing voting and civil rights measures and establishing Democratic Party monopolies in the states.

Federalism and the Construction of the "Solid South": Institutional Bases of Disenfranchisement

The construction of the block of authoritarian states known as the "Solid South" did not occur immediately. It would take some time for the Solid South's designers to recognize the opportunities that nineteenth-century federalism provided them for constructing a powerful institutional architecture of state-level authoritarianism. In the late 1870s and 1880s they employed tactics they had learned during their long struggles against occupation by the national government. Democratic Party leaders relied on combinations of fraud, voter intimidation, and violence to manufacture electoral victories.[12] They also relied on "informal arrangements" among party, state, and local officials to restrict organized challenges, co-opt dissidents, and secure the de facto disenfranchisement of voters. These tactics were remarkably effective. Democrats won almost all state and local contests during the 1880s. They lost control of only two of the southern states during this period, Tennessee and Virginia, and in each case only for a short period. Elsewhere throughout the South, they held onto power.

However, their tactics were deficient on critical levels. First, they did little to quell political activity. Legacies of the democratic transition sparked by the national government occupation period endured. Electoral challenges and voter turnout (both black and white) remained high, sustaining Reconstruction-era turnout levels throughout the 1880s (Kousser 1974, 12–15). Southern elections were tumultuous affairs, and the officially sanctioned violence and fraud only intensified them. Furthermore, local power holders' reliance on fraud and violence drew national attention to fraudulent local elections. And this revealed the most important deficit in such strategies: they were inadequate for insulating the states from pressures from the national democratic polity. In fact, they increased the vulnerability of local political systems to outside intervention.

Spurred on by media and public outrage in the North about political conditions in the South, congressional Republicans constantly threatened to pass new federal election-monitoring bills. Even in the national executive branch, top Republican cabinet officials threatened federal action against

the states. After the 1888 elections, when Republicans regained majority control of both houses of Congress, the threats acquired new levels of immediacy and plausibility.

External threats thus prompted a shift in local strategies and resulted in a new institutional morphology of southern authoritarian control. Illegal and informal political arrangements to secure Democratic Party hegemony were gradually replaced with legal measures. What was previously done by private individuals or under informal arrangements would now be achieved by the legal authority of the states. Between the late 1880s and the late 1890s an institutional revolution swept the South that codified and consolidated subnational authoritarian rule. A wave of state constitutional reforms and widespread recrafting of electoral laws and regulations took place during this time. As J. Morgan Kousser (1974, 12–15) put it, "Folkways became stateways," and a new legal architecture shielded southern incumbents from the dual threat of Republican partisan incursions and federal regulation of local political regimes.

The logic behind the institutional revolution was simple and powerful. The formal autonomy granted by US federalism gave states the power to design their political institutions and define the substantive content of political rights. Disenfranchisement could thus be designed along legal lines. Under these conditions, federal enforcement of local electoral laws would actually enhance disenfranchisement, not hinder it. Were the states to make the suppression of democracy legal, their relationship to the national polity would change dramatically. Substituting legal for extralegal methods would alter the meaning of federal monitoring of local electoral processes.

A legal foundation would also give the authoritarian systems of the South a veneer of national legitimacy. The 1880s had confirmed that the autonomy conferred on states by American federalism was an autonomy conditioned by political decorum. There were limits on how extralegal local authoritarianism could be in a nationally democratic country. As one author put it, "Any general acceptance of disenfranchisement required a show of democracy" (Valelly 2004, 125). In other words, local authoritarian rule had to be made institutionally compatible with the national democratic polity.

The effects of legal disenfranchising measures on voter turnout were significant. Kousser (1974, 240–242) reports that there were immediate effects in elections following their enactment. He calculates that in the elections following the passing of restrictive laws, the suppression of voter turnout across the region averaged 37 percent and the average drop in black voter

TABLE 2.1.
Black voter turnout in the southern former Confederate states

Year	1880	1892 (1st reform wave)	1900 (2nd reform wave)	1912
Turnout (%)	61	36	17	1.8

Source: Averages calculated from Redding and James (2001).

turnout was 62 percent. Matters would get worse for black voters as the years went by. In 1880, when voter suppression was pursued largely by illegal means, black voter turnout in the eleven former Confederate states averaged 61 percent. By 1912, when the legal architecture of disenfranchisement was well established, black voter turnout in the former Confederate states averaged 1.8 percent (Redding and James 2001, 141–158). It would remain at those levels for decades. Table 2.1 reveals the progression of disenfranchisement as the South's "institutional revolution" spread over time.

By the early 1900s the South's internal politics were "solid" indeed. The transition to legal authoritarian regimes had effectively insulated local polities from national competitive pressures. The national Republican Party receded from the local political landscape. Indeed, in his presidential inaugural address, given on March 4, 1909, Republican William Howard Taft confidently declaimed:

> There was a time when Northerners who sympathized with the negro in his necessary struggle for better conditions sought to give him the suffrage as a protection to enforce its exercise against prevailing sentiment of the South. The movement proved to be a failure. What remains is the fifteenth amendment in the Constitution and the right to have statutes of States specifying qualifications for electors subjected to the test of compliance with that amendment. *This is a great protection to the negro.*

Taft then moved logically to his view that "it is not the disposition or within the province of the Federal Government to interfere with the regulation by Southern States of their domestic affairs."[13]

Federal regulatory and legal threats against local political practices receded. As a result, in the words of one prominent historian, "the region lapsed into a period of political torpor more stultifying than any in its long history" (Woodward 1951, 106).

Transforming Federalism in the Twentieth Century: Establishing and Enforcing National Rights

Many factors were at work preparing the way for the civil rights era. These included demographic shifts (the movement to the North of African Americans and the political demands these new voters created), coalitional changes, shifts in the national partisan interests of the Democratic Party, and above all the growing mobilization and organizational capabilities of pro–civil rights groups (Morris 1984). The latter were galvanized by the Second World War (Kryder 2000; Sparrow 2011). For these factors to congeal as a wrecking ball against the walls of the Solid South, they needed a new federal system. Specifically, they needed a federal system that (a) unambiguously established the constitutionality of national rights, (b) defined those rights, and (c) gave the federal government the power to impose and enforce those rights in the states. Furthermore, the new federal system had to do this in the realms of civil and voting rights. This represented a significant political centralization of federalism, because it transferred key powers (definition and enforcement of rights) from the states to the federal government. This is a powerful metric for determining centralization.

The political centralization of federalism around the issue of rights had two key components. The first was jurisprudential, which involved the establishment and definition of national rights and of these national rights as racially egalitarian. This was expressed through federal court decisions. It was a cumulative process dating from important decisions of the 1890s to the 1950s. The second was legislative, which involved the enforcement of national rights. This was expressed in statutory action by Congress once the legal groundwork had been laid by the courts. Taken together, these formed the legal and statutory pillars of a new federal structure, one that shifted the definition and enforcement of voting rights from the states to the federal government.

The Quiet Jurisprudential Revolution: Establishing and Defining National Rights

The development of a new jurisprudence of national rights was an extended, circuitous, and often disjointed process. Over a long period of time the Supreme Court gradually asserted that specific articles in the Bill of Rights applied to the states—that is, they had to be guaranteed by the states regardless of whether states themselves had decided to guarantee them. The rights

contained in those articles were thus "nationalized," and the substantive content of specific rights protected by the states was defined by national, not state authorities. This process, known as "the nationalization of the Bill of Rights," began in the late nineteenth century and concluded in the 1960s (at which time eight of the ten articles of the Bill of Rights were nationalized).

Nationalization of the Bill of Rights was assisted in part by the unlikely contribution of the conservative Supreme Court in a series of judgments responding to business interests seeking greater security for property rights. In its 1897 decision in *Burlington and Quincy Railroad v. City of Chicago*, the Court overruled a longstanding decision from *Barron v. Baltimore* in 1833, thereby altering the states' rights doctrine with respect to private property.[14] The Court offered an expanded interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as substantive due process and laid the foundation for a new architecture of federalism that would eventually bring about the end of the Solid South.

Establishing the principle of "substantive" due process was a major theoretical breakthrough in American jurisprudence. The theoretical principle of "national" rights now had a much firmer legal foundation than it had possessed before. This legal principle would have major implications for the subsequent institutional centralization of American federalism. This centralization occurred in two stages, a judicial stage and a statutory stage. The first involved the transfer of power from state courts to federal courts. Once the principle of "substantive" due process was incorporated into American jurisprudence, the power of judicial review exercised by federal courts was expanded significantly. Judicial review of due process gave federal courts discretion to decide *what* substantive rights were so fundamental that they could not be abridged by state authorities or by state law, regardless of how flawless the procedures used to abridge those rights. And once courts had defined what substantive rights were to be protected, they were empowered to use judicial review to ensure compliance in state legislation. The decision in *Twining v. New Jersey* (1908) affirmed the idea that the due process clause of the Constitution protected "a fundamental principle of liberty and justice that inheres in the very idea of free government" and opened the way for the "incorporation" of other rights contained in the Bill of Rights.[15] A 1925 case, *Gitlow v. New York*, nationalized the First Amendment's protection of free speech and freedom of the press and was a landmark decision for the nationalization of key political rights.[16] By 1947 the nationalization of the First Amendment was complete—and the process leading up to this would have tremendous implications for the political systems of the southern

states. As Valelly (2004) underlines, this judicial development set the stage for the Court to provide a more robust defense of rights in the political process, including voting rights.

Thus in 1944 the Supreme Court expanded its legal fire to voting rights in a landmark case regarding the "all-white primary" in the state of Texas. *White primary* referred to the primary election in which candidates competed to be selected as their party's candidate in subsequent congressional or other elections, in which state laws permitted only whites to vote. In a 1921 decision the Court had concluded that primaries were beyond the remit of the Constitution.[17] In 1935 it had judged any bars to voting as private and beyond constitutional protection after the Texas legislature abrogated all its state laws about primaries.[18] The all-white primary ensued until 1944, when the Court, in *Smith v. Allwright*, declared it unconstitutional.[19] This case was seminal. It established the notion of "public function" as meaning that even if undertaken by private actors, certain activities—such as elections—have a key public dimension, which means their regulation can be held to constitutional standards; it delimited discrimination against groups of citizens such as African Americans, meaning that those engaging in discrimination had to do this on an individual basis—poll taxes or literacy tests could not be group applied; it also paved the way for civil and voting rights legislation and the ban on poll taxes enforced in the Twenty-fourth Amendment.

In what could arguably be viewed as a "big bang" moment for the civil rights era, the Supreme Court expanded its jurisdiction over voting rights cases regardless of whether the sources of the violation were private entities or state authorities.[20] Yet the big bang effects of the decision occurred not because it expressed a radical new doctrine of national rights or federal court powers but because, for the first time, the federal judiciary, from the Supreme Court to district federal courts, *closed ranks behind the decision* (Mickey 2008). Lower court after lower court ruled in accordance with the decision in numerous legal challenges from state authorities. As a result, the previous ebb and flow of decisions about the white primary and related voting issues was transformed into a unidirectional trend expanding the federal government's jurisdiction over voting rights in the states.

The Court's decision galvanized grassroots action, particularly legal mobilization by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other organizations that expanded the judicial battle over voting rights to other states. It helped confirm the NAACP's legal strategy as a pillar of overturning segregation, which culminated in *Brown v.*

Board of Education in 1954, in which the Court found "separate but equal" arrangements for education of black and white students unconstitutional. As a result, a series of Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions over the next several years reaffirmed the trend. The judicial centralization of federalism was a fact of life by mid-century, and the balance of court decisions shifted from cases about property rights to cases about individual rights (Epp 1998). It would be just a short step to statutory centralization via the establishment of national enforcement powers by the national Congress.

The Statutory Transformation of Federalism

Court decisions were foundations for legislation but lacked the same force and authority. It was two acts passed in the mid-1960s—the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965—that were crucial to democratizing the South and therefore the US political system. Indeed both pieces of legislation amounted to the most important federal laws since Reconstruction in empowering federal agencies—notably the US Department of Justice—to extensively investigate and prosecute discrimination and other abuses of citizens' rights.[21] The Civil Rights Act led to the enforcement of nondiscrimination, whereas the Voting Rights Act gave the federal government, overnight, remarkable powers in named states over all their actions with respect to voting, prompting a dramatic increase in African American registration and voting.

The journey to the mid-1960s was lengthy—spanning the presidencies of Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy—before President Lyndon Johnson drove through the two laws. In 1947 President Truman established a Committee on Civil Rights whose report documented extensive discrimination against African Americans throughout the United States under the "separate but equal" legal fiction. Truman's support of civil rights drove a rift in his Democratic Party before the 1948 presidential election, driving away a group of southern leaders called the Dixiecrats (Mickey 2015). Truman's victory in 1948 did not prove sufficiently strong to enact legislation, although his support of civil rights signaled a shift in the Democratic Party leadership's understanding of their coalitional bases: both the growth in the number of African American voters in the North and the increasing isolation of southern Democrats marked a long-term change to the party's coalition base.

Truman's Republican successor in the White House, President Eisenhower (1952–60), was not keen to push civil rights legislation. His previous record

and statements indicated his unwillingness to develop strong national laws or enforcement powers to get southern states to reform their discriminatory practices. The Republican Party's platform in 1952 made civil rights principally a state rather than a federal responsibility. The two parties' positions on federalism and states' rights were thus the obverse of their positions during the Reconstruction era. However, the febrile nature of civil rights outrages and the momentum of the civil rights reform movement made the Eisenhower administration's inactive stance unsustainable. In October 1957 Eisenhower had to deploy federal troops to impose desegregation in schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, though with weak results (King 2013). This uncomfortable decision generated some activism by the Eisenhower administration. It drafted and enacted civil rights acts in 1957 and 1960, though both had weak enforcement powers. The former created a Civil Rights Committee but lacked the enforcement powers sought by African Americans. The committee's report in 1959 recommending federal action in education, housing, and voting merely echoed the findings and recommendations of Truman's investigatory committee in 1947. The force of the 1960 act, already limited, was further diluted by the skillful organization and tactics of a Southern Democrat–Republican opposition group. President Kennedy's 1962 Civil Rights Bill was considerably weaker than that to which the Democrats had committed themselves in their 1960 party platform; it focused on the elimination of lynching and of literacy tests for voting. The bill failed.

Kennedy submitted tougher legislation to Congress in 1963, a response in large part demanded by the mounting civil rights movement. The House Judiciary Committee approved a bill, with bipartisan support, in October 1963 that was stronger than the White House draft. The bill provided federal support for the desegregation of public facilities such as playgrounds, swimming pools, and parks and for the establishment of an equal employment opportunity agency. Kennedy's death and Johnson's commitment to civil rights ensured that the bill was passed by the House in February 1964 by a vote of 290 to 130. The Senate filibustered for three months before a cloture motion succeeded on June 10, 1964. The final bill was signed on July 2.

Titles II and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act established federal administrative and judicial remedies to which racial minorities can appeal if they encounter discrimination. The Supreme Court has taken a broad view of these powers, judging their intent to be an end of discrimination in public and private life, including labor markets.[22] Affirmative action in the workplace and in university admissions was upheld in the decade after 1964 but steadily

diluted from the mid-1970s on. By 2013 the Court had fundamentally eroded affirmative action's constitutionality as a tool of university admissions.[23]

The Voting Rights Act responded directly to the civil rights movement's demands and to the violence of the years preceding it as reformers tried to get African American voters registered in the South. The law enforces national voting laws with enforcement powers overriding any rights of state justices. The act relies on the power in the Fifteenth Amendment. It proscribes voting discrimination and gives dramatic powers of enforcement to the federal government. Seven southern states were specifically listed and forbidden from using named tests or devices in determining voter eligibility. US marshals were deployed in those states as voter examiners to prevent whites from stopping or harassing African Americans voting. Section 5 of the act created a pre-clearance trigger, requiring any new legislation on voting at the state level in the seven named states to be approved in Washington, DC. It was approved by the Court in 1966.[24] Passed as a temporary law, the 1965 act was extended over the next thirty years and finally made permanent in 2006 (King and Smith 2011, 189–190). However, in 2013 the conservative-dominated Supreme Court ruled the pre-clearance process unconstitutional and ended it.[25]

Effects of the Political Centralization of Federalism on the Democratization of Southern States

We now turn to the subnational effects of federalism's political centralization. The first effect of the judicial centralization of federalism surrounding the *Smith v. Allwright* Supreme Court decision was the legal empowerment of civil rights organizations throughout the South. After the suppression of autonomous black civil society organizations in the post-Reconstruction era, new political organizations emerged slowly in the region, strengthened over time by expanding partisan and institutional linkages with pro–civil rights groups outside the region (Johnson 2010). Their power in the South, however, remained mostly latent as long as legal disenfranchisement by the states was sheltered by national law. With the *Smith v. Allwright* Texas decision local civil rights groups were handed a powerful legal sword to wield against the political order of disenfranchisement in the South. The NAACP was one organization that had developed an extensive local infrastructure in the region over previous decades and, bolstered by its linkages to national allies, was uniquely positioned to launch a regionwide legal campaign to tear asunder the white primary in southern states.[26] As state authorities throughout

the region scrambled to develop legal schemes to preserve the exclusion of black voters from Democratic primaries after *Allwright*, the NAACP launched a broad litigation strategy to counter them. Citing the Texas case, it generated federal court decisions in state after state that confirmed the ruling, expanded the federal government's powers over the states in the realm of voting, and effectively eliminated the white primary as a pillar of black disenfranchisement.

The empowerment of local civil rights organizations produced a subsequent effect: the expansion of participation by southern blacks in local electoral processes. Following the *Allwright* decision the NAACP and other associations launched major drives to register new voters and expand their access to the voting booth. As Valelly (2004, 169) writes, "Between 1944 and 1946 the NAACP's national leadership forcefully exploited the new possibilities. It called on "every branch to conduct a registration and voting drive." This call was answered by a wide spectrum of civil society organizations in the states. Independent organizations, churches, black business associations, and community associations joined in the regionwide effort to register black voters and take them to the polls.[27] The effects of these efforts on black voter participation over the next decade were striking. In the eleven states of the former Confederacy the average of the increases in voter registration for all states between 1940 and 1947 was 360 percent. By 1956 the cumulative average jump across the region was close to 600 percent.

As dramatic as these increases were for politics in the South, they fell far short of full democratization (King and Smith 2005). The starting points for these increases in voter registration were extremely low in the 1940s. This meant that, by 1956, despite the spike in voter registration, close to 70 percent of black citizens remained unregistered. The jurisprudential centralization of federalism, by limiting what states could actively do to legally disenfranchise their citizens, could do little to counter the effects of informal and de facto disenfranchisement by local power structures. This required the active enforcement of political rights in the states by the federal government—in effect, a second wave of political centralization.

The second wave came with the civil and voting rights acts of the mid-1960s. Passage and enactment of the Civil Rights Act (1964) and the Voting Rights Act (1965) were far from automatic. Most important, they rested on the efforts of the civil rights reform movement, whose wide program of nonviolent protests to win the right for African Americans to register and vote was met with savage violence and racist abuse in southern states. Na-

tional politicians including first President Kennedy and then his successor, Lyndon Johnson, acknowledged the need for new legislation in response to the crisis of racial inequality embroiling the country. But getting to the new laws was not automatic. Kennedy failed, and Johnson's success relied on responses to Kennedy's assassination and a new liberal generation of Democrat House members who could vote with moderate Republicans. The same coalition mobilized a year later—in 1965—to pass the Voting Rights Act, initially as a temporary measure but with robust powers of enforcement. In many ways the powers granted by the act to monitor voter registration and then the act of voting are the most dramatic expressions of American federal intervention relative to the states in domestic policy in the twentieth century. Neither law passed Congress uncontroversially or easily; each required diligent and adroit leadership to overcome persistent pro-segregationist protesters in the two chambers. Violence—presidential assassination, the mobilization of antireformer law enforcement officials, and growing urban unrest—was the indispensable background to the passage of the two new laws. These two laws set the framework for ending legal inequality and addressing the legacies of two centuries of oppression of African Americans. Much had to follow to translate legislation into genuine change—judicial battles over the Voting Rights Act, political and legal struggles over remedial legislation to develop race-targeted programs, and conflicts over how to get recalcitrant school districts and city housing authorities to dismantle segregation. After half a century there was significant progress in many areas, including the registration of voters and desegregation in public places (Hochschild 1999) but much less progress in others, such as housing and school desegregation.

Conclusion

The United States experienced two regionwide transitions to democracy in the southern states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In both cases, despite the drama of the "ground war" between local democratizers and defenders of the white supremacist order, national battles also raged over the recrafting of the federal political system. The outcomes of these battles were critical to how local conflicts would be structured and how power would be distributed between parties to the local conflict. As a case study of American political development, this chapter has revealed the intricate interconnections between changes in federalism and changes in the political regimes of southern states across periods of US history. As a study of

subnational democratization more generally, this chapter has suggested that subnational democratization processes are best understood if they are analyzed as subsystemic events.[28] They are inseparable from the national political systems of which they are a part. They are shaped by national politics, and they, in turn, shape democratization dynamics well beyond the boundaries of their subnational jurisdictions.[29]

Furthermore, subnational democratization fights are structured powerfully by national institutions that regulate relations between territorial jurisdictions and the relative powers of national and local levels of government. All territorial regimes, whether federal, unitary, or something in between, structure the political terrain on which subnational political conflicts are fought out. Their composition and change dynamics are critical in explaining subnational democratization outcomes.

In this chapter we have identified a more specific attribute of territorial regimes vital to subnational democratization: how they distribute the power to define and enforce political rights between national and subnational governments. The decentralization of these powers will produce a varied territorial pattern in the effective exercise of democratic rights by citizens across the country. In some jurisdictions it may foster innovation and an expansive provision of democratic rights unconstrained by more limited national standards. However, American history tells us that decentralization is instrumental to the abridgement of fundamental democratic rights. In the American case it took a significant centralization of powers of rights enforcement and the establishment of a nationally uniform standard of democracy to break the authoritarian structures of the Solid South and bring a modicum of democracy to many of its politically beleaguered inhabitants. Furthermore, in this chapter we have focused on the most basic of democratic rights: the right to vote. Comparative and contemporary studies of subnational democratization will be well served by exploring the effects of the decentralization of rights definition and enforcement on a broader range of political and electoral processes in subnational jurisdictions.

NOTES

1. We build on many previous major scholarly contributions about democratization in the United States, including those of Smith (1997), Keyssar (2000), Valelly (2004), Johnson (2007), Mickey (2008, 2015), Gerstle (2009), King et al. (2009), and Gibson (2012).
2. King (2007). Of course these facilities were racially separate but wholly unequal.
3. 32 US (7 Pet.) 243. See Kutler (1969).

4. Richard Valelly (2004) sees the political struggles of Reconstruction and the civil rights era as involving sequential phases of "party building" and "jurisprudence building."

5. The latter notion is advanced by Valelly (2004), the former by Eric Foner (1988).

6. Our emphasis.

7. Our emphasis.

8. Twenty blacks were elected to the US House of Representatives between 1869 and 1901, and two were elected to the US Senate (both from Mississippi). In total, it is estimated that two thousand blacks served in elective offices at the local and national levels. For information on black office holding see Swain (1993), Foner (1996), and Seip (1983).

9. For information on this period of state constitutional reform, see Scroggs (1961), Franklin (1970), and Hume (1977 and 1982, 129–154); Valelly (2004, 80–81) also provides a very instructive summary list of policy and constitutional innovations during this period.

10. Our emphasis.

11. *United States v. Cruikshank*, 92 US 542 (1875); *United States v. Reese*, 92 US 214 (1876).

12. A local observer described in vivid terms the methods used in a Mississippi election: "Independent candidates were run out of their counties, beaten, or murdered. . . . Ballot boxes were stuffed, fraudulent returns were made, and thousands of opposition votes were thrown out on technicalities. With mock solemnity, newspapers reported that boxes containing anti-Democratic majorities had been eaten by mules or horses." Quoted in Woodward (1951, 105).

13. Our emphasis.

14. *Burlington and Quincy Railroad*, 166 US 226 (1897). The decision asserted that state governments were compelled to obey the Fifth Amendment and pay "just compensation" when taking private property.

15. *Twining*, 211 US 78 (1908).

16. *Gitlow*, 268 US 652 (1925). See Cortner (1985). For a full account, see Cortner (1981).

17. *Newberry v. United States*, 256 US 232 (1921).

18. *Grovey v. Townsend*, 295 US 45 (1935). The justices knew that in practice black voters seeking to register and vote in a Texas Democratic Party primary would be forcefully excluded.

19. *Smith v. Allwright*, 321 US 649 (1944).

20. Criminal action by individuals against other individuals is a matter of the "police" powers of the states and beyond the jurisdiction of the federal government. For decades this was used to justify federal inaction against violations of the civil and political rights of blacks if these violations were deemed to have been committed by private entities or individuals (affirmed strongly by *Cruikshank*). *Smith*, 321 US at 649, provided a liberal interpretation of whether primaries were the affairs of private entities or of states.

21. That they were not sufficient in scope or powers has been revealed in numerous subsequent studies of US racial inequality in such areas as housing, education, employment, and income. See King and Smith (2011). What the two laws did accomplish was the establishment of equal rights of citizenship, the prerequisite for democracy identified at the beginning of the chapter.

22. The Court ruled that segregation was unlawful for restaurants, parks, and swimming pools in *Katzenbach v. McClung*, 379 US 294 (1964); *Daniel v. Paul*, 395 US 298 (1969); and *Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association*, 410 US 431, 93 S.Ct. 1080, 35 L.Ed.2d 412 (1973), respectively.

23. *Fisher v. University of Texas et al.*, 631 F. 3d 213 (2013).

24. *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, 383 US 301 (1966).

25. *Shelby County, Alabama, v. Holder*, 679 F. 3d 848 (2013). Beyond our scope here, this decision may prove fatal to the maintenance of democratization in the United States, as explained by King and Smith in their forthcoming article.

26. Several other civil rights organizations in the region participated in this struggle, but, as Richard Valelly (2004, 161) notes, "The task of killing off the White Primary fell . . . to the NAACP."

27. For example, in Georgia, where only 20,000 blacks were registered to vote, the "All Citizens Registration Committee" in Atlanta began organizing after the *Allwright* decision. By 1947 it had registered 125,000 new voters. See Davidson and Grofman (1994, 70).

28. Mickey (2015) makes this analytical point, too, in *Paths Out of Dixie*, his magisterial account of how three authoritarian enclaves (Georgia, South Carolina, and Mississippi) sustained themselves within the nominally democratic US and were eventually democratized as part of the democratization of the South. As he underlines, the presence of these undemocratic and racist enclaves meant that the US polity as a whole remained undemocratic.

29. In our study of the United States, due to space limitations, we have focused on the importance of national struggles over federalism with regard to the political regimes of southern states. We have paid little attention to the effects of struggles over southern democratization on American democracy as a whole. The collapse of the Reconstruction, for instance, played a vital role in supporting and institutionalizing white supremacy regimes throughout the country, and although many Reconstruction-era measures were passed with the southern states in mind, they were also critical to the exercise of the democratic rights of citizens in nonsouthern states. Furthermore, the twentieth-century civil rights struggles, although in great measure targeting southern states, also brought about a significant expansion of democratic rights in northern and western states. The stakes for southern authoritarianism and democratization, therefore, transcended southern boundaries.

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Subnational Democratization in India

The Role of Colonial Competition and Central Intervention

MAYA TUDOR AND ADAM ZIEGFELD

Upon achieving independence in August 1947, India quickly became the world's most populous democracy. Under the leadership of its independence-movement Indian National Congress (or Congress), the country ratified a democratic federal constitution in 1950 and held free and fair elections in 1951–52. Because elections in its states were held at the same time, some would suggest that subnational democratization in India occurred concurrently.[1] Other scholars would contend that democratization did not occur until Congress lost an election and peacefully handed over power to another party (Diamond 1999, 11; Przeworksi et al. 2000, 23–28). By the latter definition, in which party alternation constitutes a core element of democratization, India democratized nationally in 1977. At a state level, however, Indian states witnessed substantial variation in subnational democratization because they varied considerably in when non-Congress governments first came to power, ranging from 1957 to 1983.[2] Even when party alternation first occurred, the non-Congress governments that came to power were often unstable and short-lived; they were hardly viable alternatives to the country's dominant party, Congress. Stable alternatives—those that served a full term in office—tended to come to power much later. Here, too, Indian states exhibit considerable variation, as evidenced in table 3.1. The first non-Congress government to serve a full term came to power in 1967 in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, whereas in the northern state of Madhya Pradesh, an opposition government that would go on to serve a full term did not come to power until 2003. We seek to explain this variation in the consolidation of subnational democratization across India's states.

In this chapter we argue that India's divergent subnational democratization patterns can be explained by, first, the historically specific patterns of regional opposition under colonial rule and, second, the interventionist tendencies

TABLE 3.1.
Subnational democratization in India's major states

Democratizers	Year that first opposition government took power	Year that first *full-term* opposition government took power
Early democratizers		
Kerala	1957	1987
Tamil Nadu	1967	1967
West Bengal	1967	1977
Later democratizers		
Haryana	1967	1987
Bihar	1967	1990
Odisha	1967	1990
Punjab	1967	1997
Uttar Pradesh	1967	1997
Madhya Pradesh	1967	2003
Gujarat	1975	1998
Rajasthan	1977	1993
Maharashtra	1978	1995
Assam	1978	1996
Andhra Pradesh	1983	1985
Karnataka	1983	1985
Authoritarian enclave		
Jammu & Kashmir	2002[a]	2002[a]

Source: Hardgrave and Kochanek (2008, 186).

[a] Though the first legislative assembly elections in 1957 brought an opposition National Conference government to power, these elections were widely believed to have been rigged. After 1964, the National Conference was closely aligned with Congress (Tremblay 1995, 90). The first free and fair election was in 1977, when the Congress-aligned National Conference came to power and remained in office for a full term, but this could not genuinely be termed an opposition government. This brief democratic interlude was followed by another authoritarian period with unfair elections. Because the National Conference was allied with Congress, the first opposition government elected under conditions of genuine competition did not come to power until 2002, when the opposition People's Democratic Party (PDP) assumed power.

of the national government. In other words, opposition parties most successfully challenged Congress's grip on state power after independence, when such parties drew on ideational and organizational resources developed during the pre-independence period. Even when state-level opposition emerged early, central governments often used constitutionally specified means of undermining them. Where electoral margins were thin enough to plausibly warrant intervention or where there was a national security imperative to do so, the Congress-led central government regularly intervened in such a way as to delay the emergence of a full-term opposition government.

We substantiate this argument through case studies of four Indian states that exhibit the kinds of variation that best control for most probable alternative explanations: type of colonial rule, geographic location, and size. Our four states, West Bengal, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Jammu and Kashmir (often referred to as simply Kashmir), are not southern states, which are widely thought to have seen political competition emerge earlier because of

anti-Brahmin caste mobilization (Frankel and Rao 1990). They are also larger states, with populations of more than ten million people. To account for differences in political competition allowed under colonial rule, we explore two states that were formerly ruled directly by the British (Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal), as well as two states ruled indirectly by the British through indigenous monarchs (Rajasthan and Kashmir). Through these four case studies, we make two claims.

The first claim is that pre-independence patterns of political competition, in particular the cohesiveness and organizational strength of opposition groups in the colonial period, critically explain the post-independence emergence of opposition governments across Indian states. Upon independence, Congress's electoral dominance emerged as a consistent feature across almost every major state. The first-past-the-post electoral system inherited from the British allowed Congress to maintain its dominant electoral position with relatively modest vote shares as long as it faced a fractious and divided opposition. Although Congress's dominance was the norm across states, opposition parties nonetheless drew on differential organizational and ideational resources. Whereas some opposition movements possessed a history of ideological and organizational resources, others did not. This history conditioned when opposition governments would emerge.

Our argument underscores the importance of historical patterns of political competition in conditioning the timing of an effective opposition state government. The presence or absence of opposition resources, both organizational and ideational, is not simply a function of whether elections took place during the colonial period but instead reflects the historical specificities of political organizations in each state during colonial rule. Of our two cases in which elections were held under colonial rule, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, a well-organized and ideologically coherent opposition to Congress arose only in West Bengal. During the colonial period, a critical mass of educated elites emerged in West Bengal that was ideationally and organizationally committed to Marxism. Though this opposition initially disavowed electoral politics, its ideational and organizational resources positioned it well to successfully challenge Congress's dominance in the state. By contrast, Congress's primary opposition in Uttar Pradesh before independence was the Muslim League, an organization that effectively disappeared after India's partition. These differences, we argue, are critical to explaining why a full-term opposition government emerged in West Bengal far earlier than it did in Uttar Pradesh.

Our second claim is that central government intervention, though within the letter of constitutional law, generally impeded the onset of opposition governments in India, though in some cases more than others. In all of our cases, intervention by Congress-led national governments likely helped regional Congress governments to remain in power longer than they otherwise would have. The invocation of President's Rule, detailed in Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, enables the president of India to "assume to himself any or all functions of the state" in an event of "constitutional failure of state machinery." The strongest advocate for this constitutional article on India's constitutional drafting committee, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, foresaw that this article would be necessary for national unity (a unity that, in view of the partition of colonial India, was clearly in question in 1947), but that this provision would be rarely invoked (Pylee 1965, 643). Instead, not only was central intervention frequent, but its incidence also increased as Congress's grip on power eroded. Between 1951 and 1966, President's Rule was imposed only ten times. Between 1967 and 1984, it was imposed seventy-two times (Chhibber 2001, 97). As we discuss later, central government intervention was at its most extreme in Jammu and Kashmir, where a perceived national security imperative led to excessive central interference in state politics and delayed the onset of genuinely competitive elections. But central intervention on behalf of Congress was also frequent in West Bengal and to a lesser degree in Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. Thus, in keeping with the theme of this

TABLE 3.2.
Application of the argument to the case-study states

	West Bengal	Rajasthan	Uttar Pradesh	Jammu and Kashmir
Organized opposition with postindependence continuity	yes	yes	no	no
Central intervention	yes	yes	yes	yes
Date of first opposition government	1967	1977	1967	2002[a]
Date of first *full-term* opposition government	1977	1993	1997	2002[a]

[a]Though the first legislative assembly elections in 1957 brought an opposition National Conference government to power, these elections were widely believed to have been rigged. After 1964, the National Conference was closely aligned with Congress (Tremblay 1995, 90). The first free and fair election was in 1977, when the Congress-aligned National Conference came to power and remained in office for a full term, but this could not genuinely be termed an opposition government. This brief democratic interlude was followed by another authoritarian period with unfair elections. Because the National Conference was allied with Congress, the first opposition government elected under conditions of genuine competition did not come to power until 2002, when the opposition People's Democratic Party (PDP) assumed power.




Figure 3.1. India. Our case study states are indicated as *A,* West Bengal, *B,* Rajasthan, *C,* Uttar Pradesh, and *D,* Jammu and Kashmir. Source: Nations Online Project.

volume, India's subnational democratization trajectory reflects pockets of illiberal practices that effectively obstructed the genuine contestation embedded within broadly democratic institutions. Table 3.2 summarizes how our claims play out in the four case-study states, and figure 3.1 shows where the case-study states are located in India.

We develop our claims in the following seven sections. The first section provides a broad introduction to India's historical democratization. The second explains our rationale for operationalizing subnational democratization

through the emergence of viable political oppositions in Indian states. The next four sections trace the importance of colonially rooted political opposition and central intervention to explaining the emergence of opposition governments in West Bengal, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Jammu and Kashmir. The penultimate section describes the contemporary state of subnational democratization in India, and a final section concludes the chapter.

Democratization in India: The National Story

British India stretched across what is today India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. In practice, British India was a patchwork of two kinds of governance: direct rule, in which the British directly established colonial institutions of governance, and princely rule, in which semisovereign rulers maintained their rights to govern under the ultimate suzerainty of the British. Events during colonial rule had important consequences for the timing of an opposition (i.e., non-Congress) government by determining whether political competition was well established when India's dominant political party, Congress, came to national power upon independence.

In the late nineteenth century, Congress was an urban, upper-caste movement that began to take up the cause of limited self-representation within the colonial government. Over the first half of the twentieth century, this movement transformed itself into a national independence movement that contested colonially sponsored elections and later governed an independent India for several decades. By the terms of the 1919 colonial reforms, national politics effectively became the sum of politics in British India's eleven provinces, the forerunners to Indian states. In each of these provinces, the combination of separate electorates for a variety of minority communities (such as Muslims), a rural bias in the electoral system, a number of nominated legislative seats, and an extremely limited franchise enabled the colonial government and its allies to effectively retain control of what the colonial regime euphemistically called representative government.

The British colonial government held two sets of pre-independence elections in direct-rule states, in 1936–37 and in 1945–46.[3] Though these elections revealed a relatively broad base of support for Congress, they featured relatively little genuine competition.[4] In many provinces, Congress faced either token opposition or none at all. In provinces with a substantial Muslim population, having separate electorates (whereby a certain number of seats were allocated to the Muslim community and only Muslims were eligible

for these seats) ensured that Congress did not actually compete against the main Muslim-dominated parties for many seats. Meanwhile, the princely states did not hold elections before independence.

Upon independence in 1947, formal democratization occurred across India, British direct-ruled and princely alike. The Constituent Assembly of India ratified a constitution that guaranteed universal adult suffrage in 1950, and the country's first national elections took place in late 1951 and early 1952 under universal franchise. For the first twenty years after independence, Congress dominated both state and national elections, winning five consecutive national elections (1951–52, 1957, 1962, 1967, and 1971) and nearly all state-level elections prior to 1967. By the late 1960s, however, Congress's electoral dominance had begun to wane, and the party system slowly evolved from a dominant-party system to a competitive multiparty system. Some Indian states saw an opposition government come to power and remain in office for a full term much earlier than others. It is this variation in the emergence of viable opposition governments that this chapter seeks to explain.

In 1975 a brief authoritarian interlude in Indian politics ironically hastened democratic consolidation at the national level. In June 1975, at the behest of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India's president declared a national Emergency, allowing the central government to suspend an array of civil and political freedoms. The government censored the press, imprisoned a large number of opposition politicians, and failed to hold scheduled state and national elections. This infringement upon democracy, which lasted until March 1977, was India's one and only authoritarian interlude since independence.[5] Shortly after the Emergency's end, Congress lost national power for the first time.

The 1977 election, therefore, heralded the end of one-party dominance in India. The Janata Party formed the government from 1977 to 1979. In 1979 the Janata Party split, with one faction of the party exiting to form the Janata Party (Secular). The Janata Party (Secular) then formed the government from 1979 to 1980 with the outside support of Congress. Although the government was comprised entirely of non-Congress ministers, it survived at the pleasure of Congress. After Congress withdrew its support in late 1979, it then won the new elections held in 1980. Despite the relative brevity of this non-Congress interregnum, by 1980, when Congress returned to power, India had proven itself a consolidated democracy; both an incumbent and an opposition party had constitutionally won elections and then peacefully ceded power.

Defining Subnational Democratization: Full-term Opposition Governments

We define subnational democratization as an alternation in power at the state level in which an opposition (in India, non-Congress or Congress-allied) government serves a full term in office. This understanding of democratization is consistent with that of scholars of democratization, who do not consider a country to have fully democratized until it experiences at least one alternation in power. In other words, a country is not considered an established democracy until the party initially in power has peacefully conceded power to an opposing party. However, this definition also goes a step further in requiring a viable alternative to the party originally in power. Thus, although throughout this chapter we refer simply to subnational democratization, our relatively "thick" definition of subnational democratization is akin to the *consolidation* of subnational democratization.

This definition of democratization is appropriate in the Indian context for a variety of reasons. Based on an electoral or minimalist definition of democracy, India has seen very little subnational variation in democratization outcomes. Prior to national independence, some states experienced elections under a highly restricted franchise, whereas others did not. At independence, free and fair elections were held virtually everywhere. Although democratization did not occur immediately in Kashmir for reasons we elaborate later, for the overwhelming majority of Indians—upwards of 95 percent—independence was accompanied by the advent of free and fair elections at both national and subnational (state) levels. We thus adopt a somewhat thicker, but still procedural, notion of democratization that focuses on the substantive alternation in state-level power, namely the emergence of the first full-term opposition government.[6]

Our conceptualization of subnational democracy focuses on a narrow set of political organizations and their leaders. Electoral competition between a handful of elites, some might argue, hardly constitutes a substantive democracy. But the existence of political elites is almost certainly inevitable in all modern societies relying on mass political organization.[7] Thus the relevant question for our purposes is not whether a small elite dominates politics but whether governing elites allow political competitors to organize and potentially access genuine political power. Indeed, as Jaffrelot (2003) has argued, the institutionalization of procedural democracy in India was a

necessary requisite to the gradual but appreciable socioeconomic democratization of India's governing classes.

Conceptualizing subnational democratization as alternation in power makes it a particularly useful lens through which to view Indian democratization for two reasons. First, India has experienced considerable variation in this regard. Its first elections in 1951–52 quickly established Congress as the dominant force in virtually every state. Every state in India had opposition parties at independence, but the states varied in terms of how successful these alternative parties were in challenging Congress rule. Second, unlike many highly centralized federations, Indian states are important political entities with significant power over a wide array of policy domains that impinge heavily on the everyday lives of citizens, including education, health, sanitation, and law and order. From a normative perspective, democratization at the state level is crucially important as a way for citizens to hold politicians accountable at this important level of government. In addition, in a developing country like India, where the allocation of public goods is often politicized and the public demand for state services outstrips supply, the distribution of public goods and state services is deeply influenced by who governs. Without a viable governing alternative to the dominant party—that is, without substantive democratization at the state level—there is a risk that access to the state will become restricted to those who support the dominant party. Given the proximity of state government to everyday life, state-level or subnational democratization is arguably just as important for citizens' well-being as national democratization.

We therefore understand subnational democratization in the Indian context to have occurred in the year when the first full-term opposition party assumed power. Though the standard political science definition of democratization as alternation focuses on the first peaceful transfer of power to political opposition, such a definition is problematic when applied to the subnational level in the Indian context. This is because there is a surprisingly weak correlation between the first time an opposition government assumes the reins of governing power and the first time that an opposition government serves a full term in office, with the latter usually occurring much later than the former. Many opposition governments failed to serve their full terms either because the central government intervened under President's Rule, frequently dismissing state-level governments, or because opposition governments represented coalitions of all stripes of Congress

opponents, many of whom shared little in terms of shared interests or policy platforms. Consequently, these latter governments often quickly fell apart once in office. Thus the first transfer of power does not always indicate that a viable opposition had emerged.

When subnational democratization is operationalized as alternation, as indicated in table 3.1, we observe three broad empirical outcomes in India. The first pattern is early democratization, whereby opposition governments came to power relatively early in India's post-independence history and rapidly established themselves as viable alternatives to the dominant party and capable of remaining in power. We argue that this was most likely where political competition during the colonial period provided postindependence opposition parties with considerable organizational and ideational resources. The early democratizers were Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal, where opposition governments completed full terms relatively early.[8] The second pattern is late democratization. The late emergence of a credible alternative to Congress rule occurred in states where oppositions had few ideological or organizational resources (Uttar Pradesh) or where central intervention impeded opposition attempts to win power (Rajasthan). A third and rare trajectory is that of Jammu and Kashmir, an authoritarian enclave where the central government for many years prevented free and fair democratic competition from taking place. Many of India's small northeastern states would also fall into this category, because some have experienced prolonged insurgencies and been dogged by claims of election irregularities. The next four sections turn to the case studies, which illustrate how colonial patterns of competition and central intervention drove differential patterns of subnational competition.

West Bengal: Early Democratization Fueled by Colonial Opposition

Located in eastern India along the country's border with Bangladesh, West Bengal was one of India's three early democratizers. As in many states that would prove to be late democratizers, an opposition government first came to power in West Bengal for a brief and chaotic interlude following state elections in 1967. Similarly, as in many late democratizers, the 1977 state elections saw Congress lose power. But whereas opposition governments in Bihar, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh were short-lived, the 1977 opposition government in West Bengal completed its term in office and ushered in a period of stable, long-lived opposition rule.

West Bengal differed most critically from India's later democratizing states in that it possessed an unusually ideologically and organizationally robust opposition movement during the colonial period. As in much of India, Congress's main electoral rival in West Bengal was the Muslim League. When the Muslim League effectively disappeared throughout India after partition, many Indian states were left entirely without an organized, experienced opposition to Congress. But in West Bengal, even though the Muslim League was the largest electoral rival to Congress during the late colonial period, many Marxist organizations had maintained an organized, active opposition to Congress, albeit one that was not primarily concerned with contesting elections.

From independence onward, Congress's main opposition came from a collection of Marxist parties, the largest of which was the Communist Party of India (CPI), and later, after the CPI's 1964 split, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM). Other important Marxist parties included the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) and the Forward Bloc. As the headquarters of early British colonialism in India, colonial Bengal developed a large class of elites educated in English much earlier than did other parts of India.[9] As a consequence, the province had an unusually sizable population (thought still small in absolute terms) exposed to Marxism. Marxism was particularly appealing to a group known as the *bhadralok* (or "gentleman"), who were well educated but peripheral to the colonial power structure (Franda 1971, 12).

What would eventually become the core of West Bengal's parliamentary opposition began with violent revolutionary movements with leftist inclinations, such as those of the Anushilan Samithi and Jugantar. Elements of these movements later found their way into Marxist-inspired parties that were ambivalent about participation in parliamentary politics. Just prior to independence, the CPI's peasant wing launched an agitation demanding that share-croppers provide owners with a smaller share of their crops—a movement that ultimately turned violent—and a peasant rebellion in the south Indian region of Telangana (then part of the state of Hyderabad). With the failure of the Telangana rebellion, the communists committed themselves to parliamentary politics.

Once the Marxists had committed themselves to democracy, these parties drew upon a deep reservoir of organizational capacity to mobilize voters. All the major Marxist parties had been founded prior to independence, with the CPI officially dating back to the 1920s and some of the smaller parties tracing their roots to the early part of the twentieth century. Thus,

when it came time to field candidates in elections and mobilize activists on behalf of these candidates, the Marxist parties in West Bengal did not need to create an organization afresh. Instead, such parties could draw on a sizable cadre of full-time workers, which differentiated them from many of the other opposition parties that were poorly organized collections of elites that had little organizational presence outside of election time.[10]

In addition to their organizational capacity, Marxist parties possessed an ideological commitment to mass mobilization that ultimately facilitated electoral success. Marxist mobilization of labor unions, both in cities and on tea plantations, as well as peasant associations, distinguished them from other non-Congress parties populated largely either by urban-based elites with little contact with the rural masses or by landlords who won votes on the basis of coercion or relations of historical dependence. After partition, when West Bengal—Kolkata in particular—received large numbers of refugees from East Pakistan and then again after the Bangladeshi war of independence, the CPI and CPM in particular were in a position to aid in the rehabilitation of refugees. As a consequence, refugees from East Bengal (that is, contemporary Bangladesh) eventually constituted one of the CPM's major constituencies (Bose 2013, 117–118).

The Marxists' history of prior organization and mass mobilization as well as their ideological commitment to mass engagement positioned them well to thrive in the early postcolonial decades. Initially, the Marxists' electoral results in West Bengal were little better than those of other major opposition parties in India. The Marxist parties combined to win just shy of 19 percent of the vote in state elections in 1951.[11] But the Marxists, and the CPI (later CPM) in particular, grew rapidly during the next elections. Whereas many opposition parties throughout India had trouble expanding their bases (Bharatiya Jana Sangh), expanded quickly only to collapse (Swatantra), or slowly lost support over time (the various socialist parties), the CPI and later CPM were—along with the DMK in Tamil Nadu, another early democratizer—one of the few opposition parties that quickly and durably grew in the 1950s and 1960s. In states where there were multiple poorly organized parties with few historical roots, the opposition often remained fragmented, with parties briefly rising to prominence and then collapsing through opportunistic defections. By 1962, the Marxist parties had increased their combined vote share to nearly a third of the vote. This meteoric rise was similar to that of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in Tamil Nadu, another party with long historical roots but limited experience with electoral contestation.

Initially, one of the Marxists' main obstacles to electoral growth was their urban focus. Given the communist aim of radical transformation through the mobilization of the urban proletariat, the CPI's early emphasis in West Bengal was largely on urban areas. Exceptions to this pattern were found in some of the state's northern areas, where the RSP, and the Forward Bloc in particular, had strong presences on tea plantations. Mostly, however, the Marxists' strength was concentrated in the city of Kolkata and the surrounding industrial areas. In 1967, the Marxist parties won nearly 40 percent of the vote in and around Kolkata, the state's urban industrial heartland, as opposed to less than 25 percent in the rest of the state.[12] By the late 1960s, however, the Marxists, and the CPM especially, began to more consciously focus on rural West Bengal, in terms of both recruiting party cadres and ultimately winning votes (Kohli 1983, 789–790).

Once West Bengal's Marxists marshaled their organizational and ideational resources to mobilize large groups of poor rural voters, they quickly made inroads into Congress's grip on power. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, when a series of unstable non-Congress governments held power, the CPM was especially effective in using its ministerial positions to expand its base. After the 1969 election, the CPM gained control of several key ministries—Home, Labor, and Land and Land Revenue—relevant to policies related to both organized labor and the peasantry (Franda 1971, 183). Under CPM ministers, the state government initiated a program of land reform and tacitly allowed peasants to forcibly occupy land being held unlawfully by large landowners (Franda 1971, 186–190). The CPM also expanded its union presence and refused to intervene to quell labor militancy (Franda 1971, 194–196). As a result, the Marxists saw their vote share rise sharply in the late 1960s and early 1970s at a time when opposition parties across other states were seeing few gains.

Though the Marxists' vote shares declined sharply in the 1972 election, these elections were widely believed to have been fraudulent. And indeed, by the next election in 1977, their vote share in Kolkata and the surrounding districts rebounded, whereas that in the rest of the state reached unprecedented levels. The CPM-led Left Front (a coalition of Marxist parties) subsequently established electoral hegemony in the state and maintained it for decades thereafter. These parties' dramatic growth in the 1960s and 1970s, which set the stage for this later electoral success, occurred because of well-organized party infrastructures that came to postindependence elections with years of experience in mass mobilization. Had West Bengal been bereft

of an opposition with an organizational foundation in the pre-independence period, it is highly unlikely that Congress's opposition could have experienced such rapid growth. Thus the case of West Bengal highlights the importance of colonial legacies in laying the groundwork for opposition to Congress.

Although West Bengal was among India's relatively early democratizing states, the state also highlights the tendency of central intervention to delay the onset of subnational democratization. The central government intervened in most states during the late 1960s and 1970s in ways that ultimately benefited Congress, but its intervention was especially frequent in West Bengal. And whereas central intervention in many other states probably hastened the collapse of opposition governments that were doomed under any circumstances, Congress's intervention in West Bengal likely delayed subnational democratization there by several years.

The frequent imposition of President's Rule in the late 1960s and early 1970s was undoubtedly driven in part by the pathologies of the opposition and its inability to form a cohesive alternative to Congress. However, frequent imposition of President's Rule (in 1968–69, 1970–71, and 1971–72) was designed to aid Congress. Following the 1967 election, Congress was far and away the largest party in the West Bengal state legislature, though still short of a majority. The opposition formed a government, but tensions were particularly high between the two largest parties, the Bangla Congress (a recent breakaway from Congress) and the CPM. When the Bangla Congress's chief minister—the state-level analog of the prime minister—eventually resigned, his replacement was a chief minister whose government relied on Congress for support. This ministry lasted less than four months before President's Rule was imposed and fresh elections were held in which Congress expected to prevail (Mallick 1994, 114). The imposition of President's Rule in 1968 not only cut short the opposition's tenure in office but also, in facilitating another election, gave Congress a chance to win a legislative majority.

Yet, following the 1969 election, an opposition coalition again took power, with the Bangla Congress occupying the chief minister's post but the CPM holding most other key positions in the ministry. Although Congress won a virtually identical vote share to that it had won in the previous election, it fell well short of a majority, thereby weakening Congress's position in the legislature and diminishing its hopes of forming a government. President's Rule imposed in 1970 thus afforded Congress a way out of this disad-

vantageous position. In 1971, Congress's seat share went up, even though its vote share declined dramatically. President's Rule imposed in 1971 and the ensuing election in 1972 gave Congress yet another chance to win the majority that it craved.

In the 1972 election—West Bengal's fourth in six years—the repeated use of President's Rule followed by fresh elections finally succeeded in delivering Congress a stable legislative majority and keeping the opposition at bay. In those elections, Congress won a large legislative majority (216 of 280 seats) with its highest vote share ever, more than 49 percent. In total, the Marxist parties saw their overall vote share decline sharply, while Congress' vote share increased by a staggering 20 percent. However, the CPM widely decried these elections as having been rigged in Congress' favor (Mukhopadhyay 1985, 96–97; Kolhi 1990, 283; Bose 2013, 129–130), a contention supported by some scholars (Mallick 1994, 134). Given the instability over the previous several years, it is certainly possible that Congress would have won the 1972 elections no matter the circumstances, though it is also quite possible that, had the election been fair, an opposition government would have formed in 1972 (Mallick 1994, 138).[13] Although counterfactuals are difficult to prove, it seems plausible that central intervention significantly delayed democratization in West Bengal.

Rajasthan: An Incipient Opposition Thwarted by Central Intervention

Located in northern India along the border with Pakistan, Rajasthan is a state whose first full-term opposition government came to power only in 1993. Rajasthan's incipient opposition in the 1950s and 1960s was a promising alternative to Congress, but frequent intervention by the central government quashed any of its attempts to gain and retain power. Unlike that in West Bengal, Rajasthan's opposition did not draw on organizational or mobilizational resources from colonial political activity. Instead, the state's opposition coalesced around caste differences.

Comprised of former princely states, Rajasthan had almost no experience with direct British rule. Princely rule in Rajasthan left two important legacies. The first was a history of nationalist and antiprincely political activity, which Congress inherited almost in its entirety. Congress's cooptation of nearly all of Rajasthan's organized political activity ensured that an opposition could not arise around a prior political organization, as in West Bengal; it would have to emerge de novo. Second, the princely period

produced a polarized caste structure that pitted the main landowning caste, the Rajputs, against the Jats, a numerically large caste, many of whose members tilled Rajput-owned land. When Congress enacted land reform after independence, it effectively took sides in this rivalry, alienating the Rajput political class.

Though no political parties were permitted to organize in princely Rajasthan, two types of political organizations nevertheless emerged.[14] The first were *praja mandals*, urban associations that agitated for greater political freedom and additional investment in public welfare and infrastructure. The *praja mandals* were loosely tied to the wider Indian nationalist movement and favored independence and integration of the princely states into a new India. Most members were either Brahmins or Banias (traders). The second type of organization was the *kisan sabhas*, peasant organizations that demanded land reform and were overwhelmingly populated by Jats.

At independence, Congress absorbed most of the *praja mandals* and *kisan sabhas*, providing Congress with a strong electoral support base among Brahmins, Banias, and Jats, though only modest organizational resources because both types of organizations dated only to the 1930s at the earliest. Additionally, because these organizations emerged separately in each of Rajasthan's more than twenty princely states, Congress's new organizational infrastructure was highly fragmented. Nevertheless, as unorganized as Congress was, its opposition was in worse shape, because Congress had absorbed nearly all of the prior organizational resources and the politically active class from the colonial era. As in many other Indian states, any opposition to Congress would have to arise without the benefit of much prior organization or membership.

Over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, the Rajput leadership in Rajasthan—many of them former princes and large landlords—began to challenge Congress. This challenge took three forms, the Ram Rajya Parishad (RRP) in the 1950s, Swatantra in the 1960s, and uncoordinated independent candidates throughout both decades. Together these groups won around 40 percent of the vote from independence through the late 1960s. Of course, not all independent candidates were anti-Congress Rajputs. But even if a third to a half of the independent vote consisted of votes for anti-Congress Rajputs, when combined with the RRP and Swatantra votes, this amounted to 20 to 30 percent of the vote for political forces led by Rajputs.[15] A fourth group, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), intermittently fielded Rajput landowners,

known as *jagirdars*, drawing substantial popular support from these candidates (Kamal 1969, 159–160).

Congress' opposition in Rajasthan was actually a more promising alternative than the oppositions in many other states because it was, by comparison, both numerically and ideologically less fragmented. In Rajasthan, the opposition consisted mainly of three camps, the Rajput independents, a Rajput-dominated party (either the RRP or Swatantra), and the BJS. Furthermore, the Rajput independents constituted a somewhat more committed opposition force than the independents in other states, who were often former members of Congress. The opposition in Rajasthan was also more ideologically coherent than in many other states, populated as it was by upper-caste landed interests. Though the BJS differed somewhat from the Rajput-dominated groupings, it too was predominantly upper-caste and conservative, meaning that the interests of its leaders were not incompatible with those of Rajput princes and *jagirdars*. In contrast, the oppositions in other major states, such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, were fragmented across a larger number of more ideologically disparate parties.

Because the Rajasthani opposition was somewhat less fragmented than many other state's oppositions, it more successfully translated its votes into seats. In a single-member district electoral system such as India's, the largest party gets a sizable "bonus" in terms of the proportion of seats won as compared to the proportion of votes won. When the largest party faces a highly fragmented opposition that divides the opposition votes, its bonus typically increases. In Rajasthan, the bonus that Congress enjoyed was fairly small: 12 percent in 1952, 22 percent in 1957, 10 percent in 1962, and 7 percent in 1967. In other words, in 1952 Congress won 39 percent of the popular vote and 51 percent of the seats for a bonus of 12 percent. In many other states, Congress's bonus was much larger. Because of its relatively consolidated opposition in the state, in Rajasthan Congress turned in some of its worst performances in India.

Given its weak electoral results, it is perhaps unsurprising how actively the central Congress government intervened to keep itself in power in Rajasthan. Although Congress won a razor-thin majority in 1952 (51 percent of seats), captured exactly half of the legislative seats in 1962, and fell short of a majority (48 percent of seats) in 1967, the party remained in power continuously until 1977. In 1952 and 1962, Congress quashed talk of opposition governments by winning over enough independents to enhance the size of its

majority. Then in 1967, the Congress-led central government actively intervened to keep the opposition out of power. The opposition, led by Swatantra, declared that a majority of the state legislators supported a non-Congress government. Congress was the largest party in the Rajasthan legislature and also claimed a majority, with the support of several independents. The central government declared President's Rule, lifting it only when Congress had secured the support of enough independents to ensure that it could form a government. After the opposition's failure to form a government in 1967, the opposition declined, laying bare some of its inherent weakness. Rajputs constitute only about 6 percent of Rajasthan's population. (Jats, one of the largest castes in the state, are only about 9 percent). The strength of the Rajput opposition never lay in the numerical dominance of its caste base but rather in the traditional feudal status of its leaders and the social deference accorded to this status. As time wore on, these feudal ties of deference almost certainly diminished as new cohorts entered the electorate who were socialized after independence and abolition of the princely states. And when famous royal families, such as that in Jaipur, began to withdraw from active politics, the opposition was bereft of leadership. As Swatantra declined in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Rajput vote migrated to the BJS and its successor, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

As in many other states, the Janata Party came to power in Rajasthan in 1977 following the Emergency but was then dismissed in 1980. Though the Janata Party was most certainly an opposition government, it owed a crucial portion of its support to a sudden influx of Congress politicians after the Emergency. The opposition came to power again in 1990. In these elections, the BJP and the Janata Dal had successfully won away crucial elements of Congress's support base. The BJP had successfully wooed much of Congress's upper-caste support (especially among Brahmins and Banias), while the Janata Dal had won substantial support among Jats. The central government dismissed this government, along with other BJP-led governments, in 1992 amid the religious violence surrounding the destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya. A BJP-led government then returned to power after the 1993 election, this time serving its full term in office. Today the BJP is much more of a catch-all party than were earlier opposition parties. Rajputs continue to occupy an important position in the leadership of Rajasthan's BJP, but they are no longer the dominant force that they were in earlier opposition parties, such as Swatantra and the RRP.

In the end, central intervention thwarted the opposition's best chance to form a non-Congress government in 1967. Afterward, the conditions that had made a Rajput-dominated opposition possible—feudal ties between landlords and dependents and the active participation of a large class of former rulers—began to fade. Congress's opposition did not resurface until it reinvented itself as a catch-all party along the lines of Congress. Although Rajasthan was ultimately a case of late democratization, its brushes with democratization highlight the importance of central intervention in keeping the opposition out of power.

Uttar Pradesh: Democratization Delayed by Disappearing Opposition and Diffuse Demographics

Much as in Rajasthan, a viable opposition government in India's largest state, Uttar Pradesh, did not emerge until many decades after independence. Uttar Pradesh's political history exemplifies the late emergence of a viable opposition government because of a lack of prior organizational resources from the colonial period on which a nascent opposition could draw. Just as in Rajasthan, the presence of central government intervention and the absence of any effective opposition enabled Congress to remain a dominant party in Uttar Pradesh politics throughout much of the 1980s.[16] The trajectory of Congress in Uttar Pradesh can be broken down into three distinct phases: first, the Congress-led agitation for power in the pre-independence decades and its continued dominance in the first two post-independence decades; second, clearly declining dominant-party legitimacy over a period of over two decades between 1967 and 1991; and third, the definitive breakdown of the one dominant party system after 1991, effectively ushering in an unstable but competitive multiparty democracy.

The postindependence politics of Uttar Pradesh, commonly referred to by its abbreviation, UP, mirrors the rise and decline of the dominance of a single party, or the "Congress system" in India (Kothari 1964). With a population of nearly 200 million people, UP is India's most populous state. Largely because of its sheer size, Congress was the dominant party at the national level because of its success in winning seats in this single state. As India's nationalist movement morphed into its dominant political party during the pre-independence period, UP was the command center of the nationalist movement-cum-party.[17] Congress's key anticolonial agitations were based or organized in UP. Upon independence, about one-sixth of the

seats in India's lower parliamentary house, the Lok Sabha, belonged to UP. Finally, many of India's most important political leaders in both the pre-independence and the post-independence periods have hailed from this state.

To understand how and why the UP Congress was relatively successful at preventing an opposition government from taking power in the postindependence period, it is first necessary to understand the nature of Congress's social support in UP. Congress's social base in the state, as in most parts of British India during the pre-independence era, was firmly among segments of the middle class. Between the turn toward mass mobilization in 1920 and independence in 1947, Congress began to represent not only the urban professional and business classes but also parts of the rural middle class, composed of petty and middle-class landowners (*zamindars*) as well as the more prosperous tenantry. Though UP Congress leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of independent India, claimed that peasant movements were central to Congress's success, the party formally kept its organization distinct from these peasant movements (*kisan sabhas*) and even sought to subdue peasant movements and channel their discontents into Congress-sanctioned forms of political mobilization (Pandey 1988). Thus, even though the nationalist movement was thoroughly revolutionary in some respects (e.g., it sought the complete overthrow of the colonial state as well as the public rejection of caste recognition), it was also a fundamentally conservative movement in the sense that it sought a quite limited transformation of social relations in other respects.[18]

The UP Congress represented distinct class and caste groupings and contained people with diverse ideological viewpoints (ranging from radical socialists to Hindu conservatives). Before independence, disputes among these supporters were successfully contained in the shared imperative to gain national political power and access the colonial state.[19] Congress was largely successful in its outreach efforts to the rural middle class between 1920 and 1947, as evidenced by its success in the colonial elections of the mid-1930s. Not only did Congress dominate the (national) Central Legislative Assembly elections of 1934, but in the 1936–37 provincial elections, Congress won dramatic victories in seven of the eleven British provinces, including the United Provinces.[20] By 1940, the UP Congress had become a party of "rich peasants" (Pandey 1988, 213–218).

During the colonial period, political and electoral opposition to the UP Congress sprung from mainly two parties—the National Agriculturalist Party (NAP), primarily representing large and colonially entrenched land-

lords, and the Muslim League, representing a small, colonially entrenched community of Muslim landlords and civil servants. Neither of these parties was particularly successful in the elections of 1937, with Congress single-handedly winning a governing majority in UP. Though the 1946 elections indicated an increasingly organized and successful opposition in the form of the Muslim League, which doubled its assembly seats, independence and the accompanying migration of many key Muslim League leaders to Pakistan delegitimized and decimated the leadership ranks of both the NAP and the Muslim League. Congress thereby consolidated its position as the unquestioned institutional representative of Indian independence. After independence, opposition parties therefore had to emerge largely from scratch. Three major opposition parties emerged out of the first state elections: the Socialist Party, the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP), and the BJS. None was more than a few years old; two had been founded immediately prior to the elections (the BJS and KMPP); and two were comprised almost entirely of defectors from Congress (the Socialist Party and KMPP).

Before independence, political divisions between Hindus and Muslims animated state politics. In order to build a unified anticolonial movement, particularly in the circumstance of a colonial regime actively trying to divide it, Congress expediently rejected political or public recognition of caste identities and made its political appeals on the basis of a broadly inclusive and secular anticolonial nationalism.[21] As a result, among Hindus Congress aggregated urban and rural notables from across the state's major castes whose social and economic influence over lower social groups (often lower castes) helped them deliver votes to Congress.

With the partition of colonial India into India and Pakistan in 1947, many Muslim League leaders fled to Pakistan, while those that stayed lacked legitimacy as a political force. The virtual disappearance of its erstwhile electoral competitors upon independence helped Congress to maintain a dominant but declining electoral position in UP between independence in 1947 and the elections of 1967. Congress experienced a gradual decline in its vote share in the first three state elections (48 percent in 1952, 42 percent in 1957, and 36 percent in 1962) as factional rivalry became more pronounced and the middling castes, who are the main cultivators in rural UP, increasingly exited Congress. In the mid-1950s and 1960s, this social group's support for Congress was declining. Yet this dissatisfaction did not produce serious opposition because the middle-caste cultivators dispersed their votes across independents and small parties.

Congress's electoral opposition in UP suffered severe internal dissension and was unable to mount any serious opposition to Congress for the better part of two decades. The UP opposition was highly fragmented into a diverse ideological array, ranging from conservatives and Hindu nationalists to socialists, communists, and lower-caste activists. Although the communists in UP were generally quite weak, the socialist parties together polled over 20 percent of the popular vote in the 1962 elections.[22] Due to their internal divisions, however, they were unable to form stable electoral alliances. Right-leaning parties proved similarly divided and unsuccessful in cleaving off Congress supporters in the early postindependence decades, with three separate parties polling a combined vote share of 21 percent in the 1962 elections. Indeed, Congress's vote share was still twice that of the next most popular party in each of the first three postindependence elections. Moreover, unlike in Rajasthan, in UP Congress enjoyed far larger seat "bonuses" thanks to its position as the largest party, winning much larger seat shares than vote shares. For the two decades after independence, then, factionalism was largely contained within the Congress party through intra-party competition and accommodation within the party—what Rajni Kothari (1970, chap. 8) called the "Congress system."

Beginning in the late 1960s, two factors were crucial in driving erstwhile Congress supporters within UP to exit the party: the weakening of Congress' national leadership (undermining the national Congress government's ability to contain factional conflicts within states) and India's first major economic crisis (which naturally undermined the reigning Congress government). Before 1967, state-level factional conflict certainly existed, but had been contained partly by Congress' nationalist legitimacy (and the coordination it induced among power-seekers) and partly through the active intervention of the national government (Kochanek 1968). With the death of its iconic nationalist leader Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964 as well as the death of its subsequent prime minister two years later, the national leadership of Congress effectively passed out of the generation of nationalist leaders and into the hands of powerful but more parochial state leaders. These leaders sought to put Nehru's relatively inexperienced daughter, Indira Gandhi, at the helm of national politics in order to guarantee easy manipulation. This not only made state-level factional conflict less likely to be contained, but it also actively exacerbated the level of factional conflict within states, as the importance of state political power in accessing national power was only further enhanced.

In addition to the weakening of Congress's national leadership, India experienced its first genuine economic crisis since independence in the mid-1960s, the effect of which was invariably detrimental to the governing party at national and state levels. During the mid-1960s the combination of sharp prices increases, a prolonged drought in a predominantly agricultural economy, and the devaluation of the rupee all combined to create particularly poor economic conditions. All the while, the electoral participation of lower social groups was steadily increasing.[23] Those who felt that they were not gaining their fair share of patronage spoils from Congress were, particularly in this new context of Congress fragility, relatively more susceptible to political entrepreneurs seeking to establish new organizations or build new political coalitions.

These economic developments and the accompanying disaffection combined to create Congress's landmark defeat in the 1967 UP elections. Before those elections, coherent blocs of political opposition were beginning to form. A leading Congress spokesman for peasant interests, Charan Singh, defected to form a new political party, Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD), which represented peasant proprietors whose votes had previously been dispersed. Moreover, the BJS began to emerge as a more potent electoral force and garnered over 22 percent of the UP vote in 1967. After the 1967 elections, an opposition coalition took power for the first time in that state's history. It included communists, socialists, conservatives, Hindu nationalists, and defectors from Congress. Given the diverse opposition forces represented in this government, it was quite unstable, giving rise to a series of governments over the next couple of years. President's Rule was declared in 1968 and 1970, both times bringing to an end opposition governments led by Charan Singh. The opposition's task was made all the more difficult by the fact that many of its members were former Congressmen, who were especially susceptible to inducements to abandon the opposition and join Congress (Kashyap 1970; Fickett 1976).

Congress's defeat in UP mirrored the party's national fortunes. Congress lost vote shares and state assembly seats in nearly every state and lost its electoral majority in eight states. Though it still governed at a national level, it did so with a much-reduced parliamentary majority. Though it was the party of independence and had handily won every national election since 1952, Congress's defeat was shown to be possible for the first time. Political entrepreneurs thus found it less risky to exit Congress. Indeed, a survey of local elites in UP in 1970 found that local elites supported Congress because it was the party in power and thus in a position to distribute patronage.[24]

Though a severe weakening of Congress was clearly in evidence, opposition forces were unable to stably challenge Congress. During this time, central government intervention in state politics became more frequent and authoritarian in character across India. By 1973, the oil crisis and the attendant spike in consumer prices as well as a series of poor monsoon rains created intense pressure on the central government. In 1974 a national railway strike was seen as directly challenging Indira Gandhi's government, and the number of national riots rose to 80,000 in 1974 (as compared to 33,000 in 1965) (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, 239). In 1975 the central government responded to this crisis by declaring an Emergency, arrogating extraconstitutional powers for the first and only time in India's history, banning strikes and demonstrations, arresting opposition leaders, clamping down on civil and political liberties, and muzzling the press.

Some of the worst excesses of the Emergency, such as the demolition of squatter housing and forced sterilization drives, hit UP particularly hard. When Indira Gandhi held the 1977 elections, Congress's handy defeat was attributable in part to dissatisfaction with her government. However, this defeat was more of a response to the Emergency's excesses than a sign of a viable national alternative to Congress, with disaffected peasants, Muslims, and Scheduled Castes exiting the Congress coalition (Brass 1981, 13). Congress did very well in the UP elections of 1980, and national elections in the same year returned Congress to power. During the 1970s, Charan Singh's BKD had evolved into a broader-based party called the Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD). In 1977 the Janata Party was formed out of most of India's major opposition parties, including the BLD. Even though the Janata Party was highly unstable and Congress was returned to power in 1980, opposition to Congress was visible, growing, and increasingly unified.

The 1980s were the last decade in which Congress dominated UP politics. Though Congress was largely thought to have won the 1984 elections through a sympathy vote following Indira Gandhi's assassination, the opposition gradually became more coordinated and coherent. The rise of this coordinated opposition was aided by the emergence of a politically savvy middle-caste constituency that had defected from Congress. Because Congress's political support in the UP was built on the organizational dominance of elite castes and the votes they won from the rural poor, Congress's support among the middle peasant castes was thought to be brought about by their economic and social dependence on the elite proprietary castes. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, however, political entrepreneurs among the middle castes

began to organize and demand the state resources they felt were denied to them by the upper-caste dominance of Congress.

The transition away from a dominant Congress to a competitive multiparty system definitively occurred in UP in the 1990s, when state politics began to fracture along caste lines. Although a survey of the 1989 UP assembly elections showed that support for Congress was still spread relatively evenly among upper, middle, and lower caste groups, "by the time of the [UP] state assembly elections in 1991 the party system was rooted in social cleavages" (Chhibber 2001, 139). Although intermediate castes had long constituted an important component of the opposition, the early 1990s witnessed the migration of both the upper and lower castes away from Congress. The upper castes shifted decisively toward the BJP, while the Scheduled Castes—those who traditionally sit at the bottom of the caste hierarchy—began to support the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which burst onto the UP political scene in 1989. By 1991, 58 percent of the backward castes were voting for the Janata Dal, while 61 percent of the elite castes were voting for the BJP. From the early 1990s onward, Congress became an increasingly marginal force, which finally enabled opposition governments to assume power.

Although UP governments during the 1990s and early 2000s were notoriously unstable, this instability was largely unrelated to Congress. Instead, it stemmed from squabbling among the three major non-Congress parties—the BJP, BSP, and Samajwadi Party. Usually none of these parties was large enough to form a government of its own, but they were not willing to ally themselves with one another to form a stable government. Instability aside, the 1990s marked the democratization of politics in UP, because the state had fully transitioned away from Congress dominance.

Jammu and Kashmir: A National Security Imperative and Subnational Authoritarianism

Lying at the northernmost tip of the country, with a population of twelve million people, the state of Jammu and Kashmir's most notable feature has been its central role in three wars and numerous small-scale armed conflicts with Pakistan, as well as one major war with China. Because of its strategic location, the central government has intervened there heavily and regularly. Partly because of this intervention and partly because of its historical lack of political competition, this state was a notably late democratizer, to the extent that state politics have fully democratized at all. Indeed, unlike in most states, free and fair elections in the context of full civil liberties first

occurred only in the late 1970s. By the early 1980s, however, this brief democratic opening was shut. By 1990, Kashmir had descended into a violent and internationalized insurgency that has lasted well into to the 2000s.

Like other princely states, Jammu and Kashmir had no experience with pre-independence elections. Kashmir, therefore, had little history of political participation. Because of the central government's preoccupation with the state's national security concerns, potential political divisions in Kashmir were not allowed to play out in the form of genuine electoral competition. Indeed, the case of Kashmir illustrates how debilitating central intervention was to the establishment of a competitive party system. More generally, the state's situation demonstrates how, even in longstanding democracies, pockets of authoritarian practices persist.

Despite having a Muslim-majority population, Kashmir's colonial political organizations were not integrated into the nationalist movement for Pakistan. A strong sense of independent Kashmiri identity long predated the Muslim League, which did not easily accommodate a Kashmiri nationalism that crossed religious lines. Before Kashmir became a princely state ruled by the Hindu Dogra family in 1846, it was ruled by outside conquerors for nearly two and a half centuries. Largely through this experience and through periodic acts of resistance against such foreign rule, a distinct sense of Kashmiri identity developed along nonreligious lines (Puri 1968, 217). Moreover, the class divisions in Kashmir did not correspond well to the class interests of the Muslim League's leadership because the latter was largely an upper-class organization little inclined to take up more radical socioeconomic causes, and Muslims in Kashmir tended to form the cultivating tenantry.

Unlike in many other princely states, a genuine anticolonial political movement existed in Kashmir during British rule. The Muslim Conference was started in 1930 to protest both colonial and princely rule. Marked by internal dissension, the Muslim Conference collapsed in 1939 but was absorbed into a successor organization, the National Conference, under the charismatic leadership of Sheikh Abdullah (dubbed the Lion of Kashmir). This movement was influenced by communists and was generally more sympathetic to the Indian nationalist movement than to the Pakistan nationalist movement (Widmalm 2002, 34–35). By the time of independence, because of their opposition to princely rule, Abdullah and the other leaders of the National Conference were jailed.

By the legal terms of the colonial transfer of power over British India to the successor states of India and Pakistan in 1947, the rulers of princely states had the right to decide whether to accede to India or to Pakistan. Stalling for time just before independence in August 1947, the princely ruler of Kashmir attempted to negotiate a standstill agreement with both India and Pakistan, which would have alleviated the need for accession to either state. After Pakistan's and India's independence was declared in August 1947, Abdullah was released from jail and attempted to help negotiate the final status of Kashmir with the Indian and Pakistani central governments. Before this could be resolved, in October 1947 hordes of Pathan tribesmen from Pakistan invaded Kashmir in an attempt to seize its capital and liberate their Muslim brethren from Hindu rule.

The Hindu Maharajah of Kashmir appealed to the newly independent Government of India for troops to help repel the invasion. Congress's leaders, in consultation with the departing colonial viceroy, agreed that the princely state needed to accede to India before troops could be made available. Allegedly, an Instrument of Accession to the Indian Union was signed by the maharajah, though there is substantial historical debate as to when, where, and even whether this instrument was indeed signed. The terms of the Instrument of Accession nonetheless provided for substantial regional autonomy for Kashmir, which agreed to Indian national sovereignty only in the realms of defense, foreign affairs, and communications. Pursuant to this accession, India sent troops to Kashmir, and Pakistan responded by sending in its own troops. The ensuing war between India and Pakistan lasted a year, with a cease-fire negotiated by the United Nations in 1948. The effective cease-fire line divided Kashmir into two sections, a western third of the state controlled by Pakistan and an eastern two-thirds controlled by India. This "Line of Control" marks the de facto border between India and Pakistan in Kashmir.

Kashmir's position at the center of an international war meant that it was initially constitutionally exempted from the democratizing trends across other states. Article 370 of the Indian Constitution exempted the Indian portion of Kashmir from many of the liberal provisions of the Constitution, such as its guarantee of fundamental rights. The central Congress government initially allied with the National Conference, enabling the latter to firmly control state politics. Thus, between 1947 until 1951 Kashmir was wholly dominated by the National Conference under the leadership of

Abdullah. Kashmir's first experience with postcolonial independence was under the leadership of an autocratic one-party state that embarked on a revolutionary and Marxist-inspired program of land reform, abolition of landlordism, and the compulsory requisitioning of foodgrains (Puri 1968, 219).

Kashmir's first decade witnessed very little formal political competition. In 1951, elections to the state's Constituent Assembly—responsible for drafting the state constitution—took place. The Congress-allied National Conference won every seat, running unopposed in most cases (Bose 2013, 247–248). Although this government had popular support in some regions of Kashmir, it ruled the state with an iron fist, which inaugurated an autocratic trend in state politics. The National Conference had firm roots in the Muslim-dominated Valley of Kashmir but not in the Hindu-dominated Jammu, where an opposition party, the Praja Parishad, was founded.[25] Abdullah's National Conference used a variety of autocratic means to block members of the Praja Parishad from joining the Constituent Assembly.

By 1953, the national security imperative from the central government led to Abdullah's removal from Kashmir's political life for a decade. Though Abdullah had negotiated a new agreement with New Delhi that made a number of additional accessions to federal jurisdiction, the Hindu-dominated Praja Parishad in Jammu agitated for complete accession to India in hopes of minimizing the National Conference's influence in state politics. At the same time, Abdullah's competitors in the Kashmir Valley were advocating for closer relations with Pakistan as a way of protecting Muslim influence in state politics. Abdullah's statements about resisting the domination of New Delhi, intended to co-opt political competition, did not endear him to a central government that had just fought an international war with Pakistan over control of Kashmir. A wary New Delhi thus engineered Abdullah's dismissal and subsequent jailing (Puri 1968, 221–225). With the removal of its only prominent independent leader, the National Conference effectively became a state committee of the Congress party (Widmalm 2002, 50).

For the next decade, a new National Conference strongman, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, ruled the state, reducing the party to an organization of Congress sycophants, while Sheikh Abdullah increasingly threw his support behind the Plebiscite Front, led by Mirza Afzal Beg. When Jammu and Kashmir formally acceded to the Union of India, its state constitution came into force and its legislature began a two-decades-long process of extending the central government's laws to the state, thereby integrating it more fully

into India (Tremblay 1995, 89–90). The legislative election held in 1957 marked the state's first subnational election after it had acceded to the Union of India. The National Conference handily won the 1957 election, facing little opposition and amid some claims of unfairness. The National Conference government went on to serve its full term in office, and, as a result, some would claim that 1957 technically marked the first time that a non-Congress government served a full term in office. However, these elections in Kashmir were not competitive, with most National Conference candidates standing unopposed. In 1962 (the year of the first election held under the auspices of the Election Commission of India), thirty-four of seventy-five seats were uncontested, whereas in 1967, twenty-two of seventy-five were uncontested. Moreover, the National Conference did not genuinely constitute an "opposition" party. Indeed, in 1964 Bakshi's successor converted the National Conference into the Kashmir unit of Congress (Tremblay 1995, 90).

During the rule of the National Conference, Kashmir's economy grew considerably (in part through national subsidies) and the state was slowly integrated into the institutional fabric of the Union of India. Though Kashmir prospered financially, political competition was strangled, because the key to prosperity was loyalty to the state of India, Congress, and the National Conference as Congress's effective representative in Kashmir. Bakshi contained political challenges from within the state—from the Jammu-dominated Praja Parishad—by playing up caste divisions in Jammu and those from the Socialists through arrests, intimidation, and assaults. By 1963 the civil and political excesses of the Bakshi regime had prompted increasing protest from around India, and Bakshi was asked to resign by the central government.

Though a brief liberalizing trend was apparent in the mid-1960s, it did not last long amid the continuity of systematic and autocratic central intervention. In early 1964, a newly released Sheikh Abdullah sought to recreate his erstwhile political following under the Plebiscite Front, while a charismatic new young religious leader, Maulvi Muhammed Farooq, led a newly created Awami Action Committee. In the short time that political competition between these two leaders was allowed to freely play out, it was ferocious. The central government began again to tighten its grip on state politics, jailing both Abdullah and Farooq, who were not allowed to contest state elections in 1967 in yet another example of uncompetitive elections.

Several key developments combined to allow for a longer, more genuine period of political opening in Kashmir during the 1970s. India fought two

wars with Pakistan, in 1965 over Pakistan's incursions into Kashmir and in 1971 over India's assistance to East Pakistan in its bid for independence. In the aftermath of these two wars, in the mid-1970s Sheikh Abdullah reached an accord with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, which allowed for the first genuinely free state election to be held in 1977. That election saw the largest turnout of voters to date, with Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference winning a landslide victory—forty-seven of the seventy-five state assembly seats. The remaining seats were won by the Janata Party (thirteen seats), Congress (eleven seats), and Jamaat-e-Islami (one seat). Though the 1977 elections were a genuine political opening, the National Conference–led government continued the corrupt governing practices that had characterized the state in decades past but managed to serve a full term in office. This all too brief democratic opening already began to close in 1982, after the National Conference's charismatic leader, Sheikh Abdullah, passed away. He bequeathed the leadership of the National Conference to his son, Farooq Abdullah, who also won a massive majority in the state assembly elections of 1983, winning forty-six of seventy-five seats (Congress gained twenty-six seats). Farooq Abdullah fell out with Indira Gandhi over those 1983 elections, with Gandhi wanting a greater share of power in state politics. In 1984, Gandhi engineered Farooq Abdullah's dismissal, after which Farooq's rival and brother-in-law, Ghulam Mohammed Shah, was sworn in. The Shah government governed with New Delhi's support but with little legitimacy in Kashmir.

Why had the central government intervened again in Kashmir, this time during a relatively low-level threat? By most accounts, this had more to do with New Delhi's centralizing tendencies at the time than it did with the particular politics of Kashmir. After losing power in 1977, Indira Gandhi was back in power in 1980. Farooq Abdullah had led the National Conference into an alliance of regional parties called the Opposition Conclave, which opposed Congress. Because Indira Gandhi similarly intervened to dismiss governments in other states governed by parties that had signed on to this opposition alliance, including Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, this intervention was likely part of a larger centralized scheme to punish governments that were not with the party in power at the national level.

After 1984, the levels of violent political activity were growing in Kashmir, foreshadowing what was to come (Widmalm 2002). In 1986, Governor's Rule (the Kashmiri equivalent of President's Rule) was invoked by New Delhi, and Shah was also removed from power, with Abdullah and Congress sharing power until the next elections in 1987. Though there was rela-

tively little terrorist activity at the time, and comparatively little in light of the decades-long rebellion that was to follow (Lamb 1991, 329), the reason given for Farooq Abdullah's dismissal from power in 1984 was his insufficient ability to snuff out Pakistani terrorist activity in the state. This was another thin veneer of justification for central intervention.

The flawed state assembly elections in 1987 marked, for most observers of Kashmiri politics, the descent into violent chaos that has rocked the state for the better part of the past three decades. When Farooq Abdullah, the opposition National Conference leader who was summarily dismissed by Congress in 1984, agreed to an electoral alliance with Congress, many of his erstwhile supporters became disillusioned and left the party. With the more radical religious Jamaat-e-Islami as its leader, an opposition umbrella organization, the Muslim United Front, was launched to unite the opposition to the National Conference and Congress. The organization of political opposition primarily along religious lines helped to exacerbate religious tensions.

The state assembly elections of 1987 were widely believed to be rigged to overrepresent the National Conference, with forty seats going to the National Conference, twenty-six to Congress, two to the BJP, and the remaining eight to independents, four of whom were aligned with the Muslim United Front. After the success of the Congress–National Conference alliance, violence broke out in protest over the elections, at first sporadically and then more regularly. In a telling example, a leading member of the separatist movement, Abdul Ghani Lone, who had participated in the state political system for most of his career, turned to armed struggle against the state in the aftermath of the 1987 election (Widmalm 2002, 80).

When large-scale violence broke out in 1989, no party or coalition was able to put a stop to it. Not only were there few legal channels left to express political opposition, but Indian Army excesses in putting down incidences of armed revolt almost certainly contributed to the growing sense of alienation among the Kashmiri population from the state government (Widmalm 2002, chap. 4). Moreover, the state's experience with competitive politics was extremely limited. To the extent that state governments had been allowed to function without interference from the central government, these governments had often employed autocratic means to stem their own political opposition.

During the 1990s, many argue that a proxy war was effectively being fought in Jammu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan (Joshi 1999).

During that decade, tens of thousands of people died, many of whom simply disappeared (Ghate 2002). The All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), an alliance of secessionist parties and leaders, was formed in 1993 as a political front to further the cause of Kashmiri separatism, with some of its members promoting armed violence against the state. In the context of this armed struggle, both India and Pakistan publicly became nuclear-armed states in 1998. When an incursion into Indian-occupied Kashmir in 1999 led to escalating confrontation in the state, several observers of the state, including former US president Bill Clinton, called the state the "most dangerous place on earth."

State assembly elections in 2002, held amid considerable tension and military presence, generated hope that state politics were trending in a genuinely liberalizing direction for the first time since the 1987 elections had sparked the prolonged Kashmiri militancy. Elections were reasonably free, and the People's Democratic Party–Congress coalition won the elections. In November and December 2008, Jammu and Kashmir held elections once again, marking the second consecutive elections judged to be free and fair. As a democratic exercise, the 2008 elections improved on those in 2002. Turnout increased across the board to about 60 percent, which is normal in contemporary Indian state elections. Turnout varied across the state, with high rates of nearly 70 percent in Jammu and Ladakh. With the exception of Srinagar district, which has been the heart of the Kashmiri insurgency, turnout levels in the rest of Kashmir were around 57 percent, a more than respectable level. In Srinagar, turnout was only slightly above 20 percent but was still an improvement over 2002. Despite calls for boycott by separatist groups, most candidates were able to campaign, though the risks that politicians in the Valley of Kashmir faced were no doubt more pronounced than in most other places in India. With the 2014 state election, it appears that although the shadow of insurgency may still linger, a semblance of normal electoral politics has returned to the state.

The case of Kashmir underscores the crucial importance of central intervention in enabling the emergence of viable political opposition at the subnational level. Though political opposition with popular roots in one part of the state actually existed, nearly every governing administration was the target of some kind of political manipulation by the central government. Each governing administration employed heavy-handed tactics to repress political opposition. As long as the National Conference remained friendly to the government in New Delhi, it had the central government's tacit con-

sent to behave in an authoritarian manner. However, the proximity to Pakistan and Pakistan's support for the Kashmiri insurgency should not be underestimated, nor should the crucial role of the central government in inhibiting subnational democratization. Central intervention in state politics has been the most defining dynamic of subnational politics in Kashmir.

Conclusion

A transition to electoral democracy does not guarantee the emergence of robust political competition. Though scholars of democracy concur that the consolidation of democracy requires a credible alternative to the party initially in power at the moment of democratization, we know too little about how viable oppositions emerge. Many postcolonial countries have won independence after long struggles during which most of the political class united into a single nationalist platform—the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in Algeria, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in Zimbabwe, and of course the Indian National Congress. At independence, many of these nationalist movements assumed power and immediately enjoyed tremendous advantages over potential rivals: the allegiance of a broad section of the political class, an organizational infrastructure, and control of the state's patronage resources. In such circumstances, would-be opposition parties often had few resources with which to build a viable alternative to the ruling party.

The Indian experience with the emergence of viable non-Congress opposition governments highlights three important lessons for the comparative study of subnational democratization when it is defined as party alternation. The first is that historical patterns of colonial competition have critically shaped democratization and democratic consolidation trajectories. Where oppositions had something on which to build—pre-existing organizational or ideological resources, as in West Bengal, or even, second best, a more recent economic rivalry rooted in colonial-era politics, as in Rajasthan—credible alternatives to the dominant party more quickly emerged. Where the opposition had no such resources (as in UP), it floundered and delayed the onset of a viable opposition government. As long as an opposition is fragmented, fluid, and disorganized, it will pose little threat to the kinds of incumbent parties that often come to power during moments of democratization, even if the opposition enjoys substantial levels of popular support.

The second important lesson, particularly in the comparative context that this volume seeks to elucidate, is that central governments can play a

nefarious role in thwarting democratization processes at the subnational level. In some countries, central governments can exert a strong democratizing influence by eradicating pockets of authoritarianism, often on a country's periphery. In India, until relatively recently the central government frequently destabilized state-level opposition governments through the invocation of a constitutional clause empowering central intervention. As a result, the organizational threshold for establishing a viable governing alternative effectively increased. To be credible, opposition governments not only had to come to power but they also had to form very stable governments that would not justify central government intervention under the constitutional provision for President's Rule, governments that could withstand regular attempts to win away coalition partners.

Since the advent of coalition government and the landmark Supreme Court ruling in *S. R. Bommai v. Union of India* in the 1990s, the interventionist tendencies of the central government have become more limited. The Supreme Court's ruling in the *Bommai* case made dismissing state governments more difficult, prescribing that state governments have the opportunity to prove their majority in the legislature before President's Rule is invoked. Additionally, national parties now rarely rule at the national level with their own legislative majorities, and regional parties have proliferated. Consequently, central governments have reason to be wary of intervening in state-level affairs, because the parties in power at the state level are often members of the national-level coalition government or constitute potential coalition partners for the future (Sadanandan 2012; Ziegfeld 2012).

The third and final implication of the Indian case is that security concerns are relevant for understanding subnational variation in democratization (or de-democratization, as the case may be). In times of threat or war, states often abridge their citizens' freedoms in ways that undermine free and open democratic competition. As the Indian case amply demonstrates, such security threats—and the authoritarian responses that they sometimes provoke—can be regionally concentrated and are often at the geographic periphery of the state. In countries that otherwise evince a strong commitment to democracy, enclaves of authoritarianism may persist in pockets where security concerns loom large.

NOTES

1. By subnational democratization we mean democratization at the state level, a definition applying mainly to federations with multiple layers of government.

2. Following Dahl (1971), we employ a minimalist definition of democracy in the sense that we focus exclusively on elections and the possibility of an opposition party or coalition winning. Our focus on the viability of opposition parties also builds on the pithy definition of democracy as "a system in which parties lose elections" Przeworski (1991, 10).

3. The British colonial regime gambled that a broader extension of the franchise would reveal a narrow base of support for the primarily urban Congress and thus help to keep British allies in power. They were surprised by the extent of support for Congress in the countryside. Although the British had calculated that smaller landowners would support colonial allies on the basis of the secure tenure and market access that British rule had brought, the dominant peasantry and small landowners in Indian villages were won over to the Congress cause by a promise of even more favorable treatment on such issues as land revenue.

4. The franchise in these elections collectively amounted to approximately 11 percent of the adult population.

5. It is worth mentioning that the Emergency was declared and extended according to provisions set down by the Indian Constitution. In other words, the declaration of a state of Emergency and the temporary suspension of elections during the period of Emergency were constitutionally permitted. The allegations of authoritarianism stem instead from the flimsy pretense on which the Emergency was declared and the extent of the government abuses—imprisonment of political opponents and mass sterilizations in particular.

6. This meets the definition of a consolidated democracy, whereby democracy's "complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives has effectively become . . . 'the only game in town'" (Linz and Stepan 1996, 14).

7. See, for example, Bottomore (1964) and Higley and Burton (2006).

8. In Kerala, Congress was never truly dominant. Although a non-Congress government did not serve a full term until 1987–91, no Congress government had served a full term in office until 1982–87. From 1957 through 1982, no party headed a government for a full legislative mandate, and during this time, a non-Congress government was in power for at least part of every legislative period (except 1965, when no government took office). Thus the lack of full-term opposition governments was not evidence of incomplete democratization but rather a symptom of instability in a highly competitive party system.

9. The province of Bengal was briefly partitioned into two provinces in the early twentieth century, but in the decades leading up to independence, the province was known as Bengal. After India's partition, the portion remaining in India was known as West Bengal.

10. See Kohli (1983) on the CPM cadre in particular.

11. This is the combined vote share for the CPI, RSP, Revolutionary Communist Party, Forward Bloc (Marxist Group), and Forward Bloc (Ruikar Group).

12. The industrial heartland refers to the districts of Kolkata, Hooghly, Howrah, and 24 Parganas.

13. Palmer (1972–73), for instance, doubts that Congress would have lost.

14. Our account of colonial politics in Rajasthan relies heavily on Sisson (1972). The discussion of politics in the early decades after independence draws on Kamal (1969).

15. In the 1952 elections, all of the seats not won by Congress in Jodhpur division were won by "representatives of the landed aristocracy" (Sisson 1972, 169), meaning Rajputs. Together, these independent Rajput legislators from Jodhpur division (twenty-four in all)

won 9 percent of the overall vote in Rajasthan. But Sisson (1972) also points out that nearly 60 percent of the leading opposition candidates in the state were Rajputs, leaving at least fifty additional Rajput candidates (135). Some of these Rajput opposition candidates were members of other parties such as Ram Rajya Parishad, but some were almost certainly also independents. Thus 9 percent is the absolute minimum vote won by Rajput independents in 1952. The true figure is certainly higher. Because the total independent vote share was 27 percent, estimating the Rajput independent vote at one-third to one-half of the total independent vote seems plausible.

16. Congress lost power in 1967 and again in 1977. But unlike in Tamil Nadu, for example, the opposition quickly lost power both times. It was only in the 1990s that an opposition government held power without the threat that it would be brought down and replaced by a Congress government.

17. During the colonial period, the state of Uttar Pradesh formed the colonial province called the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. Even then, however, it was often designated by the abbreviation UP.

18. For example, Congress sought a revolutionary transformation of the caste system in the public sphere. For more on this, see Rudolph and Rudolph (2006, chap. 4) and Tudor (2013).

19. In the Indian context, factions are "alternative forms of political organization to interest groups and are based upon conflicting principles. Factions are vertical structures of power oriented towards influence, that is, towards the establishment of links which will provide for the transmission of favors and services. Interest groups are associations oriented towards the promotion of long-term interests of a generalized category in the population. Factions inhibit the organization of interests because they are based upon ties which unite opposed interests. The members of a faction come from different social and economic groups in the society, united by a desire for personal privileges" (Brass 1965, 244).

20. AICC (All India Congress Committee) Papers, File P20, 1938, NMML (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library).

21. The colonial regime made attempts to divide Congress along caste lines, as in the Communal Award of 1932. Congress was far less successful at resisting polarization along religious lines and failed to gain the support of the Muslim community. For an excellent review of this issue, see Brass (1974).

22. Hasan (1998) attributes the comparative weakness of the communists in UP to the relative success of land reforms in UP compared with neighboring Bihar.

23. Chhibber (2001, 85–86) notes that voter turnout rose from 48 percent in 1957 to 62 percent in 1967 and that new voters were less likely to vote Congress.

24. Nearly three quarters of local elites said they would be willing to change their party affiliation if another party won control of the state government (Chhibber 2001).

25. There is also a third region in the state, Ladakh, which is large in physical size but sparsely populated.

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PART II

The DIVERSE ORIGINS of ILLIBERAL STRUCTURES and PRACTICES in ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, and MEXICO

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Federal Intervention and Subnational Democratization in Argentina

A Comparative Perspective

JACQUELINE BEHREND

How does subnational political change leading to further democratization occur in provinces or states that show a greater resistance to the democratic standards that prevail in the rest of a federation? In democratic countries, the federal government is supposed to guarantee a minimum threshold of democracy for all provinces. But what role can the national government effectively play in subnational democratization, and what limitations do national actors encounter?

In Argentina, the transition to democracy in 1983 established a minimum floor of democracy for all provinces. Unlike the Deep South in the United States (see chapter 2 of this volume, by Gibson and King), Argentina did not have any subnational authoritarian *regimes* that persisted after redemocratization.[1] However, three decades after democratization, some provinces are still far from converging with national standards of democracy in some dimensions. Many provinces harbor illiberal structures and practices that are sheltered by the relative autonomy that the federal design awards provinces, and there have been cases of rights violations that are incompatible with democracy. These illiberal structures and practices are embedded in local political systems and have proven to be largely resilient in the face of institutional and electoral changes such as federal intervention and alternation of political parties in office. Elsewhere I refer to subnational political systems that harbor such illiberal structures and practices as "closed games" (Behrend 2011).[2]

The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to our understanding of how subnational democratization occurs by undertaking a comparative historical analysis of three Argentine provinces that faced federal intervention

in the second and third decades after national democratization. In it I aim to identify some of the areas in which illiberal political structures and practices can be expected to democratize in the face of an external shock (federal intervention) and some of the areas in which we are more likely to observe resilience. The chapter has a long-term perspective that does not focus exclusively on the period immediately after the federal intervention but rather assesses the political changes that occurred at least a decade after federal intervention. This long-term perspective allows me to take into account the possibility of decreasing effects or, on the contrary, of effects that become evident only with the lapse of time (Pierson 2004). The evidence presented in the chapter suggests that federal intervention can dismantle repressive political structures and practices, put an end to human rights violations and state-protected violence (for example, by the police), and bring about alternation in office in the short term. However, the case studies show that federal intervention alone is unlikely to put an end to family politics, state capture, and the interdependence between the three branches of government, which should (ideally) be separate and function as checks and balances.[3]

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section I present the chapter's theoretical argument. In the following section I discuss the role of federal intervention in Argentine history and the role of alternation in subnational democratization. The fourth section focuses on three provinces in which the federal government intervened after national democratization and traces political change and the resilience of illiberal structures and practices. The fifth section concludes the chapter and highlights the lessons that can be extracted from the Argentine case studies for the comparative study of subnational democratization.

Subnational Democratization

Because subnational units cannot be considered authoritarian in a conventional way (i.e., as understood in the literature on national democratization), analyzing patterns of change and continuity in their institutions and practices is a harder task in both empirical and conceptual terms. In the first place, the term *transition* is not so useful, because regime change occurs at the federal level and in these cases has already taken place. As King and Lieberman (2009, 14) state, "There is a useful distinction between the transition to democracy from some other regime type and the consolidation and preservation of democracy in the face of nondemocratic or antidemocratic challenges." And, following Morlino (2012), the processes of democratic transition

and democratic deepening need to be analytically distinguished. Transition refers to the regime, and the regime is at the federal level; democracy deepening and the preservation of democracy in the face of nondemocratic challenges at the subnational level need to be understood as parts of a long-term process of democratization. In addition, the usual association established between democratization and the alternation of political parties in power (Przeworski 1991; Alvarez et al. 1996) does not necessarily hold in these settings. Przeworski (1991, 10) succinctly defines democracy as "a system in which parties lose elections." Alternation is a sign of contestation, but it does not say much about *how* power is exercised in different provinces or states or *among whom* power alternates.

Subnational democratization is understood here as the convergence toward the democratic standards that prevail in the rest of the federation and not as the achievement of an ideal end-state of democratic perfection. As such, it is viewed as a long-term, open-ended, and slow-moving process of political construction (Whitehead 2002; Pierson 2004). This chapter, therefore, focuses on illiberal structures and practices, processes of continuity and discontinuity of political and economic elites, and political parties, as well as alternation in power.

In Gibson's (2012) model of subnational democratization there are two paths toward subnational democracy: one is party-led, whereby a broad opposition coalition defeats the authoritarian incumbent, and the other is center-led, whereby federal authorities intervene directly in the province to force political change. The first path proceeds from a more bottom-up perspective and centers on the political dynamics of each province. The second path is top-down and emphasizes the power of the federal government to enforce national democratic values and norms. The party-led path is exemplified by the case studies of Brazil in this volume (chapters 6 and 7), although, as chapter authors Borges and Souza both note, there are important limitations to the effects of political parties on subnational democratization. Gibson's center-led path is exemplified mostly by the democratization of Southern authoritarian enclaves in the United States (see chapter 2 of this volume, by Gibson and King, and also Mickey 2015) and by cases of federal intervention in the Argentine provinces.

In this chapter I build on Gibson's framework and seek to contribute to the debate on subnational democratization through a comparison of three provinces–Catamarca, Corrientes and Santiago del Estero–in which the federal government intervened following violent events that were politically

transcendent and triggered protests and demands for further democratization of the local political system.

Federal Intervention and Alternation

Federal intervention, followed by alternation in power, is one of the pathways toward subnational democratization described by Gibson (2012) in his framework. In this model, subnational democratization will normally follow a sequential pattern. A center-led transition (in this case, federal intervention) is only the first step. The main objective of this first step is to reform the institutional rules that skew the electoral playing field in favor of incumbents and restrict competition at the subnational level (Levitsky and Way 2010; Gibson 2012). According to the model, these reforms would enable a party-led transition or, in other words, electoral alternation.

Implicit in this model is the assumption that once electoral alternation has occurred, subnational democratization will follow. However, few studies have explored what happens once the opposition reaches office. How can we assess whether the replacement of a hegemonic elite by an opposition coalition is a sign of democratization? Such an assessment requires a focus on how power is accessed but also on how it is exercised (Mazzuca 2010). Electoral alternation could be understood as a necessary but insufficient condition for subnational democratization. In an optimistic sequence, federal intervention followed by electoral alternation could lead to subnational democratization and the elimination of illiberal political structures and practices. But it is also possible to imagine a scenario in which federal intervention followed by alternation leads to the creation of a new subnational hegemony or oligarchy (Behrend 2011). Alternatively, federal intervention followed by alternation could promote greater electoral competition, but the impact of this competition on illiberal structures and practices might not be immediate or might be partial and fragmentary.

The Argentine Constitution contains a powerful tool for the federal government. Article 6 enables the government to intervene in a province and remove elected authorities "to guarantee the republican form of government, or repel foreign invasions, and at the request of its constituted authorities to sustain them or reestablish them, should they have been removed by sedition or invasion by another province" (Argentine Constitution, Article 6). The federal government can intervene in the executive, the judiciary, or the legislative branch of provincial government separately or in any combination of the three branches. The US Constitution and the Brazilian Constitution also

include provisions that enable federal intervention in subnational states; however, these have rarely been used. In contrast, the federal governments of India and Russia have intervened more systematically in subnational affairs.

Although the Argentine Constitution enables the federal government to intervene in the provinces "to guarantee the republican form of government" (Article 6), among other motives, the aims of federal interventions have rarely been democratizing or even democratic. In the course of Argentine history, federal interventions have had various ends, but they have mostly been used to control opposition provincial governments or achieve the election of political allies (Botana 1977; Solá 1982; Serrafero 2005). Federal intervention was widely used by most Argentine national governments throughout the electoral periods of the twentieth century. After the transition to democracy, it was not used under the presidencies of Raúl Alfonsín or Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. President Carlos Menem, however, intervened in several provinces in his ten years in office, President Fernando De la Rúa intervened in one, and President Néstor Kirchner also intervened in one province. Whether the aim of these federal interventions was subnational democratization is highly debatable. In most cases, federal intervention followed the nationalization of local political conflicts (in Catamarca in 1991, in Santiago del Estero in 1991 and 2004, and in Corrientes in 1999) or, in some cases, an intra-elite crisis that could not be resolved internally (in Tucumán in 1991 and Corrientes in 1992). The interventions involved the removal of elected governors and legislators from office and, in some cases, the removal of judicial authorities. But in all cases the national government's political strategy during the intervention was to promote the election of a political ally in the following elections. In some cases this strategy succeeded, and in others it failed.

Although the decision to intervene in a province cannot be reduced to a single cause, in the period following democratization in 1983, federal interventions were triggered by one of two situations: (1) a political crisis in the local elite that could not be resolved internally (an intra-elite crisis) or (2) massive protests and mobilizations accompanied by demands for greater democratization (in some cases, following instances of local violence). Table 4.1 classifies the six federal interventions that occurred in the period from 1983 to 2013 according to these two triggers.

In the cases in which an intra-elite crisis triggered the federal intervention, the intervention was not accompanied by a democratizing or rights-based

TABLE 4.1.
Triggers for federal intervention in Argentina, 1983–2013

Intra-elite crisis	Demands for democratization
Tucumán (1991)	Catamarca (1991)
Corrientes (1992)	Santiago del Estero (1991)
	Corrientes (1999)
	Santiago del Estero (2004)

discourse or by citizen demands for greater democratization. In these cases, federal authorities sought to use the intervention to implement the national government's structural reform agenda and to achieve the election of a political ally. The cases in which federal intervention was triggered by demands for subnational democratization fall into the category of what Gibson calls center-led transitions. In these cases, the federal government decided to intervene in the provinces after massive mobilizations that went beyond the local sphere and attracted national media attention (nationalization of the conflict). In three of the four cases that fall under this classification, there was electoral alternation following the federal intervention and a governor from an opposition party was elected.

Because the aim of this chapter is to assess the role of federal intervention in promoting subnational democratization, I focus on the cases in which federal intervention was triggered by demands for democratization. One of the provinces, Santiago del Estero, had two interventions of this kind, so it provides an interesting case for a within-case comparison.

The three cases selected for this study comprise the total cases of federal intervention triggered by demands for democratization that took place in Argentina after 1983. However, the situation in each province before the intervention was different. In Catamarca (in 1991) and Santiago del Estero (in 2004), massive demands for subnational democratization were triggered by crimes against young women at the hands of individuals linked to the local political elite. In Corrientes (in 1999), demands for subnational democratization arose as a result of the provincial state's incapacity to fulfill its basic obligations. There was no preceding violence, and, paradoxically, it was the federal intervention that brought about a violent confrontation with the deployment of the Gendarmería to dislodge protesters from a bridge.[4] Corrientes before 1999 is best characterized as a "closed game" (Behrend 2011), but within this game there were clear limits as to what the political elite could and could not do. In contrast, demands for subnational democratization in

Catamarca and Santiago del Estero arose as a protest against the impunity of the political elite, which became evident when the previously mentioned crimes were committed. This is important to note in order to assess the continuity and change of illiberal structures and practices.

The question regarding the role of the federal government in subnational democratization is both theoretical and empirical. In normative terms, the practice of federal intervention is questionable because it involves the removal of democratically elected authorities. In some cases, as in Catamarca in 1991 and Santiago del Estero in 2004, this was justified due to crimes that showed the impunity of members of the political establishment. But in other cases, federal interventions were used to resolve intra-elite crises.[5] In empirical terms, the role of federal intervention in subnational democratization is not easy to assess, because the effects may not be immediately visible. Alternation and reform of electoral legislation are short-term effects but by themselves do not ensure or indicate a change in longstanding illiberal political structures and practices. Such changes may become observable only in the medium and long terms. Therefore, an analysis of the effects of federal intervention on subnational democratization should include an examination of how political structures and practices change (or fail to change) in the short, medium, and long terms.

In Gibson's analysis of Argentina, one of the central institutional reforms that he takes into account in order to consider a province or state authoritarian is the existence of electoral rules that introduce a majoritarian or partisan bias. According to Gibson, this institutional design is used by incumbents to restrict access to elected office by the opposition, and its use means that the playing field is not level. In this framework, once electoral institutions that make the playing field unlevel are removed, subnational democratization should follow.

After 1983 many Argentine provinces reformed their electoral systems and introduced partisan biases that tended to consolidate the power of incumbent governors or ruling parties (Calvo and Escolar 2005).[6] Both Catamarca and Santiago del Estero introduced a strong majoritarian bias into their electoral legislation, but Corrientes did not. The effects of these reforms have been interpreted in diverse ways. Although some authors argue that they contributed to consolidating the territorial power of party factions and of the incumbent parties (Calvo and Escolar 2005), others have argued that these reforms were used to restrict contestation and develop hegemonic party rule in many Argentine provinces (Gibson 2012). These reforms skewed

the electoral playing field in favor of the incumbents by redesigning electoral districts and overrepresenting some districts over others (notably, rural constituencies over urban), but they were not cases of electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2006) or competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010). Provincial elections in Argentina are important events, and they do not constitute a façade of democracy, as occurs in cases of electoral or competitive authoritarianism. Even in provinces where an incumbent governor wins by a landslide and achieves reelection, there is often intense competition at lower levels, particularly at the municipal level.[7] The existence in many districts of electoral lists that carry different candidates for lower office but converge in a single candidate for governor and, before that, the *ley de lemas* is evidence that no governor (or president) can be certain of being elected if he or she does not undertake a broad and inclusive strategy of electoral alliances. Hence, cases that appear from the outside to be hegemonic need to be closely scrutinized in order to observe what kinds of political practices account for these landslide victories.

I focus on three Argentine provinces that were governed by powerful political families and in which the federal government intervened in the 1990s and the early twenty-first century. This focus allows me to assess Gibson's model of center-led democratization by exploring the dynamics of political change following federal intervention in three Argentine provinces: Catamarca, Corrientes, and Santiago del Estero. The selection of cases was based on an examination of positive cases: that is, cases in which a federal intervention took place as a result of demands for subnational democratization by an important (or at least visible) sector of society.[8]

These three provinces share some characteristics that make them particularly well suited to a study of political change following a federal intervention: all three had political systems in which a family or a single individual dominated politics for many years, all three were the scenes of massive mobilizations demanding greater democratization, and in all three party alternation occurred after federal intervention.[9] But although Catamarca and Santiago del Estero were governed by the Peronist Party (PJ) before their interventions, Corrientes was governed by a coalition of two provincial parties. In all three provinces, a broad coalition led by the Radical Party was elected after the federal intervention.

I assess political change leading to further subnational democratization in four broad areas: electoral contestation, family politics,[10] state-protected

violence, and control of the judiciary. These areas are not exhaustive and do not account for the whole array of illiberal structures and practices that may be observed at the subnational level. But they are central to any attempt to conceptualize the illiberal aspects of subnational political systems. Electoral contestation enables me to understand how open or closed the *electoral* game is. On its own, this variable is not sufficient to characterize the political system as a whole, and I use it only in combination with the other three. The indicators of contestation that I use here are the existence of a majoritarian or partisan bias in electoral legislation, the electoral competitiveness index (the margin of victory in elections for governor), and the electoral fragmentation of the political system as reflected by the effective number of parties index, described later in this chapter. The focus on political families allows me to analyze elite circulation and what real possibilities exist for those who are outside a family's inner circle to achieve executive office in a province. Political families are understood here in broad terms, as a political and not a legal construct. These are families that command political authority (and, on some occasions but not exclusively, wield economic power and social prestige) and develop structures of political control based on kinship relations but also on relations with close associates that function as an extended family (Balmori et al. 1984; Behrend 2008, 2011). I study the continuity of family politics by looking at the trajectory and social position of the governor elected in the period following federal intervention. The analysis of state-protected violence allows me to assess the existence of illiberal political structures and practices that allow crimes (be they isolated or not) by the political elite or state institutions (for example, the police) to go unpunished.[11] I base my analysis of state-protected violence on paradigmatic cases reported in the media and on the monitoring carried out by human rights organizations such as the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS).[12] Elite control of the judiciary enables me to assess the independence of this important branch of government. Studies of subnational courts have shown the enormous variation in judicial independence that can exist across different provinces.[13] Control of the judiciary is assessed through paradigmatic rulings by provincial supreme courts and reports by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that monitor judicial affairs.[14] After analyzing the degree of change in each of these four areas, I assess to what extent democratization occurred in these provinces and what pathways toward subnational democratization can be identified in each case. To this end, I use the framework of pathways

toward subnational democratization developed in chapter 10, which is based on the categories of control/conditionality, contagion, and activation.[15]

Federal interventions are major events in provincial politics. They involve an interruption of normal, everyday politics and the replacement of elected authorities with envoys from the federal government (interventors). In most cases they act as trigger events that produce electoral realignments in the provinces. However, an electoral realignment should not be equated with subnational democratization. The analytical questions at stake here are these: What kind of change do federal interventions produce? How far-reaching are these changes? Are these interventions able to interrupt the self-reinforcing processes that enable the reproduction of illiberal structures and practices over time? It may well be that these "large events" are less consequential in the long term than their spectacular interruption of everyday politics would lead us to imagine.

In some cases it may be possible to identify neat causal chains that allow us to explain political change or the lack thereof after federal intervention. However, in other cases subnational democratization after national democratization may be more contingent and "messy" and, at least in part, attributable to less specific and harder-to-measure variables such as contagion from neighboring provinces, diffusion effects, the activation of existing institutions (See Levitsky and Murillo 2013 and chapter 10 in this volume), time, generational change, political learning, and so on.

Three Provinces: Catamarca, Corrientes and Santiago del Estero

Catamarca

Catamarca was the first province in which the federal government intervened after the transition to democracy in 1983. This northwestern province had been ruled by the Saadi family for decades. Vicente Leónidas Saadi was one of Juan Perón's early allies in the provinces of the interior, and after the transition to democracy his son Ramón Saadi was elected governor of Catamarca. But the Saadi clan was not the only political family in Catamarca. The Castillo family controlled the opposition Radical Civic Union, or Radical Party (UCR), and together the two families dominated politics for most of the twentieth century.[16]

In 1990, Catamarca was the scene of massive mobilizations against the provincial elite. These mobilizations, which began as a protest against the

murder of teenager María Soledad Morales in a case that involved many of the provincial political families, soon became a protest against the local political elite's impunity. The mobilizations and the political scandal that ensued triggered a federal intervention. The government intervened in the province with the aim of eroding the power of the Saadis, who had, additionally, openly expressed their opposition to President Menem's economic policies.

ELECTORAL CONTESTATION

From 1983 and until the federal intervention, Catamarca had a majoritarian electoral system that allowed the winning party to capture 60 percent of seats in the provincial legislature, leaving the remaining 40 percent of seats to the first minority (Calvo and Escolar 2005; Gibson and Suárez Cao 2010). Hence, although the 1983 elections were closely fought between the PJ and the UCR, the Peronists made off with a supermajority. This allowed the Saadi clan to consolidate its power. In 1988 the provincial Constitution was modified to allow for the reelection of the governor and changes were introduced to electoral legislation. The number of provincial deputies was increased, but the majoritarian bias of the electoral system that had been inherited from the past was maintained.

The 1991 intervention introduced changes to electoral legislation and implanted a proportional system for the first time in the province's history (Carrera 2001). After the intervention, in elections overseen by the national government, alternation occurred and a coalition headed by the UCR won the governorship. The UCR maintained its hegemony over provincial politics for two decades following the federal intervention, until the PJ and the Saadi family returned to the governorship in 2011. Figure 4.1 shows the competitiveness and fragmentation of the provincial party system from 1983 to 2011, when the most recent elections for governor were held. The effective number of parties (ENP) for governor, which indicates the level of fragmentation of the party system, remained relatively stable after the federal intervention, and electoral competition for governor was mostly between the PJ and the Frente Cívico y Social (headed by the UCR). Immediately after the federal intervention, the competitiveness index, which measures the governor's margin of victory, showed that elections for governor were contested until the 2003 elections, when the system became less competitive. Contestation increased again in the 2011 elections, when governor Lucía Corpacci Saadi won in a closely fought election and signaled the return of Peronism–and of the Saadi family–to provincial politics.




Figure 4.1. Effective number of parties (ENP) and electoral competitiveness in elections for governor: Catamarca, 1983–2011. Data from the Dirección Nacional Electoral, Interior Ministry.

FAMILY POLITICS

With the transition to democracy in 1983, Vicente Saadi was elected senator once again, his son Ramón Saadi was elected governor, and eleven other family members won elected office or government appointments (Hedges 1996).[17] In 1987 the elder Saadi was once again elected governor, and after his death, his son Ramón, who was in the Senate, was elected governor for a second term. The Saadis had supported President Menem's candidacy, and they held important positions in the national PJ and in the Senate. However, by the early 1990s divergences on economic policies and unfulfilled political expectations distanced the former allies.

After the federal intervention, Arnoldo Castillo (UCR) was elected governor. Castillo belonged to one of the province's oldest families and had been governor of Catamarca during the military dictatorship that ruled Argentina from 1976 to 1983. Alternation in Catamarca meant the return to power of a former de facto governor and of another traditional provincial family. Following a dynamic similar to that seen in the Saadi clan, Castillo served two terms as governor (1991–95 and 1995–99) and was then replaced by his son Oscar Castillo (1999–2003). It was only in 2003 that a governor

who did not belong to one of the traditional families–Eduardo Brizuela del Moral–was elected for two consecutive periods.[18] In 2011 the Saadi family, which had continued to hold elective positions in the twenty years of UCR hegemony, returned to the helm of the province.[19] Vicente Saadi's niece, Lucía Corpacci Saadi, was elected governor of Catamarca.

STATE-PROTECTED VIOLENCE

The murder of María Soledad Morales in 1990 uncovered a provincial police force that demonstrated connivance with human rights violations committed by the sons of influential political families linked to the Saadi government. Due to its links with the political elite, the police force failed to adequately investigate the murder. Among those accused of the crime were the son of a Peronist national deputy, the nephews of the Peronist mayor of the provincial capital (who was also the owner of the clinic where the victim's body was hidden), and the son of the police chief (*El Esquiú*, September 8, 2013). The police chief was charged with covering up the murder and was accused of intimidating key witnesses.

The federal intervention introduced a reform of the provincial police force. It is difficult to assess the level of democratization of the police, and the only data available on its performance are found in newspaper reports and the annual human rights reports published by the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS) NGO. These reports highlight the violent repression by the provincial police of social protests against mining operations in Catamarca (CELS 2011)[20] and alleged police violence against minors under arrest in the province (CELS 2012).

CONTROL OF THE JUDICIARY

The 1990 murder of María Soledad Morales also evidenced the connivance of local judges with the political elite. The judge in charge of the investigation was accused of failing to adequately investigate the main suspects, who were sons of some of the most important political families in the province. In the first trial for the crime, in 1996 (five years after the federal intervention had removed the Saadi family from office), local federal judges and the provincial Supreme Court were still responding to the interests of the Saadi political elite. That trial ended in a mistrial after the judges were seen on television cameras making signs to each other that revealed their bias toward the accused. In addition, politicians from the UCR, which was in office at the time, conducted a smear campaign against activists demanding justice

(Smulovitz and Peruzzoti 2003).[21] In 1998 a new trial was held, and two of the accused were found guilty and imprisoned.

ASSESSING SUBNATIONAL DEMOCRATIZATION

What changed and what did not change with the federal intervention of 1991? Electoral legislation was modified to eliminate the system's majoritarian bias, and an opposition governor was elected. Formal rules changed, but family politics continued under the opposition government, as did the tendency toward hegemonic party dominance. Electoral politics became more competitive in the first decade following federal intervention but then reverted after 2003. This shows how resilient certain social and political structures can be. With regard to state-protected violence, rights violations like those that were brought to light following the María Soledad murder were not reported by the media or by human rights NGOs in the two decades following the federal intervention, although in the past few years environmental protest movements against mining operations in the province have been strongly—and often violently—repressed by the local police. Although the judiciary did not become immediately accountable in the short term, as the first mistrial in the María Soledad case evidenced, in the long term it was forced to become more accountable than before. The business links of the political elite with the local state were not dismantled by the intervention or by the subsequently elected Radical government. The boundaries between public and private interests in Catamarca are still blurry to this day.

The federal intervention in Catamarca was a clear case of control/conditionality by the federal government, which forced the reform of electoral legislation and put pressure on the provincial government to have a more accountable police force. The pathway of control/conditionality was combined with the activation of existing institutions—notably the judiciary. The judiciary was not reformed, but greater societal and media attention forced it to become more responsive to citizens after the mistrial in the María Soledad case. Other forms of activation have included the mobilizations against mining in the province, but these have been less successful in achieving government accountability and responsiveness.

Corrientes

The northeastern province of Corrientes suffered two federal interventions after 1983: one in 1992 and one in 1999. Unlike in Catamarca and Santiago

del Estero, in Corrientes there were no flagrant human rights violations; the interventions were ordered after political crises that threatened the stability of the political system.

As mentioned earlier, the 1992 intervention was triggered by an intra-elite crisis. But in 1999 a federal intervention was ordered after nine months of protests and mobilizations in the provincial capital. The provincial state was in paralysis, unable to fulfill its basic functions or pay its employees, and that caused an intra-elite crisis. The protest focused on the political elite and grew into a demand for subnational democratization. However, it received little national media coverage until December 1999, when protesters blocked the road over a bridge on President Fernando de la Rúa's inauguration day. Less than a week after taking office, De la Rúa ordered the brutal repression of those staging the roadblock and federal intervention in the province.[22] In the context of the protest, the governor of Corrientes and the mayor of the provincial capital were impeached. After a two-year federal intervention, a governor from the president's party (the UCR) was elected.

ELECTORAL CONTESTATION

Through most of the twentieth century, Corrientes was ruled by two provincial parties, the Autonomista Party and the Liberal Party, which alternated in power, and after 1961 by the Autonomista–Liberal Pact, an alliance whereby the two parties alternated in power and shared governmental appointments. These parties, which were heirs of the two national conservative parties created in the nineteenth century (the Partido Autonomista Nacional and the Partido Liberal), subsisted as provincial parties in Corrientes despite their disappearance in the rest of the country. The province was one of the few where the provincial political system continued to be dominated by provincial instead of national parties after 1983.

Unlike the electoral systems in Catamarca or Santiago del Estero, that in Corrientes did not have a majoritarian or partisan bias. However, until 1992 the governor was selected by an electoral college, which was eliminated after the federal intervention and replaced with a run-off election formula. Reelection was introduced only in 2007 through a constitutional reform. Coalition government has always been the norm in Corrientes. Whereas before 1992 the formula to achieve this was the alliance between the two provincial parties, after the 1992 federal intervention the coalition was broadened to include the PJ when Governor Raúl Romero Feris created a




Figure 4.2. Effective number of parties (ENP) and electoral competitiveness in elections for governor: Corrientes, 1983–2013. Data from the Dirección Nacional Electoral, Interior Ministry.

new political party, the PaNu (Partido Nuevo), in 1995. In 2001 a new coalition headed by the UCR broadened the oligarchy and won office. This coalition has governed the province since then. Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of the fragmentation of the provincial party system and the competitiveness of elections for governor before and after the federal interventions. The 1999 federal intervention does not appear to have made elections for governor more competitive. Indeed, the opposite appears to have been true. It was only in 2009 that elections for governor became more contested in Corrientes, when the two Colombi cousins competed for the governorship, and again in 2013, when a Peronist candidate competed in a closely fought election with Governor Ricardo Colombi.

FAMILY POLITICS

The political elite in Corrientes succeeded in creating a stable political system in which members of a few families, predominantly the Romero Feris family, and the two parties in the Pact peacefully alternated in power until the early 1990s. The 1992 federal intervention was unable to put an end to family politics, and in elections overseen by the national government, one of the Romero Feris brothers was elected governor. Because reelection was not allowed in Corrientes, the problem of succession created a political

crisis. After the 1999 federal intervention, a new political family reached power, the Colombi family, enrolled in the local UCR.

The dynamics of family politics, elite agreements, and factionalism continued after the election of Governor Ricardo Colombi. His cousin Arturo Colombi succeeded him as governor in 2005. In 2009 the two cousins competed for the governorship, and Ricardo Colombi won the elections again. In a sign of the continuing importance of family politics in Corrientes, each Colombi was backed by a different Romero Feris brother.[23] The political party in power had changed, but yet another family had reached power and was once again renewing the provincial tradition of family politics, elite settlements, and factional disputes.

STATE-PROTECTED VIOLENCE

Unlike Catamarca and Santiago del Estero, Corrientes did not have a repressive political system or violent political practices. State-protected violence reached the province through the federal government's repression of the 1999 protests. In December 1999, the De la Rúa government sent the Gendarmería to Corrientes to violently repress the people involved in a roadblock. As a result, twenty-five people were injured and two people were killed after being shot at by security forces.

CONTROL OF THE JUDICIARY

Although in the 1992 federal intervention the provincial Supreme Court was accused of "responding to the political interests of the ruling families" (*El Litoral*, October 25, 1992, my translation), there is little evidence of direct attempts by the elite to control the courts or intimidate judges, before or after either of the federal interventions. One exception to this was the lack of a thorough investigation into the 1999 repression undertaken by the federal government. Local human rights organizations pointed out that the federal judge who had ordered the repression of those staging the roadblock was the same judge who was in charge of investigating the deaths and injuries that occurred as a result of the repression, which made it difficult for justice to be achieved.[24]

ASSESSING SUBNATIONAL DEMOCRATIZATION

Unlike the other two provinces included in this chapter, Corrientes did not have a repressive police force and its less democratic features were rooted in its oligarchical political structure, control of provincial media by the political

families, and the links between the political elite and state contracts. The massive mobilizations of 1999 were against family politics and the oligarchic political system and in demand of subnational democratization. The federal intervention did not dismantle the structure of family politics but rather installed a new political family in power. The case of Corrientes shows to what extent family politics can be deeply embedded in local political systems and can be reproduced despite alternation. In terms of electoral contestation, it shows that elections did not become more competitive after federal intervention; indeed, the opposite was true until the 2013 elections. Although media ownership did not change, the fact that the government was now headed by a different party meant that the media were not so closely linked to the governor. The case of Corrientes illustrates some of the illiberal aspects of federal intervention. In Corrientes, it was the federal intervention that brought state-protected violence to the province, not previously existing illiberal structures and practices.

The federal intervention aimed at controlling the political process in Corrientes lasted an unusually long time—two years. Because its objective was not to undertake institutional reform or democratize illiberal structures and practices (either electoral or judicial), the length of the intervention can be attributed to a federal government attempt to ensure the election of a political ally. This did, indeed, occur in the subsequent election. It is in this regard that the intervention's democratizing objectives can be seriously called into question. Accountability mechanisms were activated to some degree through massive mobilizations, but all in all, politics after the intervention in Corrientes continued as usual, and the province remains a closed game in which a few families control access to government positions and to the few business opportunities that exist.

Santiago del Estero

The case of Santiago del Estero is the most extreme of the three cases I cover and is one of the paradigmatic cases on which Gibson (2012) based his conceptualization of "subnational authoritarianism." Like Corrientes, Santiago del Estero has undergone federal intervention twice since the transition to democracy. Veteran caudillo Carlos Juárez dominated provincial politics directly or indirectly from the rise of Peronism in the mid-1940s until the federal intervention ordered by President Kirchner in 2003. Juárez was elected governor of Santiago del Estero five times and was also elected to the Senate during his long political career.

The first federal intervention was decreed after massive riots erupted in December 1993 to protest the provincial government's austerity plan, reform of the provincial state, delays in the payment of state employees' wages, and the widespread corruption in the government of Peronist Governor Fernando Lobo, an ally of Juárez (Farinetti 2005; Auyero 2006). These protests were accompanied by demands for subnational democratization. The interventor was a man close to then–economy minister Domingo Cavallo, which suggests that, rather than democratization, the intervention's aim was to restructure the provincial state.

In 2004 Juárez's wife, Mercedes "Nina" Aragonés de Juárez, was governor of Santiago del Estero, and massive protest movements broke out over the brutal murders of two young women—Leyla Bshier Nazar and Patricia Villalba—in the provincial capital. As in the Morales case in Catamarca, provincial politicians and the son of the local police intelligence chief were implicated in the events leading to the two murders. Antonio Musa Azar, head of provincial police intelligence, was charged with heading a repressive secret police that had carried out these and other murders and had also persecuted and spied on political opponents (*Télam*, May 24, 2012; *El Litoral*, November 14, 2012). In April 2004, President Kirchner ordered the federal intervention in Santiago del Estero, and in March 2005 a Radical governor, Gerardo Zamora, was elected, bringing an end to the Juárez era.

ELECTORAL CONTESTATION

Carlos Juárez was elected governor five times in the history of Santiago del Estero, and he was unbeaten in all electoral contests. From 1983 and until 2005, the PJ won all the elections for governor in the province. In 1983 Santiago del Estero had an electoral system with a strong majoritarian bias, which was maintained until an electoral reform carried out under the federal intervention in 2004. Santiago del Estero was one of the provinces that introduced the greatest number of electoral reforms after democratization: a total of five before the 2004 federal intervention (Calvo and Escolar 2005). These reforms aimed at maintaining the electoral system's majoritarian bias and ensuring that Juárez had strong control over the provincial legislature. Until the 1999 gubernatorial elections, there was no reelection in Santiago del Estero. This created serious succession problems for the *caudillo*, who had to rely on trusted politicians from his inner circle who he thought were always on the verge of "betraying" him and seeking to govern on their own.




Figure 4.3. Effective number of parties (ENP) and electoral competitiveness in elections for governor: Santiago del Estero, 1983–2008. Source: Data from the Dirección Nacional Electoral, Interior Ministry.

After the 2004 federal election, alternation occurred and a Radical politician, Gerardo Zamora, was elected governor as part of a broad front, the Frente Cívico. The Frente Cívico has won all subsequent elections, with an even larger margin of votes than Juárez had received, as figure 4.3 illustrates. The centrality of the governor in provincial politics has been documented by Ortiz de Rozas (2011), who shows how Juárez and Zamora undertook similar practices of alliance building—with similar results—under different electoral systems. In terms of electoral contestation, the data presented in figure 4.3 show that the political system did not become more competitive after the 2004 federal intervention. Indeed, the opposite seems to have occurred: the ENP competing for elections has dropped, to the point that Santiago del Estero now appears to have a one-party system, and the competitiveness index shows that the governor has won with ever-increasing margins of victory since the federal intervention, so elections are far less competitive than they were in the Juárez era.

FAMILY POLITICS

Politics in Santiago del Estero illustrates to what extent family politics can exist in a nonoligarchic setting. Much like Vicente Leónidas Saadi in Cata-

marca, Carlos Juárez was a provincial *caudillo* who was part of a new elite that emerged after the political opening that came with the rise of Peronism. Between 1949 and 1983, on the few occasions when there were elections, Juárez was always a candidate (Alen Lascano 1992). After 1983 he returned to the helm of the province. Because there was no reelection in Santiago del Estero and he did not have any children, Juárez always faced succession crises that were resolved when a gubernatorial period had passed and he was able to return to office. The 1991 federal intervention did not erode Juárez's power base, and he was once again elected governor of the province in 1995. Juárez was governor from 1995 until 1998, when he resigned to run for the Senate. In 1999 he resigned his Senate seat to run for the governor's office again, leaving his seat to his nephew Jorge Mikkelsen Loth Aragonés. In 2001 he once again resigned as governor to run for the Senate, and his wife, Mercedes "Nina" Aragonés de Juárez, who was his deputy governor, became governor of Santiago del Estero.

The 2004 federal intervention put an end to the Juárez era, but it did not put an end to family politics. Like Juárez, Radical Governor Gerardo Zamora did not come from a notable family, but he nonetheless developed his own family network. Zamora won the 2005 election and was reelected in 2009. In 2013, after a federal Supreme Court ruling prevented him from being reelected for a third consecutive term, Zamora resolved the succession crisis in the same way that Juárez had done a decade earlier: he designated his wife, Claudia Ledesma Abdala, as the candidate, and she won the election with over 64 percent of the votes.

STATE-PROTECTED VIOLENCE

In Santiago del Estero, state-protected violence reached unprecedented levels during the Juárez era. The murders of Leyla Bshier Nazar and Patricia Villalba in 2004 uncovered a sinister and repressive provincial police and intelligence system that had had no parallel in any Argentine province after the transition to democracy in 1983. The head of the provincial police, Musa Azar, had been responsible for the disappearance and torture of local citizens during the 1976–83 military dictatorship. As police chief under Juárez, he continued with these practices and was responsible for human rights violations and restrictions of civil rights (Intervención Federal Santiago del Estero, n.d.; Schnyder 2011).

One of the main objectives of the federal intervention was to dismantle the repressive police apparatus that had operated under Juárez through the

elimination of formal illiberal norms (for instance, norms that banned political and union acts in public spaces) and informal illiberal practices that persisted from the dictatorship. The federal intervention reformed both the police and the penitentiary system and succeeded in dismantling state-protected violence (Intervención Federal Santiago del Estero, n.d.). But although there have been no reports of gross human rights violations since these reforms were enacted, there have been cases of restriction of civil rights. In December 2013, a local journalist was arrested and held for ten days after filming the violent arrest of a police officer who was protesting in demand of a pay raise. The journalist was charged with "inciting violence" under a federal antiterrorism law, but after the case was nationalized, it was dismissed by the Federal Appeals Court in the neighboring province of Tucumán (*Clarín*, October 29, 2014).

CONTROL OF THE JUDICIARY

Another illiberal structure under Juárez was the provincial judiciary. The final report from the federal intervention highlighted the lack of independence of the local judiciary from the executive due to partisan reasons or "intolerable interference" by the political powers in the provincial Supreme Court (Intervención Federal Santiago del Estero, n.d., my translation). The report also noted the provincial Supreme Court's failure to take action in cases of gross human rights violations and delays of up to seven years in issuing rulings.

Federal authorities designated an impartial judge to try the case of the two murdered women and replaced the members of the provincial Supreme Court. But although the federal intervention reformed the judicial system and, in particular, the procedures for naming judges, with the aim of making it more independent of the provincial executive, after a few years the provincial Supreme Court's lack of independence from the executive proved to be a resilient illiberal structure. In 2013 Governor Gerardo Zamora attempted to flout the provincial Constitution and stand for a third consecutive term in office. The provincial Supreme Court ruled that the ban on a third consecutive term in office was unconstitutional and enabled the governor to run. A few days before the election for governor in October 2013, the federal Supreme Court ruled that the provincial Constitution was unequivocal in its ban and that the governor could not run. This case shows that the provincial Supreme Court is still not an independent body and, under certain circumstances, is willing to violate the provincial Constitution.

ASSESSING SUBNATIONAL DEMOCRATIZATION

To what extent did the 2004 federal intervention democratize Santiago del Estero? And did it succeed in fending off nondemocratic or antidemocratic challenges? Santiago del Estero had a very repressive and oppressive political system under Juárez. In this regard, the federal intervention succeeded in dismantling police repression that had formerly been protected by the local political system. However, illiberal structures and practices have continued under Governor Zamora, as the case of the arrested journalist evidences. With regard to contestation, Santiago del Estero is an interesting case: an opposition governor was elected after the intervention, and an electoral reform allowed the opposition to obtain a fair share of seats in the provincial legislature. However, as figure 4.3 shows, elections for governor became less competitive than in the Juárez era, and the governor's margin of victory grew to surprising levels. The evolution of the ENP shows that Santiago del Estero is currently closer to a one-party system than it was in the past. The example of the provincial Supreme Court ruling that sought to flout the Constitution and enable the governor to run for a third consecutive term in office shows the extent to which a lack of effective checks and balances persists in Santiago del Estero, as well as the resilience of illiberal political structures despite federal intervention, institutional reform, and party alternation.

The second federal intervention in Santiago del Estero, in 2004, was a clear case of control/conditionality. The federal government forced the reform of electoral and police institutions. During the intervention, control and conditionality were limited to electoral reforms and the police. The judiciary has remained an illiberal structure, and illiberal practices have persisted, as evidenced by the cases of the arrested journalist and the provincial Supreme Court. However, the federal Supreme Court's overruling of the local Supreme Court's decision that the governor could run for a third consecutive term in office was a clear case of federal control without intervention. Additionally, the dismantling of the repressive system maintained by the Juárez government enabled the activation of societal mechanisms of control, and, in the end, these mechanisms succeeded in calling attention to rights violations by the local judicial system. These activation mechanisms have served to signal illiberal practices in individual cases but have not succeeded in democratizing illiberal judicial structures in Santiago del Estero.

Conclusions

The Argentine experience of center-led democratization—or control/conditionality from the federal government—highlights three important lessons for the comparative study of subnational democratization. First, as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter and illustrated by the case studies, federal intervention is not always democratic or democratizing. In many cases, federal governments seek to extract political benefits from a federal intervention and to help a political ally win office. Second, in cases of extremely illiberal structures or practices, center-led initiatives can be very important in undermining state-protected violence, but, as the case of Corrientes illustrates, they can also cause violence. Third, oppositions that break with illiberal structures and practices are not guaranteed to arise after federal intervention or party alternation. Indeed, as the three case studies analyzed in this chapter evidence, the opposition parties that reach office after federal intervention may well reproduce many of the illiberal structures and practices of their predecessors. And alternation immediately after federal intervention does not guarantee that the party system will become more competitive in the long term.

Activation mechanisms that do not involve institutional change but make previously dormant institutions become active may prove to be an important pathway toward subnational democratization in nationally democratic countries, as the three case studies in this chapter show. This is particularly true of institutions such as the judiciary or the public prosecutor's office. Mobilization, judicial activism, and media denunciations are some examples of how previously dormant institutions can be activated to promote subnational democratization.

What changed—and what did not change—following federal intervention in the three provinces analyzed in this chapter? Was the outcome of federal intervention subnational democratization? If so, to what extent was this achieved?

In all three cases there was a fair amount of political change, particularly in the dismantling of repressive structures and practices that coexisted with democratic ones, but also a fair amount of resilience, adaptation, and continuity. Two of the provinces, Catamarca and Santiago del Estero, had political systems that sheltered illiberal structures and practices that were incompatible with democracy before the interventions. In Santiago del Estero, these practices were very systematic, in Catamarca less so. But in both provinces

the political elite had a fair amount of impunity. In these cases, intervention by the federal government succeeded in dismantling pockets of repression and important progress was made toward subnational democratization in this dimension. However, more resilience and adaptation were observed in other illiberal structures and practices related to electoral contestation, family politics, and control of the judiciary by the local executive. Formal and informal institutions structure political life. In these three provinces, institutions—both formal and informal—have shown great stickiness over time and have reproduced themselves despite political alternation and federal intervention. This does not mean that there has been no change. Resilient institutions have often adapted and modified their roles over the course of time. Table 4.2 shows the reforms carried out by the federal interventions and political change along the dimensions analyzed in each case study.

Reform of electoral legislation in all cases enabled the opposition to reach power (i.e., alternation), but in most cases it did not result in greater contestation. Indeed, the long-term tendency in all three provinces was toward an increase in the margins of victory of governors after federal intervention and, therefore, a decrease in electoral competitiveness.

Family politics proved to be another sticky and resilient structure. In the three provinces, new political families developed or reached office after federal intervention.[25] Once in office, they tended to remain in power and reproduce the family politics of their predecessors. The cases of Santiago del Estero and Corrientes are compelling examples in this regard, and that of Catamarca shows how political families that are strongly embedded in local political systems can subsist and return to executive office even after two decades. As regards control of the judiciary by the provincial executive, in Catamarca and Santiago del Estero, the two provinces that had evidenced

TABLE 4.2.
Democratization / resilience of illiberal structures and practices in Catamarca, Corrientes, and Santiago del Estero after federal intervention

Province	Year	Reform of electoral laws / constitution	Alternation following intervention	Electoral contestation	Family politics	State-protected violence	Control of judiciary
Catamarca	1991	Yes	Yes	1993–2003 increased; 2003–2009 decreased	Resilient	No	Resilient
Corrientes	1999	No	Yes	Decreased	Resilient	No	No
Santiago del Estero	1991	No	No	Decreased	Resilient	Resilient	Resilient
	2004	Yes	Yes	Decreased	Resilient	No	Resilient

greater interdependence among the three branches of government before federal intervention, this illiberal structure proved largely resilient.

Federal government control/conditionality worked at its best in the area of state-protected violence, forcing provincial governments to adhere to national human rights standards, and it is fair to conclude that federal intervention had the most democratizing consequences in provinces that had pockets of repression.[26]

Rather than demonstrating a punctuated equilibrium change model of democratization, where federal intervention produces immediate democratization, the three case studies analyzed in this chapter show how illiberal structures and practices can change gradually through control/conditionality, contagion from neighboring provinces and from federal democratic standards, and, most of all, through the activation of existing democratic institutions that start to fulfill their functions in a changing subnational environment.

Federal intervention could in some cases be understood as a necessary but insufficient condition of subnational democratization in political systems where police or other forms of state-protected violence persist. But in political systems that are not particularly repressive, like that in Corrientes, or in dimensions unrelated to state-protected violence, federal intervention on its own is unlikely to lead to subnational democratization and it may not even be a necessary condition of democratization. In many cases, the activation of democratic institutions and the convergence of political practices toward national standards may take considerable time to unfold and subnational democratization may remain an outcome only partially achieved.

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NOTES

1. The existence of a regime requires stabilization and durability over time (Morlino 2012).

2. This lack of convergence has been interpreted in various ways by scholars. Gibson (2012) considers the less democratic provinces to be "subnational authoritarian regimes." Giraudy (2010) refers to them as subnational undemocratic regimes, and Gervasoni (2010) considers them to be hybrid regimes.

3. The boundaries between public and private become blurred when the political elite has business connections with the state, for example, and the separation between the three branches does not function adequately when the governor controls the judiciary or exercises strong control over the legislature, among other possible situations.

4. Two people were killed and twenty-five were injured when the Gendarmería opened fire on protesters.

5. It also matters how a federal intervention is ordered. Although the Constitution says that a federal intervention should be decided by a congressional vote, in most cases it has been done by presidential decree and has been ratified ex post by Congress (Serrafero 2005).

6. Calvo and Escolar (2005) document thirty-eight electoral reforms and thirty-two constitutional reforms in the first two decades after redemocratization.

7. Governors in Argentina are powerful political actors; on the power of governors, see González (2014).

8. Following these criteria, the interventions in Tucumán in 1991 and Corrientes in 1992 fall outside the scope of this investigation because the triggers of federal intervention were factionalism and intra-elite crises, not a political crisis that involved a profound questioning of the democratic nature of the provincial political system.

9. In Santiago del Estero, party alternation occurred only after the second intervention, not after the first.

10. The existence of political families is not in itself illiberal, and indeed there were many political families in the origins of liberalism. However, it is the network of power and the penetration of public institutions that these political families develop at the subnational level that constitute illiberal practices.

11. In almost all democratic countries there are occasional criminal incidents or rights violations by state institutions. What varies is the protection or the impunity that the state affords those who commit these crimes. If rights violations are systematic and sustained over time, we can refer to this as a "subnational authoritarian situation" (Behrend 2012).

12. Comparative data on state-sponsored violence across Argentine provinces are not available, so I rely on cases reported by the media and by CELS.

13. See, for example, Bill Chávez (2004), Castagnola (2012), and Leiras, Giraudy, and Tuñón (2015).

14. In the cases of Catamarca and Corrientes, all the data were checked by means of author interviews with political and social actors in the two provinces. In Santiago del Estero I relied on secondary sources and scholarly studies by experts in the politics of that province.

15. The first two are adapted from the literature on the international dimensions of democratization (Whitehead 1994), and the third builds on the literature on informal institutions (Levitsky and Murillo 2013). See chapter 10 in this volume.

16. Ramón Castillo was vice president of Argentina from 1938 until 1942 and president from 1942 until 1943, during what was known as the *década infame* of conservative rule and electoral fraud. He was removed by the military coup that allowed Perón to rise to power. In Catamarca this enabled the rise of a competing sector of the elite. Vicente Leónidas

Saadi, who was new to politics, married a member of one of the conservative families that had been important in provincial politics since the early nineteenth century. Saadi joined the Peronist movement early on and in 1947 became a senator for the Partido Laborista (the forerunner to the PJ) at the age of thirty-three. In 1949 he was elected governor of Catamarca. Saadi had already passed through the UCR and the Conservative Party before migrating to Peronism. Thus Peronism allowed excluded members of the elite to reach power in the province. The PJ was adopted as an alternative to the old Conservative Party by weakened members of the elite in Catamarca and by a new political class that sought greater insertion in politics without altering the basic power structure prevalent in the region (Hedges 1996). Vicente Saadi founded his own newspaper, *La Voz*, which in the 1980s was run by his son Ramón.

17. Alfonsín, who was eager to establish good relations with Saadi, named his nephew Guillermo Rosales Saadi ambassador to Libya and his brother-in-law ambassador to Honduras (Hedges 1996).

18. In his second period, his deputy governor was Lucía Corpacci Saadi, a member of the Saadi family.

19. Contrary to the outward impression given by the election of a Radical governor after the federal intervention of 1990, the Saadi family had not disappeared from provincial politics during those years. In 1991, Ramón Saadi was elected deputy; in 1999 he returned once more to the Lower House; and in 2003 he was elected to the Senate.

20. See, for example, *La Nación* (February 10, 2012) and *Clarín* (February 11, 2012).

21. Among the politicians who were behind the smear campaign were prominent members of the UCR-led Frente Cívico y Social, including the governor, and then-legislator and future governor Eduardo Brizuela del Moral (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003).

22. Two people were killed and twenty-five injured in the repression.

23. Arturo Colombi allied himself with Tato Romero Feris, and Ricardo Colombi allied himself with J. A. Romero Feris (*Perfil*, July17, 2009).

24. Author's interviews with local human rights organizations, carried out in November and December 2003.

25. In Corrientes and Santiago del Estero it was only after the second intervention that the dominant family's power base was eroded and a new political family reached office.

26. Reform of provincial police forces is still pending in practically all Argentine provinces, and hence the police force has proven to be a durable and resilient illiberal structure. On police reform in Argentina, see Eaton (2008).

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The Dimensions of Democratic and Hybrid Subnational Regimes

Evidence from an Expert Survey in Argentina

CARLOS GERVASONI

The emerging literature on subnational regimes has started to fill a very important gap in the broader field of democracy and democratization studies—that is, the uneven distribution of political rights across regions, provinces, states, and municipalities in the same country. A number of theoretical approaches have recently been proposed to explain this variance. In just a few years scholars have pointed to modernization (McMann and Petrov 2000), patterns of interaction with national actors (Gibson 2005, 2012; Giraudy 2015; Mickey 2015), economic autonomy (McMann 2006), diffusion (Lankina and Getachew 2006), and rentierism, based either on natural resources (Goldberg, Wibbels, and Mvukiyehe 2008) or on redistributive fiscal federalism (Gervasoni 2010a). These explanatory efforts have not always been accompanied by similarly intense descriptive efforts. To some extent, we seem to have put the cart before the horse by reversing the logical description–explanation sequence. Obtaining sound descriptive inferences is a valuable and complex social science goal in and of itself and is a precondition for producing sound explanatory inferences. In this spirit, this chapter presents initial results from a broad descriptive study of provincial regimes in Argentina. It focuses on the country's twenty-four first-level subnational units, that is, the city of Buenos Aires (or CF, for Capital Federal[1] and twenty-three provinces.

Measuring subnational regimes in national-level democracies is especially difficult, in large part because national-level legislation requires provinces[2] to be institutionally democratic (which means that all of them "look" democratic at first sight). In Argentina, for example, the national constitution establishes a representative and republican form of government

for the provinces that replicates the national-level presidential system. Therefore, easy-to-observe distinctions between democratic and authoritarian regimes are generally absent. Cuba or Saudi Arabia are easily distinguished from Spain or Uruguay because the latter elect their governments in reasonably free and fair elections and for the most part respect liberal political rights. The former, on the other hand, are ruled by nonelected dictators who ban opposition parties. So the distinctions are crystal clear. All the provinces of Argentina (and of many other democracies around the world), on the contrary, are institutionally similar. In particular, they elect their executives and legislatures in multiparty elections. As the literature on hybrid regimes has clearly shown, however, electoral institutions often mask regimes that are not especially democratic (Karl 1995; Zakaria 1997; Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2006). In other words, the illiberal practices emphasized in this volume are often present in the context of democratic-looking institutions.

How do we measure regime type in this context? A first and relatively easy-to-implement strategy is through objective indicators of political competitiveness and/or inclusiveness—as is done, for example, in the indexes proposed by Alvarez et al. (1996) and Vanhanen (2000). A second strategy, which is complementary to the first in terms of advantages and disadvantages, employs subjective (but informed) judgments to determine how democratic different aspects of a given political regime actually are, as illustrated by the Freedom House index. Drawing on this second approach, in this chapter I present the main results of an expert survey that I conducted to assess the levels of democracy in all the Argentine provinces.

Operationalizing Subnational Democracy: Conceptualization and Measurement

Issues of conceptualization and measurement have been only lightly addressed by the literature on subnational regimes. It is often unclear what conceptual definitions of democracy and authoritarianism are used, and what operational rules are applied, to determine whether a given province belongs in the first category, with Spain and Uruguay, in the second, with Cuba and Saudi Arabia, or somewhere in between. The pioneering case studies of "subnational authoritarianisms" (Cornelius 1999; Snyder 1999; Gibson 2005) placed the matter on the academic agenda and contributed significant insights but without providing explicit operationalizations of the concept of subnational democracy/authoritarianism.

National indexes of regime type have been available for decades (e.g., Alvarez et al. 1996; Vanhanen 2000; Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013; Freedom House 2015). In recent times a sophisticated methodological debate on measuring democracy has led to a better understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of the extant measures (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Goertz 2006; Treier and Jackman 2008; Coppedge 2012). As a result, a new wave of cross-national indices has emerged that—using new conceptualizations, new data. and/or new statistical methods—improves on imperfections of the previous ones (e.g., Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado 2008; Treier and Jackman 2008; for the Varieties of Democracy project, see Coppedge and Gerring et al. 2011). The young subfield of subnational regimes is, by comparison, well behind in conceptual clarity, measurement rigorousness, and data richness.

Given this state of affairs, sound descriptive inferences should be a priority for scholars of subnational regimes. This chapter draws on a methodological contribution—a new, expert-based operationalization strategy—to make a substantive contribution: a description of subnational democracy in the twenty-four provinces of Argentina for the period 2003–7. Many of the "illiberal structures and practices" would go unnoticed if one used typical objective indices based on formal institutions or electoral results (such as those of Alvarez et al. 1996 and Vanhanen 2000). One of the key advantages of the subjective (or perception-based) measurement strategy is precisely that it is better suited to capturing the many and often subtle ways in which democracy is restricted in subnational polities that are embedded in national democracies (Gervasoni 2010b).

Below I briefly introduce the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics (SEPP).[3] The rest of the chapter presents and analyzes the survey's key findings, with a focus on the dimensionality of regimes in the Argentine provinces. Readers interested in a detailed explanation and justification of the general operationalization strategy and of the SEPP's methodological design can consult an online appendix[4] and Gervasoni (2008 and 2010b). The survey can be easily replicated in any nation with elected and reasonably autonomous subnational governments (as has recently been done in the Mexican states[5]). We can hope that, in a not-so-distant future, scholars will periodically produce comparable estimates of subnational regime types around the world that can be used to assess the causes and consequences of subnational democracy on a sounder empirical basis.

The Nature of Subnational Regimes and Its Measurement Consequences

In his classic *Polyarchy*, Robert Dahl stressed that not dealing with *subnational* variance in opportunities for contestation and participation was a "grave omission" of his book (1971, 14). Only recently has this omission been tackled. The earliest studies I am aware of that define and measure regimes systematically in all (or most) of the subnational units of a country are those conducted by Hill (1994), Hernández Valdez (2000), and McMann and Petrov (2000). These and a wave of more recent studies have generally resorted to objective (institutional or electoral) indicators (e.g., Beer and Mitchell 2006; Borges 2007; Goldberg, Wibbels, and Mvukiyehe 2008; Gervasoni 2010a; and Giraudy 2010; for an exception using subjective indicators, see McMann 2006). These recent operationalization efforts have gone in the right direction but still pale in comparison to their national counterparts.

Although the concepts of democracy and authoritarianism are relatively well established in political science (Dahl 1971; Linz 1975), potential for disagreement and "stretching" does exist, especially when they are applied to new empirical domains. Thus, conceptualizations of subnational regime types sometimes incorporate idiosyncratic elements. Authoritarianism in Latin America, for example, is associated by some authors with "conservative rule" or "machine politics," and democratization is linked to the electoral progress of the (often leftist) opposition. In this chapter *democracy* is defined at a high level of abstraction, avoiding region-specific attributes that may not "travel" well (e.g., the understandable Latin American tendency to associate authoritarianism with conservative forces would be awkward in the context of the former communist countries of Eastern Europe).

Any measurement efforts should seriously take into account that, in the context of national-level democracies, subnational regimes are usually institutionally democratic: they have multiparty elections (often reasonably free), legislatures with some representation of opposition parties, nontrivial levels of freedom of speech, and the like. Subnational authorities are constrained in the extent to which they can restrict political rights. Blatantly authoritarian leaders are unlikely to succeed in keeping "boundary control" (Gibson 2005, 2012). Open and visible violations of political rights attract much negative national attention, which both hurts the provincial leaders' (often national) career ambitions and increases the likelihood that the federal government will use its formal or informal powers to remove them.[6] Moreover, national

constitutions and laws generally establish democratic subnational institutions that subnational legal norms cannot contradict. As a result, even the less democratic provincial regimes contain significant doses of democracy. The point may be blurred by the literature's tendency to use adjectives such as "authoritarian" and "undemocratic" to describe certain subnational regimes (Fox 1994; Cornelius 1999; Snyder 1999; Gibson 2005; Durazo Herrmann 2010; Giraudy 2010). As argued by McMann (2006), however, these are generally better described as "hybrid" rather than as "authoritarian" regimes.[7] A methodological consequence of the hybrid nature of some subnational regimes is that measurement is especially challenging: the differences between a hybrid Argentine province such as San Luis and a democratic one like Mendoza are smaller and less visible (and therefore harder to measure) than those between blatantly authoritarian North Korea and prototypically democratic Finland.

Hybrid regimes pose two distinct measurement problems. First, the narrower range of regime variation found in the provinces (as compared to national regime variation, given that many fully autocratic regimes do exist) implies, ceteris paribus, weaker reliability. Reliability depends not only on the precision of the measurement instrument but also on the magnitude of the differences among the objects being measured (Traub 1994). A given level of measurement error may be acceptable to establish differences among objects that are far apart, but too great to distinguish objects that are closer to each other. Second, the mix of elements of democracy and authoritarianism in the less democratic provinces increases measurement error: when the object to be coded is homogenous, all indicators will yield similar scores; conversely, when the object is complex, heterogeneous, "hybrid," different indicators and instances of measurements will yield different scores: North Korea will be coded as authoritarian regardless of the measure used, while Nigeria or Venezuela will appear more democratic according to some indicators and less so according to others. The relatively high proportion of hybrid subnational regimes in Argentina, then, conspires against reliability.

Figure 5.1 presents these measurement challenges graphically. The horizontal line represents the total range of regime variation, from fully autocratic to fully democratic (with four countries illustrating each pole). The gap in the line reflects the "jump" between regimes that do not hold elections (or hold uncompetitive ones) and electoral regimes. A democratic province (Mendoza) and a less democratic one (San Luis) are placed on this continuum. The distance between them is considerably smaller than that between Cuba and Finland. The circles and triangles represent scores from repeated measure-




Figure 5.1. National and subnational regime variance and its measurement.

ments (or from different indicators) of democracy for San Luis and Mendoza, respectively. Notice that the scores for each province differ considerably (because measurement error is inevitable), especially for the case of San Luis (because its hybrid nature makes its level of democracy harder to measure). In fact, the most democratic circle is not far from the least democratic triangle. One is in danger of missing the (important but not huge) regime difference between more (Mendoza) and less (San Luis) democratic provinces but not in danger of making such a mistake when assessing China and Canada.

In practical terms, this means that measurement has to be more careful and rigorous in the empirical domain of subnational regimes than at the national level. The scoring of a single indicator may be enough for us to estimate the magnitude of the difference between North Korea and Spain relatively accurately. As the figure shows, however, the same is not true for San Luis and Mendoza: picking any pair of triangle and circle may lead us to greatly under- or overestimate the regime differences between them.

Disaggregating Subnational Democracy: Dimensions and Subdimensions

Regime type is defined as a set of "procedural rules, whether formal or informal, that determine the number and type of actors who are allowed to gain access to the principal governmental positions, the methods of access to such positions, and the rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions" (Munck 1996, 8). This definition can be reduced to two sets of rules, those about how government positions are filled and those about what government officials can and cannot do. These two dimensions broadly correspond to the "democratic" and the "liberal" components of modern representative liberal democracies, respectively. They are, in turn, decomposed into five subdimensions, as shown in figure 5.2.




Figure 5.2. Genus, differentia, dimensions, and subdimensions of democracy.

Table 5.1 presents the dimensions (column 1) and subdimensions (column 2) introduced so far, plus a list of the components (column 3) and subcomponents (column 4) into which I decomposed each subdimension of democracy. Each subcomponent represents the end of the process of conceptual disaggregation and is measured by one or more indicators, that is, by one or more questions in the SEPP. The final data, then, are the answers experts provided to those questions (aggregated by province). Columns 1–4 were conceived as general categories applicable to electoral subnational regimes anywhere; the wording of the questions that measure each subcomponent, on the other hand, have to be adapted to each context—in this case to the specificities of the Argentine provinces. Some SEPP questions may be directly applicable to other countries, but others will need substantial rewording to adapt them to different national realities.

Indicators: Subjective (or Perception-Based) Measures of Democracy

Given the complexities of a "thick" concept (Coppedge 1999) such as subnational democracy and the additional difficulties posed by the fact that hybrid regimes are illiberal in diverse and subtle ways, I decided to follow the subjective tradition of measuring democracy (Bollen and Paxton 2000, 60). As opposed to the objective strategy that uses measures that do not depend on the judgment of the researcher or of experts (e.g., Vanhanen 2000), the subjective strategy uses "perceptions-based" (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005) indicators.[8] In this approach a researcher makes an informed judgment about the status of a certain aspect of democracy in a given polity

TABLE 5.1.
Operational disaggregation of the degree of subnational democracy

Dimensions	Subdimensions	Components	Subcomponents
Democratic	Inclusion	Extension of effective right to vote	Denial of right to vote
		Extension of effective right to run	Denial of right to run
	Contestation	Fairness of elections	Fairness of campaign Fairness of electoral act and vote counting
		Freedom of expression	Opposition leaders Critical journalists Politically relevant media Public employees General population
		Freedom to form/join organizations	Political parties
	Effective elections	Unelected local powers	Unelected local powers
		Elected national powers	Elected national powers
Liberal	Institutional constraints	Legislature	Provincial legislature
		Judiciary	Provincial justice
		Agencies of horizontal accountability (HA)	Independence of agencies of HA
		Incumbent party	Constraints of party on governor
	Liberal rights	Freedom of information	Right to alternative and diverse sources of information Access to information about government
		Personal freedoms	Physical security Privacy Alternative or minority lifestyles Academic freedom

using secondary sources and/or consulting experts. This tradition is illustrated by mainstream democracy measures such as Polity IV (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013); Freedom House's (2015) ratings of political rights and civil liberties; Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán's (2001) trichotomous index for Latin American countries; and the measures of the Varieties of Democracy project (Coppedge and Gerring et al. 2011).

The subjective strategy has few precedents in subnational settings (to my knowledge there are only two, carried out by Kelly McMann and Nikolai Petrov in Russia and Kyrgyzstan (see McMann and Petrov 2000 and McMann 2006). In coding the characteristics of Argentine subnational regimes

subjectively, I considered that experts were more reliable than secondary sources, in part because the latter lack the necessary level of detail, quality, and neutrality for several provinces and in part because the identification of the many, diverse, and often subtle illiberal practices in hybrid regimes calls for very specific pieces of information. The questionnaire of the SEPP included more than a hundred items aimed at tapping experts' assessment of the situation of each of the components and subcomponents in table 5.1.

The SEPP was conducted face to face in each of Argentina's 24 subnational units during 2008 using a structured questionnaire that covered the 2003–7 gubernatorial period. Most interviewees were scholars in the social sciences or political journalists. The effective sample included a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 12 interviewees per province (for a total of 155 experts; mean = 6.46 per province).[9]

Descriptive Results

After the end of fieldwork the questionnaires were revised, coded, and entered into an electronic database. The experts' answers were averaged to form an aggregate score for each item in each province. The means are presented below without any consideration of their level of certainty, but interexpert reliabilities vary both across provinces and across items: sometimes experts are in full agreement, more often they disagree moderately (something that would be expected just on the grounds of random measurement error), and in some cases they disagree significantly. In each of these three situations the mean is a better estimate of the true provincial score than any single expert opinion, but the level of reliability of the mean falls together with the level of interexpert agreement.

Items vary considerably both in central tendency and dispersion. Some obtain quite democratic average scores, while others reveal widespread nondemocratic practices. Equally important, some items contain little interprovincial variance, while others make sharp distinctions between more and less democratic provinces. The graphs I present below, representing some of the most critical aspects of democracy, illustrate these situations (for further descriptive results, see Gervasoni 2010b).

The questions posed to the experts had (typically ordinal) response options that, depending on context, wording, and ease of interpretation, went sometimes from less to more democratic and sometimes from more to less democratic. Moreover, not all questions had the same number of response options (most had between three and five substantive categories). Therefore,

the raw scores for different survey items are not always comparable. To facilitate the interpretation and comparison of items, I rescaled all of them so that they range from a theoretical minimum of zero (least democratic end) to a theoretical maximum of one (most democratic end). Because provincial scores are the mean of the answers given by all the experts, a province can reach the minimum of zero (or the maximum of one) on a given item only when all experts choose the least democratic (or most democratic) answer.

Contestation

Contestation is the only element of democracy for which all definitions, including the most minimal ones, agree. Free and fair elections for the main executive and legislative offices is the central element of this subdimension of democracy. How free and fair are provincial elections in Argentina? Figure 5.3 displays the results of two questions measuring the fairness of the most recent gubernatorial elections, that is, the extent to which some people were arbitrarily excluded from the ballot and the extent to which votes were miscounted to favor a given party. (In this and the following figures the most democratic scores correspond to the upper right corner and the least democratic to the lower left corner). The texts of the questions and the response options are shown below the figure.

According to figure 5.3, there are almost no important instances of electoral fraud (the province of Misiones appears to be an exception). Most provinces cluster close to the democratic (upper right) quadrant, while the lower left quadrant is empty. These variables, then, seem to reflect a situation of relatively high and homogenous levels of (fair) electoral competition in the provinces. However, the situation changes when we take a broader view of the electoral process. Figure 5.4 shows indicators of the pro-incumbent bias of the provincial media (TV on the *x*-axis and provincial newspapers on the *y*-axis) in the most recent gubernatorial elections. Córdoba and Mendoza appear at the upper right corner, while four other districts are not far from it.[10] However, all the quadrants are populated, and three provinces—Formosa, Jujuy, and San Luis—do very poorly in both TV and newspaper coverage. That is, there is considerable variance in these measures, implying that in some provinces incumbent and opposition candidates have similar access to the media, while in others incumbents get much more and better coverage than their opponents. Elections in the latter cannot be considered fair even if votes are counted fairly. Another important conclusion from the figure is that, although the variables are positively associated, the correlation is




Figure 5.3. Fairness of elections. Source: Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics. *X-axis* (Q. 24): "How fair was the counting of the votes by the electoral authorities? Do you believe there were 1) no irregularities in the counting of the votes, 2) few, 3) some, 4) quite a few, or 5) many irregularities in the counting of the votes?" *Y-axis* (Q. 21): "Sometimes citizens cannot vote because they are not given their ID cards on time, because their names do not appear on the voting rolls, etc. How serious do you think this kind of problem preventing citizens from voting was in the provincial elections of 2007? 1) Very serious, 2) quite serious, 3) somewhat serious, 4) not very serious, 5) not serious at all?" BA = Province of Buenos Aires; CA = Catamarca; CB = Córdoba; CH = Chaco; CF = City of Buenos Aires; CS = Corrientes; CU = Chubut; ER = Entre Ríos; FS = Formosa; JJ = Jujuy; LP = La Pampa; LR = La Rioja; MS = Misiones; MZ = Mendoza; NQ = Neuquén; RN = Río Negro; SC = Santa Cruz; SE = Santiago del Estero; SF = Santa Fe; ST = Salta; SJ = San Juan; SL = San Luis; TC = Tucumán; TF = Tierra del Fuego.




Figure 5.4. Fairness of campaign media coverage. *X and y axes* (Q. 32a–32d): "Please think about the provincial media coverage of the 2007 electoral campaigns. We mean the coverage by the media and not the publicity of the candidates. Taking into account both the quantity and content of TV broadcasting, would you say that on average it was 1) very biased in favor of the incumbent's gubernatorial candidate, 2) somewhat biased in favor of the incumbent's candidate, 3) balanced (including countervailing biases), or biased in favor of the candidates of the opposition? And what about the coverage of the main provincial newspaper/s? (same response options)." BA = Province of Buenos Aires; CA = Catamarca; CB = Córdoba; CF = City of Buenos Aires; CH = Chaco; CS = Corrientes; CU = Chubut; ER = Entre Ríos; FS = Formosa; JJ = Jujuy; LP = La Pampa; LR = La Rioja; MS = Misiones; MZ = Mendoza; NQ = Neuquén; RN = Río Negro; SC = Santa Cruz; SE = Santiago del Estero; SF = Santa Fe; SJ = San Juan; SL = San Luis; ST = Salta; TC = Tucumán; TF = Tierra del Fuego. The abbreviations that overlap at the upper right corner are as follows: CB, MZ. Source: Responses to the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics.

only moderately strong ($r = 0.56$) because of off-diagonal provinces like La Pampa, in which the TV coverage is biased but the newspapers are not.

In sum, it seems that the electoral act in itself is generally not subject to important political manipulations, but the pro-incumbency bias of the provincial media ranges from null to extremely high. Contestation, then, is in some provinces restricted in one of the most critical arenas of modern politics. As both classic liberal thinkers have posited and contemporary public opinion research shows, a reasonably informed democratic public cannot exist in the absence of media pluralism.

Freedom of Expression

Democracy can function properly only when citizens can voice their political views without fear of punishment. The SEPP included a number of questions about freedom of expression. The results of two of them, one about public employees and another about the population in general, are presented in figure 5.5. Only two provinces appear in the left sector of the graph, indicating that the citizens of most provinces enjoy significant levels of freedom of expression. When this attribute is evaluated only for provincial public employees, who are especially vulnerable to government sanctions if they express dissent, interprovincial differences become larger: several provinces are located in the lower half of the chart. Citizens on the provincial payroll, then, are not so free to speak about politics publicly. This is a major limitation of democracy in many provinces where most jobs (and the overwhelming majority of the best jobs) are controlled directly or indirectly by the provincial administration. The finding is consistent with interpretations of differences in subnational regimes as emerging from differences in levels of "economic autonomy" (McMann 2006; Gervasoni 2010a). Overall, only a few provinces are well into the upper right quadrant. These results and the findings above on campaign coverage by the media suggest that one of the main ways in which provincial incumbents limit contestation is by restricting political communications.

Checks and Balances

The SEPP assesses institutional constraints through questions about the role of the provincial legislature and the provincial supreme court of justice in functioning as limitations on the power of the executive (all of Argentina's provinces are "presidential" and have, constitutionally, three clearly separated branches). Figure 5.6 shows that only the city of Buenos Aires has




Figure 5.5. Freedom of expression. *X-axis* (Q. 36): "How free to criticize the provincial government without fear of punishment were regular citizens during 2002–2007: 1) Very free, 2) quite free, 3) somewhat free, 4) not very free, 5) not free at all?" *Y-axis* (Q. 35b): "We would like to know whether provincial public employees were at risk of being punished if they were openly critical of the administration of governor XX. Would you say that career administrative employees 1) ran serious risks such as being fired, 2) ran moderate risks such as not being promoted, or 3) did not run risks?" BA = Province of Buenos Aires; CA = Catamarca; CB = Córdoba; CF = City of Buenos Aires; CH = Chaco; CU = Chubut; CS = Corrientes; ER = Entre Ríos; FS = Formosa; JJ = Jujuy; LP = La Pampa; LR = La Rioja; MS = Misiones; MZ = Mendoza; NQ = Neuquén; RN = Río Negro; SC = Santa Cruz; SE = Santiago del Estero; SF = Santa Fe; SJ = San Juan; SL = San Luis; ST = Salta; TC = Tucumán; TF = Tierra del Fuego. Source: Responses to the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics.




Figure 5.6. Checks and balances. *X-axis* (Q. 6): "How limited was Governor XX's power by the provincial legislature during the 2003–2007 period?: 1) Very limited, 2) quite limited, 3) somewhat limited, 4) not very limited, or 5) not limited at all?" *Y-axis* (Q. 7): "How many of the provincial supreme court justices were independent enough to make decisions contrary to the preferences of the XX administration?: 1) No justice was independent, 2) fewer than half were independent, 3) half were independent, 4) more than half were independent, 5) all justices were independent?" BA = Province of Buenos Aires; CA = Catamarca; CB = Córdoba; CF = City of Buenos Aires; CH = Chaco; CU = Chubut; CS = Corrientes; ER = Entre Ríos; FS = Formosa; JJ = Jujuy; LP = La Pampa; LR = La Rioja; MS = Misiones; MZ = Mendoza; NQ = Neuquén; RN = Río Negro; SC = Santa Cruz; SE = Santiago del Estero; SF = Santa Fe; SJ = San Juan; SL = San Luis; ST = Salta; TC = Tucumán; TF = Tierra del Fuego. Source: Responses to the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics.

effective legislative and judicial controls on the power of the executive. The provinces of Buenos Aires and Mendoza also appear in relatively democratic positions. Most notably, there is a large group of provinces clustered toward the lower left corner. The governors of Santiago del Estero, San Luis, Santa Cruz, La Pampa, Jujuy, and other provinces enjoy almost total autonomy from the other branches, a finding consistent with journalistic accounts and academic case studies of some of these provinces (Bill Chávez 2003; Gibson 2005). Contrary to the findings above about electoral fraud, the "checks-and-balances" subdimension appears as a deficit of democracy in most provinces. An interesting additional finding is that provinces with decent levels of judicial independence outnumber those with effective legislative control.

Figures 5.3–5.6 illustrate items of the SEPP that are both closer to the democratic end (such as the prevalence of electoral fraud) and closer to the less democratic pole (e.g., the level of legislative control on the executive). They also show that items are sometimes rather homogenous across provinces (again, electoral fraud) and sometimes quite heterogeneous (for example, the level of fairness of newspapers' political coverage). These results anticipate a rather complex multidimensional subnational regime picture: average levels of subnational democracy and interprovincial differences in subnational democracy depend to a large extent on which aspect of the regime is considered.

Table 5.2 presents the means and standard deviations of all the relevant survey questions[11] by dimension (with part A showing the democratic dimension and part B showing the liberal), subdimension, component, and subcomponent for all the provinces. Because provincial scores range from a minimum of zero to a maximum of one (even if on many variables no province reaches these extremes), the interpretation of mean values is straightforward. Standard deviations are somewhat more difficult to interpret because their minimal value is clear (zero, when all provinces have the same score on a given item), but their maximum value is not. Notice that the maximum possible standard deviation for a variable that ranges between zero and one is 0.5 (a very unlikely situation of perfect polarization, with twelve provinces scoring zero and twelve provinces scoring one). A (more plausible) normal distribution of cases would result, for a variable between zero and one, in a standard deviation of approximately 0.17. Therefore, standard deviation values above 0.2 should be considered important and values above 0.3 very high.

TABLE 5.2A.
Means and standard deviations of items on the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics: Democratic dimension

Subdimensions	Components	Subcomponents	Survey items	Mean	SD
Inclusion	Right to vote	Denial of right to vote	Seriousness of denial of voting rights to citizens	0.73	.11
			Voting rights denied mostly to opposition voters	0.95	.11
	Right to run	Denial of right to run	Seriousness of candidate proscriptions	0.99	0.04
			Government pressures for a gubernatorial candidate to withdraw	0.99	0.02
Contestation	Fairness of elections	Fairness of campaign	Incumbent's gubernatorial campaign spending advantage	0.17	0.22
			Incumbent's use of state resources for gubernatorial campaign	0.17	0.15
			Pro-incumbent's gubernatorial candidate bias: TV	0.45	0.35
			Pro-incumbent's gubernatorial candidate bias: Cable TV	0.60	0.27
			Pro-incumbent's gubernatorial candidate bias: Radio	0.57	0.29
			Pro-incumbent's gubernatorial candidate bias: Newspapers	0.62	0.31
			Government tampering with opposition gubernatorial campaigns	0.72	0.15
		Fairness of electoral act and vote counting	Extent of irregularities at the ballot station	0.70	0.17
			Fairness of vote-counting process in gubernatorial elections	0.83	0.12
	Freedom of expression	Opposition leaders	Opponents prosecuted for libel/defamation	0.82	0.12
			Opponents fired from a job	0.76	0.20
			Opponents threatened or blackmailed	0.70	0.20
			Opponents physically attacked	0.89	0.15
			Opponents arrested	0.95	0.11
			Opponents killed or disappeared	0.99	0.03
			Opponents self-censored because of fear of punishment	0.73	0.19
		Critical journalists	Political journalists mostly pro-governor	0.60	0.20
			Political journalists often critical of governor	0.56	0.18

	Critical journalists excluded from government publicity	0.38	0.25
	Critical journalists prosecuted for libel/defamation	0.75	0.20
	Critical journalists fired from a job	0.82	0.15
	Critical journalists threatened or blackmailed	0.75	0.21
	Critical journalists physically attacked	0.91	0.10
	Critical journalists arrested	0.97	0.07
	Critical journalists killed or disappeared	1.0	0.01
Politically relevant media	Media coverage of opinions about governor: TV	0.43	0.29
	Media coverage of opinions about governor: Cable	0.57	0.24
	Media coverage of opinions about governor: Radio	0.66	0.21
	Media coverage of opinions about governor: Newspapers	0.62	0.28
	% of media outlets that would minimize a government corruption case	0.45	0.19
	Use of selective distribution of government publicity	0.27	0.14
	Use of selective distribution of government information	0.39	0.16
	Use of pressure on companies to withdraw publicity from critical media	0.70	0.21
	Use of selective inspections to critical media	0.83	0.18
	Use of denial of paper, electricity, etc., to critical media	0.93	0.09
	Use of denial/cancelation of permits to critical media	0.91	0.13
	Use of libel prosecution of critical media	0.82	0.15
	Use of bribes to journalists or media owners	0.64	0.20
	Use of harassment of journalists or media owners	0.79	0.16
	Use of provincially owned media to obtain favorable coverage of government	0.57	0.32
	Use of media owned by governor/allies to obtain favorable coverage	0.65	0.28

(continued)

TABLE 5.2A. (*Continued*)
Means and standard deviations of items on the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics: Democratic dimension

Subdimensions	Components	Subcomponents	Survey items	Mean	SD
		Public employees	Risk of punishment for criticizing government: high-ranking staff	0.37	0.20
			Risk of punishment for criticizing government: permanent staff	0.48	0.24
			Risk of punishment for criticizing government: temporary staff	0.21	0.18
			Risk of punishment for criticizing government: teachers	0.71	0.25
		General population	Freedom to participate in opposition demonstrations	0.75	0.20
			Freedom to criticize government	0.77	0.17
	Freedom to organize	Political parties	Likelihood of punishment for joining an opposition party	0.57	0.21
			Likelihood of positive incentive to preempt joining an opposition party	0.43	0.17
Effectiveness		Unelected local powers	Extent of limitations on power of elected officials by unelected actors	0.70	0.18
		Elected national powers	Extent of limitations on power of elected authorities by federal government	0.42	0.22

TABLE 5.2B.
Means and standard deviations of items on the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics: Liberal dimension

Subdimensions	Components	Subcomponents	Survey items	Mean	SD
Institutional constraints	Legislature	Provincial legislature	Government bills passed unchanged by legislature	0.48	0.20
			Government bills substantially modified by legislature	0.37	0.24
			Extent of legislative constraints on the executive	0.26	0.22
	Judiciary	Provincial justice	Influence of government preferences on provincial highest court rulings	0.33	0.21
			Proportion of highest court justices independent of government	0.37	0.27
			Probability that provincial courts investigate a minister accused of corruption	0.32	0.21
	Agencies of horizontal accountability (HA)	Independence of HA agencies	Effectiveness in control of government: Tribunal de Cuentas	0.29	0.19
			Effectiveness in control of government: Fiscalía de Estado	0.28	0.20
			Effectiveness in control of government: Defensoría del Pueblo	0.27	0.29
			Effectiveness in control of government: *Otra*	0.36	0.30
	Incumbent party	Party constraints on governor	Power of governor over his/her own party	0.27	0.25
Liberal rights	Freedom of information	Right to consume alternative and diverse sources of information	Ease of access to varied information on provincial politics: poor peasants	0.36	0.16
			Ease of access to varied information on provincial politics: teachers	0.57	0.19
			Ease of access to varied information on provincial politics: lawyers	0.88	0.11
		Access to govt. information	Ease of access to information on procurement or welfare recipients	0.34	0.16

(continued)

TABLE 5.2B. (*Continued*)
Means and standard deviations of items on the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics: Liberal dimension

Subdimensions	Components	Subcomponents	Survey items	Mean	SD
	Personal freedoms	Physical security	Arbitrary detentions by police or other government agents	0.65	0.22
			Excessive force against public events by police or other government agents	0.76	0.15
			Excessive force against demonstrations by police or other government agents	0.72	0.19
			Excessive force against detainees/suspects by police or other government agents	0.57	0.21
			Murders of detainees/suspects by police or other government agents	0.88	0.12
			Murders or disappearances by police or other government agents	0.94	0.09
		Privacy	Use of intelligence services to spy on politically prominent people	0.53	0.25
		Alternative minority lifestyles	Government discrimination against religious minorities	0.98	0.04
			Government discrimination against people of indigenous descent	0.89	0.14
			Government discrimination against Latin American immigrants	0.94	0.09
			Government discrimination against immigrants from other provinces	0.94	0.09
			Government discrimination against women	0.91	0.11
			Government discrimination against homosexuals	0.92	0.11
		Academic freedom	Use of provincial schools and textbooks to enhance government image	0.84	0.17

Source: Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics.

The means range from 0.17 (two items related to the campaign resources available to incumbents and challengers) to one (an item on the killing of critical journalists). This means that the SEPP covers a wide range of issues that go from those in which the provinces rank consistently high (e.g., on none of them do the experts report that the government kills journalists) to those on which they tend to do poorly (in most provinces the experts agree that the incumbents' campaign funds are much greater than those of challengers). The standard deviations are sometimes practically zero (on items on which all provinces score essentially one) and sometimes as high as 0.35 (an item on the extent to which local TV stations bias their campaign coverage in favor of the incumbent's gubernatorial candidate).

The statistical results presented in table 5.2 are organized analytically according to the operationalization scheme presented in table 5.1. However, it is immediately clear that within dimensions, subdimensions, components, and even subcomponents, items can vary widely both in central tendency and dispersion, as illustrated by the items in the "fairness of campaign" subcomponent: provinces are homogenously democratic in not registering cases of pressures for a gubernatorial candidate to withdraw from an election, but they do quite poorly and are rather heterogeneous when the incumbent's advantage in terms of campaign spending is evaluated.

It would be descriptively illuminating to look at this information in terms of the statistical characteristics of the items. For example, a first useful distinction is between those items that differentiate provinces and those that do not (i.e., items with standard deviations close to zero). Likewise, our understanding of provincial regimes would be advanced a long way just by exploring on what types of items provinces score highly, on which their scores are middling, and on which they are low.

Table 5.3 systematizes these distinctions. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that item means and standard deviations can be "low," "medium," or "high." The lower left and lower right cells are empty because it is logically impossible for a low or high mean to be accompanied by a high standard deviation: the former requires a clustering of the provinces at one end, whereas the latter implies that provinces are widely scattered.

Left-to-right movement in table 5.3 implies going from less to more democratic overall provincial situations. Movement from the top to the bottom, on the other hand, is associated with low to high interprovincial differences. For example, the "low" row ranges from items that are "consistently nondemocratic" (i.e., all provinces do poorly) to those that are "consistently

TABLE 5.3.
Classification of items on the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics by mean and standard deviation

	Mean		
SD	Low	Medium	High
Low	Consistently nondemocratic	Consistently middling	Consistently democratic
Medium	Nondemocratic with exceptions	Middling and dispersed	Democratic with exceptions
High		Polarized	

Note: The lower left and lower right cells are empty because it is impossible for a low or high mean to be accompanied by a high standard deviation.

democratic" (all provinces do well), with an intermediate category for items that are "consistently middling," that is, aspects of democracy on which all provinces cluster close to an intermediate level. The "medium" column illustrates the table's vertical axis: the overall provincial mean can be middling because all provinces are middling, because provinces are moderately dispersed around a middling mean value, or because they are "polarized" (i.e., about half of the provinces score very high and the other half very low).

The actual distribution of many survey items is displayed in figure 5.7. Notice, first, the empty area on the left of the graph: no item has a very low mean, which implies that there is no aspect of democracy on which all provinces perform consistently poorly. At the right end of the graph, however, there are several items with high means: some features of democracy appear to be prevalent across the national territory. The items with means close to one are largely those associated with highly visible violations of democratic principles, such as candidate proscriptions or arrests and executions of opponents. As I argued earlier, there are strong theoretical reasons to expect that subnational incumbents in national democracies will tend to curtail democratic rights in subtle and relatively peaceful ways, trying to avoid blatant (and therefore nationally visible) undemocratic practices.

The declining level of dispersion as the item means approach one is, as I explained earlier, inevitable. Standard deviations do differ considerably toward the center of the figure. No item approaches the maximum possible of 0.5 (the unrealistic "polarized" situation of table 5.3). However, the fact that all items in the central area of the figure are above 0.1, and many above 0.2, suggests that nontrivial interprovincial differences are common and that sometimes they are rather large.




Figure 5.7. Means and standard deviations of responses to items on the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics.

Is there a pattern in the types of items that appear in each sector of the graph? In figure 5.8 I have broken down figure 5.7 into five scatterplots that show the distribution of items belonging to each of the subdimensions (plus a scatterplot for an overall assessment of democracy that experts were asked to provide toward the end of the survey).[12] Some sets of items tend to cluster in a specific sector. First, the four items tapping the inclusion dimension are at the lower right corner, indicating that they are consistently democratic: provincial regimes tend to be highly inclusive both in terms of the right to run and the right to vote. Second, the institutional constraints items are the only ones that fall clearly in the left half of the figure. Checks and balances that limit the incumbents' power appear to be the weakest aspect of subnational democracy in Argentina. Both the provincial legislatures and the provincial supreme tribunals (and lower courts) are judged generally ineffective in checking the governor. The same is true for the provincial agencies of horizontal accountability and for incumbent parties. Notice, however, that the relatively high standard deviations of some of these items indicate that




Figure 5.8. Means and standard deviations of responses to items on the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics by subdimension.

at least in some provinces checks and balances do work. The items associated with institutional constraints, then, approach the "nondemocratic with exceptions" pattern in table 5.3.

The items associated with contestation, the most central feature of democracy, follow a less clear distributional pattern. They appear in all populated sectors of the graph but seem to move from left to right as the substantive content becomes more associated with traditional forms of electoral fraud. For example, electoral irregularities, the arrest of opposition leaders, or the harassment of opposition campaigns are relatively uncommon. Items tapping the fairness of electoral campaigns in terms of financial resources or media coverage, on the other hand, show a generally lopsided picture: incumbents often (but with important interprovincial differences) prevail over their opponents because of privileged access to campaign funds, state resources, and favorable media treatment. In sum, some aspects of democratic contestation seem to hold up well in the Argentine provinces, while others are generally weak.

Some contestation items are among the most heterogeneous. The three items with the highest standard deviations—those related to the fairness of the campaign coverage of broadcast TV and newspapers and to the use of state-owned media to bias coverage in favor of the provincial administration—belong to this subdimension. This evidence suggests that interprovincial differences in levels of actual contestation are to a significant extent related to the role of the media. Consistent with the hybrid logic, it may be more convenient for a provincial incumbent to bias the media in her favor than to openly rig elections.

Most of the "liberal rights" items appear in the right half of the figure, especially when the substantive content includes overt repression. Items asking about the execution of detainees or about instances of arbitrary detentions or excessive use of force by the police are very close to the right end of the figure. The only two liberal rights items located left of the 0.5 threshold are related to access to government information and to the availability of alternative sources of information for the poor.[13] That is, core liberal rights such as physical security and liberty are for the most part respected, while violations occur in the realm of less critical rights and for less privileged citizens.

The two questions related to "effectiveness" (or the extent to which democratically elected authorities can exercise power without limitations from unelected actors or the national government) occupy middling positions in terms of both their central tendency and their dispersion. The experts saw those constraints originating in the federal government as more important than those coming from de facto powers such as business associations, the police, or criminal organizations.

The overall indicator of democracy is, not surprisingly, located approximately at the center of all items: the experts surely took into consideration many aspects of democracy in their provinces and concluded that the overall situation is some type of weighted average of all of them (the mean and standard deviation of this item are 0.55 and 0.21, respectively). Table 5.2 and figures 5.7 and 5.8 show that the states of provincial regimes in Argentina are diverse in two senses: (1) some aspects of democracy do better than others, and (2) with respect to most items, some provinces do better than others. On average, provincial regimes seem to be very democratic in terms of inclusion and reasonably so in terms of guaranteed classic liberal rights. There is more heterogeneity with respect to the central dimension of democracy—contestation. That is, some political rights are generally

protected, while others are weak in many provinces. Checks and balances—a key element of liberal democracy—are weak in the typical province.

Finding the Number of Dimensions of Subnational Democracy: Exploratory Factor Analysis

Democracy has usually been understood as a low-dimensionality concept. Some definitions see it as unidimensional, prominently those that conceive of it minimally, as an electoral procedure used to fill out government positions (Schumpeter 1975 [1942]; Alvarez et al. 1996). Bidimensional conceptualizations are also common, for example, those seeing (or measuring) democracy in terms of contestation and inclusion (Dahl 1971; Vanhanen 2000; Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado 2008) or, as here, in terms of the strictly democratic dimension and the liberal dimension. However, more dimensions have been proposed, and there are explicit defenses of democracy as a "thick" and highly multidimensional concept (Coppedge 1999), as well as a prominent recent effort to measure many "varieties of democracy" at the national level (Coppedge and Gerring et al. 2011). The extensive set of items included in the SEPP, which in turn measure a complex set of dimensions, subdimensions, components, and subcomponents of democracy, reflects a thick view of democracy. Even a conceptually thick concept, however, can be empirically uni- or bidimensional if its parts are strongly correlated. An important analytical task, then, is to determine the dimensionality underlying the many items measured in the SEPP.

The traditional statistical procedure for analyzing dimensionality is exploratory factor analysis. However, factor analysis cannot be simply applied to the SEPP data because of a familiar problem: there are too many variables and not so many cases. The survey includes at least eighty-five items that measure specific characteristics of the provincial regime (those displayed in table 5.2), but only twenty-four subnational units. At the very least, factor analysis needs the same number of variables and cases and, as is the case with all statistical techniques, works better when the cases-to-variables ratio is higher (Costello and Osborne 2005).

To deal with this problem I adopted a two-stage strategy. I first factor analyzed the items in each of the components or subcomponents (focusing on one or the other depending on the number of items they encompass). Because the number of items in each of them is smaller than twenty-four, factor analysis was always possible. In each case the items could be well

TABLE 5.4.
Ten factors underlying the data from the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics

Subdimension	Component or subcomponent	Factor number and name
Contestation	Fairness of campaign	1. Incumbency advantage
	Fairness of electoral act and vote counting	2. Fairness of electoral procedure
	Opposition leaders	3. Freedom of expression for opponents
	Critical journalists	4. Freedom of expression for journalists
	Politically relevant media	5. State control of the media
	Public employees, general population	6. Pro-government media bias 7. Freedom to oppose the government
Institutional constraints	All	8. Institutional constraints
Liberal rights	Freedom of information	9. Freedom of information
	Personal freedoms	10. Personal freedoms

summarized by the first or by the first and second factor extracted. As a result of these analyses (now shown), I derived ten factors. Table 5.4 lists them. The factor names should be enough to allow one to grasp the underlying aspect of democracy tapped by each of them. The second stage consisted of a "meta-factor analysis," that is, a factor analysis of the ten factors to reduce them to a smaller number of theoretically relevant dimensions.

Stage 1

Only three of the five subdimensions identified in figure 5.1 appear in table 5.4. The reason is that the items belonging to the "inclusion" and "effectiveness" subdimensions could not be factor analyzed because the underlying correlation structure is weak: the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy for the items of the former is a poor 0.42 (whereas for the ten factors in table 5.4 it was always above 0.50 and typically above 0.70), and the bivariate correlation between the two "effectiveness" items is a mere 0.34.

In the illustrative scatterplots that follow, provinces are located according to their scores on different pairs of factors. The first (figure 5.9) displays "Incumbency advantage" on the *x*-axis and "Freedom of expression: Journalists" on the *y*-axis. The outlying position of Santiago del Estero is explained by the fact that gubernatorial elections there were conducted under a federal intervention, so there was no "incumbent" candidate who ran enjoying the advantage of controlling state resources. Interestingly, Santiago del Estero is the least democratic province in terms of freedom of expression.




Figure 5.9. Freedom of expression for journalists and incumbency advantage, by province. BA = Province of Buenos Aires; CA = Catamarca; CB = Córdoba; CF = City of Buenos Aires; CH = Chaco; CU = Chubut; CS = Corrientes; ER = Entre Ríos; FS = Formosa; JJ = Jujuy; LP = La Pampa; LR = La Rioja; MS = Misiones; MZ = Mendoza; NQ = Neuquén; RN = Río Negro; SC = Santa Cruz; SE = Santiago del Estero; SF = Santa Fe; SJ = San Juan; SL = San Luis; ST = Salta; TC = Tucumán; TF = Tierra del Fuego.

The position of this province and, to a lesser extent, those of Neuquén, Salta, and Corrientes, show that the two regime dimensions displayed in the graph need not vary together.

The upper right "democratic" quadrant is occupied by Mendoza and four of the six districts of the Pampas region. In the opposite, "undemocratic" quadrant we find Formosa, Jujuy, La Pampa, Misiones, San Luis, and Santa Cruz. There is a visible positive correlation in the data, but not a very high one ($r = 0.43$, Santiago del Estero excluded).

Figure 5.10 shows the provincial positions on the factors "institutional constraints" and "freedom of information." In this case it is clear that the correlation between these aspects of democracy is higher ($r = 0.70$) but not strong enough to be merged into a single factor: notice, for example, that provinces with very similar scores on the freedom of information factor, such as Río Negro and Mendoza, differ widely in terms of institutional constraints. The city and province of Buenos Aires, Mendoza, and Tierra del Fuego appear as the only districts with a democratic information environ-




Figure 5.10. Institutional constraints and freedom of information, by province. BA = Province of Buenos Aires; CA = Catamarca; CB = Córdoba; CF = City of Buenos Aires; CH = Chaco; CU = Chubut; CS = Corrientes; ER = Entre Ríos; FS = Formosa; JJ = Jujuy; LP = La Pampa; LR = La Rioja; MS = Misiones; MZ = Mendoza; NQ = Neuquén; RN = Río Negro; SC = Santa Cruz; SE = Santiago del Estero; SF = Santa Fe; SJ = San Juan; SL = San Luis; ST = Salta; TC = Tucumán; TF = Tierra del Fuego. Source: Responses to the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics.




Figure 5.11. Pro-government media bias and federal constraints, by province. BA = Province of Buenos Aires; CA = Catamarca; CB = Córdoba; CF = City of Buenos Aires; CH = Chaco; CU = Chubut; CS = Corrientes; ER = Entre Ríos; FS = Formosa; JJ = Jujuy; LP = La Pampa; LR = La Rioja; MS = Misiones; MZ = Mendoza; NQ = Neuquén; RN = Río Negro; SC = Santa Cruz; SE = Santiago del Estero; SF = Santa Fe; SJ = San Juan; SL = San Luis; ST = Salta; TC = Tucumán; TF = Tierra del Fuego. Source: Responses to the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics.

ment and an executive that is reasonably checked by the legislature, the courts, and/or the provincial agencies of horizontal accountability. San Luis and Santiago del Estero, followed by Formosa, Jujuy, and Salta, are the clearest instances of restricted information and unchecked executives.

Finally, figure 5.11 displays the positions of provinces in terms of the prevalence of a bias in favor of the provincial government in the local media and of the constraints imposed by federal authorities (the latter being a single indicator, not a factor). The first pattern to strike the eye is that there is no

positive correlation here. In fact, Pearson's r is −0.36. A province may do well in terms of media bias and still be severely constrained by federal rulers (e.g., Córdoba and Mendoza) or, conversely, have a media system highly biased in favor of incumbents but be free from federal constraints (as is San Luis and, to a lesser extent, Chubut). There is one element of continuity with respect to the previous figures: Formosa, Jujuy, Misiones, and Santa Cruz appear again in the lower left quadrant, here in the company of La Rioja.

Stage 2

There are theoretical reasons to suspect that the factors identified earlier are not independent. Provinces that are more (or less) democratic in one regime dimension are likely to be more (or less) democratic in another. The "second-stage" factor analysis I performed sought to identify "meta-factors" underlying the original ten factors (plus an indicator of the inclusion dimension and two indicators of the effectiveness dimension[14]). The correlation matrix for these variables[15] shows that those corresponding to inclusion, incumbency advantage, and effectiveness are generally not highly correlated with the rest. The other factors, however, do tend to co-vary, especially those related to aspects of freedom. In sum, the pattern of correlations reveals both potential for multidimensionality (because not all variables are correlated with the rest) and potential for reducing the thirteen variables in the correlation matrix to a more manageable number of underlying dimensions.

A factor analysis of these variables (table 5.5) shows that the data can be reduced to three dimensions, a dominant one associated with most "freedom" factors (in particular "freedom of expression for journalists," "personal freedoms," "freedom to oppose the government," "freedom of expression for opponents," and "freedom of information," and, to a lesser extent, with "state control of the media" and "institutional constraints"), a second one defined mainly by "incumbency advantage," and a third and relatively weak one linked to federal government limitations on the power of elected provincial authorities.[16]

In sum, provincial democracy can be broadly described in terms of three substantively important and empirically independent dimensions: the extent to which various freedoms are granted to their citizens, the extent to which incumbents enjoy competitive advantages incompatible with a level playing field, and the extent to which the federal government limits the decisional autonomy of elected provincial rulers.[17] That federal constraints are empirically independent from the other two factors is unsurprising, because there are no obvious a priori reasons to believe that they should be related to

TABLE 5.5.
Second-stage factor analysis of first-stage factors in the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics

Number of observations = 24
Method: Principal factors
Rotation: Oblique oblimin

Factor	Variance	Proportion
Factor 1	6.30	0.57
Factor 2	2.28	0.21
Factor 3	1.43	0.13

Rotated factor loadings and unique variances

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Uniqueness
Right to vote	0.52	0.10	0.51	0.47
Incumbency advantage	−0.12	*0.88*	0.00	0.24
Fairness of electoral process	0.69	0.21	0.52	0.19
FoE: Opponents	*0.85*	−0.43	−0.09	0.18
FoE: Journalists	*0.95*	0.09	−0.03	0.07
State control of media	0.75	−0.39	−0.12	0.35
Pro-govt. media bias	0.45	0.69	−0.05	0.24
Freedom to oppose govt.	*0.91*	0.11	−0.04	0.13
Institutional constraints	0.73	0.26	−0.34	0.22
Freedom of information	*0.85*	0.26	−0.03	0.13
Personal freedoms	*0.93*	−0.12	0.13	0.13
Nonelected powers	−0.05	−0.49	0.46	0.53
Federal constraints	−0.27	−0.10	0.72	0.38

Note: Factor loadings above 0.70 are underlined, and figures above 0.8 are also in *italics*. FoE = freedom of expression.

the level of freedom or incumbency advantage prevalent in the provinces. That the latter two factors are not sufficiently correlated to constitute a single one runs against theoretical expectations: an incumbent who is able to restrict the political freedoms of provincial journalists, opponents, and the population in general should almost by definition enjoy a significant incumbency advantage. The clearest case in which this expectation is not realized is federal interventions: freedoms in a province may be curtailed under a certain administration, but if the federal government intervenes and calls new elections (as was the case in the province of Santiago del Estero during the period covered by the SEPP), no party has the advantage campaigning while commanding the state apparatus and budget (unless the federal intervention blatantly favors one candidate, a situation that did not occur in Santiago del Estero).

Explaining Regime Variance: Fiscal Federalism, Provincial Rentierism, and Subnational Democracy

Why are some provinces less democratic than others? Modernization-related answers immediately come up when this question is posed, partly because of the great influence that modernization theory has had for decades on scholarship on democracy (Lipset 1959; Przeworski and Limongi 1997) and partly because some evidence seems to point in the direction of a connection between development and subnational regimes. After all, Formosa, Misiones, and Santiago del Estero, which are among the poorest Argentine provinces, show low levels of democracy on most indicators, while the much more developed Mendoza, Santa Fe, and city of Buenos Aires are basically democratic.

But causal inference should not proceed so fast. Among the least democratic provinces one also finds some that do well in terms of modernization indicators: Santa Cruz is among the top three provinces in the country, and San Luis is clearly above average. Provinces that are much less developed, such as Chaco and Corrientes, have more democratic regimes than Santa Cruz and San Luis.

Elsewhere I have proposed "a rentier theory" of subnational democracy to account for interprovincial variance (Gervasoni 2010a). Drawing on fiscal theories of the state, I posit that regime differences among provinces are to a large extent explained by the magnitude and origin of their fiscal resources: provinces that enjoy plentiful central government subsidies and have weak tax links with local citizens are likely to sustain less democratic regimes because incumbents can rely on their privileged fiscal positions to restrict political competition and weaken institutional limitations on their power. Unlike national states, which can afford to give up taxation and live off rents only under very special circumstances—as is the case with oil-rich nations—many Argentine provinces receive generous national subsidies that constitute an overwhelming proportion of their budgets (they also collect modest tax revenues of their own).

In per capita terms, the relative amounts of central government transfers tend to be particularly large for less populated provinces. This may be partly justified on economy-of-scale grounds and partly explained politically by the logic of "low-maintenance" constituencies (Gibson and Calvo 2000), but its fiscal consequence is that the smallest Argentine provinces are in many ways like oil-rich emirates: they collect plentiful external rents and practically

forgo domestic taxation. Rentierism in this context is not determined geographically by resource wealth but rather created politically by the rules of fiscal federalism. Thus central government redistribution to the demographically smaller provinces of revenues collected in larger provinces makes the governments of the former relatively rich vis-à-vis their societies and fiscally independent of their constituents. These rentier subnational states, like their resource-based national counterparts, are less democratic because their rulers combine the natural political power vested in their offices with overwhelming economic power. Incumbents who collect fiscal rents (be they based on natural resources or on fiscal federalism) enjoy the political benefits of spending without facing the political costs of taxing (Gervasoni 2010a). Many causal mechanisms have been proposed to link rentierism and authoritarianism (Ross 2001; Gervasoni 2009).

Interestingly, once the amounts of "fiscal federalism rents" are controlled for, the impact of development on subnational democracy is indistinguishable from zero, whereas the impact of the former is consistently negative and statistically significant (Gervasoni 2010a). Formosa and Santiago del Estero may be hybrid not because they are poor but because they are rentier. Conversely, Santa Cruz may be among the least democratic provinces in spite of its high level of development precisely because of its rentier nature: it is not only one of the top recipients of federal transfers in per capita terms, but it collects significant resource rents (in the form of oil royalties).

Given the importance and fruitfulness of the modernization research program in comparative politics, one should not rush to reject development as a causal factor on the basis of a single study. I would not be surprised if a different conceptualization or measurement of development resulted in a positive finding. However, even in that case it would be unlikely that the strong statistical link between "fiscal federalism rents" and provincial regimes would disappear.

Can the descriptive findings reported in this chapter be accounted for in terms of a rentier theory of regimes? The statistical evidence mentioned above linking greater fiscal federalism rents to less democratic provincial regimes was obtained using a different operationalization of the dependent variable, an objective and unidimensional index of subnational democracy (Gervasoni 2010a). However, all of the factor analysis–based indexes shown in tables 5.4 and 5.5 are positively correlated with that objective index. Moreover, elsewhere (Gervasoni 2011, chap. 6) I have shown that all SEPP-based indexes of different dimensions of democracy consistently yield negative

coefficients when regressed on several possible measures of fiscal rentierism (after controlling for development and presidential support).[18] In sum, regardless of the index of democracy used (objective or subjective), the dimension of democracy under study, and the way in which rentierism is operationalized, the evidence suggests that Formosa, Santiago del Estero, and Santa Cruz are less democratic than Entre Ríos, Mendoza, and Santa Fe because the former are subnational rentier states (i.e., are highly subsidized by federal transfers from Buenos Aires), while the latter are not (they either "break even" or have "negative rents" because their contribution to federally shared taxes is larger than the fiscal transfers they get back from the national treasury).

In a more speculative vein, one could surmise that the patterns shown in table 5.2 and figure 5.8 are to some extent explained by the fiscal approach, coupled with the aforementioned national-level constraints on blatant forms of subnational authoritarianism. Given career-maximizing provincial rulers who wish to stay in power (or progress to national office), one would expect them to use fiscal resources in ways that can advance their goals without risking Gibson's "boundary opening" (i.e., a highly visible provincial conflict that prompts national actors to intervene). A rational incumbent in a rentier province, then, is much more likely to use her plentiful fiscal resources to subordinate legislators, outspend opposition parties in electoral campaigns, and buy off local media outlets than to close down the legislature, ban opposition candidates, and arrest critical journalists. In a nutshell, the sovereign dictator of an oil-based rentier state has the choice to use his immense fiscal wealth to co-opt or repress those who oppose him. The less autonomous governor of a rentier Argentine province, on the other hand, has strong incentives to choose the first tactic over the second. The fall of provincial bosses Ramón Saadi in Catamarca and Carlos Juárez in Santiago del Estero, both in the aftermath of the intense national media attention attracted by murder cases linked to figures of their regimes, has not gone unheeded by other hegemonic governors.

Comparative politics should strive to increase the level of abstraction of the rentier state approach, applying the explanatory logic originally developed for natural resource rents (Ross 2001) to rents based on other sources, such as foreign aid (Moore 2004; Morrison 2009) or federal transfers (Gervasoni 2010a), and more generally to fiscal income that can be considered "unearned resources" (Smith 2008) or "nontax revenues" (Morrison 2009). The provinces of Argentina appear to give an unexpected but enlightening boost to the explanatory scope of fiscal and rentier approaches to politics.

Conclusion

Different aspects of democracy in the Argentine provinces, as evaluated by the Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics, range from (on average) very good to rather poor. Many also have a significant level of interprovincial variance. These findings mean that subnational regimes in Argentina are heterogeneous in two different ways. First, the provinces as a whole vary with respect to the particular component of democracy under consideration (for example, they tend to be democratic in terms of inclusion but not so much in terms of checks and balances). Second, provincial regimes vary with respect to the overall mean: on a majority of the items some provinces are significantly more and some significantly less democratic than the average. There is, then, plenty of interitem and interprovincial variance to explain.

The descriptive results presented earlier suggest that the less democratic subnational regimes in Argentina are characterized by weak checks and balances, sophisticated ways of undermining contestation, and significant (if subtle) violations of liberal rights. Inclusion requirements and the basic rules of democratic contestation, on the other hand, are generally respected by provincial incumbents. Subnational democracy is to some extent limited by federal authorities, but the most affected provinces are not in general those that are less democratic in the other dimensions.

Exploratory factor analysis of the survey's items clearly rejects a unidimensional view of provincial regimes. The many dimensions of democracy identified in the "thick" conceptualization adopted in this chapter can be reduced to a small number of factors but not to a single one. That is, regime type seems to be multidimensional not only at the conceptual level but also empirically. Preliminary statistical analyses suggest that at least three empirically different dimensions are needed to adequately summarize the underlying structure of the SEPP data. Taken at face value, the factor analysis results indicate that subnational regimes should be described in terms of (1) how much freedom they allow, (2) the magnitude of the incumbent's political and electoral advantage, and (3) the extent to which provincial authorities are limited by federal ones. This implies that "not all good/bad things go together" or that a given province may do well on one aspect of democracy and poorly in another. It also means that different provinces are characterized by different illiberal practices. Subnational political regimes appear to be at least as complex as national regimes, and maybe even more complex.

Beyond some distinguishable patterns in terms of what provinces tend to score as more or less democratic, the subnational regime landscape varies depending on the dimension of democracy under consideration. Provinces do not align neatly on a single democracy–authoritarianism continuum. Consequently, the descriptive task at hand is hard: a comprehensive characterization of subnational regimes will imply dealing with realities both complex (in the sense of having more than one dimension) and hybrid (in the sense of not always being clearly democratic or clearly authoritarian). The absence of "subnational North Koreas" is a normative blessing for Argentina and other national democracies, but it is at the same time a methodological and descriptive challenge for scholars of democracy.

NOTES

1. Also known as Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires (CABA). "Greater Buenos Aires" (home to about thirteen million people) includes the federal capital (about three million inhabitants) and twenty-four additional municipalities that, although sociologically and geographically adjacent to CABA, belong administratively to the province of Buenos Aires.

2. From here on I use the word *province* to refer to any first-level subnational unit.

3. The survey was funded by a National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant (NSF Award no. 0719658). Additional financial assistance for the project was provided by the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies and the Graduate School, University of Notre Dame. Andrea Cavalli, Adrián Lucardi, Maria Marta Maroto, and Maria Eugenia Wolcoff provided invaluable research assistance.

4. At http://www.utdt.edu/ver_contenido.php?id_contenido=5479&id_item_menu=11336.

5. This project was carried out by Irma Méndez de Hoyos and Nicolás Loza Otero at Flacso México.

6. The Argentine Constitution, for example, assigns Congress and the president the right to remove provincial authorities to "guarantee the republican form of government" (art. 6). These federal interventions have taken place six times since 1983: in Catamarca (1990), Tucumán (1991), Corrientes (1991 and 2000), and Santiago del Estero (1993 and 2004).

7. Durazo Herrmann (2010) uses the concept of "hybrid regime" to describe the Mexican state of Oaxaca. In his conceptualization, however, the combination of "formally democratic political institutions . . . with authoritarian practices" does not call "its authoritarian character into question" (105). That is, he sees hybrid regimes as a type of authoritarianism, not as an intermediate category between democracy and authoritarianism.

8. The word *subjective* is often loaded with negative connotations. It is sometimes associated with normative biases or interested opinions. Here it is used in a straightforward, neutral way, just to describe a measurement process based on informed and educated judgments of certain "subjects." Many respected and widely used databases in political science come from subjective operationalizations. This is the case not only with measures of democracy but also, for example, with measures of parties' ideological positions or of

governance. For a defense of the strengths of "perception-based" indicators over objective ones, see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005, 27–31).

9. Methodological details are available in the online appendix (http://www.utdt.edu/ver_contenido.php?id_contenido=5479&id_item_menu=11336) and in Gervasoni (2010b).

10. The very democratic performance of Santiago del Estero on these two indicators may be surprising at first, but note that the elections about which the media coverage questions are asked are those of 2005, when the incumbent was a federal delegate. One could plausibly surmise that if the Juarista regime (Gibson 2005) had been in place, the provincial media would not have done so well.

11. Not all the items in the SEPP measure subnational democracy.

12. For an alternative presentation of some of these items in a single figure with items differentiated by color, see http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/rt/suppFiles/274/274.

13. The question about ease of access to alternative sources of information was asked for three hypothetical citizens, a poor peasant, a lower-middle-class teacher, and an upper-middle-class professional.

14. As explained earlier, the indicators measuring these subdimensions of democracy could not be reduced to a common factor.

15. The correlation matrix can be consulted in the online appendix: http://www.utdt.edu/ver_contenido.php?id_contenido=5479&id_item_menu=11336.

16. Keep in mind that the strength or weakness of a factor reflects in part the number of items related to each aspect of the concept included in the analysis. Given that only one SEPP item was designed to measure federal constraints, it is not surprising that the associated factor is relatively weak.

17. The findings of the dimensionality analysis should be taken as preliminary and exploratory. Several of the methodological and statistical decisions that led to the results in Table 5.5 may be modified on deeper analysis.

18. Not all these coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels, a result to be expected given the relatively small *N* of 24.

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CHAPTER 6

Subnational Hybrid Regimes and Democratization in Brazil

Why Party Nationalization Matters

ANDRÉ BORGES

Comparative research on subnational authoritarian regimes has persuasively argued that national transitions to democracy in combination with extensive political and financial decentralization do not always and necessarily lead to stronger democratic institutions at the subnational level. Rather the contrary: decentralization may actually allow subnational rulers to parochialize power and establish less-than-democratic enclaves, national democratization notwithstanding.

Brazil's transition to democracy is an exemplary case of such unintended effects of decentralized federalism. The new regime's 1988 constitution empowered local and especially state governments, transforming the country into one of the most decentralized federations in the world. State governors emerged as powerful political brokers during the return to democracy in the 1980s, as the decentralized organization of national political parties allowed subnational rulers to rely on their increased power over policy-making to strengthen regional party machines and maximize their autonomy from central actors and institutions. State bosses have sought to parochialize power in their home states and at the same time increase their leverage over national political actors (Costa 1997; Ames 2001; Dantas Neto 2006; Spinelli 2006), not different from subnational authoritarian elites in Mexico and Argentina.

What makes Brazil an interesting case from the point of view of the study of subnational authoritarianism and democratization is not, however, continuity from authoritarian to civilian rule, much less governors' capacity to regularly circumvent checks and balances. If there is anything that makes Brazil different, it is the major and rapid changes in the landscape of territo-

rial politics starting in the late 1990s, which resulted in much more contested gubernatorial and state legislative elections in parallel to local bosses' gradual loss of control of voters and candidates. Since 1998 the political left has rapidly increased its vote in state elections in the North and Northeast regions, which concentrate the bulk of the Brazilian poor and have been for long the stronghold of conservative parties (Borges 2011; Montero 2012).

Given that these changes coincide with the rise of the Workers' Party (PT), Brazil's largest and most important left-wing party, to the presidency and with a reasonably successful agenda of redistribution implemented throughout the PT's recently completed twelve years in power, one might wonder whether they reflect larger structural processes of nationalization of politics. As a matter of fact, subnational democratization and party nationalization are closely related phenomena. The party-system change following the New Deal in the United States demonstrates that large-scale social and economic redistribution by the national executive may create national alignments that gradually undermine local party monopolies (Schattschneider 1960).

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the role of political parties as agents of subnational democratization. It analyzes the mechanisms through which national parties may promote greater political contestation at the subnational level and nationalize politics. The chapter further assesses the effects of alternation in power and increasingly competitive elections on subnational democratic performance. Specifically, it looks at the question of whether party turnover and the emergence of competitive and fragmented party systems are in themselves sufficient conditions for subnational democratization.

In the first part of the chapter I revisit the literature on subnational authoritarianism and subnational hybrid regimes to develop a general argument on the links between party nationalization and subnational regime change. In the second part I analyze the evolution of subnational hybrid regimes and the related effects of changes to federal–state relations and national party dynamics since the early 2000s. This analysis is complemented by comparative data on patterns of subnational democracy and party nationalization in the Brazilian states. The final section looks at the case of Rio Grande do Norte to assess the effect of the rise of left-wing parties to power in instances of low contestation. The analysis focuses on the institutions and practices that sustained the hegemony of conservative political families and the changes to patterns of political recruitment and party competition during the gubernatorial administrations of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) from 2003 to 2010.

The Scope of Conflict, Subnational Hybrid Regimes, and Party Nationalization

In his seminal study of American politics, E. E. Schattschneider (1960) developed a theory about the scope of conflict and its implications for political organization. His core argument is that the outcome of every conflict is determined by the scope of its contagion. That is, the number of people involved in any conflict determines what happens. When the scope of a conflict is restricted, the relative strength of the contestants is likely to be known in advance, and, as a consequence, the stronger side may more easily impose its will on the weaker. As the number of individuals and groups involved in the conflict grows, the balance of power will naturally change and the outcome will become less certain. From this it follows that the stronger actor in a local conflict has every incentive to keep it private, whereas the less powerful party will seek to expand its scope.

Gibson (2005) builds upon Schattschneider's original insights about the scope of conflict to explain how subnational authoritarian regimes emerge and survive. In authoritarian provinces, incumbents have an interest in keeping conflicts localized, whereas oppositions have an interest in nationalizing political conflicts. "Boundary control" requires depriving the local opposition of access to national allies and resources so as to insulate provincial politics from national democratizing pressures (Gibson 2005, 108).

Boundary control involves three types of strategies: parochialization of power, nationalization of influence, and monopolization of national–subnational linkages. Incumbents pursue strategies of parochialization of power to maximize gubernatorial hegemony over provincial institutions such as the local executive, legislative, and judicial branches, as well as provincial party organizations (Gibson 2005, 110). Also, successful authoritarian leaders must occupy or control important national arenas for the purpose of buttressing their control at the provincial level. Finally, subnational authoritarian regimes rely on the monopolization of national–subnational linkages. Such linkages can include institutions established to regulate intergovernmental relations, to monitor provincial activities and expenditures, and to organize the representation of provincial interests before the center (Gibson 2005, 111–112).

Behrend (2011) has argued that full-blown subnational authoritarianism in the terms described by Gibson is a highly exceptional situation due to the fact that in federal democratic countries subnational units are embedded in

a national democratic framework and subnational elites face significant institutional and political constraints on their rule. Territorial variation in the workings of democratic institutions is more likely to be associated with "hybrid" subnational regimes that combine democratic and authoritarian practices. These polities safeguard the electoral components of democracy by allowing citizens to vote and express their preferences while, at the same time, there are constraints on the liberal components of democracy—freedom to form and join organizations, alternative sources of information, and freedom of expression—that make elections essentially uncompetitive (McMann 2006).

Subtypes of subnational hybrid regimes should differ in what concerns two central dimensions of democratic rule: access to power and exercise of power. Access to power in a democratic regime requires the following: fully contested elections for both executive and legislative office, free and fair elections, and alternation in power (Giraudy 2013). These three criteria comprise the contestation subdimension of access to power. The inclusiveness or participation dimension includes the right to vote and run for office (McMann 2006). The second dimension, exercise of power, includes the liberal components of democratic rule. These include institutional constraints on government officials (effectiveness of checks and balances), liberal rights (freedom of expression and information), and the existence of an independent civil society (Gervasoni 2010).

Note that access to power and the exercise of power dimensions are not linearly related. It is both theoretically and empirically possible that a given subnational regime is characterized by formally competitive elections and high levels of participation but yet, because it ranks low in the liberal subdimensions of democratic rule, democratically elected incumbents exercise power in ways that are incompatible with observation of the rule of law and with the basic rights and freedoms of democracy (McMann 2006).

Regardless of the characteristics of subnational regimes, it is certainly the case that the coexistence of a national democratic polity and undemocratic practices and institutions at the subnational level are closely related to the extent to which politics is nationalized. Gibson's (2005) argument on boundary control correctly stresses the point that national political pressures represent a threat to the parochialization of power. In a similar vein, Schattschneider (1960) saw the nationalization of politics as the process through which local power monopolies and old sectional power complexes are undermined, because national political alignments produce more homogeneous party dynamics across the territory.

In broad terms, party nationalization refers to the predominant forms of party organization and electoral mobilization. When party systems are nationalized, parties are mostly organizations of national scope, with the capacity to act according to a national, common orientation rather than dividing themselves across regional or subnational issues (Jones and Mainwaring 2003; Caramani 2004; Jones 2010). In multilevel political systems, party nationalization includes a horizontal dimension (distribution of votes across districts) and a vertical dimension (the degree of congruence among the national and the subnational party systems). Horizontal nationalization requires that parties' share of the vote in each district deviate only marginally from their national vote share. Vertical nationalization implies that national and subnational party systems are very similar and there is a substantial degree of correspondence in the results of elections disputed at different levels of government (Thorlakson 2007; Leiras 2010; Rodden and Wibbels 2011). Furthermore, subnational elections and party cleavages have no autonomy from the national party system, because voters base their choices in elections for subnational offices mostly in national party cues, such as the performance of the incumbent party at the national level (Rodden and Wibbels, 2011).

As a general rule, hybrid, uncompetitive regimes at the subnational level should display a low level of party nationalization, at least in comparison with the country's average. This may be because the extreme incumbency advantage inscribed in local institutions allows the governing party to obtain in provincial elections vote shares much higher than its national share in both subnational and national elections.

From the point of view of undemocratic local elites, vertical nationalization is especially threatening because it often involves the replacement of local party divisions by national party alignments. This necessarily expands the scope of conflict and increases the uncertainty of electoral results. In broader terms, vertical nationalization is inherent to the replacement of territorial cleavages by functional cleavages. The experience of Western Europe suggests that polities nationalize as a result of broader processes of social and economic modernization, such as the development of mass education systems, urbanization, and national economic integration (Caramani 2004). Nationalization, according to this sociological perspective, involves the replacement of the politics of local notables by parties organized around national cleavages.

Note that I do not assume the existence of a linear relationship between levels of party nationalization and subnational democracy. A party system

may present high levels of integration and yet sustain undemocratic political structures.[1] Also, political contestation and participation may increase at the subnational level, despite the persistence of low levels of nationalization. The formation of highly competitive, regionalized party systems is both theoretically and empirically possible.

The point I wish to make is simply that party nationalization, in the context of a fully democratized national polity and competitive national party politics, is likely to be incongruent with the maintenance of hybrid, less than democratic subnational political systems. Hence, the integration of national and subnational political arenas is a key mechanism though which political parties may operate as promoters of subnational democratization.

I propose a simple, minimalist definition of subnational democratization as the process through which variation in the formal and informal rules that regulate access to power and exercise of power both across levels of government and across states or provinces substantially decreases. More specifically, subnational democratization involves the narrowing of the gap that separates the most democratic provinces and the national government from the least democratic provinces in federal countries. This process may occur in only one or a few provinces, assuming a localized, restricted character. Alternatively, subnational democratization may involve systemic change, in that all subnational hybrid regimes are simultaneously democratized, thus resulting in a much more homogeneous "topography" of democratic institutions.

At the subsystem level—that is, at the level of subnational political systems—subnational democratization requires at least effective alternation in power. By this I mean the replacement of the cadres of the old regime by social and political groups previously excluded or underrepresented in subnational government. According to this criterion, greater electoral competition and elite circulation arising due to factional splits in the dominant party at the provincial level does not count as effective alternation because it involves a mere rearrangement of forces in the governing group.

Although there are several potential explanations of subnational hybrid regime reproduction and change, it is arguably the case that party nationalization is likely to be associated with systemic subnational democratization. That is, once local power monopolies become enmeshed in the web of national competitive party politics, pressures for change will be similar across each and every one of the less democratic provinces, producing more homogeneous patterns of participation and contestation.

In the following sections I investigate the nexus between party competition, the nationalization of politics, and related processes of subnational political change by analyzing the case of Brazil.

The Evolution of Subnational Hybrid Regimes in Brazil

Subnational hybrid regimes in Brazil have relied on various formal and informal resources of power for their survival. These include state incumbents' control of the media and businesses and their reliance on the discretionary distribution of patronage and pork to co-opt the opposition and buy voters' support (Costa 1997; Moraes Filho 2000; Spinelli 2006). Furthermore, governors often take advantage of their institutional prerogatives to undermine horizontal accountability. Governors' influence over the selection of state and sometimes federal judges is one mechanism through which checks and balances are regularly circumvented (Abrucio 1998; Dantas Neto 2006).

A key element that explains the reproduction of subnational hybrid regimes in democratic Brazil is continuity from authoritarian to civilian rule. Brazil's bureaucratic-authoritarian regime (1964–1985) was peculiar in that the military decided to maintain a façade of political pluralism by creating a two-party system formed by the National Renewal Alliance (ARENA), which represented the authoritarian government, and the opposition Democratic Movement Party (MDB). Institutional rules were heavily biased in favor of the pro-military ARENA, which left the MDB to play the role of a party of largely symbolic protest (Stepan 1976; Kinzo 1988). During the last years of the regime, the ARENA remained strongest in the rural states of the North, Northeast, and Center-West, and subnational elites took advantage of generous patronage resources and development projects provided by the military rulers to fortify their own personally controlled party machines (Power 2000). In many cases, the political elites affiliated with the local ARENA machines continued to play a dominant role after the return to democracy, though under different party labels such as the Liberal Front Party (PFL), the Popular Party (PP), and the Liberal Party (PL).[2]

Conservatives' capacity to secure continued access to federal patronage by participating in most if not all of the national coalitions mounted between 1985—the year that marks the democratic transition—to 2002, when Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was elected, allowed them to extend their control of national–subnational linkages. The high degree of political continuity of Brazil's postdemocratic national politics is evident in the fact that two of the direct successors of the political organizations created by the military—the

PFL and the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB)—played a key role in national coalition-making throughout this period. It is also noticeable that the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) of president F. H. Cardoso (1995–2002) emerged in dissent from the PMDB, and the party soon left behind its social democratic ideals to form a durable alliance with the political right in support of market-oriented reform. Because left-wing parties, with few exceptions, did not participate of national cabinets until Lula's election in 2002, this allowed center-right forces to monopolize control of federal resources in the poorest states.

Lula's victory in 2002 represented a serious blow to incumbents in many of the less democratic states as they were pushed into the ranks of the opposition. State party branches of the PT and its left-wing allies were strengthened by gaining access to federal posts and resources that had long been monopolized by their center-right adversaries. The president forged a broad coalition that included traditional leftist allies of the PT such as the PSB and the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) but also the center PMDB and small right-wing parties such as the PL. Still, subnational alliances in the less democratic states often favored the left against their more conservative opponents, whereas in other instances the PT and other left-wing organizations relied on the support of the PMDB to defeat right-wing forces (Montero 2010; Souza 2010).[3]

The political right suffered heavy losses in the North, Northeast, and Center-West regions as left-wing parties took hold of governorships in states previously under the firm grip of conservatives. Brazil's largest right-wing party as of 1998, the Liberal Front Party / Democrats (PFL/DEM), was the major victim of these realignments: because the party remained in opposition to the federal government since Lula's election, it could no longer count on state resources to grease state political machines in its Northeast stronghold. Hence, the party shrank in state and local elections, whereas some of its right-wing competitors, such as the PP, adopted an office-seeking strategy and joined the PT coalition, which allowed them to survive and even improve their electoral fortunes (Power 2015).

Competitive pressures suffered by incumbents in the least democratic states have increased, not only due to national electoral shifts following Lula's election in 2002 but also due to a set of changes in Brazilian federalism. Post-1990 changes to fiscal federalism have decreased the resources available to the states, whereas local governments have been strengthened by the decentralization of greater authority over policy-making and fiscal resources. State governments have partly lost the power to implement key social policies

and mediate the distribution of federal grants as the federal government has sought to bypass governors by transferring resources directly to municipalities (Souza 2002; Almeida 2005; Arretche 2009; Fenwick 2009).

These changes relate to broader moves recently toward the strengthening of the presidency and the nationalization of politics. Research on party nationalization in Brazil has shown that the hegemony of only two viable coalitions in presidential elections—led by the left-wing PT and the center PSDB, respectively—reflects the success of the nationalization strategies adopted by these two parties. According to Cortez (2009), the PT and PSDB have pursued the strategy of integrating presidential and gubernatorial disputes by reproducing the national bipolarity at the state level. This has been possible in part because all presidential, gubernatorial, and national legislative elections held since 1994 have been held concurrently, greatly increasing the stakes of the presidential race. However, PT–PSDB hegemony in national elections has not been transferred to gubernatorial races. In Brazil's coalitional presidentialism, electoral coordination involves the exchange of electoral support across different levels of government between the party leading the presidential coalition and its allies. Therefore, in exchange for support in the national election, parties disputing the presidential race will not run a gubernatorial candidate in certain states, instead joining a coalition led by one of their national allies.[4] As a consequence, the major parties disputing gubernatorial elections differ significantly across states (Borges 2015).

Both the PSDB and the PT presidential administrations sought to "nationalize credit-claiming" by developing federal social policies that do not depend on local intermediaries and thus allow for a direct connection between voters and the federal executive (Melo 2005; Borges 2013). The best example of this process of "federalization" is the Bolsa Família (Family Grant), a basic income program that unified several pre-existing federal policies and initiatives under a single label and a single budget. The program targeted families with an income below R$120 a month and conditioned transfers on school attendance for students aged six to fifteen. By 2006, when Lula was preparing to run for re-election, the Bolsa Família covered practically all the population below the poverty line: eleven million families or an estimated forty million people. The program was a key factor behind Lula's victory against the PSDB in 2006, because it allowed the president to compensate for the losses suffered in the most developed and industrialized states with a much stronger electoral performance in the poorest regions of the country (Hunter and Power 2007; Nicolau and Peixoto 2007; Zucco 2008).

Elsewhere I have presented statistical evidence that confirms the hypothesis that national party dynamics have gradually undermined subnational incumbents' power over state institutions. One of the mechanisms through which national and subnational arenas are linked is participation on the president's cabinet: being in opposition to the federal government decreases the governor's party vote in state legislative elections, even when one controls for gubernatorial coattails and states' economic and social development. Furthermore, the Bolsa Família program has had a positive effect on the electoral performance of the PT and its allies in state elections (Borges 2011).

In the following sections I analyze how these trends have evolved and affected subnational hybrid regimes. First I present aggregate data on party nationalization, the degree of political contestation, and checks and balances in Brazil's twenty-seven states. Then I narrow the focus by looking at the case of Rio Grande do Norte, in the Brazilian Northeast.

Patterns of Subnational Democracy in the Brazilian States

I present a simple measure of political contestation at the state level that is intended to capture incumbents' relative advantage in electoral competition.[5] Whenever control of state government resources and powers allows incumbents to obtain substantial and persistent electoral majorities, this should be correlated with underlying practices that result in the systematic weakening of the opposition and in pro-incumbent bias in the rules of the democratic game, thus restricting the space of contestation. As a proximate measure of subnational incumbents' control of state institutions and electoral processes, I have developed an electoral dominance index to rank order all twenty-seven Brazilian states. The index is composed of three main variables: the governor's party share of the total vote in the first round, the share of seats controlled by the governor's party, and a political continuity index that measures the number of terms completed by the incumbent party since 1982.

All the measures were calculated for the period 1990–2010, with the exception of the number of consecutive terms, which considered elections from 1982. This is justified because the first democratic gubernatorial election occurred in 1982, a few years before the transition to civilian rule. Furthermore, several states did not exist or lacked political autonomy before 1986, so that starting data collection with earlier periods would imply a loss of data. Given the occurrence of high levels of intercorrelation, I relied on factor analysis to reduce all three variables to a single index of electoral dominance and divided the resulting scores by the median value. The index

is an updated and slightly modified version of the index originally presented in Borges (2007), because this previous version did not include data on the 2002, 2006, and 2010 elections.

I calculated the mean dominance scores for the period 1990–98 to classify the states, on the grounds that patterns of electoral competition changed substantially in the three subsequent elections. I relied on the distribution of mean scores to classify the states into four groups: high dominance (fourth quartile of the distribution), low dominance (first quartile), and two intermediate groups (third and fourth quartiles).[6]

The absolute majority of the states in the high-dominance group—Bahia, Ceará, Goiás, Paraíba, Piauí, Amazonas, and Tocantins—were poorly developed states located in the poorest North and Northeast regions (the only exception was Goiás, a center-western state). Four out of the seven states (Bahia, Ceará, Goiás, and Paraíba) were characterized by the dominance of a single party for a period equal to or greater than three elections between 1982 and 1998. Also, two of the states (Bahia and Piauí) were paradigmatic examples of political continuity from authoritarian to civilian rule because in them right-wing political families born and bred during the military regime succeeded in maintaining their political clout throughout most of the recent democratic period (Moraes Filho 2000; Dantas Neto 2006).

The intermediate and highly competitive groups are integrated mainly by Brazil's most developed states of the South and Southeast, where left-wing parties are usually stronger, whereas political families play a less important role in statewide political alliances (though they may still be important in local politics). These categories also include a set of northern states characterized by highly volatile patterns of electoral competition (Rondônia and Roraima) and sometimes a relatively strong political left (Amapá). These Amazon states have recently been colonized by migrants from all parts of Brazil, and for that reason they lack the perennial political families of the Northeast.

How did these patterns of competition evolve in the recent period? Figure 6.1 shows the evolution of dominance scores, aggregated by the mean levels of dominance estimated for the period 1990–98, through the four elections starting in 1998.

The graph shows that the distance between the most and the least competitive states has decreased substantially, reaching its lowest point in 2006. This is congruent with the notion of a systemic process of subnational democratization by which the least democratic states gradually "catch up"




Figure 6.1. Evolution of electoral dominance in the Brazilian states by dominance category, 1998–2010. Data from the Brazilian High Electoral Court (TSE) and Borges (2007).

with the most democratic. Figure 6.2 presents boxplots of electoral dominance by election year, from 1998 to 2010. The boxplots show that the overall distribution of dominance scores became more homogeneous throughout the period.

Even though electoral dominance provides us with a notion of the effectiveness of political contestation, it does not say much about how power is exercised, which is another key dimension of subnational democracy. Although there is no available measure to capture variation over time, Alston et al. (2000) developed a checks and balances index (CBI) for the period 1999–2002 that may be used for the purpose of cross-sectional comparison. The index includes a set of measures of the effectiveness of judicial institutions and of the state audit office, the percentage of media concessions not in the hands of politicians, and the governance of state and federal regulatory agencies at the state level. All these measures were reduced to a single standardized index through factor analysis. Figure 6.3 shows a simple plot of scores on the CBI against the mean dominance scores for the period 1990–98. A bivariate regression line was added to the plot to facilitate its interpretation.

Overall, the graph indicates that there is a negative relationship between electoral dominance and the strength of checks and balances at the state




Figure 6.2. Electoral dominance in the Brazilian states by election year, 1998–2010. The circles represent the outliers in the distribution of cases. Data from the Brazilian High Electoral Court (TSE) and Borges (2007).

level, as expected. Governors face weaker controls in states with weaker political competition. Note, however, that some states seem to deviate from this pattern. In particular, a group of four states at the bottom of the plot (Rio Grande do Norte, Piauí, Maranhão, and Roraima) present much lower checks and balances scores than would be "expected" based on their mean dominance scores. These states actually had weaker checks and balances than did the two least competitive states in the period 1990–98 (Ceará and Paraíba). This suggests that the dimensions of access to power and exercise of power at the state level are not necessarily related. Furthermore, variation across states in the period 1999–2002 was wide, ranging from a score of zero (Maranhão) to 0.80 (Rio Grande do Sul), with a standard deviation of 0.22. This is a likely indication that territorial differences in institutional constraints on state governors have remained substantial, despite increasingly homogeneous patterns of electoral competition observed since 1998.

To what extent is variation in electoral dominance across time and space related to changes in party nationalization? To answer this question, I rely on the dissimilarity index (DI) (Schakel 2012), which is calculated by the formula in equation 6.1:

$$\frac{1}{2}\sum_{i=1}^{n} | X_{in} - X_{ir} |, \tag{6.1}$$




Figure 6.3. Mean dominance scores (1990–98) and checks-and-balances index scores (1999–2002). AC = Acre; AL = Alagoas; AM = Amazonas; AP = Amapá; BA = Bahia; CE = Ceará; DF = Distrito Federal; ES = Espírito Santo; GO = Goiás; MA = Maranhão; MG = Minas Gerais; MS = Mato Grosso do Sul; MT = Mato Grosso; PA = Pará; PB = Paraíba; PE = Pernambuco; PI = Piauí; PR = Paraná; RJ = Rio de Janeiro; RN = Rio Grande do Norte; RO = Rondônia; RR = Roraima; RS = Rio Grande do Sul; SC = Santa Catarina; SE = Sergipe; SP = São Paulo; TO = Tocantins. Data from the Brazilian High Electoral Court (TSE); Borges (2007); and Alston et al. (2010).

where X_{in} is the percentage of the national vote obtained by the *i*th party and X_{ir} is the percentage of the vote obtained by the same party at the district level. Absolute differences are summed up and divided by two to avoid double counting. Global averages are calculated by weighting the dissimilarity indexes obtained for each district by the size of the district electorate relative to the national vote (Jeffery and Hough 2001; Schakel 2012). As a DI approaches zero, parties' shares at the national and district levels become more similar, which indicates a high level of congruence between the national- and district-level party systems.

I calculated dissimilarity scores for national legislative elections at the state level for the period 1990–2010. The scores were then aggregated by the levels of electoral dominance (high/low) estimated for 1990–98. In figure 6.4 I plotted the mean dissimilarity scores obtained by the high- and low-dominance states and compared the results with the national mean scores.

The figure shows that legislative elections nationalized over the period, from a DI of about 36 in 1990 to 23 in the last year of the series. However, this trend played out differently in low- and high-dominance states. In the states with the highest levels of incumbent dominance, dissimilarity remained high although it was falling nationally from 1994 to 2002. In the low-dominance states the nationalization trend was remarkably similar to the national curve, at least until 1998. In the last two years of the series, dissimilarity fell rapidly in the high-dominance states, coinciding with the less heterogeneous patterns of electoral competition observed from 2006 (see fig. 6.1). These results are congruent with the notion that the less democratic states in a federal country will deviate from the rest of the country in terms of party alignments and party competition as long as incumbents succeed in "localizing conflict," to use Schattschneider's (1960) term. However, because undemocratic elites' power is undermined, for whatever reason, and states




Figure 6.4. Dissimilarity index, lower-chamber elections: National average and mean scores for high- and low-dominance states, 1990–2010. Data from the Brazilian High Electoral Court (TSE); Ipeadata; and Borges (2007).

can no longer be "insulated" from national political dynamics, these differences tend to become less salient.

Party nationalization coincides temporally with territorial expansion of the left wing's vote. As center and right-wing parties that controlled hybrid regime states partly lost the capacity to erect barriers to entry in their electoral markets, left-wing parties grew in territories where they were previously weak or almost nonexistent in terms of both local organization and support (Borges 2007; Van Dyck 2014).

In the following and last section of the chapter I analyze how these trends have played out in the northeastern state of Rio Grande do Norte and to what extent they are associated with effective subnational democratization.

The Case of Rio Grande do Norte

Rio Grande do Norte stands outs in the Brazilian federation as an emblematic example of the demise of conservatives' control of state institutions. Because the state experienced rapid and significant changes in patterns of political contestation, it fits the notion of a "most-likely" case. If alternation in power and left-wing government matter for subnational democratization in Brazil, we would expect to see relevant changes occurring in instances in which these trends were the most evident.

Table 6.1 compares Rio Grande do Norte with a set of selected states placed in the high and upper intermediate tiers of electoral dominance (mean scores for 1990–98). The table presents figures for the left-wing share of seats in state assemblies and states' positions in the distribution of mean dominance scores for the base period (1990–98) and the three subsequent elections (2002–10).

On average, left-wing parties tripled their representation in the state assembly between the two periods under analysis. In the other states selected for comparison, left-wing parties did not grow so rapidly or they started from higher levels of support (as in the states of Bahia, Ceará, and Mato Grosso). Concerning incumbents' dominance, Rio Grande do Norte moved from the eleventh to the nineteenth position, which also indicates that the state has entered the group of states with the highest levels of political contestation. Thus it differs from Bahia and Ceará, which have maintained their positions as high-dominance states, in relative terms, notwithstanding a stronger left wing in the second period.

Different from the most populous states of the Northeast, such as Bahia and Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte benefited little from state-led

TABLE 6.1.
Mean dominance scores (rank-order position) and left-wing share of seats, Rio Grande do Norte and selected states, 1990–98 and 2002–10

	Mean dominance, rank order position		Left share of seats, state assemblies	
State	1990–98	2002–10	1990–98	2002–10
R. G. do Norte	11	19	9.80	33.35
Amazonas	3	25	9.80	18.90
Bahia	4	2	16.93	27.90
Ceará	1	4	18.13	31.50
Maranhão	8	9	11.13	29.85
Mato Grosso	9	7	20.83	29.10
Paraíba	7	13	25.00	23.70
Piauí	2	16	7.77	28.35

Sources: Brazilian High Electoral Court (TSE); Ipeadata; and Borges (2007).

industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s, and its economy relied heavily on oil production, textiles, food processing, tourism, and public administration. By the year 2000, over half of the state's population (55 percent) was below the poverty line and the gross domestic product per capita represented about 48 percent of the national average.[7]

Since the military regime, politics in Rio Grande do Norte was marked by the hegemony of the Maia and the Alves political families. The Maia family gained importance in state politics after the nomination of federal deputy Tarcízio Maia to the governorship in 1975. The governor was a skilful politician who succeeded in creating his own political group. His nephew José Agripino Maia assumed the lead of the political clan following the transition to democracy (Machado 1995; Andrade 1997). Not different from conservative political families elsewhere in Brazil, the Maia took advantage of their control of the local section of the ARENA, the party of the military regime, to cultivate a solid electoral base in the state's rural and backward countryside, which would allow them to play a crucial role in democratic politics.

The Alves family had a somewhat older story in state politics. The patriarch of the clan, Aluízio, had started his career as a journalist and businessman who was the founder of one of the major state news diaries, the *Tribuna do Norte*. Initially a protégé of Governor Dinarte Mariz, to whom he owed his election to the federal chamber in 1946, Alves gradually gained autonomy from the Mariz clan as he emerged as a key figure within the conservative National Democratic Union (UDN). Following his victory in the 1962 gubernatorial election, Aluízio succeeded in creating an enduring

political machine under the firm control of his family (Trindade 2003). Although the Alves group took hold of the opposition MDB during the authoritarian years, during the last years of the regime the Alves and Maia clans sealed a political agreement that allowed them to divide control of elective positions (Machado 1995). The agreement was soon broken during the transition to democracy, and the two groups have competed fiercely among themselves throughout the last thirty years.

Among the several political families that controlled politics at the local level in Rio Grande do Norte, the Rosados were surely the most powerful and influential in state political affairs. The Rosado oligarchy was based in Mossoró, the second-largest city in the state, and it descended from the former governor Dix-Sept Rosado, elected in 1950 (Trindade 2003).[8] Even though the Rosado family remained mostly a local group, they have dominated politics in their home city at least since the 1950s—on all but two occasions, they have elected all mayors since 1948—and their influence had extended to other municipalities in the Mossoró region, which has allowed them to elect several representatives to the state and federal chambers. In gubernatorial and other statewide disputes, the Rosados have more often aligned with the Maia family, though they have been pragmatic in their alliances and their family members have divided themselves among several political parties.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the Maia and the Alves families consolidated their positions as the dominant forces in *potiguar* politics, with the Rosado group playing a secondary though important role. José Agripino Maia was elected governor in 1982 and 1990, whereas the Alves clan was victorious in the 1986, 1994, and 1998 gubernatorial contests.[9] The Maia political machine was organized within the right-wing PFL. The Alves group took hold of the local PMDB (Spinelli 2006).

Both of the state's top political families, the Maia and the Alves families, relied on extensive networks of local political families to mobilize voters. An example is the Rego family, which has traditionally been allied with the Maias at the state level. State Deputy Getúlio Rego and his kin controlled politics in the city of Riacho de Santana with an iron hand: all mayors elected from 1992 to 2012 were members of the family.[10] Thanks to the local machine's support, the PFL obtained above-average vote shares in the city in state legislative elections: 62 percent in 1994, 81 percent in 1998, 64percent in 2002, and 42 percent in 2006. The Maias counted on the support of various other political families in the state's western region, which allowed the

PFL to obtain dominant voting patterns in its western stronghold. In turn, the Alves family had their support concentrated in the central region of the state, where the city of Angicos, homeland of the family's patriarch, Aluízio, is located. The PMDB enjoyed some of its best electoral performances in cities of central Rio Grande do Norte where hegemonic local families such as the Leocádio de Araújo family, in the municipality of Lajes, aligned themselves with the Alves family. Widespread vote-buying and harrasment of opposition candidates is common currency in these municipalities, because dominant families rely on their privileged economic positions and weak local institutions to rule undisturbed (Borges 2010).[11]

Control of the media by the state's political families is another key element of their enduring political power. The Alves family owns the state's largest newspaper, *Tribuna do Norte*, the Globo Natal radio, and the Inter TV Cabugi network, which is the local affiliate of Globo, Brazil's largest and most popular commercial network. In turn, the Maia family is in control of Tropical TV, a local affiliate of the SBT broadcast network, and several radio stations affiliated with the Tropical media complex. The Rosado family also controls local newspapers, radio stations, and the Mossoró TV network. Such an impressive list of media concessions directly owned and sometimes managed by members of the top political clans has obvious implications for democratic competition, because it provides the state's dominant groups with the opportunity to manipulate news coverage in their own favor and yet reduce voters' access to independent sources of information.

Rio Grande do Norte's political families have further weakened opposition groups by monopolizing national–subnational linkages. From 1990 to 1998 the PMDB–PFL party oligopoly elected 75 percent of the twenty-four seats disputed in the federal chamber. When one adds to this figure the five seats obtained by traditional allies of the Maia and Alves groups, the PTB and the PSDB, the percentage climbs to 95 percent of the seats disputed from 1990 to 1998. Of the total twenty-four seats disputed in the period, eleven were occupied by direct descendents of the state's top political families: the Maia, the Alves, and the Rosado families.[12]

The Fall of the Old Regime: Old Wine in New Bottles?

The decay of Rio Grande do Norte's political families coincides with the meteoric political trajectory of a former mayor of the state's capital city, who succeeded in beating state bosses in two gubernatorial elections (2002 and 2006). Even though she was initially connected with the Maia clan, to

which she owed her first steps in electoral politics, Vilma Faria soon succeeded in gaining autonomy from her old allies, creating her own political group. She started her political career as state secretary of Social Assistance in the early 1980s during the governorship of her husband's cousin, José Agripino Maia.[13] However, she became a relevant player in state politics only in 1988, when she decided to run for mayor of Natal for the second time (she had run for the first time in 1985 and had been defeated by Garibaldi Alves). This time, she defeated the Alves family, represented by the federal deputy Henrique Alves.

Vilma Faria's first term as mayor of Natal represented a clear watershed in her political career. By occupying one of the most important executive posts in state politics, second only to the governorship, she was able to develop and cultivate her own base of support, independent of her family ties to the Maia family (Almeida 2001). In 1992 Vilma was able to get her successor, Aldo Tinoco, elected to the Natal mayoralty. At that time she was affiliated to the leftist PSB and no longer followed the lead of her former husband, Lavoisier, and his cousin José Agripino. Vilma was elected mayor again in 1996 and reelected in 2000 thanks to her great popularity in the state capital. Because of her electoral strength in the most populous and politically important city of Rio Grande Norte, which contained almost 40 percent of the state's electorate, she soon emerged as an important player in state politics (Lacerda and Oliveira 2005).

In 2002, as the major political parties were preparing to dispute the gubernatorial election, Vilma Faria emerged in the polls as a potential candidate for the governorship. Without the support of local political machines that had always aligned with either the Maia or the Alves political clan, and relying on a very small party, Vilma Faria surprised political analysts as she defeated both the Alves the Maia candidates, obtaining 37 percent of the vote in the first round of the gubernatorial election. In the second round of the gubernatorial election, Vilma Faria relied on a broad (and ideologically bizarre) political coalition to beat the candidate of the Alves family, the vice governor Fernando Freire. She obtained the support of both the right-wing PFL and the left-wing PT. Thanks to the alliance with the PT, she could take advantage of the "Lula wave" that swept over the country and secured the PT's victory in the presidential election runoff. In turn, the support of the PFL machine strengthened her candidacy in the poor and rural countryside of Rio Grande do Norte, where the PSB was either too weak or nonexistent.

Vilma Faria was reelected in 2006 with the support of president Lula's PT. This time the Alves and Maia political families sealed an alliance in

support of the gubernatorial candidacy of Garibaldi Alves. The fact that the center-left coalition led by the governor defeated an alliance between the two political machines that had dominated state politics for decades had a clear symbolic meaning. The party oligopoly built by the Maia and Alves groups had finally lost its capacity to control and restrict the electoral arena in the wake of the emergence of a third, independent force in *potiguar* politics.

In 2010 Faria's group split because the mayor of Natal, Carlos Eduardo, decided to dispute the gubernatorial race against the PSB candidate, Iberê Ferreira. Carlos Eduardo had actually been elected mayor thanks to the governor's support, but he decided to leave the PSB for the Democratic Labor Party (PDT) to compete against Faria's candidate. Whereas the local left was divided, the Maia and Alves families joined forces in support of the gubernatorial candidacy of senator Rosalba Ciarlini, who happened to be a member of the Rosado clan. The president of the legislative assembly, Robinson Faria, who had previously been in Faria's coalition, ran as vice governor on Ciarlini's ticket. Senator Rosalba Ciarlini was elected in the first round, which allowed the Rosado oligarchy to take hold of the state executive for the second time ever, sixty years after the election of Dix-Sept Rosado in 1950. If it is out of question that Rosalba Ciarlini's election in 2010 demonstrated the persisting power of family politics in the state, it is worth noticing that it occurred within a fragmented and competitive party system in which no political boss possessed either the means to fully control its followers or the formal and informal resources required to turn electoral results into a foregone conclusion.

Because most of the empirical evidence analyzed in this chapter was gathered before 2011, the chapter does not look at Ciarlini's administration. Rather, it focuses on the two gubernatorial administrations of Vilma Faria and the related electoral success of the left in Rio Grande do Norte in order to assess the extent of recent political changes.

Analysts of state politics have noticed that governor Faria did not care to innovate in terms of well-established political practices in state politics. Rather than investing in the development of a strong party organization, the governor spent much of her two gubernatorial terms trying to help her family and friends—for instance, her daughter, Márcia Maia, was nominated for secretary of Social Assistance in 2007 after being reelected state deputy—and co-opting the same political elites that had dominated the state for decades before her election.[14] Faria's coalition included the PSB, the PT,

the PFL of senator Agripino Maia, and two other right-wing organizations: the PTB and the PL.

Formally, the PMDB and the right-wing Progressive Party (PPB) were in opposition to the governor during her first term. The PFL left the government in 2004, when Senator José Agripino Maia and Governor Vilma Faria quarreled over the nomination of the coalition's candidate to the Natal mayoralty. The PMDB, the PFL, and the PPB were actually in possession of a legislative majority in 2003: they controlled seventeen out of twenty-four seats. Given the tiny share of seats held by her original coalition in the legislative assembly, Faria had no option other than to rely on the support of patronage-seeking deputies eager to switch sides in exchange for the government's largesse. As a matter of fact, a substantial number of the opposition deputies left their parties to join the pro-government Party of National Mobilization (PMN) following the lead of the president of the legislative assembly, Robinson Faria.

By the midst of Faria's second term, in 2008, the legislative opposition was reduced to only two deputies out of twenty-four.[15] As a consequence, the legislature could hardly work as an effective check on the executive.[16] On the other hand, the relative weakness of the PSB and its left-wing allies resulted in substantial continuity in coalition formation.

Table 6.2 shows the distribution of state legislative seats among the PMDB, the PFL, the PSB, and other left-wing parties and a remaining group of "satellite" parties traditionally allied to the Maia and Alves families, from 1998 to 2010.

By 1998 the PMDB and PFL machines and their allies controlled an impressive 80 percent of the seats in the state assembly. These percentages fell to about 41 percent in 2010. Meanwhile, the PSB and its left-wing allies

TABLE 6.2.
Rio Grande do Norte: Distribution of state seats by party / party bloc, 1998–2010

Year	PMDB (A)	PFL/DEM (B)	"Satellite" parties (C)	Left-wing parties	% (A + B + C)
1998	8	5	6	4	79.17
2002	4	5	8	5	70.83
2006	4	5	1	8	41.67
2010	6	2	2	6	41.67

Source: Brazilian High Electoral Court (TSE).
Note: PMDB = Brazilian Democratic Movement Party; PFL/DEM = Liberal Front Party / Democrats.

increased their representation, from a low of 16 percent of seats in 1998 to a high of 33 percent in 2006. Greater electoral competition has boosted the vote of small parties that have benefited from widespread party-switching, such as the PMN. By 2007 the latter party had the largest delegation in the legislative assembly.

In the federal chamber, one observes similar trends, although the left's performance has been somewhat better. Table 6.3 presents the distribution of seats in the federal chamber among the four blocs (the PMDB, the PFL, the satellite parties, and the left), comparing two periods: the three delegations elected in 1990–98 and the three delegations elected in 2002, 2006, and 2010.

At the local level, the PSB experienced exponential growth in elections during Faria's two terms. The total number of mayors elected by the party was multiplied by eight between 2000 and 2004: the PSB elected forty-eight mayors in 2004 compared to six in the previous local elections. At the same time, the PFL suffered heavy losses: the party's local representation fell from thirty-five mayors in 2000 to only seventeen in 2008. Even though the PMDB lost space in local politics as well, the party better resisted the growth of the PSB, electing fifty-five mayors in 2000, thirty-five in 2004, and thirty-seven in 2008. Note that these changes do not necessarily imply that there was elite turnover at the state level: the governing PSB did not bother to strengthen local oppositions, preferring instead to co-opt local hegemonic groups. Of the total forty-eight mayors elected by the party in 2004, at least one-fourth had been previously affiliated with other parties, mostly the PMDB and the PFL. But these numbers are probably underestimated due to a lack of data.

TABLE 6.3.
Rio Grande do Norte: Distribution of lower chamber seats by party / party bloc, 1990–2014

	1990–2002		2003–14	
Party	*N*	%	*N*	%
PFL	9	37.5	6	25.0
PMDB	9	37.5	3	12.5
"Satellite" parties	3	12.5	1	6.3
Left-wing parties	0	0.0	10	41.7
Other	3	12.5	4	16.7
Total	24	100.0	24	100.0

Source: Brazilian High Electoral Court (TSE).
Note: PFL = Liberal Front Party; PMDB = Brazilian Democratic Movement Party.

The differences in the performance of the PMDB and the PFL in local elections are not hard to understand considering that the latter party remained in opposition to both the state and the federal government during the eight years of Vilma Faria's gubernatorial administration. The local section of the PMDB joined the Lula government in 2006, and the Alves clan soon rose to a position of prominence in national politics, with Garibaldi Alves Filho elected president of the Senate in 2007. Hence, whereas PFL politicians were cut off from access to national and state pork, the PMDB counted on federal resources to survive in opposition to the PSB government.

Political Recruitment and Party Competition

This section moves beyond electoral results to inquire whether the demise of the Alves and Maia families has actually led to the rise of a new governing elite. As already hinted in the previous section, the governing PSB has relied on the support of members of the "old regime." Hence, analyzing legislative recruitment is crucial to assess whether there has been effective alternation in power.

In table 6.4 I compare the career backgrounds of deputies elected before and after 2002. The table presents data on the first political office (either politically appointive or elective) held by parliamentarians.

As seen in the table, there is no significant difference between the two periods. A substantial number of deputies started their political careers at higher points in the political hierarchy (as state secretary or in some other top-level state appointive position or as federal or state deputy). The totals for these three categories were over 60 percent in both periods. This suggests that there was a more closed pattern of recruitment in which politicians were allowed to jump positions in the political hierarchy of elective offices due to factors such as family connections and privileged access to state or federal top bureaucratic positions and the jobs and resources under the control of the latter.

Ideally these results should be complemented by an analysis of patterns of recruitment in the state assembly, considering that the national database is limited by the small number of individuals elected in each legislature (eight). Due to the paucity of both primary and secondary data, I was unable to obtain reliable information for the whole period of interest (1990–2010). In the legislative assembly's database and other complementary sources (the local council and mayoralty of Natal, the state court of accounts, and local newspapers), I could find information only for the legislatures elected in

TABLE 6.4.
Rio Grande do Norte: Career backgrounds of federal deputies, 1990–2002 and 2003–10

	Period			
	1990–2002		2003–10	
First political/administrative position occupied	*N*	%	*N*	%
Local councilman	1	7.7	2	15.4
Mayor / vice mayor	1	7.7	0	0.0
State deputy	2	15.4	2	15.4
Governor / vice governor	0	0.0	0	0.0
Federal deputy	3	23.1	3	23.1
Minister of state / other federal top position	0	0.0	0	0.0
State secretary / other state top position	3	23.1	4	30.8
Local secretary / other local top position	3	23.1	2	15.4
Total	13	100.0	13	100.0

Sources: Abreu (2001); website of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, http://www.camara.leg.br.

2002 and 2006, totaling thirty-one biographic profiles (the actual number of state deputies that served from 2003 to 2010 was thirty-four, but I could not find reliable information for three of these individuals). I then added to this database the thirteen federal deputies who served in the same period, totaling forty-four members of the state's political elite.

I relied on this enlarged database to make comparisons across groups of deputies. I started by looking at differences among deputies elected for the first time in either 2002 or 2006 and those who had previous legislative careers.[17] Half of the sophomore deputies had a close relative in politics, as compared to 36.4 percent of the freshmen. Although these figures indicate that family connections continue to play an important role in political recruitment, significant differences emerge when deputies are grouped by ideology. Among left-wing deputies, 27.5 percent (five out of nineteen) had relatives in politics; in the remaining group of deputies, the percentage of descendents of a political family was almost twice as high: 53 percent (fourteen of twenty-six).

Table 6.5 shows the career backgrounds of left-wing deputies compared with center and right-wing deputies (grouped together as "other parties"). Interestingly enough, a substantial majority of left-wing parliamentarians started their careers in local politics (as local councilmen, mayors, or vice mayors or in other top appointive positions). The cumulative percentage of these categories was 68 percent (thirteen out of nineteen) compared to 40 percent (ten out of twenty-five) among deputies affiliated with center and

TABLE 6.5.
Rio Grande do Norte: Career backgrounds of federal and state deputies by ideology (left/other), 2003–10

	Left-wing parties		Other parties	
Political/administrative position occupied	*N*	%	*N*	%
Local councilman	6	31.58	4	16.00
Mayor / vice mayor	4	21.05	2	8.00
State deputy	4	21.05	8	32.00
Federal deputy	0	0.00	3	12.00
State secretary / other state top position	2	10.53	4	16.00
Local secretary / other local top position	3	15.79	4	16.00
Total	19	100.00	25	100.00

Sources: Abreu (2001); websites of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (www.camara.leg.br), Rio Grande do Norte's state assembly (www.al.rn.gov.br) and local council (www.cmnat.rn.gov.br); and Natal's mayoralty (natal.rn.gov.br).

right-wing parties. Most of these locally oriented leftists started their careers in the Natal metropolitan region (in nine out of thirteen cases).

The differences between the political left and the traditional parties are less significant when it comes to the partisan backgrounds of state and federal deputies, as shown in table 6.6. Only about half of the left-wing deputies in the sample (nine out of nineteen) started their political careers in a left-wing party (the PSB, the PT, the PDT, or the PV). It is also noteworthy that three deputies actually migrated from a conservative political organization: the PFL (two cases) or the ARENA (one case). In the majority of the cases (31.6 percent), leftist parliamentarians were recruited from the ranks of the PMDB. Table 6.6 compares the patterns of partisan recruitment of left- and right-wing parties.

In comparison with the right-wing delegation in the national and state legislatures, the left-wing group shows less internal cohesion in terms of partisan recruitment given that all right-wing parliamentarians in the period under consideration started their careers in conservative organizations (the PFL, the PPB/PP, the PL/PR, the Democratic Social Party or PDS, and the ARENA). A more detailed analysis of the career trajectories of left-wing deputies recruited in center and right-wing organizations revealed that in eight out of ten cases they joined a left-wing party *after* the election of Vilma Faria to the governorship in 2002. This pattern suggests that part of the growth of the left since 2002 is explained by politicians' opportunistic tendency to support whichever party forces are in power in order to obtain access to patronage resources controlled by the state and federal executive branches of power.

TABLE 6.6
Rio Grande do Norte: First party affiliation of federal and state deputies by ideology (left/right), 2003–10

First party affiliation	Left-wing parties		Right-wing parties	
Right-center	*N*	%	*N*	%
ARENA	1	5.3	4	28.6
PFL	2	10.5	5	35.7
PDS/PPB/PP	0	0.0	2	14.2
PL/PR	0	0.0	2	14.3
MDB	1	5.3	0	0.0
PMDB	6	31.6	0	0.0
Subtotal	10	52.6	13	92.8
Left-wing	*N*	%	*N*	%
PT	3	15.8	0	0.0
PSB	3	15.8	1	7.1
PDT	1	5.3	0	0.0
PV	2	10.5	0	0.0
Subtotal	9	47.4	1	7.1
Total	19	100.0	14	100.0

Sources: Abreu (2001); websites of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (www.camara.leg.br), Rio Grande do Norte's state assembly (www.al.rn.gov.br) and local council (www.cmnat.rn.gov.br), and Natal's mayoralty (natal.rn.gov.br).

Note: ARENA = National Renewal Alliance; PFL = Liberal Front Party; PDS/PPB/PP = Democratic Social Party/Progressive Party/Popular Party; PL/PR = Liberal Party/Republican Party; MDB = Brazilian Democratic Moment; PMDB = Brazilian Democratic Movement Party; PT = Workers' Party; PDT = Democratic Labor Party; PV = Green Party.

From the point of view of the party leadership, adopting an "open-door" strategy of recruitment was justifiable due to its potential to generate electoral returns. For instance, the second-largest number of votes among all PSB candidates to the federal chamber in 2006 was obtained by Sandra Maria Rosado, niece of Dix-Sept Rosado and former mayor of Mossoró, the political home of the clan. The deputy entered the PSB only in 2005, leaving her former party, the PMDB.

All the PSB deputies who started their careers in the party had roots in metropolitan politics: Rogério Marinho was a local councilman and president of Natal's local council (2004–6) before his election to the federal chamber in 2006, whereas Márcia Faria, who happened to be the governor's daughter, and Gustavo de Carvalho (both elected to the state assembly) participated in Vilma Faria's cabinet during her terms as mayor of Natal. A similar pattern is observed in the other left-wing parties: deputies with longer careers in their party organizations were more likely to have started their careers in the capital city or in the surrounding metropolitan area, which reflects the historical weakness of the left outside the more populated and urbanized regions of the state.

The available data indicate that Rio Grande do Norte's "new" political elite comprises, in reality, both elements of the old political class and a new generation of legislative cadres, most of whom started their careers in capital city politics. Personalism and family politics continue to play key roles in legislative recruitment, though the evidence on left-wing parliamentarians' profiles suggests that patterns of recruitment are changing, albeit slowly. Despite the substantial changes in parties' levels of electoral support following Vilma Faria's first election in 2002, alternation in power has been limited due to conservatives' capacity to move across party boundaries and exert substantial influence in the governing and electoral arenas. Furthermore, competitive elections have not resulted in stronger legislative opposition and more effective institutional constraints on incumbents.[18]

Conclusions

Brazil's experience of subnational democratization presents a mixed record. Higher levels of competition and alternation in power followed from moves toward greater nationalization of party dynamics, leading to more homogeneous patterns of political contestation. Thus Brazil likely differs from Mexico and Argentina, where instances of subnational democratization have been mostly localized and do not seem to respond to broader national changes. Rather the contrary: party integration has actually decreased in these two countries, as well as presidents' and national parties' capacity to promote subnational regime change (Gibson 2005; Leiras 2006; Giraudy 2010; Harbers 2010; Behrend 2011).

If there is indeed evidence that subnational political change is of a systemic nature in Brazil, on the other hand, on the basis of the limited evidence available, one may infer that differences in the liberal dimension of democracy remain wide across states. Because both theoretical reasoning and the comparative evidence on Brazilian states support the view that access to power and the exercise of power are not necessarily related, it follows that greater contestation may be taking place in settings characterized by extremely weak checks and balances. One possible consequence of the combination of strong contestation and weak institutional constraints on incumbents is the rise of predatory competition and widespread rent-seeking, leading to the consolidation of "competitive patrimonial" regimes.

Although legislative elections have nationalized, including in the less democratic states, these changes have not been associated with competition

rooted in national political cleavages and greater party system integration. It is true that PT–PSDB polarization at the national level has helped to structure competition in other lower-level elections and even to reinforce partisan attachments (Samuels and Zucco 2014), but coalition politics and federalism both conspire against greater congruence between national and subnational electoral arenas.

The case of Rio Grande do Norte clearly demonstrates that the nationalization of politics has affected subnational hybrid regimes only to the extent that state party sections have become more dependent on presidents' coalition-making strategies for their political survival. In reality, the single most important "national cleavage" in Brazilian politics is that separating government from the opposition at the national level. As national coalitions changed following Lula's election and part of the center-right forces that had controlled the national executive during most of the recent democratic period were forced to move into the ranks of the opposition, the local left could compete more effectively against conservative political families that had dominated state politics for decades. But even these effects have been less pronounced than one might have expected, because party-switching allowed several members of the old regime to remain in power for all intents and purposes.

No less important is the fact that national party organizations, with the likely exception of the PT and, to a much lesser extent, the PSDB and the DEM (Ribeiro 2013), lack the kind of centralized structures that might allow national leaders to discipline co-partisans at lower levels of government and control party recruitment from the top. To the contrary, the case of Rio Grande do Norte suggests that PT left-wing allies such as the PSB function as vote-seeking party machines at the state level and that recruitment is driven mainly by local factors. This has obvious implications for subnational regime change, because poorly institutionalized parties will often serve as vehicles of personalistic and factionalized competition, thus allowing for the persistence of the illiberal practices typical of hybrid regimes.

More generally, because the PT has had to rely on broad and ideologically heterogeneous coalitions to govern at the national level, and these structures have been reproduced by the party and its left-wing allies in the states, this has necessarily prevented a realignment based on ideological divisions. This applies not only to states with weak and uncohesive left-wing

parties, such as Rio Grande do Norte, but also to cases in which the PT's regional section relied on piecemeal party-building and institutionalization to defeat conservative rule in state elections. In the course of its quest to defeat the political machine built by former governor Antônio Carlos Magalhães in the state of Bahia, the party developed strong roots in urban and rural social movements, organized labor, and the local intelligentsia. However, because the PT has had to make alliances with right-wing parties and elites that supported the old regime, this has severely constrained the party's reformist agenda, forcing it to moderate ideological appeals and conform to entrenched illiberal practices and structures.[19]

All that said, it is important to note that the changes analyzed in this chapter are very recent and it is still too early to be sure about their actual effects on democratic institutions, not to speak of the obvious limitations of the empirical evidence. Before Lula's election in 2002, left-wing parties were virtually nonexistent outside state capitals and the largest cities of Brazil's poorest regions, whereas conservative forces had enjoyed the benefits of control of patronage networks in the countryside, strengthened by their privileged access to state and federal resources over decades. As suggested by the case of Rio Grande do Norte, control of the media and strong connections with dominant authoritarian machines at the local level are also important factors behind the creation of informal barriers to effective contestation and alternation in power, and these are more stable and less subject to change due to national competitive pressures. It would be unrealistic to expect these enduring political structures to simply wither away in a few years' time. Still, given the institutional realities of coalition presidentialism and federalism, it is arguably the case that national parties, including "presidentialized" organizations such as the PT and the PSDB, can play only a limited role in the promotion of subnational democratization and in the nationalization of politics.

APPENDIX A

TABLE 6A.1.
Mean dominance scores for the Brazilian states, 1990–98

Group	State	Dominance score
High dominance	Ceará	59.07
4th quartile	Paraíba	51.60
	Amazonas	44.16
	Bahia	40.11
	Tocantins	39.70
	Goiás	36.49
	Piauí	32.04
High intermediate dominance	Maranhão	31.99
3rd quartile	Mato Grosso	31.22
	Rio Grande do Norte	29.05
	Paraná	27.67
	Alagoas	26.75
	Roraima	26.31
	Pernambuco	25.87
Low intermediate dominance	São Paulo	25.03
2nd quartile	Acre	23.95
	Santa Catarina	23.70
	Pará	22.98
	Rio de Janeiro	21.44
	Rio Grande do Sul	21.16
	Sergipe	20.96
Low dominance	Amapá	20.89
1st quartile	Distrito Federal	20.62
	Espirito Santo	18.33
	Mato Grosso do Sul	17.80
	Minas Gerais	11.24
	Rondônia	9.99

Sources: TSE; Ipeadata; and Borges 2007.

NOTES

1. Mexico under the hegemonic party regime of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) could certainly be characterized this way. Because PRI governors' recruitment and career advancement depended on loyalty to the president and to the national party organization, incumbents had little if any autonomy from the center. Obviously this structure was functional to a semiauthoritarian regime in which the PRI's victory in all relevant elections was a foregone conclusion.

2. In early 2007, the PFL adopted the label DEM (Democrats). The PL also changed its name to PR (Republican Party) after fusing with the right-wing PRONA (Party of the Reconstruction of the National Order) in 2006.

3. See also my discussion on the case of Rio Grande do Norte in this chapter.

4. For instance, in 2010 the PT disputed gubernatorial elections in ten states. In the remaining seventeen states, the party supported a gubernatorial candidate affiliated with one of the largest parties in the pre-electoral coalition formed in support of the PT's candidate in the presidential race.

5. Unfortunately, there is no readily available comparable data on electoral fraud at the state level. Despite this limitation of the evidence, it is probably the case that states do not differ too significantly in the inclusiveness subdimension of democracy because voters' level of participation is usually high (voting is compulsory) and elections are run by a federal agency, the High Electoral Court (TSE). Overt attempts at restricting the right to vote and run for office are more common in local elections, which complicates the task of producing data comparable across states.

6. In the appendix to this chapter is the list of Brazilian states, ranked by their respective dominance scores (table 6A.1).

7. Data obtained from the 2000 Brazilian National Census.

8. The patriarch of the Rosado family, Jerônimo, had twenty-one children from two marriages (three in the first marriage and eighteen in the second). He and his second wife, Isaura, found an eccentric way to name their sons and daughters: they used numbers in French according to the order of birth of their children, starting with Laurentina Onziéme ("eleventh," in French). Dix-Sept Rosado was seventeenth among the patriarch's sons (Trindade 2003).

9. *Potiguar* is the demonym, or name given to the people who live in Rio Grande do Norte state. The term was originally used to refer to the tribe that inhabited the state before Portuguese colonization, and its literal meaning in tupi idiom is "shrimp eater."

10. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain information on the names of mayors elected before 1992, but it is probably the case that the family's hegemony extended well beyond this period, given that the PFL machine that was home to the clan won all mayoral elections from 1985 onward.

11. However, institutional constraints on mayors have increased due to the increasing judicialization of elections. For instance, in the city of Martins, where the Fernandes de Queiroz family had ruled for forty years, the opposition questioned the victory of the family's candidate in 2004, Maria Gurgel da Costa, in the federal electoral court. She was condemned on charges of extensive vote-buying in 2005 and lost her mandate. A new mayoral election was held immediately afterward, and the opposition was victorious (*Jornal o Mossoroense*, May 29, 2005, http://www2.uol.com.br/omossoroense/310505/regional.htm).

12. This section is based on data obtained from the official website of Brazil's Federal Chamber, www.camara.leg.br, and from Abreu (2001).

13. She was married to Lavoisier Maia, who was appointed governor in 1978 and who happened to be Tarcísio Maia's nephew.

14. I am grateful to Ilza Araújo Andrade for calling my attention to this point.

15. Interviews by the author with state deputies Fernando Mineiro (PT) and Wober Jr. (PPS, or Popular Socialist Party) in Natal, August 2008.

16. Although the PMDB did not participate in Faria's cabinet, some of the party's deputies did collaborate with the government in the state legislature.

17. Of the deputies who served their first terms in 2002 or 2006 (twenty-two of forty-four), more than half (54.6 percent) were affiliated with left-wing parties. Two-thirds of the deputies with previous legislative experience belonged to centrist and right-wing parties.

18. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Rio Grande do Norte obtained the third lowest score in the checks and balances index estimated for the period 1999–2002 (see fig. 6.3).

19. On the case of Bahia, see Durazo Herrmann (2014) and chapter 7 of this book, by Souza.

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The Rise and Fall of Illiberal Politics in the Brazilian State of Bahia

CELINA SOUZA

In the two decades since the return to democracy in certain Brazilian states, party politics has not been truly competitive, institutions that provide checks and balances have been under the informal control of the state executive, and improvements in social indicators have been slower than the national average. Furthermore, in some states political elites established or consolidated during the military regime have continued to gain successive electoral victories at the state level. This is the way it has been in the state of Bahia in Brazil's Northeast until 2006.

The narrative of Bahia is used to investigate why and how the promises and expectations of redemocratization have taken longer to be reached there than in other states and national institutions. Bahia, however, is not a peculiar case. Not only had other Brazilian states experienced uneven electoral competition, but also their political elites, consolidated during the military regime, remained in power.[1] Furthermore, the electorate has also kept politically active politicians with close ties to the national authoritarian regime, and there are well-documented studies showing similarities in newly redemocratized countries.[2] In Brazil, however, strikingly but not surprisingly, most of these political elites lost ground in electoral politics in the 2000s. Bahia is considered to have experienced subnational illiberal practices and structures within a democratic regime because the longevity of one political group initially led by one political boss made informal control of institutions providing checks and balances possible, thus limiting access to electoral competition by other parties and the accountability of that political group.

This chapter explores the dynamics of continuity and change in subnational electoral politics and policies. It discusses the strategies pursued by politicians affiliated with the Democrats (DEM), formerly the Liberal Front

Party (PFL), to remain in power and to keep its long hegemonic position. It covers mainly the period between 1994 and 2006, when the DEM lost state elections. The chapter poses two questions. First, why and how did politicians affiliated with the DEM and with ties to the national authoritarian regime manage to remain in power after the return to democracy? And second, why did the electorate oust the party from office in 2006, and how can one explain such an unforeseen victory?

I make three claims. First, the DEM's ruling for several decades relied not only on clientelist mechanisms alone, as some authors argue, but rather on a complex combination of private and public goods, the latter to upgrade the state's economic performance and to control fiscal expenditures and the former to distribute benefits to constituencies loyal to local and state-level politicians. This claim is in line with the argument that politicians are likely to provide both public and private (or club) goods, but the balance between them varies (Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004, 161). In the case of Bahia, the strategy of DEM politicians was to isolate certain policies away from party politics but not others. My second claim is that the victory of the opposition in 2006 cannot be explained by one rationale alone but rather by the convergence of national, state, and local political dynamics and policies. In the political realm, several endogenous and exogenous factors discussed later contributed to the party's defeat. In the policy realm, given the size of the poor electorate in Bahia, the DEM policies based on discretionary and distributive programs mainly for rural and poor communities started to compete with federal pro-poor policies designed as universal or clearly targeted and hence more redistributive. The result was that voters started to have more policy choices at their disposal and an opportunity to reward or punish parties and incumbents based on their policies. My third claim is that the DEM's defeat has indeed contributed to the democratization of Bahia's political system and that mechanisms providing checks and balances and the oversight of the executive by other institutions have improved.

Continuity and change in electoral politics can be analyzed in several ways. One is to investigate territorial-level voting by aggregating the electorate according to the sociodemographic characteristics of municipalities in association with policy preferences. If one associates the design and management of the DEM's lasting discretionary policy with those of federal programs of a more redistributive nature, one can describe the DEM policies as "traditional" or "conservative" and federal policies as "modern." Research using this association has revealed the existence of a complementarity be-

tween modern and traditional politics and policies (Gibson 2005). Following this typology, Souza (2007) has discussed the policy of hard budget constraints in three Brazilian states and shown that this policy was made possible because the political coalitions in some states were able to keep their territorial bases of electoral support both in the metropolitan areas and in the peripheral subcoalitions.

Although there is strong evidence of this complementarity on certain issues, in this chapter I take another approach. I analyze competition between political parties—the DEM and the Workers' Party (PT)—and between social policies in a given territory, the state of Bahia, where these parties have been sponsoring and implementing different kinds of social policies.

When continuity and change in electoral politics and policies occur in an informally controlled subnational setting in a democratic regime, the analytical framework becomes more complex.[3] Furthermore, the redemocratization of subnational institutions does not necessarily follow the same timing and practices as national ones, even in countries that are highly uniform with regard to political institutions, electoral rules, and public policies. The importance of analyzing regional informal structures and practices in democratic countries is summarized by Gervasoni (2010, 302): "Academic and policy analysts have recently theorized about and emphasized the importance of studying regional authoritarianisms but the matter has received little systematic attention, even more than three decades after Dahl referred to the neglect of subnational units as 'a grave omission' in his seminal book *Poliarchy*."

As mentioned earlier, analysis of this kind has become the focus of political science scholarship in Latin American countries, in particular Mexico and Argentina. New avenues have been opened up by Gibson's latest work (2013). This chapter is derived from Gibson's contributions and attempts to add a third factor to his two models of subnational democratization. His first contribution was the acknowledgement that subnational authoritarianism in democratic regimes is not a local issue but an outcome of the broader dynamics of national territorial governance. As will be shown, the making and the survival of the DEM over decades was a product of national–state–local political dynamics. Gibson's second contribution was a discussion of how subnational politics makes the transition from authoritarianism to a democratic regime after democratization at the national level. He argues that subnational democratization depends on national institutions, either parties or governments, and they intervene when conflicts in subnational

settings become nationalized. In the case of Bahia, however, neither national parties nor the federal government played a direct role, as they did in the cases analyzed by Gibson. I argue that the electorate changed their electoral preferences as a result of being influenced more by the consolidation of federal pro-poor policies even though other exogenous and endogenous factors also played a role. The analysis of Bahia's informal practices and structures and its current political dynamics might add a third factor, policy-led, to Gibson's analytical framework and his proposed two models of subnational democratization.

Despite the importance of subnational politics and policies in a federal and redemocratized country, scholarly work on state politics, institutions, and policies after redemocratization is in its infancy in Brazil in comparison to national politics and policies. Filling this research gap is important, in particular to test institutional hypotheses given that the states in Brazil are characterized by a high level of institutional and policy uniformity but also by different outcomes with regard to electoral, political, and policy results.

Although there are differences in political processes and policy results, a study by Sátyro (2006) using different statistical techniques shows that in terms of social spending there are no differences among the states, meaning that variables such as ideology, party affiliation, electoral competition, coalition governments, previous policies, and social, demographic, and economic conditions do not make any significant difference in the patterns of social spending in Brazilian states. I argue that this is because of the large number of federal pro-poor policies developed since the late 1990s. Although there are no significant differences in social spending among the states, the outcomes of social policies do vary. The similarity in patterns of social spending prompted by federal policies does not mean that the states have not embarked on pro-poor policies of their own, to be discussed later. Rather they are more constrained than their foreign counterparts—Indian states, for instance—because social policies in Brazil are detailed in chapters of the Constitution that specify their design, as well as the role played by the constituent units in these policies.

This chapter goes beyond previous studies by discussing the possible reasons for the change in the pattern of voter preferences among the poorest in the state of Bahia by confronting pro-poor policies with different features. In it I attempt to link the roles played by subnational elites and federal policies, as well as the role of federal–state–local political dynamics in transitional polities. This discussion might further the research agenda on subnational

politics, on the electoral effects of federal policies, on comparative studies among states with similar political characteristics, on the functioning of subnational democratic institutions, and on the national-centered literature on democratization.

The chapter is organized as follows. The first section describes the political institutions governing Brazilian federalism. The next briefly presents the socioeconomic context of Bahia. The three sections after that address the questions related to the DEM's rise and fall. The next-to-last section analyzes what has and has not changed with the election of a PT governing coalition. And the last section presents some conclusions.

Subnational Political Institutions in the Brazilian Federation

All Brazilian states have their own constitutions, elected executives, and unicameral legislatures, but the rules governing subnational jurisdiction, revenue, and many public policies comprise detailed sections of the federal constitution, which is not a common feature among federations. Also, unlike in many federations, the rules governing the electoral system are set out in the constitution, and the states' courts and a federal court oversee election procedures and results. Elections for president, governors, and federal and state legislators are held simultaneously every four years. Two years later, mayors and municipal councilors are simultaneously elected to four-year terms. Reelection of those occupying executive positions was introduced in 1997, with one reelection permitted. In elections for federal and state executives, a second round of voting must be held if no candidate achieves a majority. All legislatures are elected through a system of open-list proportional representation, except for the Senate. Each state and the Federal District elect three senators to serve eight-year terms. In the National House of Representatives the number of seats per state is determined by population, and the 1988 Constitution states that there are to be a minimum of eight and a maximum of seventy seats per state. Each state is an electoral district. Unlike in Argentina, federal intervention in the states and state intervention in the municipalities have never occurred since redemocratization, even though some governors and hundreds of mayors have lost their jobs because of decisions by the courts and/or the legislature.

Bahia is one of Brazil's twenty-six states. It is where the Portuguese first landed in Brazil in 1500, and it was the capital of colonial Brazil until 1763. Bahia is territorially divided into 417 municipalities occupying an area of more than 500,000 square kilometers, slightly larger than that of France. It

is part of the Northeast region of Brazil. In 2010, some 14,016,906 people lived in Bahia, Brazil's fourth most populous state.

The State of Bahia: Socioeconomic Background

As in other developing countries, the trajectory of socioeconomic performance in Bahia presents a paradox: from the 1970s onward Bahia began to recover from a long period of economic stagnation that had started at the end of the nineteenth century. In the 1980s, the state reached sixth place in the states' gross domestic product (GDP) ranking, a position it has maintained ever since. However, its social indicators have lagged behind the national average. Since 2004 Brazil has registered a dramatic improvement in most social indicators, particularly in the poverty rate, but Bahia maintains its position as the state with the largest number in absolute terms of people living in poverty, 4,002,387 in 2013. In 2010 Bahia's poverty rate was 10.4 percent, twice the Brazilian average of 5.3 percent. The state's GDP per capita also improved, reaching US$6,394 in 2010, but was below the Brazilian average of US$10,824.

To examine Bahia politics it is important to show its demographic patterns. This is because Bahia still has a highly rural population when compared to other states. Furthermore, the state has only one city with more than 500,000 inhabitants other than the state capital, Salvador. Indeed, 309 of Bahia's 417 municipalities have between 10,001 and 50,000 inhabitants, and only 11 have between 100,001 and 500,000 inhabitants.

In the macroeconomic realm, however, Bahia has been described as a success. In 1975 its economy was strongly concentrated in agricultural activities (30.7 percent), and the manufacture of industrial goods accounted for only 14.7 percent. In 2010 the former represented 8.6 percent of the GDP and the latter 63.9 percent. These figures show the success of a policy strategy of leveraging the state's economic position through industrialization. Yet the production of industrial goods is capital-intensive, generating few jobs that are concentrated in the metropolitan area of Salvador.

How Bahia emerged from economic stagnation presents a rich and interesting tale, but telling that tale is not the objective of this chapter. The success of its strategy of manufacturing capital-intensive intermediate goods and later cars can be witnessed in the state's rise in GDP. Between 2002 and 2010, Bahia's GDP grew by 47.5 percent, above the Brazilian average of 37.1 percent.[4]

Summing up, Bahia is a state in which the social expectations brought about by redemocratization have yet to be realized, but it is an economic

success when compared to other Brazilian states. However, this situation is not peculiar to Brazil alone. As reported by Kohli (1987), the same has occurred in India, where three decades of economic development have failed to improve the living conditions of the poor.

How and Why Politics in Bahia Was Illiberal

Strictly speaking, politics in Bahia since redemocratization cannot be labeled authoritarian. Elections had been relatively free; electoral fraud, while suspected in the 1994 result for the Senate, had been absent following the introduction of the electronic ballot; opposition parties were represented in the legislature; and there was freedom of speech and association. However, there were several covert and overt illiberal practices.

Bahia's political history is intertwined with that of Antônio Carlos Magalhães, better known by his initials, ACM, who governed the state or supported its governors for twenty-seven years with only two short intermissions.[5] He governed the state twice during the authoritarian regime, and in 1990 he was elected by popular vote. If he was not governing the state, he occupied appointed federal offices during both the military and the democratic regimes. ACM died in 2007 while in the Senate.

The construction of ACM's leadership in Bahia and the exclusion of old political leaders was a masterstroke. The strategy was to capture young and talented professionals, in particular graduates in economics and public administration, granting them high positions in the administration's agencies and thus creating a group of what I have elsewhere labeled technocrats-turned-politicians (Souza 1997, 125). In doing so ACM brought in skilled professionals who were carefully chosen to occupy key positions in the government. ACM was also preparing his own political group with a large team of technocrats. Later ACM sponsored their careers as elected politicians and slowly took ground from his old allies, who had opened the doors to his political advancement. This characteristic of Bahian politics plays against an oft-quoted argument that ACM's political ties were with traditional politicians, which made him a representative of rural and conservative interests. Technocrats-turned-politicians started their careers as state secretaries or heads of state companies, and then selected ones ran for the federal legislature. They were also appointed by ACM to federal positions both during the military years and after redemocratization; depending on how ACM evaluated their loyalty, he sponsored their candidacies for Salvador's and Bahia's chief executive offices (Souza 1997, 149).

ACM was appointed to important federal positions both during the military regime and after its demise. He managed to support and be supported by every president of Brazil with the exception of Itamar Franco in Franco's short two-year term. His powerful positions at the federal level had two major consequences. First, ACM was able to get ahold of federal funds for investment projects in Bahia. Second, he was able to block his foes' access to federal funds, as he did during the term of Waldir Pires. Apart from having created his own political group based on professionals with no previous electoral backgrounds, who therefore depended on his support to embark on political careers, ACM also had control of every democratic institution within the state except that of the public prosecutors. The latter, however, became more independent only after the changes introduced by the 1988 Constitution. This control was built up over the years and can be understood by examining the functioning of the main institutions providing checks and balances, in particular executive–legislative relations and local political dynamics. The following subsections deal with the role of endogenous factors favoring the DEM's hegemony.

Executive–Legislative Relations

Few scholarly works have analyzed at length the functioning and the influence of the state executive over the state institutions providing checks and balances. Exceptions are Abrucio (1988) and Souza (1997), who analyzed this relationship two decades ago. They both agreed that the institutions providing checks and balances at the state level were still weak. However, much has changed in the states' institutions since then.

Bahia has sixty-three state representatives. Although the number of parties represented in the legislature may seem high and has been increasing—from thirteen in 1994 and 1998 to fifteen in 2002 and sixteen in 2006, when Jaques Wagner, from the PT, was elected—this does not mean that Bahia's party system has been fragmented. As a matter of fact, one of ACM's electoral strategies was always to position his closer allies among several parties. This does not mean that the coalitions to govern were broad but rather that those affiliated with other parties were indeed the DEM's most loyal followers, who were sent to other parties to accommodate political struggles at the local level, a point I return to later. When this strategy was implemented, the DEM had control of at least seven other parties, which I have labeled elsewhere the "DEM's satellite parties" (Souza 1997, 140). In 2006, however, the majority of the parties of the DEM's coalition had joined the PT. Fur-

thermore, party-switching was intense after the DEM's defeat and as a result of the need for state representatives to become part of the state governing coalition. Nevertheless, it is important to note that party-switching in Bahia and Brazil is mostly triggered by opportunistic alliances for local and state elections or to accommodate regional and local discontent, and it does not involve ideologically noncontiguous parties. However, here again Bahia is not a peculiar case. Melo (2011) created an index of party volatility between 1982 and 2006 covering twelve Brazilian state legislatures. Bahia is in the middle of the ranking. The candidates-to-seats ratio in Bahia was small compared to other states with a similar electorate until the 2006 election.

A usual way of investigating executive–legislative relations in Brazil is to examine amendments to the annual budget. In federal countries characterized by high levels of socioeconomic and financial disparities and in which fiscal equalization mechanisms are insufficient, amendments to the budget have become an important variable for analyzing executive–legislative relations. Using budget amendments as tools for analyzing these relations at the national level has become an area of academic research in Brazil and in the United States, but little is known about the state level.

Budget amendments in Bahia work as follows.[6] As everywhere in Brazil, a planning team elaborates a budget proposal, which is sent to the legislature by the executive. According to state constitutions, parliamentarians at all levels of government are entitled to propose amendments to the budget, as opposed to what happened during the military regime. Budget spending in Brazil is not mandatory, and according to those interviewed during the DEM's rule, the implementation of the amendments was not equally shared among the party's members.[7] The champions of implemented amendments were those closest to the chief executive. Oddly, approved amendments were not inserted into the budget but rather annexed to the budgetary law, as opposed to amendments to the federal budgetary law, which, once approved, become part of the annual budget and are available online. There is no record or database of the amendments except for a printed copy of all the amendments proposed, whether approved or not, which is kept in the library of the state legislature. As one official of the state legislature put it, "This is a house without memory," referring not only to the lack of data on the budget.

Because there is no database of amendments, there is also no follow-up of their implementation. This begs the question: If amendments are a mere formality, why do parliamentarians bother to propose them? The answer of parliamentarians interviewed is that they have a double objective. First, each

parliamentarian keeps a record of his or her amendment, and as soon as the budget is approved sends a letter to local leaders informing them of what has been requested. Second and most important, the amendment is a "document" used by the parliamentarian and the mayor to apply pressure for the release of funds to implement the amendment. This, of course, happens only if the representative is well positioned in the governing coalition.

The lack of implementation of budget amendments does not mean that they are of no use to local constituencies or state lawmakers. They are used as an instrument for putting pressure on the executive for resources. There is enough anecdotal evidence from the interviewees that at least three state agencies are crucial in implementing the amendments. Among them is the agency that administered Bahia's most important social policy, known as Produzir, which will be analyzed later.

Summing up, resources for assuring votes for the DEM in local constituencies were negotiated by state representatives, who act as brokers between the state's executive branch and local politicians through discretionary funds that are kept under the strict control of the executive. This means that the DEM's governors were very much free to control the budget and the states' expenditures and to select their favorite state and local politicians for paybacks.

Oversight of the executive by the legislature is another tool for understanding executive–legislative relations and for assessing the level of the state's institutionalization. The main strategy used by the DEM was to deny representatives a password allowing them to follow up on public expenditures. This refusal of access dominated debates in the legislature throughout 2005 and 2006 and received much media coverage. Such access has been in practice at the federal level for some years. As is widely acknowledged, a desire for the fiscal accountability of government has been the genesis of democratic rule throughout the ages.

Unlike the amendments to the federal budget, in which all parties are considered, in states where the executive has strong control over the budget and over lawmakers, amendments play the role of strengthening the executive's control of both lawmakers and local politicians. This is in line with other scholarly findings. Souza (2007), for instance, showed that one of the factors that had enabled the Bahia, Ceará, and Paraná governors to adopt hard budget constraints without affecting their parties' victories in the following election was the executive control over the legislative branch. Schneider (2001) focused on budget institutions in Bahia and Paraná and argued in the

same direction. However, this strategy had a price: the extensive distribution of funds to state representatives and their constituencies required long and complex negotiations and was a source of dissatisfaction among local leaders.

This subsection has shown that, with regard to executive–legislative relations, there is indeed evidence that during the DEM's lasting hegemony the executive kept strong control, making state lawmakers dependent on it to provide financial resources to their constituencies, blocking their access to information on the government's spending, and not sharing decisions.

The High Court and the Public Prosecutors

After several decades of being suspected of fraud, judges are now selected through an open competition carried out by an independent organization. The state's high court is composed of thirty judges. Of these, by 2004 four were appointed by seniority and six by the public prosecutor's office and the Bar Association (and included one of ACM's brothers), and six were freely chosen by the executive from among judges. As for the remaining members, there is no information on the judiciary's website about how they were appointed to the court. As in the cases of many courts in the world, the appointment is made by the executive.[8]

For many years there were accusations that the state's high court was dominated by ACM; this was not an allegation without substance, given the number of years in which he or his followers controlled the executive and therefore had the means to decide on appointments. In 2001, however, a high court judge appointed to the court by the public prosecutor's office ran for its presidency in a heated campaign against a candidate openly supported by ACM. The former won. This victory was seen as marking the court's independence from the executive. From this point on, candidates supported by the DEM failed to regain the presidency of the high court.

Bahia has 532 public prosecutors, all selected in open competition. The 1988 Constitution expanded the scope of action of the prosecutor's office by adding several new roles to prosecutors. Despite the lack of research on the state's judiciary and the legislature, Bahia's public prosecutor's office has been the object of some academic work. One such piece, by Sanches Filho (2004), analyzes whether state governors influence judicial actions taken by public prosecutors to the courts, thus testing the literature on the power of states' governors over states' institutions. The focus of Sanches Filho's work is the number of mayors prosecuted on grounds of corruption. His research shows that despite the fact that the executive holds several informal and

formal powers at the state level, public prosecutors have not been constrained from taking mayors suspected of wrongdoing to court. The argument put forward by Sanches Filho is that public prosecutors are less constrained by party politics due to the fact that their role ends at the procedural phase of the judicial process and that the final decision belongs to the courts. Prosecuted local authorities have belonged to all parties, but because the great majority of the mayors belonged to the DEM or to its satellite parties for many years, as shown in the forthcoming subsection, it appears that prosecutors were independent. However, although public prosecutors were relatively active against mayors, the same cannot be said about their activity with regard to state officials. The reason for this might have been the lack of transparency in the DEM's several administrations, which prevented prosecutors from having access to information. Nevertheless, in 2002 a case was brought against Governor César Borges, affiliated with the DEM, on the grounds of illicit earnings and the use of public works for self-promotion.

Local Political Dynamics

In the interior of the state, despite a decrease in the number of parties opposing the DEM and its satellite parties, the DEM has continued to be the major player until very recently. In the 1996 municipal election, for instance, the DEM and its allies were elected to the mayors' offices of 75 percent of the municipalities, meaning around 300 of 417. In 2001, some 312 municipalities were under DEM leadership, a figure that later increased to 363 as a result of party-switching; that is, more than 80 percent of the mayors were affiliated with the DEM or its satellite parties. In the 2004 election, 335 of the mayors elected belonged to the DEM and its allies, but there was an increase in the number of cities governed by the PT in more urbanized areas.

In the first months of 2007, soon after the inauguration of the PT's term in the state executive, many mayors started to join other parties. As is well known to those familiar with Brazilian local politics, party-switching is quite a common feature in small, poor municipalities, though politicians switch to parties within the same political spectrum. Data collected by Borges (2008) show that in 2007 some 151 mayors of the 278 affiliated with the DEM or its coalition changed parties, most of them to the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), a catch-all party made up of the coalition supporting the winning candidate for the state executive.

As I have argued elsewhere (Souza 1997, 152), mayors of small and medium-sized towns are marked by pragmatism, and although they might be elected

or affiliated with the DEM or its satellite parties, they can betray their parties if they foresee the victory of a candidate from the opposition. Although there is some evidence that political parties are becoming more associated with the policies they implement and that the electorate, poor or otherwise, are making decisions based more on party policies, a point to which I shall return, the same cannot be said when it comes to local political leaders governing small, poor municipalities. Furthermore, the DEM has never had a tradition of recruitment, formation, and consolidation of local leaders (Dantas Neto 2006), as ACM has had with the technocrats-turned-politicians. This is because there was and still is a long list of candidates willing to join a party they foresee as being victorious. However, because the list is too long, two or more groups struggle in each local constituency to gain access to resources and to appoint protégées to local low-paid positions, although both groups support the state governor. These competing groups inside the same political coalition are known as Banda A (Group A) and Banda B, and they are repeating what also happened during the military years in the regime's official party. What characterizes each banda is not party affiliation but rather the number of votes they carry (or promise to carry) to state elections. Banda A is the most successful. Two parties or groups generally make up each banda. There is anecdotal evidence to show that occasionally the members of Banda B feel that they are being mistreated by state politicians. This triggers a sense of betrayal and makes them switch their votes to the candidate of the opposition if they foresee a DEM defeat and if the opposition is capable of appointing a credible candidate. Such was the case when Pires and Wagner were elected in 1996 and 2006, respectively.

As mentioned earlier, local politics is greatly influenced by the chief executive, and state representatives act as brokers. Several factors may explain this dependency on state-level politicians. First, as shown earlier, Bahia has a high number of small municipalities with little or no economic activity to generate local revenue. This means that local governments are heavily dependent on exogenous resources (state or federal) to deliver goods (public or private) to the electorate. This also means that the electorate is likely to be influenced by the public resources allocated to them, in particular to the poorest living in rural areas, who are the target population of state social programs such as Produzir, to be detailed later. Underpaid and temporary state jobs in these municipalities also play a role in sustaining support for local politicians, as mentioned by interviewees and indicated by the increasing number of these jobs, to be detailed later.

A second factor that explains the dependence on state-level politicians is the fact that, because Bahia is a large state, it is costly for candidates to visit all municipalities, especially small ones. However, the state government provides resources for every small municipality and even every district. Produzir, for instance, is implemented in all municipalities but those in the metropolitan area of Salvador. There is evidence that the state invests resources in a scattered way, thus failing to create the conditions for the development of medium-sized towns. Public investment is generally destined either for small municipalities or for the metropolitan area of Salvador. The former steadily provided the DEM with a large number of votes. Investment in the latter is coherent with the policy of increasing the economic performance of the state. The last DEM strategy to improve the state's economic performance was to boost the tourist industry, taking advantage of the state's long coastline. This strategy has been successful, in particular in southern Bahia, but it has not generated a great number of jobs or local or much state revenue due to tax breaks. Since the late 1990s the western part of the state has dramatically upgraded its economic performance with soya agribusiness. However, the state government played no role in this development.

TABLE 7.1.
Access to power

Subdimension	Components	Facts
Inclusion	Fairness of campaign	Incumbents had a spending advantage, made use of state resources, and benefited from media bias because of the ties of the Democrats (DEM) with the business community and the media and their long time in power.
	Fairness of elections and vote counting	There was suspicion of electoral fraud in the 1994 election for the Senate.
Contestation	Freedom of expression	Political journalists were mostly pro-DEM, and the media were threatened with exclusion from government publicity.
	Public employees	Before the 1982 state election, several civil servants were fired because they signed petitions supporting the opposition candidate for governor or were candidates for the legislature.
	Political parties	Former DEM party members received informal punishment for joining opposition parties.

Source: Based on interviews, media coverage, and published articles.

TABLE 7.2.
Exercise of power

Subdimension	Subcomponent	Facts
Institutional constraints	State legislature	Government bills passed unchanged.
	Judiciary	The DEM controlled the nominations of members of the high court until 2001.
	Independence of agencies of horizontal accountability	All members of the State Accounts Tribunal had been appointed by the DEM for 25 years.
	Party constraint on governor	Antônio Carlos Magalhães had tight control of the DEM, but after 2002 fissures among members became common.
	Senators	The DEM had elected all of its candidates for the Senate until 2006, when one senator from the Party of the Brazilian Movement for Democracy was elected with the Workers' Party's support.
	Federal deputies	Except in 1986, the majority of representatives were affiliated with the DEM, many of them technocrats-turned-politicians.
Liberal rights	Access to government information	Politicians and the general public had no access to public accounts and to agreements signed between the government, the municipalities, or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including local communities granted *Produzir* resources.
Independent civil society	Autonomous business organizations	All board members had the support of Magalhães.
	NGOs	Many NGOs are dependent on government funding, albeit not only in Bahia.

Source: Based on interviews, media coverage, and published articles.

I close this section by applying Mazzuca's (2007) two dimensions of democracy—access to power and exercise of power—to Bahia's experience during the period of DEM rule. These two dimensions and the list of subdimensions and components found in tables 7.1 and 7.2 were inspired by Gervasoni's work in chapter 5 of this volume. The bases for describing these two dimensions were found in other academic works, in the interviews, or in the media.

Where the DEM's Electoral Support Came From

The second way to investigate the strategies used by Bahia's elites to remain in power is to examine the territorial distribution of votes. Table 7.3 shows the electoral results of the votes for governor in the 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2006 elections.[9] Bahia is home to Brazil's fourth-largest electorate, with 9,109,353 registered voters in 2006.

TABLE 7.3.
Bahia: Results of the 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 elections for state governor

Year	Candidates and null/void votes or abstentions	Party	Number of votes	%
1994[a]	Paulo Souto	DEM	2,235,659	58.64
	João Durval	PMN	1,577,043	41.36
	Void/null			12.71
	Abstentions			37.88
1998	Cesar Borges	DEM	2,418,765	69.91
	José Ribeiro	PT	524,796	15.71
	Others		516,297	14.93
	Void/Null			36.00
	Abstentions			31.84
2002	Paulo G. Souto	DEM	2,871,025	53.69
	Jaques Wagner	PT	2,057,022	38.47
	Others		418,895	7.83
	Void/null		1,052,887	16.45
	Abstentions		2,168,773	25.31
2006	Jaques Wagner	PT	3,242,336	52.88
	Paulo G. Souto	DEM	2,638,215	43.03
	Others		250,315	4.08
	Void		418,895	4.93
	Null		737,875	10.21
	Abstention		1,884,249	20.68

Source: Brazilian Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE), http://www.tse.gov.br.
Note: DEM = Democrats; PMN = Party of the National Mobilization; PT = Workers' Party.
[a]There were two rounds of voting because no candidate achieved a majority in the first round.

The figures in table 7.3 show that the increase in the number of votes of what became the DEM's main opposition party in Bahia, the PT, became apparent in 2002. These figures also show that DEM candidates for the state executive had traditionally maintained a relatively constant number of valid votes, around 2.5 million, and that the percentage of null votes and abstentions had always been high, declining only in 2006. The stability in the number of votes indicates that the DEM had managed to sustain a captive and faithful electorate. Unlike in similar cases of one-party control of politics in democratic regimes, the figures demonstrate that the DEM never achieved easy or unchallenged victories, with the exception of the landslide election of 1998. The same occurred in the cases analyzed by Gibson (2005). Furthermore, the decrease in the number of null votes and abstentions registered in 2006 shows that the opposition had finally managed to appoint a credible candidate, one who was able to unite all the opposition parties.

The DEM's constant victories raise two questions: (1) Were they territorially concentrated? and (2) What sectors of the electorate had voted for the DEM? Table 7.4 shows that in 1994 there was no relationship between the

TABLE 7.4.
Votes for candidates and parties by municipality size (percentage of valid votes)

	1994		1998		2002		2006	
Municipality size (no. of inhabitants)	Souto (DEM)	Durval (PMN)	Borges (DEM)	Ribeiro (PT)	Souto (DEM)	Wagner (PT)	Souto (DEM)	Wagner (PT)
Up to 10,000	55.0	23.4	77.4	8.1	66.9	25.2	51.3	47.0
10,001–20,000	53.2	24.4	76.9	8.5	67.2	25.1	51.7	46.8
20,001–50,000	48.7	25.4	72.7	11.5	60.2	31.7	45.8	52.2
50,001–200,000	46.7	25.8	71.4	14.8	49.2	42.0	38.0	57.8
Over 200,000	47.7	25.8	61.6	23.0	39.8	53.3	37.1	55.1

Brazilian Superior Electoral Tribunal (TRE); Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE); 1991 and 2000 Brazilian censuses and population calculations for 2002 and 2006.

Notes: DEM = Democrats; PMN = Party of National Mobilization; PT = Workers' Party.

percentage of votes for the candidates and the sizes of the municipalities. In 1998 there was a slight relationship, with the DEM's candidate performing better in medium-sized and small municipalities and votes for the opposition candidate concentrated in the more urbanized municipalities. In 2002 the number of votes for Paulo Souto declined as the size of the municipality increased. In 2006 Wagner increased his percentage of votes in municipalities of all sizes when compared to 2002, but the most dramatic increase in the percentage of votes given to the PT in 2006 was in smaller municipalities, those with up to 50,000 inhabitants. Despite this, the DEM still won the majority in smaller municipalities. As the table shows, in the subgroup of up to 50,000 inhabitants, the percentage of votes gained by the PT candidate increased by almost 80 percent compared with 2002.

The results of the statistical analyses presented in table 7.5 also confirm the importance of small municipalities in DEM victories and the relative decrease in DEM support among voters from small municipalities (up to 50,000 inhabitants) between 1998 and 2002. The table also reveals the decrease in DEM votes in small municipalities after 1998.

Figure 7.1 introduces other demographic data on the percentage of the urban population out of the total population in relation to the percentage of votes for DEM candidates. As the table shows, no correlation was found in 1994, but in the following elections it can be seen that in municipalities with less than 50 percent of their populations classed as urban the DEM reached absolute majorities. In 1998 it enjoyed a landslide victory when 76.5 percent of the electorates of municipalities with an urbanization rate of less than 25 percent voted for Borges.

ACM ran for the Senate in the 1994 election, when two seats were available. He was elected with 1,926,557 votes (33 percent) and appointed Waldeck Ornelas,

TABLE 7.5.
Percentage of votes for Democrat (DEM) candidates by size of municipality

Inhabitants	No. of municipalities	Pop. 2000 total	% pop total	% of votes to DEM			
				Souto 06	Souto 02	Borges 98	Souto 94
Up to 10,000	70	522,468	4.0	51.3	66.9	77.4	55.0
10,001–20,000	183	2,648,712	20.3	51.7	67.2	76.9	53.2
20,001–50,000	124	3,564,906	27.3	45.8	60.2	72.7	48.7
50,001–200,000	34	2,894,563	22.2	38.0	49.2	71.4	46.7
Over 200,000	4	3,408,677	26.1	37.1	39.8	61.6	47.7
Total	415[a]	13,039,326	100.0				

Source: Brazilian Superior Electoral Tribunal (TRE); Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE); 1991 and 2000 Brazilian censuses and population calculations for 2002 and 2006.
[a]Two municipalities created in the early 2000s were excluded.

a member of ACM's technocrat-turned-politician team, to one of the seats. Pires, now in the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), was the main opposition candidate. ACM managed to elect Ornelas in a tight competition.[10] The defeated candidate alleged fraud, but Ornelas's victory was cleared by the court. Since the introduction of the electronic ballot in 1996, there has been no suspicion of electoral fraud in Bahia or almost anywhere else in Brazil.

The results of the 1998 election can be analyzed as the height of ACM and DEM dominance before their slow and subtle decline. In that election no second round of voting was required and the percentage of votes granted to Borges was high, although the number of absolute votes maintained its traditional ceiling, around two million. For the Senate, when only one seat was available, Souto, former governor and one of ACM's technocrats-turned-politician, was elected with 73.29 percent of the votes.

The 2002 election was more competitive than that of 1998. Although the DEM candidate won in the first round of voting, the percentage of votes given to the defeated candidate was much higher than in 1998. Again the number of absolute votes remained similar to those of previous elections. These results differ from the party's performance in the legislature, which was more unstable and declining after 1998. For the Senate, when two seats were available, ACM was elected with 30.59 percent of the votes and former governor Borges with 27.89 percent. It was in this election that electronic ballots were introduced throughout Brazil, and this had three major consequences: a decrease in fraud, a speeding up of the election results, and ease of voting for less literate electors. ACM, however, had to resign from the Senate because he was about to be impeached by his peers for violating




Figure 7.1. Percentages of votes for Democrat (DEM) candidates for governor, plotted against urbanization rate, by year. Based on data from the Brazilian Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE), http://www.tse.gov.br; the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE); and the 1991 and 2000 Brazilian censuses and population calculations for 2002 and 2006.

the voting panel of one particular vote in the Senate, taking advantage of being its president. (Voting in the Senate is secret, but ACM's peers found out that he, as president of the Senate, managed to find out how each senator had voted.) His purpose was not to change the voting result but rather to know how his peers had voted in the secret ballot. This had been his common practice in Bahia to keep tabs on those around him. In 2006 ACM was again elected to the Senate.

Despite the relative decline in DEM electoral support after 1998, the party remained in office until 2006. The reasons for such electoral success and the longevity of the DEM in Bahia have become the focus of political analysts. Most concur that its success lay in the internal characteristics of the party in Bahia. Many saw this political group as an oligarchy (new and old) and/or as playing the political game only on patron–client relations, local bossism, pork-barrel spending, and so on. However, some acknowledge that these analyses represent an oversimplification of a much more complex political phenomenon.[11] Furthermore, many analysts tend to credit the DEM's successive victories to the personage of ACM alone, leaving aside what others

see as a style of doing politics and of governing that no longer required the existence of that personage (Dantas Neto 2006). This is why it is important to investigate, as I have done here, the strategies used by ACM and his party to control institutions providing checks and balances and whether the policy strategies used by ACM first and the DEM later have played a role in the group's electoral victories and in maintaining a captive electorate.

The preceding subsections have shown the trajectory of the DEM's rule in Bahia and how the party kept its political control for so long. However, these strategies were complemented by policy choices. This is why I close this section with a quotation (from Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 1292) that also introduces the subject of the next section: "Institutions, students of authoritarianism often claim, are but 'window dressing.' But why would some autocrats care to dress their windows?"

Policy Choices

State Policies

By governing the state for several decades, the DEM had the opportunity to initiate and consolidate the party's preferred policies. In this section I discuss the party's main policies: (1) the policy of leverage in industrialization, (2) the policy of fiscal adjustment and its effect on payroll expenditures, and (3) a distributive and discretionary social policy known as Produzir. As I discuss later, the first two can be labeled as modernizing and the third as conservative, given its failure to change the social conditions of the rural poor.

The control of one political group through almost three decades did not imply that the DEM did not deliver public goods or relied on the provision of private goods and on distributive policies for the very poor alone. Two main policies offering public goods were provided. First was a policy to modernize the state's economy through industrialization and tourism. As described earlier, this was highly successful, but it also concentrated the bulk of public resources in the metropolitan area and on the southern coast, leaving aside large areas of the state. The purpose of the earlier industrialization policy was to grant incentives and to build infrastructure to attract private companies. Later the same occurred with tourism.

The second main policy pursued by the DEM was adherence to the national policy of fiscal control. The policy of fiscal adjustment and hard budget constraints was a consequence of the success of the 1994 stabilization plan, the *Real* Plan, in controlling Brazil's hitherto unstoppable inflation.

TABLE 7.6.
Bahia and Brazil: Payroll expenditures (as percentage of net revenue), 1995–2000

	Year/expenditure					
Area	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Bahia	55	54	50	51	52	45
Brazil	62	65	60	62	63	58

Source: Adapted from Mora (2000, 39–40).

After it was a success, the federal government began to deepen fiscal mechanisms to control what was then seen as one of the most important pillars of fiscal stabilization in Brazil: constraint of the expenditure of the states and renegotiation of their debt. A major component of state fiscal adjustment was the decrease of payroll expenditures. Table 7.6 shows that Bahia has decreased its payroll expenditures considerably, much more than the average for Brazilian states.

The decision made by the DEM to promote a policy of hard budget constraints did not have any effect on the 1998 electoral results; on the contrary, the party obtained a landslide victory. This challenges the view that state politics in Brazil is driven by one rationale alone and that it is the terrain of clientelism, pork-barrel spending, and traditional politics.[12] According to this view, one would assume that fiscal adjustment policies would alter electoral coalitions given that, with fiscal control, segments of the electorate who depend on public funding for access to private goods, including jobs, would see their interests compromised. Instead, state politics is driven by several rationales, giving room for state politicians to adopt fiscal control and still be reelected or elect their candidates for the governorship. Furthermore, although I do not deny the existence of clientelistic relationships, these relationships do not block the adoption of policies that change the status quo.

The severe fiscal adjustment in Bahia from the late 1990s onward was followed by a change in civil service recruitment and salaries. Although the overall number of civil servants increased slightly in a decade, payroll expenditures decreased (see table 7.6). Civil servants' recruitment changed in that many are now hired on a temporary basis and at very low salaries. The scheme has been adopted at the federal, state, and local levels throughout Brazil, and in Bahia it is known by the acronym REDA. Instituted in 1992, it is a device to legally overcome the constitutional mandate that requires public competition for entering the civil service at all levels of government. This is because public competitive recruitment is expensive and time-consuming.

Although REDA is used for contracting specialized services such as those of doctors, interviewees pointed out that it had been used for electoral purposes, particularly in the countryside. However, since the inauguration of the state government elected in 2006, selection procedures for REDA candidates have been introduced. The use of REDA by the government was heavily criticized in the 2005 audit report by the State Accounts Tribunal. The report shows that between 2004 and 2005 spending under REDA increased by 13.49 percent. The bulk of contracts were for the Secretariat of Education (83.11 percent). This secretariat is the one with the lowest-paid workers but also with the highest number of employees, mostly teachers.

The use of REDA as a way to meet the demands for jobs by state and local politicians shows that despite the survival of clientelist practices, they have changed compared to previous decades, and the number of permanent jobs in the state government has declined. As elsewhere in Brazil, the number of retired workers has increased.

The modernization of Bahia's bureaucracy started in 1967 through a comprehensive reform with the technical support of the Federal University of Bahia. This led to a profound change in the administration, with the adoption of planning, administrative, and financial systems and with the selection of civil servants on a more technical basis rather than that of personal or family ties. ACM, who governed soon after the administrative reform, took this opportunity to bring into the administration the young experts who later would become his technocrats-turned-politicians. However, the professionalization of the bureaucracy did not extend to all sectors of the government. There was a trend to favor agencies in charge of economic and planning activities over those in charge of social programs; in the latter, politicians acted as brokers between their supporters and the services provided to them, as I have argued elsewhere (Souza 1997, 161). The new bureaucrats allocated in social secretariats were paid less and had fewer fringe benefits than those allocated in the planning and finance portfolios, and they were used as vehicles of clientelism. Hence, segments of the administration were made up of experts and insulated from the obstacles to change of the state's economic performance. In sum, from the late 1960s and throughout the DEM's rule, public employment at the state level was never based on clientelism alone.

The success of the industrialization policy contrasted with the provision of social services, in particular fundamental education and health care. Because the provision of these services did not cover nearly all those in need,

state-level politicians became intermediaries for obtaining a vacancy in a school or for providing access to a doctor or a type of health treatment. This role of politicians, however, has recently changed with the universalization of access to these two crucial social services. The policy of universalization was designed at the federal level but is financed by the three levels of government. This was not the case prior to univerzalization, when enrollment at a public school and access to basic health care required the mediation of a politician for the most part.

Although the two policies analyzed earlier—those for industrialization and fiscal adjustment—have been successful, the same cannot be said of the DEM's social policy choices. As shown earlier, improvements in the social conditions of the population have lagged, making Bahia's population one of the poorest in Brazil. What little social policy was implemented by the DEM was addressed to rural areas and to small, poor rural communities.

In 2006 Bahia had sixteen programs financed by multilateral and bilateral organizations for rural areas and small municipalities. Of these, the most important in the number of municipalities reached and in the amount invested is Produzir, which has invested resources in rural areas and in urban centers with under 7,500 inhabitants since 1993. By 2006 it reached 450,000 families in 407 municipalities, and US$294.7 million was invested through a World Bank loan. Produzir's stated objective is to increase social and economic opportunities for the rural poor by improving their access to basic socioeconomic infrastructure.

Produzir is designed as a social fund, meaning that the decision-making about which projects are to be funded is granted to members of the communities gathered in a community council. However, the empowerment of the community as decision-makers has not happened, as shown by several evaluations.[13] These evaluations provide evidence of the manipulation of the program by politicians, in particular local politicians and state legislators, and the influence of electoral cycles in the selection of communities and municipalities to be served. These evaluations also show the instability of resource allocation, the lack of sustainability of projects, and the difficulties communities face in applying for and receiving resources. These findings, however, are not new. The literature discussing the electoral role of discretionary and distributive policies is now vast.

The DEM's strategy of allocating a considerable amount of resources to less urbanized and poorer municipalities for minor infrastructure works and for programs to support small family production, including subsistence

production, does not aggregate value to the areas where resources are invested, produces only isolated results, and makes the target populations highly dependent on these resources for their survival. However, there is enough evidence that these programs, introduced by the military in the early 1970s, have been a powerful strategy for maintaining electoral support in such constituencies.

Throughout the DEM's government, signed agreements, contracts, and investments related to Produzir could not be disclosed; hence the program was not open to public scrutiny and evaluation by independent analysts. It was only in 2008, under the PT administration, that a link was created in the state agency in charge of the management of Produzir to provide a list of all resources allocated in each municipality. The previous discussion raises one further question: If Produzir was used by DEM politicians to retain the loyalty of the poor electorate, what made poor voters switch their voting preference to the PT in the 2006 election?

Federal Policies

Since the late 1990s federal social policies have begun to reach the very poor. Several policies are significant because of the amount of resources involved, coupled with their universalized nature or clear targeting. These policies now provide services and benefits previously inaccessible to the poor. Despite my claim that democratization at the subnational level can be triggered by federal policies, it cannot be accurately quantified because the resources allocated through Produzir do not go directly to the beneficiaries but rather to community associations. In 2009, however, Produzir reached 149,820 families, whereas in the same year two federal cash transfer programs alone reached more than 1.5 million beneficiaries in Bahia. In 2009 the amount transferred from Bolsa Família (BF) to families in Bahia was R$164 million and that from BCP (Benefício de Prestação Continuada) was R$94 million, whereas *Produzir* invested R$17 million.[14] Given these figures and those given earlier for elections, it is not unreasonable to argue that poor voters finally gained the confidence to trust other parties for their survival given the consolidation and expansion of federal pro-poor policies coupled with the advent of a credible candidate for governor. After all, and as argued by some, if the electorates of wealthy societies "vote with their feet," why can't the poor electorate in Bahia vote with their pockets? Although Wagner did not gain a majority of the votes in small municipalities in 2006, as shown earlier, votes for the PT had increased by 80 percent in municipalities of

between 10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants, and in municipalities of between 20,001 and 50,000 inhabitants, Wagner achieved 52.2 percent of the votes.

The Demise of the DEM

The gradual decline in support for the DEM demonstrated earlier led to an unexpected defeat in 2006 with the victory of a PT candidate, Jaques Wagner, in the first round of voting. Four of the main opposition parties had rallied to support Wagner.

Wagner's victory was a bombshell because in the opinion polls he had been behind Souto, who was seeking reelection. For instance, in a poll taken in August 2006, two months before the election, Wagner scored only 13 percent of the voters' preferences, although his position was rapidly improving with each new poll. The first sign of the possible need for a second round of voting was detected by one poll, taken only on the eve of the election, in which Souto scored 51 percent and Wagner 41 percent. As also happened in the election of Pires in 1986, Wagner became a credible candidate not only because of his support from and close ties to President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva but mainly because he managed to build an electoral coalition with a relatively strong party in the state. This party was the PMDB, now under the leadership of Geddel Vieira Lima, who has made his political career sometimes at ACM's side and sometimes not. When only one seat was available in the Senate, for the first time since redemocratization a candidate not affiliated with the DEM was elected, João Durval Carneiro from the PMDB, who had the support of the PT.

How can one explain such unforeseen victories? Both endogenous and exogenous factors can account for them, as well as institutional and noninstitutional variables. The addition of these factors and variables to the ones analyzed earlier follows scholarship that highlights the importance of a multiplicity of factors in explaining electoral results.

Three endogenous factors can be listed. First, the increased independence of public prosecutors and the defeat of ACM's candidate for the presidency of the high court. This contributed to the improvement of institutions providing checks and balances. Second, intraparty cleavages. As mentioned earlier, one of the strengths of Bahia's main political group was one person's control of the entire group for three decades. However, certain members of the group, in particular technocrats-turned-politicians, later started to develop their own political ambitions counter to ACM's plans. Thus important fissures started to appear that became particularly noticeable in the

early 2000s. Some candidates formalized their departure and joined other parties; others struggled within the DEM itself. The latter was the case of Souto, the incumbent governor running for reelection in 2006. Souto did not officially break his ties with ACM, but his term was marked by tense relations with ACM and his most faithful supporters. Internal disputes within the DEM might also have influenced local leaders' decisions to jump the DEM's ship. Furthermore, local political discontents in the form of Banda B had betrayed the DEM before when they had foreseen a credible candidate for the state executive.

The third factor explaining the unforeseen victories was the fact that Wagner benefited from previous changes in the alignment of mass communications networks, which were heavily controlled by ACM and his family. ACM was able to build a communications empire (a TV channel, radio station, and newspaper) while he was Sarney's minister of communication, but since the early 2000s he had lost the support of the most popular TV channel, Globo.

Several exogenous factors also contributed to the DEM's demise. First was the strengthening of local governments as one of the results of the implementation of constitutional mandates. The 1988 Constitution stated that the provision of social services should be decentralized. Since the late 1990s this mandate has been implemented through constitutional amendments making municipalities the main providers of basic health care and fundamental education with the financial backing of the three levels of government. Furthermore, soon after Lula's inauguration, a department linked to the chief of staff was created to promote intergovernmental relations between the federal and local governments without the intermediation of the states. These recently created federal agencies and policies have certainly strengthened the ties between the federal and the local governments, decreasing the influence of state politics and resources. However, this does not mean that municipalities in Bahia are no longer dependent on state discretionary resources, as shown earlier.

The second exogenous factor that contributed to the DEM's demise was one of the most successful strategies adopted by the DEM to win state and local elections and to govern. That was the party's and ACM's close ties with the federal governing coalition, regardless of the ruling party. ACM and the DEM were the main allies of José Sarney, Fernando Collor de Mello, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, each of whom served as Brazil's president; the only exception was during the two-year term of Franco. The same relation-

ships existed during the military regime, when ACM managed to develop close ties with each of the factions that controlled the federal executive. However, in the early 2000s first ACM and later the DEM were expelled from President Cardoso's governing coalition. The DEM's isolation was aggravated by Lula's election, from the PT, in 2002. The advantage for ACM of these close ties had also been to bring federal investments to Bahia. For national leaders this had meant the loyalty of a political group controlling Brazil's fourth-largest electorate.

Institutional variables also played a role in Wagner's election. The assumption is that the reelection of President Lula influenced Wagner's election result, given the rule of simultaneous national and state elections introduced in 1994. Another usual assumption is that the interdependence between national and state candidates is not uncommon in federal countries characterized by high levels of regional inequality and by a centralized tax system. This is likely to have a greater effect on less-developed states. These assumptions, however, have exceptions. In 2002 Bahia's electorate chose the PT to lead the country and the DEM to lead the state.

A further comparison between Lula's reelection and Wagner's election also has to be stressed. Contrary to the country's average, Wagner's highest percentage of votes was not from the electorate in small municipalities, although the PT registered the most dramatic increase in these municipalities vis-à-vis 2002, as shown earlier. As many accounts reveal (e.g., that of Nicolau and Peixoto 2007), Lula's best electoral results in 2006, when he was running for reelection, came from municipalities with between 10,001 and 20,000 inhabitants, where he received 64.2 percent of the valid votes in the second round.[15] Wagner, however, did not gain a majority in these municipalities, receiving 46.9 percent of the valid votes, even though the votes for the PT had increased by 80 percent in these municipalities, as shown earlier. Is this a sign that the DEM has not been excluded from electoral politics in Bahia?

What Has and What Has Not Changed

In October 2010 Wagner ran for reelection and won in the first round, leading a coalition much broader than in 2006 and one that included several former DEM members. His competitors were former governor Souto, from the DEM, and Geddel Vieira Lima, from the PMDB. Lima had been Lula's minister and was Wagner's major supporter in 2006. Wagner achieved 63.83 percent of the votes. Souto and Lima scored a mediocre 16.09 percent

and 15.56 percent, respectively. The two senators elected were from the PT and the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), the latter a party of Wagner's coalition. Wagner's running mate in 2010 was Otto Alencar, one of ACM's most faithful followers. The choice of Alencar reveals Wagner's need for DEM votes to be reelected, although this could lead to a resuscitation of political practices of the past. In the election of 2014, the PT candidate, Rui Costa, won in the first round of voting. This means that the PT has become a powerful party in Bahia. As had happened before, Costa built a wide coalition with several parties, including former DEM members.

Produzir, the main state program for the rural poor, was maintained until 2013. A PT member was appointed head of the state agency in charge of administering Produzir, but when Wagner had difficulties in building a majority in the state legislature, he asked a former DEM state-level politician to appoint someone, and the appointee had been the head of that agency for eight years during the DEM administrations. The difference between the PT and the DEM in Produzir's management was that all agreements between the state government and the communities became available online following Wagner's promise of a transparent government.

With regard to two of the most important institutions providing checks and balances—the public prosecutor's office and the high court—the former has always enjoyed relative freedom from party politics, whereas the high court was already free from the DEM's influence when Wagner took office.

In terms of executive–legislative relations, Wagner made an agreement to release R$400 thousand a year for each state representative as a budget amendment, regardless of party affiliation and with no strings attached. A password for accessing state accounts has been granted to parliamentarians.

Neither Wagner nor the PT enjoys the control of the media that ACM did. The main printed newspaper, which began to oppose ACM and the DEM only in the early 2000s, now opposes the PT's governments, and the main TV station still remains in the hands of ACM's heirs.

Another difference is that Wagner has to administer a coalition of several parties, in contrast to the DEM. However, this also means that politicians close to the previous political group have found a place at the PT table.

I close this section by pointing out that on the one hand, the use of Produzir to make electoral gains and to gather the support of the poor without changing their status quo until 2013, coupled with the strategy of making alliances with politicians and officials previously affiliated with the DEM, signals that certain electoral strategies may remain. On the other hand, in-

stitutions providing checks and balances are no longer under the influence of any particular political group, and state-led pro-poor policies such as the one that gave rise to Produzir became unnecessary, given the adoption and expansion of federal pro-poor policies.

Conclusions

This chapter has presented a discussion of political and policy continuity and change in a state ruled by an elite with ties to the military regime after the return to democracy. For two decades this elite had informal control of the government, the legislature, local politics, and institutions providing checks and balances through a political party, the DEM, and a political boss, ACM.

The political elite controlling the state took advantage of the difficulties of other parties in presenting credible candidates to the electorate and in accruing federal aid for the state. The group has also benefited from its control of several other parties under the DEM's umbrella, thus steadily keeping a majority in the legislative branch and in local politics. Furthermore, because the DEM's control of the government had gone on for so long, the party had had the opportunity to appoint literally all members of the institutions that provide checks and balances until the mid-2000s. In the policy realm, the group administered a large discretionary fund to be distributed among poor communities. On the other hand, the DEM became responsible for upgrading the state's economic performance and for keeping public accounts under control. These factors, coupled with the lack of a credible candidate who was able to build a broad electoral coalition, helped keep opposition at bay for more than two decades.

The DEM maintained lasting control not through clientelism alone but rather through a mixture of policies regarding private and public goods. The former addressed the demands of state parliamentarians and local politicians and was highly centralized at the executive through discretionary and distributive programs. The latter changed the state economy. Public employees were clearly divided between two rationales—technocracy and clientelism—and it was no coincidence that macroeconomic policies were successful and social policies were not. However, the DEM's pro-poor policies based on the allocation of discretionary and distributive funds mainly to rural areas and poor communities now compete with federal-led social policies designed to be universal or clearly targeted and hence more redistributive. With the federalization of social policies, voters have more policy choices at their disposal and an opportunity to reward or punish parties

based on their policies. This means that competing social policies may have played a role in the demise of the DEM's authoritarian control over Bahia's polity.

What are the prospects for this transition to democracy in Bahia? As in any transition, there is room for improvement as much as for setbacks. If one assumes that a democratic polity moves from bosses and elites to institutions, this has already begun in Bahia. After the 2006 election, electoral and party politics have become more plural, with the presence of three major parties—the PT, the PMDB, and the DEM.

The PMDB expanded quickly and attracted state and local DEM dissidents. Its leader had learned ACM's stick-and-carrot strategy. However, the PMDB experienced a setback when Lima decided to oppose Wagner and Costa and run for governor in 2010 and 2014, earning a small number of votes.

As for the prospects for the DEM's return to the center of the political scene, it is too early to speculate if and when that will happen, either nationally or in Bahia. Nationally, the DEM has been losing affiliates in rapid succession. The DEM, however, won the election of Bahia's state capital, Salvador, in 2012. The mayor is ACM's grandson. The scenario is that he is going to run for Bahia's government in 2018. But even if the DEM recovers its electorate in Bahia, democratic institutions will not be the same, and some of the PT's decisions to govern in a more transparent way might change the DEM's traditional means of governing and of dealing with democratic institutions.

Although the PT has introduced several measures toward transparency and the institutions that provide checks and balances are no longer under the control of a single man or party, that party has been governing Bahia for the last nine years, and the incumbent governor, Costa, has three more years ahead. However, neither the PT nor the DEM can count on the connivance of other political institutions any longer.

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NOTES

1. According to André Borges (2008), between 1982 and 1988 in six states including Bahia, party competition was uneven, and only one party achieved electoral success in that period over three elections.

2. Subnational enclaves in Mexico and Argentina have been the objects of some analyses. See, for instance, Fox (1994); Cornelius, Eisenstadt, and Hindley (1999); Gervasoni (2010); and Gibson (2013). In Brazil, however, there is still little literature on that.

3. For a review of the literature on democratization studies, see Whitehead (1998).

4. Data on economic and social indicators of Bahia are available at www.sei.ba.gov.br /sei/consulta_frame.wsp.

5. The first intermission was during the military regime, when Roberto Santos was appointed state governor by the military against ACM's candidate. The second followed the election of Waldir Pires in 1986, which can be credited to both exogenous and endogenous factors. Nationally, Pires was affiliated with the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), a party associated with the temporary success of a stabilization plan (the Cruzado Plan). The positive effect of this plan was so overwhelming that the PMDB elected twenty-two governors in the twenty-four states that existed then. However, ACM was President José Sarney's most powerful minister, and he managed to block Pires's demands for the state. The endogenous factor contributing to Pires's victory was that he managed to build a broad alliance among several parties at different points on the political spectrum, a strategy also favoring the PT in 2006. Pires resigned two years before the end of his term to be the running mate of Ulysses Guimarães, PMDB's candidate for president in Brazil's first direct election for the federal executive. These intermissions failed to be enough to weaken the DEM's hegemony in state politics, and its candidates were subsequently elected once more.

6. Two officials from the state's legislature, three civil servants, and two state lawmakers, one from the DEM and another from the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), a party in opposition to the DEM, were interviewed for a better understanding of the role played by budget amendments. The interviewees also provided valuable information about executive–legislative relations beyond budgetary issues.

7. One interviewee stated that in the last year of the DEM's tenure an informal agreement resulted in the approval of one amendment for the construction of cisterns by each representative regardless of party affiliation. The agreement, however, had little or no positive effect for the opposition because their votes accrue mainly from large cities.

8. Information about the judiciary is available at www.tj.ba.gov.br. As far as I know, there has been no academic study about the functioning of the high court in Bahia or in other Brazilian states.

9. Data on elections prior to 1994 are not available online.

10. The difference between the two candidates was the small margin of 306 votes.

11. See Dantas Neto (2006) and Souza (1997).

12. See, for instance, Ames (1996); Hagopian (1996); and Mainwaring (1999).

13. Judith Tendler (2000) provides a thorough list of these evaluations.

14. Aggregated information about Produzir is available at http://www.seplan.ba.gov.br /verRelatorio.php?varCodigo=24.

15. See the data collected by Jairo Nicolau and Vitor Peixoto (2007).

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Social Heterogeneity, Political Mediation, and Subnational Illiberalism

Oaxaca and Puebla, Mexico

JULIÁN DURAZO HERRMANN

Recently several Mexican states witnessed important political problems. The best-known cases are those of Oaxaca, where state police severely repressed a peaceful teachers' demonstration and thereby unleashed an unprecedented crisis, and Puebla, where a journalist was illegally arrested to face a dubious libel trial instigated by one of the governor's close friends. These states are indicated on the map of the Mexican Federation that appears as figure 8.1.

In both cases, protest was strong and overflowed subnational borders into the federal arena, moving the federal Congress and the Supreme Court to investigate the charges of authoritarianism and abuse of power against the governors of the two states. Despite being formally blamed and called to resign, both governors—Ulises Ruiz in Oaxaca and Mario Marín in Puebla—remained in power until the conclusion of their terms (December 2010 and February 2011, respectively). Only then was a broad opposition coalition able to dislodge the longstanding subnational authoritarian elites from power.

How do subnational authoritarian enclaves such as these survive a federal democratic transition? How do they endure large-scale mobilizations like the ones that shook Puebla and Oaxaca in 2006? And why did they undergo electoral defeat four years later? In search for causal explanations, I go beyond short-term analysis and take profound social and political dynamics into account.

Part of the answer lies in the relationship between subnational and federal actors. Given the permanent and legitimate access the latter enjoy in subnational politics, if an authoritarian enclave is to survive, subnational elites must elicit federal tolerance of their practices. This dimension has

been widely studied and is rich in insights (Hernández Rodríguez 2008; Gibson 2013).[1]

However, federal tolerance of subnational authoritarian practices is insufficient to explain why subnational polities sustain and eventually reproduce these practices. The failure of federal efforts to prevent—or even criticize—subnational authoritarianism (as was the case in Oaxaca and Puebla) is quite telling in this respect.

The internal dimension of subnational authoritarianism must therefore be studied. So I seek to determine to what extent the dynamic interaction among subnational political actors and institutions contributes to the emergence, consolidation, and eventual downfall of authoritarian enclaves. I address federal processes only inasmuch as they affect the subnational equilibrium.

Despite the strength of homogenizing federal policies, the evolution of Mexico's various subnational states throughout the twentieth century was rather different (Vaughan 1997). Although Oaxaca did not have effective statewide *cacicazgo* (subnational boss rule) (Martínez Vásquez 1990), Puebla experienced its full life cycle between 1937 and 1972, followed by a relative opening in the 1980s (Pansters 1998). That both states qualify as authoritarian enclaves in 2010 demands that we engage in systematic comparative analysis. We must focus not only on the specific mechanisms of subnational authoritarianism but on the broader social and political dynamics involved. I argue that subnational authoritarian enclaves survive federal democratization because of their neopatrimonial nature. Based on social heterogeneity and relying on several sources of legitimacy, neopatrimonialism allowed these subnational regimes to adapt to federal democratizing pressures while remaining substantially authoritarian. Hybridization certainly transformed subnational institutions but left almost intact both the social structures and the political dynamics that emerge from them. The sources of subnational authoritarianism were therefore never directly called into question, even though the political environment was thoroughly transformed—and eventually led to an opposition electoral victory.

The study of subnational authoritarian enclaves must simultaneously address the questions of change and continuity. Therefore, I distinguish between a regime and a domination system. Whereas the concept of a regime—the pattern of access to and exclusion from governmental positions in a given polity, together with the distribution of political resources that derives from it (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986)—allows for the study of relatively short-term equilibria and their evolution, the concept of a domination system—the

hierarchy arrangement that determines the origins and nature of the governing class in a given polity as well as the general features of how authority is legitimately exercised (Weber 1972 [1922])—uncovers the profound linkages between social structures and political institutions. By looking at them side by side, it is possible to identify both short-term processes and long-term trends and explain the links between the two. In the next section I introduce the conceptual framework guiding my analysis. I then introduce the case studies. In the conclusions I dwell on this chapter's insights on Mexican politics, as well as on its potential contribution to the larger theoretical debate.

Studying Subnational Authoritarianism

In this chapter the term *subnational authoritarian enclave* refers to the way the physical borders of a subnational state substantially limit public debate and contestation, the federal transition to democracy notwithstanding. For its part, the defining feature of all social domination systems is the type of legitimacy they rely on, because it determines the form of obedience that is called for.

Neopatrimonialism is a mixed type of domination that brings together both modern (usually urban) and traditional (mostly but not exclusively rural) social groups and whose sources of legitimacy are simultaneously legal and traditional. Whereas legal legitimacy is based on rational abstract and universal rules that give rise to the rule of law, traditional legitimacy emerges from historical conceptions of the political order that assign relatively static hierarchical positions to the various actors. Neopatrimonial domination thus combines arbitrary power, tradition, and the rule of law in a heterogeneous fashion (Eisenstadt 1973). Furthermore, despite the penetration of abstract and universal values that are characteristic of modernity into traditional settings, neopatrimonialism does not in itself represent a transition stage between tradition and modernity or between authoritarianism and democracy (Médard 1991). Rather, the coexistence between modernity and tradition is fraught with discontinuities, contradictions, and conflict. The political systems that emerge from these processes are therefore simultaneously ambiguous and heterogeneous (Quijano 2000). Heterogeneity consists of profound crosscutting cleavages within a society wherein different groups have distinct perceptions of legitimacy, which range from modern to traditional and even charismatic. Beyond ethnic cleavages, heterogeneity emerges from the coexistence in a single territory of divergent mobilization

logics (corporatist, partisan, ethnic, and so on) that fragment—and potentially polarize—the political system; this is called neopluralism (Oxhorn 1998). Furthermore, the various segments tend to act as much as independent, isolated units as they do as part of a larger social body so that conflict and competition are more common than cooperation (Quijano 2000). As a result of heterogeneity, neopatrimonial systems are in permanent need of political mediation, where an elite is capable of interacting with different social sectors while simultaneously meeting their divergent conceptions of legitimacy. The actor capable of durably achieving this feat monopolizes political communication both within its society and its various components and with the outside world, thus wielding boundary control (Gibson 2013). In so doing, it obtains substantial political rents, not least by presenting itself as an indispensable factor in local governance (Eisenstadt 1973). This same heterogeneity forces neopatrimonial elites to construct large coalitions, including the maximum possible number of both traditional and modern sectors, in order to actually rule. Neopatrimonial regimes are thus fragile by nature, dependent on a continuous flow of material and symbolic resources to sustain these coalitions. Consequently, neopatrimonial domination is prone to crises—although they frequently result in personnel rather than in structural change (Médard 1991). Systemic change requires substantial social change so as to render political mediation unnecessary (Pansters 2005a). With the onset of the federal transition, neopatrimonial subnational systems face significant pressure to democratize as well. These pressures lead them to make some concessions and even engage in a genuine opening. In many cases, however, neopatrimonial elites adjust, adopting formally democratic reforms while continuing to pursue authoritarian practices, at least with regard to some aspects of the subnational political system (Gervasoni 2010). Consequently, illiberal structures and practices persist and develop under subnational democratization (chapter 1 of this volume, by Whitehead and Behrend). This long and ambiguous process is known as hybridization and allows for—and serves to legitimize—the coexistence of formally democratic institutions with authoritarian practices. Any political opening (however minimal) necessarily implies some degree of regime transformation. Change and continuity are thus both key features of hybridization. Its results are contingent on the subnational equilibrium. Hybridization is heterogeneous, allowing for advances in some areas (e.g., electoral law) while condoning stagnation in others—such as human rights abuses (Diamond 2002). By resorting to divergent political logics, it is a characteristically

neopatrimonial response to regime change. Hybridization calls into question the degree of consolidation reached by the subnational regime, because the political environment might be unstable and the prevailing uncertainty may prevent the effective reproduction of the regime (Linz, Stepan, and Gunther 1995). In such cases, hybridization enhances rather than reduces neopatrimonialism's short-term instability without necessarily contributing to an alternative domination system.

Comparing Heterogeneous Societies: Oaxaca and Puebla

As in other regions, the Mexican Revolution became the source of both legal and traditional legitimacy in Oaxaca and Puebla, paving the ground for neopatrimonial domination. On the one hand, the 1917 revolutionary Constitution became the basis of the Mexican legal system and a crucial factor in the institutionalization and consolidation of the postrevolutionary regime at both the federal and the subnational levels. On the other, the dense network of personal ties some military commanders had created in certain regions survived the institutionalization of the new regime and became the source of traditional forms of authority (Hernández Chávez 1993).

Despite being neighbors (see fig. 8.1), Oaxaca and Puebla are quite different from each other. Oaxaca (figure 8.2) is isolated both from central Mexico and from its neighboring states by imposing mountain chains that also dissect its territory, giving rise to a number of distinct subregions and territorial districts. This geographic diversity translates into severe fragmentation: Oaxaca comprises 570 municipalities (*municipios*) (INEGI 2015).

Conversely, Puebla (figure 8.3) is a great valley surrounded by high mountain chains (*sierras*) on all sides. Midway between Mexico City and the port of Veracruz, Puebla is very well connected to the rest of the nation. As a result, only the highest areas in both the northern and the southern *sierras* are severely isolated. Puebla is also quite fragmented, with 217 *municipios*.

In 2005, Oaxaca had 3.8 million inhabitants and its rural population accounted for 53 percent of the total—against a national average of 24 percent. Oaxaca City, the largest city and the state capital, has a mere 300,000 inhabitants. Moreover, 1.25 million people (36 percent of the total) speak one of fifteen indigenous languages, although their demographic weight is unequal and the more numerous groups do not enjoy territorial continuity. A significant proportion of Oaxaca's rural population is not indigenous.



Figure 8.1. The Mexican Federation. Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, 2015.

Puebla has a more numerous population (5.8 million) as well as a much greater urban proportion (72 percent). Puebla City, the state capital, has more than 1.5 million inhabitants and is Mexico's fourth-largest metropolitan area. Compared to Oaxaca, Puebla's indigenous population is smaller in size and diversity: 632,000 persons, 11 percent of the total, with only four major linguistic groups.

Oaxaca's economy remains centered on the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries). Communal property—both land and resources—is still dominant in Oaxaca, especially among indigenous communities, reflecting the state's historical isolation from Mexico's main economic trends (Flores Leyva and Marini Zúñiga 2004). During the second half of the twentieth century, the service sector (traditionally trade, now also tourism), concentrated in the cities (especially Oaxaca City), became increasingly important. Oaxaca's industrial sector, relatively prosperous before the Mexican Revolution, was unable to compete with central Mexico's powerhouses and entered a long stagnation period, never exceeding 18 percent of the state's gross domestic product (GDP). Beginning in the 1950s, almost all important




Figure 8.2. Oaxaca. Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, 2015.

investment projects were confined to the federal public sector (most notably the oil industry), and these projects were very localized and had few linkages to the local economy (Miguel 2004). In contrast, Puebla's economy has a strong industrial component. Originally the heart of the textile industry, Puebla evolved and diversified throughout the twentieth century. In 2015, industrial activities—most notably centered on auto parts, machinery, and metal products—accounted for 35 percent of the state's GDP, compared to 61 percent for the service sector and only 4 percent for the primary sector (INEGI 2015). For a long time, Puebla's economic growth was faster than the national average; however, it remained concentrated in Puebla City (Castillo Palma 1994). In conclusion, Oaxaca and Puebla provide compelling cases for the study the life cycle of subnational authoritarian enclaves. In terms of outcome—right to the simultaneous defeat of their authoritarian incumbents in 2010—and of social heterogeneity, Oaxaca and Puebla provide for a most-similar research design. However, the presence of a heavily urban and industrialized society in Puebla, one that had undergone a measure of democratization, contrasts starkly with the situation of the continuously authori-




Figure 8.3. Puebla. Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, 2015.

tarian rural state of Oaxaca, thereby providing for a most-different research design as well. We can thus isolate subnational authoritarianism's causal factors while simultaneously placing them in the broader picture, thereby contributing to a comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon (Przeworski and Teune 1970).

Social Heterogeneity and Political Mediation in Oaxaca

Classical Neopatrimonialism in Oaxaca

From the early 1920s, Oaxaca's postrevolutionary governors created a complex mediation network centered in the subnational government and based on a clientelistic exchange of material and symbolic goods in return for unconditional political support. In the 1930s, the advent of the hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and of the Mexican corporatist system, which largely integrated these networks, strengthened the subnational government's role as the prime political intermediary both within the state and vis-à-vis the federation (Dalton 2004). After the Revolution, Oaxaca—and all of Mexico—adopted an electoral system based on universal, secret, and formally if not actually competitive suffrage to elect the state governor, the members of the subnational Congress, and the 570 mayors and municipal councils. From the 1920s onward, the electoral calendar was strictly observed, although in most races the PRI was the only party to field a candidate.

In most rural municipalities the electoral process was simply a formalization of traditional selection practices (*usos y costumbres*). The PRI provided legal recognition by automatically selecting the traditional authorities as its local candidates in exchange for unanimous support for all other elections. The Oaxacan PRI thus acted as an intermediary, ensuring the translation of the formal political system's demands into institutions and procedures acceptable to rural and indigenous communities while simultaneously gathering support for the regime. The PRI relied both on its revolutionary and nationalist mystique and on the distribution of material resources.

The PRI, however, never was the sole intermediary between rural communities and the state. The primary school teachers, whom the expansion of public education after the Revolution made a permanent presence throughout Oaxaca, provided another alternative. Their higher education and their permanent links to the government and their union, the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE) made them natural intermediaries between their home communities and the outside world.

In addition to the educational services they provided, the teachers were often able to monopolize the relationship between their communities and the government's sectoral agencies (coffee, forestry, fisheries, and so on). The corporatist links between the SNTE and the PRI and the federal and subnational governments facilitated the concentration of political commu-

nication lines between rural communities and the outside world (Recondo 2007). In urban areas, the local university and the subnational PRI provided relatively open arenas for political competition. Over time, the professional classes controlled the PRI's formal structure in Oaxaca, together with most subnational elective offices (with the exception of that of the governor, where federal intervention was always decisive) and the top echelons of the subnational bureaucracy.

The Oaxacan commercial elite, benefiting from both national economic growth and local industrial weakness, consolidated its position as the dominant subnational economic elite, playing an intermediary role between local producers and their national customers and suppliers. Unlike in other regions, the traders' association in Oaxaca City became a combative organization that often intervened in open politics. Nevertheless, the PRI's revolutionary rhetoric and its aversion to open alliances with the business sector ensured that Oaxaca's political and economic elites remained distinct (Zafra 2004). During most of the twentieth century, Oaxaca's political system exhibited some typical neopatrimonial features: major heterogeneity gave rise to significant fragmentation, which, in turn, allowed for the emergence of distinct legitimacy logics and a comprehensive system of political mediation. Yet postrevolutionary Oaxaca had not a unified ruling elite but rather an uneasy alliance between political and commercial elites. This combination thwarted not only the emergence of an autonomous subnational state but also the consolidation of a stable political system.

Questioning the Neopatrimonial Model

After 1926, Oaxaca enjoyed a period of relative stability. However, the alliance between the subnational political and merchant elites soon showed its limits. In 1946 and 1952, attempts at imposing a local tax generated such strong unrest that the federal government intervened and forced the resignation of the governor concerned (Dalton 2004). The legacy of the 1968 national student movement transformed Oaxaca's political arena. Students organized independently for the first time and formed a coalition with marginalized workers and peasants, the Coalition of Workers, Peasants, and Students of Oaxaca (COCEO) in Oaxaca City in 1971 and the Coalition of Workers, Peasants, and Students of the Isthmus (COCEI) in Juchitán in 1973. Opposition parties remained small and inconsequential.

COCEO's growing ascendancy among the university's collegiate bodies and its efforts to mobilize workers and peasants by providing free legal

assistance worried the state's neopatrimonial elite, who saw a threat to their role as exclusive political mediators. When COCEO and COCEI proved resilient to cooptation, the governor resorted to repression. In 1977, police violence gained national notoriety and the federation intervened to force the governor's resignation (Martínez Vásquez 1990).

COCEO faded with time, but COCEI managed to consolidate and became a model of social organization throughout Oaxaca, with its indigenist rhetoric and its focus on strictly local problems, including land ownership and the exploitation of natural resources (Rubin 1997). Although only a few of these new organizations entered the electoral arena (and none enjoyed the success of COCEI, which won the municipality of Juchitán in 1980 and again between 1989 and 2004), they all entertained an ambiguous relationship of rhetorical conflict and material dependence with the subnational government (Hernández Díaz 2004).

Traditionally a central element of neopatrimonial rule, the SNTE's local section maintained strong ties with the Oaxacan PRI. Nevertheless, when a serious dissident movement emerged in the late 1970s, the Oaxacan SNTE leader was quickly ousted from the PRI's subnational executive committee. To avoid isolation, the dissident teachers sought to establish links with both COCEO and COCEI, as well as with other regional organizations. The teachers took advantage of their union's national dimension to bring their demands to the federal level. Eventually the dissident movement succeeded in dominating the Oaxacan SNTE and in having its internal autonomy recognized (Yescas Martínez and Zafra 2006). In so doing, it directly challenged the subnational government's boundary control.

Although the neopatrimonial mediation monopoly was explicitly questioned, the regime could minimize the threat. The absence of effective opposition parties, together with the limited scope of the new social organizations, reinforced the PRI and the subnational government as political intermediaries. The proliferation of semiautonomous organizations and the independence of the local section of the SNTE interfered with Oaxaca's mediation monopoly, but their inability to form a common front allowed for the hybridization of subnational neopatrimonialism by creating new opportunities for political mediation (Hernández Díaz 2004).

Hybridization and Neopatrimonial Recomposition in Oaxaca

Hybridization began in earnest in 1986 with the election of Heladio Ramírez López. From the outset, the new governor made his indigenous origins a

central element of his discourse. He drew on his experience in the PRI's corporate networks to depolarize Oaxacan politics and rebuild the authority of the neopatrimonial regime (Dalton 2004). Taking advantage of federal neoliberal policies that privatized or closed many sectoral agencies, Ramírez López reinforced the subnational government by creating local substitutes. Among others, a subnational agency in charge of coffee—Oaxaca's main export—replaced the federal one in 1989 and became the exclusive provider of credit, storage, and marketing for Oaxacan growers. The subnational government agreed to negotiate with and respect the independence of the coffee growers' organizations in exchange for their neutrality (Snyder 2001).

Ramírez López succeeded in partially reintegrating the teachers into the clientelistic pact. With resources from the federal decentralization programmes, the Oaxacan government granted teachers significant salary increases and gave their union a say in subnational education policy design and administration. In exchange, the teachers agreed to mediate between the government and numerous semiautonomous subnational organizations, thus contributing to the reconstruction of the state's political mediation network (Cortés 2006).

The Oaxacan government strengthened its influence among urban organizations and trade unions through the clientelistic distribution of material resources and operating permits. Taxi drivers' and street vendors' organizations in Oaxaca City were particularly targeted. The subnational government eschewed the PRI, relying instead on its own bureaucratic apparatus (Martínez Vásquez 2004). The new fiscal federalism—which imposed many obligations but granted substantial new resources to subnational states—facilitated this process by financing the creation of new administrative structures, such as the subnational coffee council (Sobarzo 2005).

The indigenist reforms were also important. In 1986 Ramírez López appointed the state's first attorney for indigenous peoples. In 1990 a subnational constitutional reform formally recognized Oaxaca's multicultural character, the role of traditional authorities in agrarian conflict resolution, and the importance of communal forms of ownership and work in indigenous municipalities. After the neo-Zapatista revolt in neighboring Chiapas in 1994, Governor Diódoro Carrasco (1992–98) decided to end the legal fiction surrounding the selection of rural and indigenous municipal authorities and formally recognized the *usos y costumbres*.

In so doing, the Oaxacan government not only recognized one dimension of the state's pluralism but also created new and effective political rights

for a large sector of the population. The process involved transferring yet another political mediation channel from the PRI to the subnational government, which created regional bureaus to supervise the direct distribution of resources in rural and indigenous communities (Recondo 2007).

Consequently, Oaxaca's bureaucratic structure grew at the expense of the PRI, now facing increasing electoral competition. After 1988 the PRI found itself engaged in a prolonged decline as the partisan opposition grew from less than 25 percent to almost 50 percent of the vote between 1992 and 2004. However, the PRI's decay in Oaxaca was much less pronounced than elsewhere, given the opposition's fragmentation and its concentration in the larger cities. The opposition parties remained unable to effectively curb the subnational government through the use of any legislative checks and balances.

Conversely, lacking alternative leadership and dependent on government resources, the PRI remained subordinated to the subnational government (Alonso Criollo 2004). The unravelling of the PRI–government link at the federal level after 1995 further strengthened subnational elites by making them the PRI's natural leaders in each state (Modoux 2006).

In 2000 Mexico underwent alternation at the federal level. However, Oaxaca stayed under neopatrimonial rule. Despite moderate urbanization and social integration, Oaxaca remained a predominantly rural state with a large indigenous presence in which many communities were geographically isolated. Economically, the state remained poorly integrated and dependent on central Mexico. The emergence of numerous semiautonomous organizations challenged the subnational government's political mediation monopoly, but their fragmentation and their narrow focus, together with subnational bureaucratic expansion and the recognition of rural and indigenous traditional authorities, renovated the neopatrimonial system (Durazo Herrmann 2012). Handicapped by their organizational weaknesses, political parties could not offer an effective alternative, contributing instead to neopluralism.

Oaxaca's neopatrimonial regime thus adapted to federal democratization through hybridization. Electoral reform gave opposition parties enhanced visibility, while the political opening allowed the subnational government to negotiate and, in many cases, depoliticize the semiautonomous organizations. However, the regime succeeded in recreating the neopatrimonial pact by concentrating the clientelistic distribution of resources in its own bureaucracy. Its continuous hold on rural and indigenous areas, reinforced by the reforms, assured it an electoral majority and severely limited the opposition's ability to check the subnational government. Although the neopatri-

monial mediation monopoly was seriously contested, the subnational government remained the richest and most effective political mediator and continued to proclaim its irreplaceability in Oaxacan governance.

The Consolidation of an Authoritarian Enclave

The 2000 presidential election that ended the federal PRI's seventy-one-year reign transformed Oaxaca's political landscape. Federal alternation finally severed the organic link between the president and the state governor without weaning the Oaxacan PRI from the subnational government. Nevertheless, the PRI's relatively good results in Oaxaca and some other states turned them into bastions of the former hegemonic party and gave their political elites significant weight within the party's federal structures. Given the weakness of the new federal National Action Party (PAN) government, the Oaxacan neopatrimonial elite renewed its role as the dominant intermediary within the subnational system and vis-à-vis the federation (Hernández Rodríguez 2008; Gibson 2013).

Governor José Murat (1998–2004) took full advantage of the situation. Upon his coming to power, he established complete control over both the party's mobilization process and its candidatures (most notably, that of his successor). Through the clientelistic use of federal fiscal transfers as well as subnational prerogatives, Murat integrated—or reintegrated—many urban, rural, and indigenous organizations to the Oaxacan PRI. However, Murat did not hesitate to resort to violent repression of recalcitrant opponents (Yescas Martínez 2007). Murat's confrontational style and the unavoidable comparison between subnational and federal developments fueled substantial opposition. He was thus unable to achieve complete control of Oaxaca's political system, and the state's two largest cities (Oaxaca City and Juchitán) remained under opposition control throughout his term. The biggest challenge came during the 2004 gubernatorial election, when Oaxaca City's former opposition mayor, Gabino Cué, seemed close to winning with a broad coalition that included the PAN, the PRD, and Convergencia. However, Oaxaca's fragmentation frustrated these efforts; a local party—supported by, among others, a faction of COCEI—divided the opposition vote and guaranteed the PRI a thin and very controversial victory (Yescas Martínez 2007).

The new governor, Ulises Ruiz, immediately sought to buttress his legitimacy. His government used its infrastructure investments to maximize its visibility. Ruiz is also suspected of siphoning resources from certain investments and directing them toward discretionary expenditures in rural areas,

strengthening his clientelistic links in those regions (Recondo 2007). Ruiz responded to the middle classes's rule-of-law demands by pursuing his predecessors' hybrid democratic reforms, most notably through the adoption of Oaxaca's first freedom of information law. Originally tabled by the PRD, the governor adopted the bill as his own, albeit limiting its scope and increasing the number of permissible exceptions. When finally adopted in September 2006, the law only marginally restricted the subnational government's clientelistic activities (Johnson 2006).

Ruiz hardened his stance vis-à-vis the semiautonomous organizations that refused to support his government openly and explicitly. Numerous acts of repression—from the takeover of an opposition newspaper to several political assassinations—were reported from the beginning of his government (Martínez Vásquez 2007). Ruiz thus sought to re-impose the neopatrimonial mediation monopoly by force.

This rigid position affected the SNTE. After negotiating with the teachers in 2005, Ruiz chose to reject their demands the following year and violently dispersed their demonstration in downtown Oaxaca City. Given the existing tensions and the teachers' broad networks, repression unleashed a violent crisis as a broad coalition formed to demand Ruiz's immediate resignation. In addition to the SNTE's subnational section, the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO) included student associations, university unions, and even radical groups linked to the guerrillas. Between June and November 2006, the APPO's massive demonstrations paralyzed Oaxaca City on several occasions.

In an attempt to coordinate these disparate groups, the APPO adopted a large collective leadership and drew explicitly on indigenous deliberation and consensual decision-making practices. These efforts notwithstanding, the APPO remained bound to Oaxaca City and the areas just north and south of the capital. Only a few factions of the PRD—and no other political party—joined the APPO. COCEI also remained aloof. When the SNTE, fragilized by significant internal divisions, obtained separate satisfaction of its particular demands, it withdrew from the APPO in October 2006. The movement's subsequent radicalization led to violent confrontation with both subnational and federal police and justified the government's resorting to violent repression.

The 2006 federal elections complicated the situation. Initially the PRD and its presidential candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, showed little

interest in the conflict, because the close relationship between the PRI and the SNTE was well known. However, after the violent repression of their demonstration, the teachers called the population to vote for the PRD, which won a landslide victory in Oaxaca. Nationally, the results were much less clear, and the PRD strongly contested the PAN's narrow victory.

Given the climate of uncertainty, the PAN negotiated an agreement with the PRI to ensure the accession of its candidate—Felipe Calderón—to the presidency. As a result, the Senate's fact-finding mission did not recommend federal intervention, despite recognizing the gravity of the situation. In exchange, the PRI formally recognized Calderón's victory. Just days before the transfer of power, the federal police intervened in support of the subnational governor and crushed the APPO, leaving behind at least seventeen casualties (Martínez Vásquez 2007).

With many of its leaders in prison, the APPO demobilized rapidly. Its member organizations recovered their independence and sought to rebuild a working relationship with the subnational government, which found in federal fiscal transfers the means to reopen the dialog and to attempt to revive the neopatrimonial pact. Oaxaca's neopluralism resurfaced quickly (Yescas Martínez 2007).

The midterm legislative elections took place as scheduled in July 2007. Despite an expected opposition breakthrough, the PRI won all majority districts with 49.6 percent of the vote (and a participation rate of 36.5 percent), confining the opposition, divided and poorly organized, to the minority proportional-representation seats (mentioned later). The PRI also recovered Oaxaca City. The 2009 federal midterm elections confirmed the trend; the PRI won 43.7 percent, the PAN 16.3 percent, and the PRD a mere 15.9 percent of the vote (Instituto Nacional Electoral 2015). Consequently, all attempts at legislative oversight of the subnational government were doomed to failure until the 2010 subnational elections.

Only a broad coalition, explicitly aimed against the PRI, was able to defeat it in the 2010 elections—and then only on its second try. Nevertheless, the PRI retained a plurality in the subnational legislature (*La Jornada* 2010). In terms of governance style, Cué, the new governor, is constantly accused of renewing the PRI's authoritarianism and has faced numerous protests, including a police strike. In the 2013 midterm elections, the PRI recovered three seats in the subnational legislature (López Velasco 2013; Matías 2014).

Social Heterogeneity and Political Mediation in Puebla
Classical Neopatrimonialism in Puebla

After the end of the Revolution, Puebla experienced a prolonged period of instability. Between 1920 and 1933, the state had sixteen governors, none of whom was able to finish his term. Only with the onset of the Maximato—when former president Plutarco Elías Calles controlled Mexico's federal government as *éminence grise*—did a Poblano governor manage to complete his mandate. Upon Calles's fall in 1935, his Poblano protégé was unable to consolidate his grip on power. Instead, Maximino Ávila Camacho, brother of the federal defense secretary and a member of the president's inner group, was elected governor in 1937 (Lomelí 2001).

Maximino's term as governor was a watershed in Poblano politics. The modernization of Poblano industry, which had remained stagnant as a result of the Revolution, became a priority. By pacifying Puebla's previously turbulent industrial relations, Maximino established solid links with the state's industrial elites, divided nonetheless between the more conservative, openly Catholic, traditional textile industrialists of Spanish origin and the more recently established, much more dynamic, entrepreneurs, many of them of Lebanese origin. When his brother Manuel Ávila Camacho became president in 1940, the road was clear for the formation of a postrevolutionary *cacicazgo*, in which a closed group, headed by Maximino, controlled all significant political positions in Puebla (Pansters 1998).

Simultaneously, the governor expanded the corporatist system to incorporate all significant subnational peasant and labor unions into the PRI under his leadership, thus extending his mediation monopoly from the family bastion of Teziutlán, in the Northern *sierra*, to the entire state. He endeavored to suppress or subordinate local *cacicazgos* in the more isolated areas of the state. Maximino thus consolidated his stranglehold on Puebla by combining traditional territorial bases with modern corporatist patronage. In the heyday of the revolutionary regime, intense social and economic modernization in Puebla offered significant opportunities to consolidate a neopatrimonial regime under Maximino's leadership and, after his death in 1945, that of his close political relations. Moreover, the uneven patterns of change multiplied opportunities for political mediation at the subnational level (Brewster 2005).

The industrial elite remained divided. Whereas traditional entrepreneurs remained suspicious of the postrevolutionary regime, the emerging

elite supported its economic policies. With the arrival of major national and international concerns in Puebla in the 1950s and 1960s, most notably Volkswagen, the economic elite became even more fragmented. Under such circumstances, the subnational government easily succeeded in exchanging policy advantages for political support (Quiroz Palacios 2006).

The Poblano caciques entertained relations with a number of competing peasant and labor unions, stimulating fragmentation and eventually neopluralism, with the subnational PRI providing the only horizontal link and the governor as the natural mediator. The state's growing urbanization multiplied the informal sectors, which were organized in turn by a different wing of the PRI (Pansters 1998; Lomelí 2001). Avilacamachismo, as the *cacicazgo* was known, ruled Puebla without any significant opposition until the late 1950s. Its capacity to guarantee local governance, coupled with extensive federal contacts, ensured federal tolerance of its continued hold on Poblano politics. Yet the same forces that allowed for the formation of a neopatrimonial *cacicazgo* gave rise to a growing opposition. Centered in the regional university, a left-wing student movement increasingly demanded respect for democratic procedures both within the university and at the state level. The subnational government and the conservative faction of the industrial elite responded with a virulent anti-Communist campaign aimed at crushing opposition at its source while renewing the links between the *cacicazgo* and the traditional industrial sectors (Pansters 1998).

However, direct attacks against federal policies—most notably those regarding public education and support for the Cuban Revolution (Loaeza 1988)—from the conservative elite and excessive police violence from the subnational government led to federal intervention and the removal of the state's governor in 1964. The accession of a former *avilacamachista*—Gustavo Díaz Ordaz—to the presidency later that year allowed the Puebla *cacicazgo* to survive, but the seeds of intense polarization and instability had been sown. Again, no Poblano governor managed to finish his term between 1963 and 1975.

The Puebla *cacicazgo* collapsed in 1972. Another round of university agitation—this time effectively under the leadership of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM)—had led to another fierce anti-Communist campaign that again resulted in violence, thereby demonstrating that Avilacamachismo was no longer able to mediate political developments in Puebla. This time the federation forced the governor's resignation, conceded substantial space to the left within the regional university, and appointed a federal politician

with no local ties as interim governor with the mandate to purge and reorganize the Poblano PRI (Pansters 1998). This procedure had already been used to destroy *cacicazgos* in other Mexican states (Durazo Herrmann 2006).

Authoritarian Rule without Caciquismo

After 1972, and especially with the election of a new governor in 1975, the Poblano government's priority was to restore order. The PCM was thus allowed to keep and develop its positions in the regional university. Eventually, the PCM would come to control—although not uncontroversially—the university's entire administrative structure by taking advantage of the university's self-governing structures (Pansters 1998). However, Puebla's Workers, Peasants, and Students Front, modeled on Oaxaca's COCEO, unraveled quickly under government pressure (Quiroz Palacios 2006).

In 1977 a subnational electoral reform, borrowing from the federal one, introduced a limited number of proportional-representation seats in the Poblano Congress and in some municipal councils, most notably the state capital. As a result, the opposition's presence in the state's formal institutions increased noticeably throughout the 1980s, including the PCM—now renamed the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM)—but also, and in greater numbers, the PAN (García García 1998). The rise in the number of postelectoral conflicts forced the Poblano government to pursue its electoral reforms throughout the 1980s, albeit in limited, reactive, and piecemeal fashion. The result was a moderate opening that roughly corresponded to federal dynamics. Paradoxically—and possibly related to the state's experience with extreme polarization—electoral turnout dropped to a mere 40 percent in the 1991 federal elections (Castillo Palma 1994).

During this time, the Poblano PRI experimented with several candidate selection methods to find an equilibrium between satisfying local ambitions and giving the governor sufficient leverage to control the subnational Congress and the largest municipalities. Although the PRI was unable to avoid internal conflicts, these attempts consecrated both the party as the main venue for patronage and clientelism and the governor as the main political mediator.

The 1982 economic crisis generated substantial unrest in Puebla. Following the lead of some northern states, some prominent Poblano entrepreneurs adhered to the PAN and began contesting surprisingly competitive elections. Although the PAN failed to win Puebla City, it came rather close in both the 1983 and the 1986 elections and did win in several other important cities (Pansters 1998). Nevertheless, the opposition remained concen-

trated in the large cities and, as late as 1986, fielded candidates in fewer than half of the state's municipalities (García García 1998).

A major casualty of the opening process was the PRI's old corporatist structures. The party's renewal process marginalized them in favor of new territorial structures more amenable to the governor's direct control. Meanwhile, the emergence of a large informal economic sector in the cities, with its own independent, albeit fragmented organizations, and the decision by the Volkswagen union (by far the state's largest) to withdraw from the PRI dealt serious blows to the strength and representative character of the PRI-affiliated labor organizations in Puebla (Quiroz Palacios 2006).

As a result, by the mid-1980s Poblano politics was relatively open and competitive. On the left, the PSUM had an unparalleled bastion in the regional university and was a permanent presence in the state capital's municipal council. On the right, the PAN had become the main subnational opposition party and enjoyed substantial entrepreneurial support. Although the opposition was unable to effectively counterbalance the PRI, the opening in Puebla matched that of Mexico's most advanced subnational states at the time—and surpassed many others (Durazo Herrmann 2006).

The Reconstruction of Authoritarianism in Puebla

In 1987, Mariano Piña Olaya was elected governor of Puebla. The president had selected a politician with few, if any, direct links to the subnational political system. Consequently, Piña Olaya did not receive a warm welcome from the state's elites—most notably the corporatist unions—and quarreled frequently with a fraction of the state's industrial leadership, now openly flirting with the PAN. Nevertheless, the governor took advantage of the economic elite's fragmentation and developed close relationships with its more modern sectors—including the numerous out-of-state investors (Lomelí 2001).

Piña Olaya continued his predecessors' work of reorganizing the PRI and managing the political opening. Although in policy terms Piña Olaya was not very successful (Snyder 2001), the governor stabilized internal dissent within the PRI and fruitfully used its candidate selection practices to mediate among the party's sectors and to place prominent local leaders (especially in the rural areas) within the formal power structure and under his direct supervision (García García 1998). The overrepresentation of the state's rural areas in the subnational Congress greatly contributed to his success (Snyder and Samuels 2004).

With federal support, Piña Olaya and his successors co-opted many of the independent rural organizations that had appeared after the collapse of the *cacicazgo* in the 1970s and whose activities had brought increasing conflict to the more isolated areas of the state. In exchange for a limited, inward-looking mobilization style, the Poblano government heard their grievances, recognized their autonomy, and accepted their refusal to directly join the PRI (Beaucage 2009).

In 1993 a new governor took power. Although a stranger to subnational politics, Manuel Bartlett had national stature, having been federal interior and education secretary in the years preceding his election in Puebla. As the PRI gradually lost its hold on federal power, its subnational strongholds became more important. The acceleration of fiscal and administrative decentralization, together with the governors' increasing initiative and responsibility and their growing public visibility, made subnational governorships ever more complex and powerful positions. In this context, Bartlett openly intended to use his governorship as a springboard for his presidential candidacy (Flamand 2004).

As in Oaxaca, Bartlett took advantage of the new fiscal federalism's resources to strengthen and develop the state's bureaucracy. Contrary to the Oaxaca case, however, instead of renewing the clientelistic pact, Bartlett developed exclusionary policies geared at cementing a new alliance with Puebla's various economic groups. This was the case both with the rural elites, who were handed control of the state's agricultural policies, and with the urban commercial and industrial elites, who largely benefited from comprehensive land-zoning reform. The state's traditional exclusionary patterns facilitated this process (Quintero Cedeño 2005).

Bartlett consciously continued his predecessor's party denationalization policy of marginalizing the PRI's corporatist sectors and promoting its territorial units instead. In 1998 the governor adopted Puebla's fiscal federalism regulation law (known as the Ley Bartlett) in an attempt to concentrate the flow of fiscal resources from the federation to the municipalities in the governor's hands, which would then redistribute them according to his own criteria (poverty rather than population). In so doing, the governor simultaneously achieved control of municipal finances and penalized the larger cities, now in the hands of the PAN. Because of the ambiguous provisos regarding fiscal federalism, the Ley Bartlett survived an extremely mediatized constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court (Flamand 2004).

The opposition's electoral fortunes were mixed at best. Although the PAN captured Puebla City in 1995, it lost it again in 1998. The renewal of the state's radical right-wing associations consolidated the PAN's presence as a subnational party but isolated it by reviving the old anti-Communist polarization. The leftist opposition also won a handful of small municipalities, and, although it never managed to challenge the PRI, it gradually became more present throughout the state (García García 1998).

In the 1998 subnational legislative elections, only the PAN managed to win one majority district (out of twenty-six), thus confining the opposition to the minority proportional-representation seats (fourteen seats out of forty) and to a largely symbolic role. As in Oaxaca, the PRI managed to keep a stranglehold on the state's political institutions and prevent the emergence of checks and balances between 1995 and 2010 with an average of only 45 percent of the vote (Instituto Electoral del Estado de Puebla 2013).

Puebla's social organizations were unable to check the subnational government. Although they were generally articulate and combative, their mistrust of government, their reduced territorial scope in both rural and urban areas, and their inclination toward intense fractiousness limited their clout. Moreover, their misgivings about each other and their inability (or unwillingness) to form large fronts led them to cooperate with rather than confront the subnational government. By controlling substantive material resources at the top of a vertical social structure, the subnational government dealt with social mobilization in piecemeal fashion, co-opting or isolating potentially conflictive organizations (Quintero Cedeño 2005; Quiroz Palacios 2006).

The political closure affected the regional university as well. Once the bastion of the PSUM/PRD, the university's administration, conflictive by nature, had become sclerotic. Lacking organizational oversight, the university was burdened by the unruly growth of both its student body and its administrative corps. In this context, a right-wing group managed to win control of the university and, supported by the subnational government, eventually destroyed the university's recalcitrant union (Pansters 2005b).

By the end of Bartlett's term, Puebla had experienced substantial closure. Although the partisan opposition continued to grow electorally and the PAN even managed to win Puebla City in 1995, it was never able to compete with the PRI on a statewide basis or even challenge its stranglehold on Puebla's political institutions. In the 1998 gubernatorial election, the PRI won with 54 percent of the vote (Instituto Electoral del Estado de Puebla 2013).

Regarding political mediation, the breakdown of the state's corporatist network was largely offset by the transformation of the Puebla PRI into a territorial organization, the increased control of federal fiscal transfers by the subnational government, and the renewal of the alliance with the state's economic elites through exclusionary policy-making. These developments combined with the weaknesses of the region's social movements, both urban and rural, to produce an extremely fragmented political system over which the Puebla government could exert neopatrimonial domination.

The Consolidation of an Authoritarian Enclave

After 1998, the PRI's electoral fortunes declined once again and the PAN recaptured Puebla City in 2001, together with six legislative districts. The PRD, with 10 percent of the vote, remained confined to a few municipalities. In 2004 and 2007, however, the PRI recovered Puebla City and most of the majority districts lost (Instituto Electoral del Estado de Puebla 2013). Consequently, there was no effective legislative oversight of either Melquiades Morales' (1999–2005) or Mario Marín's (2005–11) government.

Moreover, the neopatrimonial regime's strong negotiating position vis-à-vis the state's social organizations gave rise to a tough government style in which legal harassment and open repression frequently accompany any political overture. Co-optation and selective patronage remain frequently used instruments in the Poblano government's repertoire (Quintero Cedeño 2005).

Puebla's authoritarian practices received national coverage when, in December 2005, state police kidnapped a journalist in another state and brought her to Puebla City to stand trial for libel against one of the governor's close associates. The resulting uproar prompted the federal Congress to request that the Supreme Court clarify the case using its investigation power—a power used only twice before in the Court's history (Cacho 2008).

The Supreme Court's investigation revealed not only that a child pornography network existed in Puebla but that it operated with the protection of the governor, who had been directly involved in the journalist's kidnapping. The investigation also found evidence that Puebla's judiciary system lacked the necessary independence from the subnational governor and therefore was in need of profound reforms. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's plenum rejected the findings in a 6–5 vote on technical rather than factual grounds, arguing that their adoption would be a violation of executive privilege (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación 2007). In both the federal

Congress and the subnational one, the PRI blocked all attempts to debate the affair (Pérez Silva 2007).

In Puebla the affair triggered massive demonstrations, which nevertheless subsided shortly afterwards (Hernández 2007). In the 2007 subnational midterm elections, the PRI slipped from 44 to 41 percent of the vote, but actually recovered two of the three majority districts it had lost in 2004 (Instituto Electoral del Estado de Puebla 2013). The overrepresentation of rural areas, where the opposition has little presence, again contributed to this result. Moreover, Puebla's subnational government was relatively successful in linking political closure to stability, thus consolidating its claim to indispensability.

Although Bartlett engaged in very open conflict with the federation, most notably over the Ley Bartlett, his successors remained on relatively good terms with the federal government. Although, as a presidential candidate, Calderón severely criticized Governor Marín and promised to act against him, once he was in power relations between the Puebla government and the federation were rather good and cooperative (Bellinghausen 2009). The Poblano governors also found ways of cooperating with their counterparts, most notably on the issue of federal fiscal transfers (Hernández Rodríguez 2008).

The Poblano authoritarian enclave thus appeared consolidated. Even with only a plurality of the vote, the PRI continued to control the state's political institutions. As the only party with a full statewide presence and confronted by neopluralism, it continued to claim to be an indispensable element of subnational governance.

Only a broad coalition, led by the PAN but also consisting of the PRD and Convergencia, was able to defeat the PRI in the 2010 gubernatorial elections. Although this coalition obtained a majority in the gubernatorial election, it received a bare plurality in the legislative election—44 percent against 41 percent for the PRI. In the 2013 midterm election, the coalition held together and, although it lost votes, it won a substantial majority in the subnational legislature—40 percent of the vote and twenty-five out of forty seats (Instituto Electoral del Estado de Puebla 2013). The new governor, Rafael Moreno Valle, is the grandson of a former Poblano governor and associated with the Avilacamachista clique. Originally a *príista*, he affiliated with the PAN in 2006. He is criticized for being as authoritarian as his predecessors and for using his control of the state legislature to thwart any checks and balances, thus preventing real change in Puebla's regime (Roal 2014).

Subnational Illiberalism and Persisting Neopatrimonialism

Numerous institutional and structural changes have taken place in Oaxaca and Puebla since the 1970s, from electoral reform to the recognition of *usos y costumbres* in Oaxaca to the emergence and recognition of numerous semi-independent organizations in both states. Moreover, the authoritarian enclaves appear to have been battered by the recent crises and—from a broader perspective—by the erosion of neopatrimonialism. The PRI's decline and the rise of open dissent led in 2010 to the first opposition victories in these states.

The way for these developments was prepared by the expansion of pluralism (however limited), the increase in popular political participation (e.g., in the semiautonomous organizations), the effective consolidation of formal political rights, and constant and far-reaching electoral reforms. In the context of the intense polarization brought about by the 2006 crises, the election of a new governor allowed the population to ventilate pent-up grievances.

It is noteworthy, however, that only gubernatorial elections offered this opportunity; the opposition grievously lost the legislative elections immediately following the crises. The enormous salience of executive office suggests that effective political mediation remains a critical consideration in the minds of Oaxacan and Poblano voters.

Other important elements of the hybrid regime and the broader neopatrimonial domination system also remain in place. Initiated in the late 1970s with the adoption of limited proportional representation in both legislatures and municipal councils and with formal recognition of semiautonomous organizations, hybridization continues, marked by the formal recognition of indigenous identities in Oaxaca and the Ley Bartlett in Puebla. The strengthening of the subnational bureaucracy in both states at the expense of the former hegemonic party facilitates the electoral transition while keeping effective mediation channels in the hands of the subnational government.

In Oaxaca, neocorporatism appears to bear good results. On the one hand, it was an important instrument in securing the allegiance of the semiautonomous organizations that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. On the other, it allowed the teachers to consolidate their intermediary position between rural communities—whose traditional authorities are now formally recognized—and the subnational government. However, in the aftermath of the 2006 crisis, the SNTE's local section found itself formally

split in two in face of the subnational government's tough negotiating tactics, thus limiting its mobilizing potential.

In Puebla, on the contrary, the state government consciously marginalized the corporatist structure while giving increased clout to the state's territorial structure. The Poblano PRI's municipal committees became an instrument of power-sharing and a key element in overseeing the integration of local politics into the overarching subnational power structure.

The differentiated evolution of the Oaxacan and Poblano PRI reflects both the plasticity of illiberal structures and practices and the rising importance of subnational politics in Mexico. As the federal PRI lost the initiative and was ousted from power in 2000, the *priísta* governors took over responsibility for leading the party. From being a channel of federal intervention in subnational politics, the PRI evolved to serving as a subnational instrument at the federal level (Hernández Rodríguez 2008).

The personal features of key governors are partly responsible for this differentiated outcome. Although Heladio Ramírez López stemmed from the PRI's corporatist structure and continued to rely extensively on his experience with it, Manuel Bartlett was a seasoned technocrat much more at ease with territorial than with corporatist modes of mobilization and representation. These personal differences later became institutionalized and further differentiated Puebla and Oaxaca.

In both cases, hybridization allowed for a gradual opening without calling either the domination system or its authoritarian character into question. Moreover, the crises did not stop this process, as shown by the adoption of the Oaxacan freedom of information law and the meticulously observed electoral calendar, thus highlighting both change and continuity in subnational governance.

In this context, elections became the only alternative to subnational authoritarian renewal. In order to win them, the opposition brought together broad coalitions in both Puebla and Oaxaca, ranging from the rightist PAN to the left-of-center PRD and Convergencia. Although their success bespeaks the degree of electoral opening achieved by the subnational authoritarian enclaves, the fact that only a gubernatorial election is capable of eliciting some form of change underscores the limited responsiveness of the subnational political system. Moreover, the coalitions' capacity to bring about substantial political change, not to mention a change in the domination system, remains an open question even five years after alternation.

From a structural perspective, Oaxaca and Puebla remain extremely heterogeneous societies. In Oaxaca, two distinct legitimacy logics remain operational and easily identifiable. In Puebla, intense industrialization and urbanization, coupled with active social organization, did not significantly reduce the state's heterogeneity but rather fostered neopluralism. Albeit active and numerous, Poblano and Oaxacan social organizations remain inward-looking and shun open confrontation with the subnational government. Moreover, during the 2006 crises, the business elite and even some rural organizations ratified their neopatrimonial alliance with the incumbent political elite.

Consequently, the need for a mediator to guarantee subnational governance has not disappeared in either state. The fact that, even before the 2010 elections, the dominant intermediary was no longer the PRI but the subnational bureaucracy guaranteed a relatively smooth transition in this respect. The role of regional governance guarantor that Mexican federalism assigns to subnational governments (Durazo Herrmann 2009) further contributes to boundary control. This situation has not changed under the new governments.

To conclude, the existence of subnational authoritarian enclaves in Puebla and Oaxaca up to 2010 was the result of a long hybridization process based on the neopatrimonial character of these societies. As these two cases show, although the domination system itself is rather stable, the regimes it has given rise to are not. In Oaxaca there have been several cycles of violent contestation since 1946—the one involving the APPO representing only the most recent one. In Puebla, Avilacamachismo ran the full *cacicazgo* cycle by 1972 and then gave place to a limited but significant opening, only to cede to renewed political closure in the 1990s. In both cases, the contingent political intermediary is called into question—not the domination system itself.

Media attention, the effects of federal demonstrations, and new electoral legislation all increased the already high costs of coalition maintenance under hybrid neopatrimonialism. The bases of neopatrimonialism in Oaxaca and Puebla today appear rather weak—especially the political intermediation monopoly, battered by the defeat of the PRI, the decline of the traditional state–corporatist network, and the emergence of active and semiautonomous organizations. Nevertheless, the need to build these coalitions is unlikely to disappear—or even subside—as the new governments juggle their members' diverging expectations and preferences in order to remain in power. The difficulties these new governments face in effectively integrating social organizations into policy design and execution are also inauspicious.

In Oaxaca and Puebla, social transformation and economic modernization had relatively little effect on heterogeneity, whereas neopluralism actually increased with hybridization and the emergence and consolidation of effective formal democratic procedures. Consequently, these subnational authoritarian enclaves were fragile regimes; they failed to secure the necessary allegiance from a majority of actors and simultaneously underscored the instability of the political environment. Their resorting to high levels of political violence in recent years further indicates the fragility of their sources of legitimacy.

It is thus unclear in what direction the new governments are going. Although a complete collapse of the opposition coalition appears a remote possibility, the return of the authoritarian elite in the 2016 gubernatorial elections cannot be ruled out at this time. And, if the coalitions do survive, they might represent a simple rotation in personnel with little effect on the underlying domination systems, because heterogeneity and the need for intermediation have not disappeared.

The federation also casts a shadow over the future of neopatrimonial regimes in Puebla and Oaxaca. Fiscal federalism and its resources allowed both subnational governments to renew the clientelistic pact and to strengthen subnational state capacity. This flow continues under the new governments, but it is not permanently guaranteed because it depends on both the country's economic conditions and federal goodwill (Sobarzo 2005). Without these resources, the political elites in Oaxaca and Puebla cannot hope to preserve or renew a mediation monopoly.

Should instability again overtake Puebla or Oaxaca, the Mexican federation will likely intervene. Nevertheless, as the 2006 crises show, the federation is reluctant to dismiss a subnational government if no immediate credible alternative exists. In those cases, the federation chose to support the incumbent subnational elite, however authoritarian, rather than risk extended governance problems in the state. Consequently, subnational regime change appears impossible if long-term dynamics of subnational domination militate against it.

In the current circumstances, it appears that for any stable regime to appear, profound social change is necessary. Although this is unlikely to happen in the short term, given the magnitude of the challenge, Puebla and Oaxaca are not static societies, and, as recent elections show, they are already experiencing profound transformation, so the democratic "activation" of subnational illiberalism might take place in the near future (chapter 10 of this volume, by Whitehead and Behrend).

NOTE

1. The Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) was founded in 1989 as a coalition between the splinter left wing of the PRI and a number of leftist parties and social movements. It is Mexico's third-largest party. Convergencia, founded in 1996 by another splinter group from the PRI, is a small party in the Mexican political system. In 2011 it became Movimiento Ciudadano.

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PART III

RUSSIA and the BOUNDARIES of DEMOCRACY

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Subnational Democratization and Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia

From Subnational Regime Diversity to Unitary Authoritarianism

INGA A.-L. SAIKKONEN

The end of the Cold War saw a significant increase in the number of democracies in the world but also the proliferation of "electoral authoritarian" systems, that is, regimes that combine "formal democratic institutions . . . with authoritarian practices" (Schedler 2006, 1). Similarly, democratization in many federal states was accompanied by the emergence of a variety of political systems at the subnational level, ranging from (electoral) democracies to subnational authoritarian regimes.[1] This was particularly noticeable in Russia, where the transition from communism and the introduction of subnational elections resulted in the emergence of a mixture of subnational political regimes in the eighty-nine subnational units ("regions").[2] The subnational executive ("gubernatorial") elections, which were held in most of the regions between the mid-1990s and 2005,[3] resulted in a range of outcomes, from reasonably democratic subnational regimes such as that in St. Petersburg city to the consolidation of hegemonic authoritarian regimes such as that in Orel Oblast under Governor Egor Stroev.

This chapter highlights the great diversity in the subnational political regimes that emerged in Russia in the 1990s and 2000s. The chapter also examines the gradual demise of this subnational political diversity and the co-optation of subnational regimes into an increasingly unitary and authoritarian federal regime under President Vladimir Putin in the latter half of the 2000s. The analysis is based on the electoral authoritarianism framework (see, for example, Levitsky and Way 2010, Schedler 2013), which is especially well suited for operationalizing and examining subnational nondemocratic regimes. Subnational electoral authoritarian regimes are not "traditional" authoritarian regimes (Behrend 2010; Gervasoni 2010) but

rather electoral regimes in which formal democratic institutions are undermined by electoral manipulation and incumbent advantage. The electoral authoritarianism conceptual framework also highlights the "illiberal structures and practices" used in such regimes—the informal means by which the formal democratic institutions are subverted.[4]

In this chapter I first operationalize Russian subnational regimes between 1991 and 2005, drawing on a cross-national post–Cold War classification of political regimes (Howard and Roessler 2006). Most of the Russian subnational cases can be classified as electoral authoritarian, but a small number of cases meet the minimum criteria for electoral democracy. I then examine various structural differences between the regime types. The electoral democratic regimes differ from the electoral authoritarian cases in a variety of indicators associated with socioeconomic modernization. On the whole, the electoral democratic regimes are more industrialized and urbanized and have a larger share of highly educated populations. Yet the regimes considered "democratic leaders" made up only a small minority of the Russian subnational cases, and I move on to accounting for differences between subnational electoral authoritarian regimes. The findings of a series of multilevel models suggest that authoritarian stability at the Russian subnational level appears to be associated with several structural variables, such as natural resource rents and institutionalised ethnicity, but not with the specificities of the Russian federal context as such.

The broader democratization literature has only recently begun to pay attention to the divergence in subnational transition outcomes. However, students of Russian politics have studied the variation in subnational economic and political regimes since the early 1990s, producing a theoretically and empirically rich literature that this chapter builds on.[5] This literature has also laudably linked the growth of Russian subnational authoritarianism with Russian democratic regression in the 2000s.[6] The last part of the chapter outlines how, instead of seeking to democratize the subnational electoral authoritarian regimes, the Kremlin sought to integrate them into the federal "power vertical" from the mid-2000s onward. The co-opted Russian subnational authoritarian regimes became central in delivering votes to the federal regime in both presidential and parliamentary elections. Thus the story of Russian democratic regression cannot be told without understanding the development of subnational electoral authoritarianism in the 1990s and 2000s.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the electoral authoritarianism framework and discusses differences between electoral democratic and electoral authoritarian regimes, which are delineated empirically in the third section. The fourth section outlines the results of the regime type classification and illustrates the regime types with examples of Russian subnational cases. The section following that compares the Russian subnational electoral democratic and electoral authoritarian cases by means of a host of indicators associated with democratization and socioeconomic development. The chapter then moves on to examining differences within the nondemocratic regimes and accounting for variation in electoral competition between the Russian subnational electoral authoritarian regimes. The final section outlines how the subnational variation in regime types in Russia was gradually replaced by an increasingly unitary state system and how the subnational electoral authoritarian regimes were co-opted by the national-level authoritarian regime. The last section is a conclusion.

Theoretical Framework: Electoral Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism

Several works have highlighted the rise of electoral authoritarian regimes in the post–Cold War era.[7] The theoretical framework for electoral authoritarianism is notably well suited to the conceptualization of subnational authoritarian regimes. Electoral authoritarian regimes possess (formally) democratic institutions, such as multicandidate elections, but "subvert them in practice through severe, widespread, and systematic manipulation" (Schedler 2013, 2). The notion of electoral authoritarianism also fits well into the broader category of subnational illiberal structures and practices put forward by Laurence Whitehead and Jacqueline Behrend.[8] The illiberal practices that (electoral) authoritarian incumbents employ to avoid losing elections are notably *informal*.[9] Instead of canceling elections, subnational (and national) electoral authoritarian incumbents seek to contain the "electoral threat" by a variety of informal means, such as electoral manipulation, patronage politics, and opposition subversion.

The conceptual difference between electoral democratic regimes and electoral authoritarian regimes focuses on the integrity of the electoral process. According to Levitsky and Way (2010, 7, authors' emphasis): "In democracies, elections are *free*, in the sense that there is virtually no fraud or intimidation of voters, and *fair*, in the sense that opposition parties campaign

on relatively even footing: They are not subject to repression or harassment, and they are not systematically denied access to the media or other critical resources." This does not mean that free and fair elections are all that is required for democratic "consolidation."[10] However, as Roessler and Howard (2009, 107) argue, "Democracy cannot be less than free and fair elections." Systematic electoral manipulation deprives elections of democratic substance (Schedler 2006 and 2013)—that is, the function of elections as a delegation mechanism between the citizens and the politicians is undermined. Regimes in which electoral manipulation is so severe that it breaks the linkage between popular preferences and electoral outcomes should thus not be considered democracies but rather electoral authoritarian regimes.

The existence of formal democratic institutions distinguishes electoral authoritarian regimes from traditional (or "closed") authoritarian regimes (Schedler 2006). Electoral authoritarian regimes hold regular elections for the selection of the government. Despite electoral corruption, elections are not meaningless in electoral authoritarian regimes, because they shape the "game for access to power" between the elites. First, unlike in closed autocracies, elections determine who governs, and elites invest considerable resources to either attain or remain in power through elections. Second, multiparty elections also make elite defections less costly than in traditional dictatorships, because multiparty elections provide potential regime opposition with a regular, and relatively low-cost, "exit option" (Geddes 2005, Magaloni 2006). Different types of electoral authoritarian regimes can be distinguished by the uncertainty and competition that elections generate in the regimes. Competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by contested elections in which the incumbent may lose (Roessler and Howard 2009). These regimes can be thought of more as cases of "authoritarian failure" (Way 2006) than as cases of substantive democratization. Competitive authoritarian regimes are contrasted with hegemonic authoritarian regimes. Elections in hegemonic authoritarian regimes result in the incumbent candidate or party's losing very rarely, and these regimes often develop into "a de facto one-party state" (Roessler and Howard 2009).

Categorizing Electoral Democratic and Electoral Authoritarian Regimes at the Russian Subnational Level

Several cross-national studies have developed categorization schemes for electoral democratic and electoral authoritarian regimes using both comparative democratization indicators (from Freedom House and Polity) and

electoral data on regime type operationalization (from Schedler 2004; Howard and Roessler 2006; Brownlee 2009; Roessler and Howard 2009; and Schedler 2013). Here the Russian subnational political regimes are classified on the basis of a post–Cold War regime categorization scheme developed by Marc Morje Howard and Philip Roessler (Howard and Roessler 2006).[11] These authors use a two-tier process to code post–Cold War electoral democratic and competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes globally.[12] First, electoral democratic regimes are demarcated from the electoral authoritarian regimes by cutoff points in the Freedom House and Polity scores. Second, a cutoff point of 70 percent of the votes for the winning candidate is used to delineate competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes.

Although the conceptual differences between electoral democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes are fairly clear, locating the empirical "boundary" between the regime types is challenging and bound to be controversial (as are all dichotomous regime operationalizations).[13] Global regime indexes of democracy versus authoritarianism, such as those of Freedom House or Polity, do not code subnational units. However, fortunately for students of Russian subnational politics, a set of indicators following the Freedom House Nations in Transit methodology has been developed for the Russian regions. The Index of Democracy is an expert rating of Russian regions compiled by Moscow Carnegie Center scholars Nikolai Petrov and Alexey Titkov (n.d.).[14] It is a continuous measure of "democratization" measured on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being the least democratic, 5 the most). The authors present two possible cutoff points for "democratic" regimes: 37 (for "moderately democratic" cases) and 40 (for "democratic leaders") (Petrov 2004). The index includes ten subscores, of which two indicators, economic liberalization and corruption, are not traditionally included in conventional operationalizations of democracy,[15] and two indicators, political regime and local self-administration, that are more related to the exercise of power than to the access to power in political regimes.[16] Therefore the index was recalculated to include the scores for six subindicators (the openness of political life, free and fair elections, political pluralism, media freedom, civil society, and elite relations) using the published disaggregated scores for 2000–2004.[17] This makes the highest possible score of the index 30. The cutoff point for coding electoral democratic regimes was readjusted to 24. Regimes were coded from one election to the next. Thus elections in a region that received a score of 24 in the recalculated Index of Democracy were categorized as electoral democratic.

In order to classify the remaining electoral authoritarian regimes, a 70 percent cutoff point in the first-round election results is used to delineate competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes. The operationalization focuses on the differences in electoral competitiveness between the regions, not necessarily on their degree of "authoritarianism." Howard and Roessler use both executive and legislative election data, but because most of the deputies in the Russian regional legislatures were nonpartisan,[18] only executive election data can be used here. The categorization is based on Russian regional gubernatorial election data between 1991 and 2005, with 241 observations from 87 regions.[19] Hegemonic authoritarian regimes were categorised as those that scored less than 24 in the recalculated Index of Democracy between 1991 and 2005 and in which the first-round winner in the regional executive elections received more than 70 percent of the votes.[20] Although this categorization does not distinguish whether the winners with more than 70 percent of the votes were incumbents or opposition candidates, 94.5 percent of the "hegemonic" winners were incumbents. The competitive authoritarian regimes were coded as those with a score of less than 24 in the Index of Democracy and fewer than 70 percent of the votes for the winner in the first-round gubernatorial elections.

Electoral Democratic and Electoral Authoritarian Regimes at the Russian Subnational Level between 1991 and 2005

The results of the regime classification follow. The majority of the Russian subnational regimes can be classified as competitive authoritarian (making up around 67.6 percent of the cases), with contested but not fully free and fair elections. Hegemonic authoritarian cases are considerably rarer (22.8 percent of the total). The electoral democratic regimes form the smallest regime type in the set of cases (9.5 percent of the cases). There are no clear patterns of regime distribution between different Russian region types or geographical areas, as can be seen in Figure 9.1. The electoral democratic regimes are mostly situated in ethnically Russian oblasts and krays (Nizhniy Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Perm, Samara, and Sverdlovsk Oblasts and Krasnoyarsk Kray), in one federal city (St. Petersburg), and in one republic (Kareliya). Hegemonic authoritarian regimes are not located solely in titular republics but can be found both in ethnically Russian oblasts and krays as well as in the titular republics and okrugs/oblast (AOs), including two cases in Moscow Federal City, in 1991 and 1999. Competitive authoritarian cases can be found in all the region types.




Figure 9.1. Percent of regimes of various types, by Russian region type. AO = autonomous okrug/oblast; CA = competitive authoritarian; ED = electoral democratic; FC = federal city; HA = hegemonic authoritarian.

The rather abstract regime categories can be illustrated with a few examples from the subnational cases. Electoral democracies are not "perfect" democracies but nevertheless hold contested and reasonably free and fair elections. The freedom and fairness of elections are supported by developed political parties, an active civil society, and an independent mass media. St. Petersburg was ranked as one of the democratic "leaders" among the Russian regions in the 1990s (Titkov and Mukhin 1998). Politics in St. Petersburg was characterized by high levels of civil society activity and strong political parties in the 1990s and early 2000s (Titkov and Mukhin 1998; Hahn 2004). Mayoral elections, held between 1991 and 2003, resulted in two incumbent turnovers in the city. On the whole, opposition had a reasonably good chance to contest both the mayoral and the legislative elections, and media and civil society space remained reasonably free, at least until 2003.[21]

In contrast, although elections can be strongly contested in competitive authoritarian regimes, the electoral "playing field" is tilted against the opposition. Successive gubernatorial elections in Pskov Oblast illustrate the dynamics of Russian subnational competitive authoritarian regimes. The incumbent governor, Evgeniy Mikhailov, had come to power in the 1996

"founding" elections and sought to subordinate the regional media and gain control of regional sources of revenue.[22] In the 2000 elections Mikhailov was opposed by several prominent regional politicians and businessmen. The survival of the governor in the elections was widely attributed to the change of electoral legislation preceding the elections (Kostikov and Golubev 2004). The gubernatorial electoral system was changed in the incumbent's favor so that in order to win a candidate needed to gain only 25 percent of the votes in the first round instead of an absolute majority as required previously (Kozhin 2000; Tsygankov 2000). Yet Mikhailov was unable to consolidate his power in the region and was challenged in the 2004 elections by the popular mayor of Pskov city, Mikhail Khoronen. In a typical case of electoral authoritarian "exclusionary strategies" (Schedler 2013, chap. 7), Khoronen was removed from the ballot by the regional electoral commission (Golubev 2004). Even though his strongest opponent was excluded from the elections, the incumbent Mikhailov lost the 2004 gubernatorial elections in the second round (Kamyshev 2004).

Hegemonic authoritarian regimes feature very little electoral contestation or uncertainty. Political developments in Orel Oblast illustrate regime change from an initially competitive situation to a politically hegemonic regime. After coming to power in 1993 in relatively competitive elections, the incumbent governor, Egor Stroev, consolidated his power over the region.[23] Stroev won two successive gubernatorial elections in 1997 and 2001, with 93.6 percent and 91.5 percent of the votes, respectively. In the 2001 elections Stroev was supported by a broad spectrum of political forces: the communists and the pro-Kremlin Unity party, as well as all the major business enterprises in the region (Orlov 2001). President Putin reappointed Stroev as the region's governor in 2005, and he remained governor until 2009.

Comparing Russian Subnational Electoral Democratic and Electoral Authoritarian Regimes

The examples just given illustrated the considerable variation between the subnational regime types that emerged at the Russian regional level. On the whole, a small number of electoral democratic regimes emerged, whereas most of the regions developed electoral authoritarian political systems. How do the Russian subnational electoral democratic cases differ from those of the electoral authoritarian regimes?

Variations of "modernization theory" have argued that wealthy countries are more likely to be democracies and that several socioeconomic

characteristics, such as industrialization, urbanization, and higher education, are associated with democratization.[24] Studies on Russia have also found regional democratization to be associated with socioeconomic development.[25] Table 9.1 compares the mean values of several socioeconomic indicators that are associated with socioeconomic modernization between the Russian subnational electoral democratic and electoral authoritarian regimes.[26] On the whole, the table suggests that there are sizable differences between the regime types. For example, on average, the share of the urban population in the electoral democratic regimes is 16 percentage points higher than in the electoral authoritarian regimes. The electoral democratic regimes are also, on average, more industrialized and have a larger share of educated population. All of these differences are highly statistically significant, as suggested by the *t*-tests performed (the last two columns in table 9.1). Russia's capital, Moscow city, is somewhat of an outlier to this pattern. Despite being totally urban and one of the wealthiest regions in Russia, Moscow developed into a hegemonic authoritarian regime in the 1990s under the long-serving mayor Yuri Luzhkov (Brie 2004). When it comes to differences in regional wealth between the regime types, the mean monthly income per capita is higher in electoral democratic regimes, but the difference is not statistically significant. This may be related to the fact a number of wealthy, natural resource–rich regions, such as Khanty-Mansi AO, developed into electoral authoritarian regimes.

Various case studies on the electoral democratic regimes have noted how political parties and civil society have been much more developed in these regimes than in the rest of the Russian regions (Gel'man and Golosov 1998; Titkov and Mukhin 1998). The regime types also differ in aggregate political preferences, and liberal opposition parties, such as Yabloko or the Union of Right Forces (SPS), tended to receive higher shares of votes in the electoral democratic regimes than in the rest of the regions. As shown on table 9.1, the combined vote share of Yabloko and SPS in the 1999 elections for the Duma (the lower house of Russia's legislature) was around 10 percentage points higher in the electoral democratic cases than in the rest of the regions.[27] Robust political party and civil society development may explain why contentious politics in these regions did not become as marred by electoral manipulation as in the competitive authoritarian cases.

The electoral democratic regimes thus appear to differ from the electoral authoritarian cases in a host of socioeconomic structural variables and also in terms of political party development and aggregate political preferences.

TABLE 9.1.
Modernization indicators and aggregate political preferences by Russian subnational regime type

	Electoral democratic regimes		
Indicators	Observations	Mean	SD
Modernization indicators			
Industrial production	23	115,545.00	59,380.08
Urbanization	23	81.49	9.75
Higher education	23	321.65	147.88
Monthly income per capita	23	2,232.26	407.74
Opposition party support			
Yabloko and Union of Right Forces vote in 1999	23	21.74	4.20

Sources: Goskomstat (various years); Mercator and IGRAN (2007).

The next section moves our focus to variation within Russian subnational electoral authoritarian regimes and accounts for the differences in electoral competition levels between the regimes.

Accounting for Differences in Russian Subnational Hegemonic and Competitive Authoritarian Regimes

Although electoral authoritarian regimes make up the majority of Russian subnational regimes, there are considerable differences in electoral competitiveness in the nondemocratic regime group. What accounts for this variation?

One of the leading works on electoral authoritarianism, the study by Levitsky and Way (2010), links electoral authoritarian regime stability to incumbents' capacity to withstand opposition challenges. Incumbent capacity can be operationalized along two dimensions, the degree of cohesion within the state and the state's infrastructural capacity and coercive scope.

In Levistky and Way's largely structural account, a state's administrative cohesion can be rooted in several factors, such as shared nonmaterial ties between the ruling elites (e.g., a common ethnicity) or institutionalized ruling parties. When such ties are absent, an incumbent regime's control of state economic resources (such as natural resource rents) can account for its ability to withstand opposition challenges. Some of these factors are more applicable to the Russian subnational context than others. Russian regions generally lacked institutionalized mass parties, and most governors contested elections as nonpartisans.[28] In contrast, Russian regions vary highly in their degree of natural resource concentration and in their share of minority ethnic population, which could account for greater degrees of regime cohesion in some cases.

Electoral authoritarian regimes			*t*-test (difference in means)	$p > \|t\|$
Observations	Mean	SD		
218	44,293.08	68,684.16	4.788	0.000
218	65.47	16.49	4.570	0.000
200	207.58	107.36	4.624	0.000
218	1991.23	1,469.63	0.782	0.435
218	11.76	4.69	9.801	0.000

Many cross-national studies have associated natural resource–based economies with stable authoritarianism,[29] and Levitsky and Way argue that natural resources are particularly amenable to authoritarian control of state economic resources. Natural resource rents have also been found to reduce electoral competition at the subnational level.[30] Russian regions differ markedly in their resource concentration, and natural resource extraction makes up the largest source of industrial production in many regions, such as Tyumen Oblast. Therefore it would be plausible to expect natural resource rents to be associated with reduced political competition in the Russian regions as well. In the models discussed below, natural resource concentration is operationalized by the variable "Nat Res," which measures the share of natural resources (oil, gas, coal, and metals)[31] in a region's industrial production and is derived from Goskomstat Rossi (various years) statistics.

Levitsky and Way (2010) highlight a shared ethnic background as one of the drivers of elite cohesion and state capacity. The Russian Federation is a multiethnic state, and the Russian regions vary widely in terms of their share of non-Russian minority population. Previous literature on Russia has associated greater shares of regional non-Russian population with the propensity for electoral fraud and less democratic politics (Myagkov, Ordeshook, et al. 2009; Reisinger and Moraski 2010; Goodnow, Moser, et al. 2014). Based on previous research, variations in ethnic minority concentration could be expected to have an effect on political regime hegemonization. This is tested with a variable measuring the share of non-Russian population per region ("Non Rus"), which comes from the 2002 Russian census.

The effect of ethnicity on regional politics could also be conditioned by the Soviet ethno-federal legacies. The Soviet regime institutionalized ethnicity in complex ways, and the Russian Federation inherited a hierarchical ethno-federal structure of different tiers of "titular" ethnic units, such as the titular republics and AOs (Gorenburg 2003). Scholars have argued that the Soviet institutionalization of ethnicity created fertile conditions for the emergence of ethnic "political machines" in the titular regions (Hale 2003 and 2007). Therefore, the effect of ethnicity on political outcomes could be moderated by titular region status. To test this expectation, the models include an interaction term between titular region status (titular republic or AO) and the share of non-Russian ethnicity in a region. The expectation is that the coefficient is positive.

In Levitsky and Way's (2010) account, incumbent capacity also rests on a state's coercive scope. The extent to which the control over state coercive powers (such as the police) is allocated between the federal and subnational levels varies between federations (Taylor 2011, chap. 4). In the Russian case, the federal state retained control over arguably the most powerful instruments of coercion, the Federal Security Service (FSB) (Taylor 2011, chap. 4). However, in some regions the regional elites colluded with the regional police forces, because the regional elites were able to supplement the meager pay of the federal officials with various benefits (Taylor 2011, 125). Thus the degree of informal control over the regional coercive structures was rooted in regional wealth. Levitsky and Way (2010) also link state coercive capacity and administrative cohesion to a state's fiscal capacity. If this had allowed some governors to subvert electoral competition, we should see fewer competitive elections in wealthier regions. In the models discussed below, regional wealth is operationalized by the regional monthly income per capita variable from 2000 (logged), which comes from Goskomstat Rossi (various years) regional statistics.[32]

The Russian subnational political regimes are "nested" within a federation, and variations in the Russian federal context need to also be taken into account in the models. The Russian federal regime was, especially in the 1990s, highly asymmetrical, and there were great differences in the institutional and political autonomy of the regions. The twenty-one "titular republics" were constitutionally privileged under the Soviet regime. Despite formal constitutional equality among the regions after 1993, the titular republics continued to retain much autonomy in institutional building and political development. The AOs retained less constitutional autonomy after the col-

lapse of the USSR, but all titular regions enjoyed some levels of institutional privileging under the Soviet Union. Thus the models control for variations in administrative status between titular and nontitular regions by a dummy variable denoting titular republic / AO status (coded "1").

Another factor that contributed to Russian asymmetrical federalism and gave some regions more autonomy over their internal affairs was Boris Yeltsin's "bargaining" approach to managing federal relations in the 1990s. To clarify the separation of the powers between the center and the regions, the federal and regional executives signed forty-six "extraconstitutional" bilateral treaties that regulated areas such as taxation, control over natural resources, and cultural and linguistic policies (Kahn 2002; Söderlund 2006; Kahn, Trochev, et al. 2009). To account for this federal asymmetry, the models control for whether the region had signed a bilateral treaty (coded "1").[33] The Russian federal regime also changed markedly under President Putin in the 2000s. The new federal administration sought to recentralize the Russian administrative and fiscal regimes and take away some of the powers that the regional executives had exercised at the federal level. Therefore the models also include a control for the Yeltsin and Putin eras (the variable is coded "1" under Putin).

The expectations that electoral authoritarian stability would be associated with natural resource rents, regional wealth, minority ethnicity concentration, or institutionalised ethnicity are tested with a set of 218 Russian electoral authoritarian regimes that were separated from the electoral democratic regimes as described earlier. Electoral competitiveness is operationalized by the margin of victory, that is, the difference in vote share between the winner and the runner-up in the first round of voting, which is widely used in the extant literature.[34] The analysis is run with linear multilevel (random-intercept) models to take into account of the panel nature of the data.[35] The results are presented in table 9.2, with Model 1 being a full model and Models 2 and 3 presenting two alternative specifications.

The results from Model 1 suggest that the structure of the regional economy plays a role in electoral authoritarian regime hegemonization. The coefficient for the share of natural resources is positive, of substantive size, and statistically significant, suggesting that natural resource rents are associated with higher margins of victory, that is, less competitive gubernatorial elections. Based on Model 1, it can be estimated that as the share of natural resources in a region's industrial production increases from the mean to the maximum value, the margin of victory grows by more than 16 percentage

TABLE 9.2
Determinants of Russian subnational electoral authoritarian regime competitiveness

Determinants	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Nat Res	0.231**	0.244**	0.226**
	(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.104)
MonInc(log)	4.889	8.069	6.559
	(5.091)	(5.145)	(5.164)
Non Rus	0.182	−0.674	
	(0.172)	(0.420)	
Titul Reg	−4.165	−23.12**	
	(8.228)	(11.67)	
Treaty	−1.594	0.226	−1.945
	(4.445)	(4.402)	(4.376)
Fed Context	4.477	4.849	4.631
	(3.033)	(3.030)	(3.032)
TitulReg*NonRus		1.047**	
		(0.470)	
MajMinRegion			11.73*
			(6.257)
Constant	−8.996	−24.79	−19.99
	(37.35)	(36.97)	(37.54)
lns1_1_1Constant	2.653***	2.603***	2.633***
	(0.156)	(0.163)	(0.159)
lnsig_e Constant	3.077***	3.075***	3.076***
	(0.0598)	(0.0596)	(0.0598)
N elections	218	218	218
N regions	79	79	79
BIC	2,069.9	2,070.5	2,062.6

Sources: see text.
Note: For explanations of the determinant variables and measurements, see text. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$.
** $p < 0.05$.
*** $p < 0.01$.

points. All the coefficients for regional wealth and the share of non-Russian population have the expected signs, they are not statistically significant in this model. It is also noteworthy that none of the control variables accounting for asymmetries and differences in the Russian federal regime attain statistical significance in any of the models.[36]

Model 2 tests the expectation that the effect of minority ethnicity on authoritarian competitiveness would be moderated by the titular region status. The interaction term between an ethnic region (titular republic and AO) and the share of non-Russian population is positive and statistically significant in this model. This suggests that the effect of minority ethnicity on electoral competitiveness would be greater in titular regions than in the

rest of the regions, supporting the theory of the emergence of "machine politics" in ethnic regions (Hale 2003 and 2007). Model 3 tests whether the concentration of minority ethnicity would play a role in authoritarian stability, with a dummy variable measuring whether the region has a majority non-Russian population (coded on the basis of the census data). The coefficient for the dummy variable is positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level, suggesting that the margin of victory in regions with a majority ethnic minority population would be, on average, nearly 12 percentage points higher than in other regions.

On the whole, the results suggest that Russian subnational electoral authoritarian stability is associated with structural characteristics inherent to the regions, such as natural resource rents and ethnic political machines, and has less to do with structural variables related to Russian federal structure, such as the institutional and political asymmetry among the regions.

There are naturally limitations to this enquiry, which focused heavily on structural variation among the Russian regions. The analysis paid little attention to the role of agency and elite relations, which have been central in the more strategic accounts of authoritarian politics (Magaloni 2006).[37] Thus further work is needed to probe the effects of Russian regional elite relations on political regime development and hegemonic authoritarian consolidation.[38]

The Co-optation of Subnational Authoritarian Regimes and the Stabilization of the Federal Authoritarian Regime in Russia

This chapter has tracked the variation in subnational authoritarianism in Russia in the 1990s and 2000s. Why should we pay attention to subnational regime developments that occurred in Russia more than ten years ago? The short answer is that understanding the development of subnational authoritarianism in Russia is crucial for comprehending Russia's democratic regression in the 2000s. The regional electoral authoritarian regimes that consolidated in the late 1990s and early 2000s form the backbone of the current Russian authoritarian regime.

The fiscal and administrative weakness of the Russian central state that resulted from the difficult transition from the Soviet system led to the formation of diverse and relatively autonomous subnational political regimes in the 1990s and 2000s. The central state accorded the regional political elites rather a lot of autonomy in their internal political affairs in return for noninterference in national-level politics.[39] From the mid-2000s onward this diversity, however, gradually disappeared, and the regional political

regimes were merged into an increasingly unitary and authoritarian political system. In contrast with democratic federations, such as Argentina and the United States, where democratic political parties or the (progressive) federal executive sought to dismantle the regional "authoritarian enclaves" (Gibson 2013), the Russian federal regime sought to co-opt the regional authoritarian regimes into the federal "power vertical." As Vladimir Gel'man has noted, the mechanisms that led to the integration of regional authoritarianism into the federal authoritarian regime resembled the "boundary-dismantling" mechanisms identified by Edward Gibson in democratizing federations (Gel'man 2010; Gibson 2013). In Russia, too, the process was advanced through the state and a political party, but the outcome—federal authoritarianism—was the polar opposite of the nationwide democratization that occurred in Argentina and the United States.[40] The state- and party-led processes that took place in Russia are now outlined.

The Russian subnational regimes were integrated into the federal power vertical through both state-led administrative reform and the co-optation of the gubernatorial corpus into the new "party of power," United Russia. President Putin came to power in the 2000s with the aim of recentralizing the federal administration and increasing central state capacity. The initial federal reforms encompassed the revision of the bilateral treaties, the recentralization of federal control over the state coercive agencies located in the regions through the creation of seven (later eight) federal districts, and the curtailment of regional influence on federal policy-making through the reform of the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian legislature). These initial reforms focused more on recentralizing federal powers and limiting the regional executives' influence on federal policy-making than on dismantling regional authoritarian regimes per se. According to some scholars, the powers of the regional governors actually increased in "their" regions after these reforms.[41] However, the trend toward greater administrative hierarchy culminated in the abolition of the gubernatorial elections in 2004. The last gubernatorial elections were held in 2005, and the governors were subsequently nominated by the federal president. Even though most of the governors continued to be reappointed to their posts (Goode 2007), their positions vis-à-vis the federal center had obviously fundamentally changed. Instead of trying to ensure their political survival by winning consecutive elections, the governors now relied on the federal center for their re-appointment. Moreover, by the mid-2000s the federal fiscal reforms

and economic growth had strengthened the position of the federal center vis-à-vis the regional elites (Reuter and Remington 2009).

The state-led subversion of the regional regimes was accompanied by the co-optation of the gubernatorial "political machines" into the United Russia party and the federal "electoral machine." The 1999 elections to the Duma demonstrated the importance of gubernatorial political machines in delivering votes in federal elections. Two regional party blocs that were created by powerful heads of hegemonic authoritarian subnational regimes, Yuri Luzhkov of Moscow and Mintimer Shaimiev of Tatarstan, were merged into the Fatherland–All Russia party (OVR) in 1999. Although the OVR lost to the Kremlin-backed "party of power," the Unity party, in the 1999 Duma elections, the OVR's party-list vote demonstrated the ability of the gubernatorial political machines to mobilize votes for the party.[42] This made incorporating the powerful gubernatorial political machines necessary for the Kremlin in order to win the 2003 Duma elections (Reuter and Remington 2009). In 2001, the OVR and the Kremlin-backed Unity party were merged into a new party of power, United Russia, and from 2003 onward the Kremlin started to increase its efforts to co-opt the Russian governors into the federal party machine (Reuter and Remington 2009).

By 2003 most of the Russian governors had joined the United Russia party. Grigorii Golosov (2013, 474–475) argues: "The relative success of United Russia in the 2003 national legislative elections was to a large extent a product of the efforts of governors who accepted political responsibility for the party's performance at the polls." The abolition of the gubernatorial elections in 2004 had made the governors hierarchically subordinate to the Kremlin, and the governors increasingly became responsible for delivering votes for the center. The tenure and re-appointments of the governors began to be dependent on mobilizing enough votes for the Kremlin's candidates in federal legislative and presidential elections (Reuter and Robertson 2012). Thus the current electoral (hyper–) incumbent advantage enjoyed by the Kremlin is very much rooted in the regional authoritarian political regimes that consolidated in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As Grigorii Golosov (2013, 475) notes: "The integration of regional political machines was a core component of the authoritarian turn in Russia."[43] Thus our appreciation of Russia's democratic regression in the 2000s is very much incomplete without understanding the development of Russian subnational authoritarianism in the 1990s and 2000s.

Conclusions

This chapter has outlined the substantial diversity in subnational political regimes in the Russian Federation in the 1990s and 2000s. The introduction of executive elections in Russia did not result in the democratization of most of the regions, even though the executive elections remained, on the whole, rather competitive in the 1990s and 2000s. The majority of the Russian regional political systems could be classified as electoral authoritarian regimes. Competitive authoritarian cases—with contested elections undermined by an outright incumbent advantage and manipulation—were the most prevalent electoral regime type in the Russian regions in the 1990s and 2000s. Hegemonic authoritarian regimes—characterized by restricted electoral competition—formed a smaller but politically distinct group of the regional political regimes, and a small number of cases can be classified as (subnational) electoral democracies. It is interesting to note that even with the increasing "hegemonization" of the Russian federal regime from the mid-2000s, federal presidential elections have still been more competitive than the hegemonic regional elections, which the incumbents frequently won with more than 80 or even 90 percent of the votes.

This chapter has also emphasized that the current Russian federal electoral authoritarian regime is rooted in the subnational electoral authoritarian regimes that formed in the 1990s and the early 2000s. The general electoral authoritarianism field has largely paid attention to elite-level politics and to the struggle between the incumbents and the opposition in elections. Yet authoritarian incumbents rely on local and subnational "agents" to "deliver" votes and to manipulate elections,[44] and thus the co-optation of subnational authoritarian structures is crucial for understanding electoral authoritarian dynamics. As the growing literature on subnational authoritarianism attests, the authoritarian illiberal structures and practices are very much local, subnational phenomena. Thus the broader electoral authoritarianism literature should pay more attention to "regional roots of (electoral) authoritarianism" (Golosov 2011) and the role of subnational political regimes in democratic regression.

Gubernatorial elections were reinstituted in Russia in 2012 as part of President Dmitry Medvedev's liberalizing reforms. The current elections are not directly comparable to those held before 2005, because candidate entry has been severely restricted due to administrative hurdles related to candidate registration.[45] Apart from the Moscow mayoral elections in September

2013 (in which the incumbent, Sergey Sobyanin, won against the opposition candidate, Alexey Navalniy), the post-2012 gubernatorial elections have not been much contested or very programmatic. Thus, so far the administrative control of the gubernatorial elections has kept them from threatening the Kremlin's "power vertical." Yet, as I have argued in this chapter, the compliance of the lower-level agents is crucial for the success of the Kremlin's party of power in future elections. We should thus continue to pay attention to Russian subnational politics.

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NOTES

1. See, for instance, Gibson (2013) and several contributions to this volume.
2. Between 1991 and 2005 the Russian Federation consisted of eighty-nine "subjects of the federation": twenty-one titular republics, six territories (*krays*), forty-nine regions (*oblasts*), one autonomous *oblast*, and ten autonomous districts (*okrugs*). These subnational units are commonly referred to as regions. The republics and autonomous okrugs/oblast (AOs) are ethnically defined regions. The oblasts and krays are mostly ethnically Russian. The two main cities of Russia, St. Petersburg and Moscow, form separate regions from their surrounding oblasts. Since 2005 some of the autonomous okrugs have been merged with their surrounding regions, resulting in eighty-three subnational units.
3. Subnational executive elections were held in the titular republics and the federal cities from 1991 onward and in some oblasts before 1996. However, in most of the regions the first gubernatorial elections took place around 1996. Gubernatorial elections were abolished in 2004, and the last elections were held in 2005. President Dmitry Medvedev reinstated the gubernatorial elections in 2012.
4. See the concluding chapter of this volume.
5. The literature is too vast to be adequately summed up here. For recent collections of the leading research in this area, see, for example, Gel'man and Ross (2010) and Reisinger (2013).
6. See, for example, Gel'man and Ross (2010) and Golosov (2013).

7. See, for example, Diamond (2002); Howard and Roessler (2006); Levitsky and Way (2010); and Schedler (2013). The main difference between the concepts *electoral authoritarianism* and *competitive authoritarianism* is empirical rather than theoretical. Both concepts describe electoral regimes in which elections are undermined by undemocratic practices. Although Levitsky and Way (2010) focus on the category of electorally competitive authoritarian regimes ("competitive authoritarianism"), the category "electoral authoritarianism" encompasses both electorally competitive and noncompetitive authoritarian regimes.

8. See the concluding chapter of this volume.

9. See Levitsky and Way (2010), Introduction. On the focus on (informal) authoritarian practices, see also Schedler (2013), Introduction.

10. See Linz and Stepan (1996) and Whitehead (2002) for discussion.

11. See also Roessler and Howard (2009).

12. There were no closed authoritarian regimes among the Russian subnational cases because in all regions apart from Dagestan executives were elected directly. Dagestan had a parliamentary regime, with the executive selected through the parliament. However, the regime was not closed authoritarian—that is, one in which the executive is selected by means other than elections. The data do not allow us to distinguish between electoral and liberal democratic regimes. Moreover, it is unlikely that subnational liberal democratic regimes would have emerged in a national regime that was not a liberal democracy.

13. As Andreas Schedler (2013, 102) argues: "Almost by definition, the border areas of electoral authoritarian regimes are neither simple nor clear-cut, but contain considerable ambiguities."

14. Thanks to the authors for sharing the data for 2005.

15. Many thanks to Carlos Gervasoni for drawing attention to this.

16. See, for example, Mazzuca (2010).

17. The scores for 1991–2001 and 2000–2004 are highly correlated ($r = 0.91$).

18. See, for example, Golosov (2004) and Hale (2006).

19. Two North Caucasus republics, Chechnya and Dagestan, are excluded from the data set. Chechnya was under military operations or effectively subjugated to the federal administration during much of the 1990s and 2000s. Dagestan had a complex parliamentary system and did not hold direct executive elections until 2006. The gubernatorial election data come from the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation (1997, 2001); McFaul and Petrov (1998); and the website of *Nezavisimiy institut vyborov*, which has electoral data and information about elections (accessed December 2007, www.vibory.ru).

20. Note that the winner of the first round is not always the eventual winner if the elections were decided in the second round. However, because the regime type operationalization is meant to differentiate between regimes in which the winner gains a "huge" margin in the first round (hegemonic authoritarian cases, in which the winner is clear already after the first round) and the cases in which the elections are competitive (competitive authoritarian cases), this is not a problem regarding the measurement validity of the indicator.

21. The fairness of the 2003 electoral contest between Kremlin-backed candidate Valentina Matviyenko and the deputy governor, Anna Markova, was undermined by declarations of support by federal state officials in favor of Matviyenko (see Hahn 2004) and accusations of electoral violations by both sides (see Maksimov, Tsyganov, et al. 2003).

22. See, for example, Slider (1999) and Tsygankov (2000).

23. Orel Oblast was one of the regions that held gubernatorial elections in 1993, after the regional soviet refused to confirm President Yeltsin's gubernatorial appointment (McFaul and Petrov 1998; Petrov, Titkov, et al. 1998).

24. For a causal account, see Lipset (1959). For a disaggregation and a discussion of different subcomponents of socioeconomic modernization, see Teorell (2010), chap. 3.

25. See, for example, Remington (2011).

26. The level of higher education is measured by the number of students in higher education per ten thousand inhabitants in the 1999–2000 academic year. The data for the volume of industrial production and the share of urban population are from 2000. Regional wealth is measured by the per capita monthly income for 2000. This indicator has the advantage of being reported for all the regions, unlike gross regional capital, which is not reported for all the AOs. All the data come from the Goskomstat (Russian Federal Service for State Statistics) *Regiony Rossii* yearbooks (various years). Goskomstat does not report education data for all the AOs; hence the lower numbers observed for this indicator.

27. The data come from Mercator and IGRAN (2007).

28. See, for example, Golosov (2004) and Hale (2006).

29. See, for example, Ross (2001).

30. Goldberg, Wibbels, et al. (2008). For a similar "fiscal mechanism" between federal transfers and subnational authoritarianism, see Gervasoni (2010).

31. Following Solanko (2006).

32. This indicator was used to proxy regional wealth instead of gross regional product, because the latter is not reported for all the AOs. Gross regional product per capita and monthly income per capita are highly correlated.

33. Coded from Söderlund (2006, 94).

34. See, for example, Schedler (2013).

35. A likelihood ratio test also suggested that the hierarchical models were a significant improvement over single-level models.

36. The results remain very similar if the "Titular Region" variable is replaced with a dummy variable denoting titular republic status.

37. See also Schedler (2013).

38. On the work stressing elite relations in accounting for Russian regional political regime types, see, for example, Gel'man, Ryzhenkov, et al. (2000 and 2003).

39. For such an assessment, see, for example, Sakwa (2008).

40. See Gibson (2013).

41. See, for example, Goode (2007).

42. See, for example, Golosov (2013).

43. See also Gel'man and Ross (2010).

44. The literature on electoral authoritarianism does acknowledge the role of "agent control" in authoritarian politics (see, for example, Levitsky and Way 2010 and Schedler 2013). But the role of subnational authoritarianism in national-level democratic regressions still remains undertheorized in the broader literature.

45. According to current legislation, the gubernatorial candidates need the supporting signatures of 5–10 percent of municipal deputies or elected municipality heads in order to register for the ballot. This, together with United Russia's dominance of the regional legislatures, significantly restricts the entry of opposition candidates.

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PART IV

MAPPING the CASES

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CHAPTER 10

Uneven Processes and Multiple Pathways

LAURENCE WHITEHEAD AND JACQUELINE BEHREND

Comparative analysis of subnational variations in democratization outcomes in large federations is still at an exploratory stage. The study—and practice—of "subnational authoritarianism" has been expanding rapidly. This volume adopts a related but less familiar and slightly different focus on "illiberal structures and practices" that can generate and sustain major territorial variations between subfederal units, even though in strictly institutional terms they are all supposed to be governed by the same democratic procedures. The interaction among inequitable local conditions and federal constitutional provisions can produce strikingly undemocratic outcomes in some (but not all) local jurisdictions, to such an extent that the overall performance of the federal democracy as a whole may be affected. In the worst cases, it may be correct to classify such outcomes as examples of subnational authoritarianism; in others, the results may be less clear-cut. The case studies in this volume, for example, include a broader (and more hybrid) set of undemocratic local possibilities, such as blocked elite circulation and unaccountable forms of provincial government. This enables us to look beyond straightforward processes of "transition" from authoritarian to democratic subnational polities and to extend the range of possible pathways toward more uniform federal democracies. In addition, the coverage provided by this volume is more comprehensive than usual. Not only does it cover all three of Samuel P. Huntingon's "waves," but it also extends to India, Russia, and the United States, thus taking the analysis well beyond the now standard Latin American cases.

"Liberal democracy" is a complex combination of two broad traditions that often support each other but can also at times be in tension. So there are, in fact, "illiberal structures and practices" in all really existing democracies, unitary as well as federal. As explained in the introduction, the concern of this book is with a precisely demarcated subset of illiberal political

features—those that can be found in some subunits of most large federal democracies. Our concern is with politically illiberal arrangements that are at variance with both the formal-legal and the actual-informal standards of democracy upheld at the national level. Moreover, it is with deeply rooted and long-lasting structures and practices that are embedded at the subnational level and that are sufficiently consequential to matter for the overall democratic regime.

These variations have been highlighted by the work on subnational authoritarianism. However, not all provinces or states that fall short of national democratic standards constitute full-fledged authoritarian regimes. Between the most democratic provinces/states and the extreme and quite rare subnational authoritarian regimes there is an intermediate zone that requires systematic exploration and that cannot be classified adequately as subnational authoritarianism, even if these units are less democratic and do not converge with national standards of democracy. It is for this reason that we introduce the concept of illiberal structures and practices, which allows us to focus on this critical area in between the polar opposites of subnational authoritarianism and subnational democracy. Our argument is that subnational illiberal structures and practices are far more frequently found and widespread than subnational authoritarianism and, as such, merit closer attention. In some cases, illiberal structures and practices may be found in subnational hybrid regimes (McMann 2006). But they may also be found in subnational political systems that comply with procedurally minimum standards of democracy.

So "subnational authoritarianism" falls within our remit, but we have found that terminology on its own too restrictive. Our case studies include many examples of a larger and more diffuse set of phenomena that also qualify according to the criteria just stated. These features extend from formal institutions—such as oppressive local justice systems and unfair or discriminatory local electoral arrangements—to more informal forms of illiberal politics, such as rigged media and tacit political exclusions on grounds of religion, ethnicity, gender, or minority status. Such formal and informal barriers to liberal democracy can be tightly articulated and durable without quite qualifying as an outright "authoritarian regime."

Whereas clear-cut deviations from national standards of democracy can be confronted and overturned either by federal intervention or by local regime change, the illiberal structures and practices examined here can be harder to root out. After all, federalism is a system designed to accommo-

date regional diversity and local variations of self-rule. Although it is possible that substandard local practices may gradually be eroded over time through the nationalization of federal democratic values, it is by no means assured. The entrenched political features identified in our case studies may well prove capable of self-renewal, and sometimes even of growth and extension from the margins towards the center. So these structures and practices can have a broader antidemocratic potential that cannot easily be countered. Instead of abrupt local "regime change," any durable antidote may involve patient, long-term, low-visibility efforts at building democracy from below (Migdal n.d.) and the progressive construction of rights awareness through the activation of already existing institutions and consciousness-raising campaigns. However (and whether) they can be overcome, these local systems merit careful study, not least because they can have the potential to spread and change the balance of political forces at the federal level.

The work in the volume was originally inspired by O'Donnell's (1993) discussion of "brown areas," but the focus is on the largest of federal democracies, where the issues that concerned O'Donnell arise in a particularly visible and accentuated form. The relatively formal features of federalism and subnational authoritarianism have been illuminated by Gibson's (2012) recent work on "boundary control," to which we also owe a major debt. We build on Gibson's work, but, as noted, our focus on subnational variations in democratic responsiveness extends beyond the formal politics of outright authoritarian rule.

This chapter provides a review of the uneven processes and multiple pathways associated with localized "illiberal structures and practices" in large federal democracies, addresses the comparative and analytical challenges arising from this approach, and points to some fruitful directions for further investigation.

Democratization from Below

A modern focus on democratic responsiveness must also include the examination of democratic politics from the bottom up, and that is the aspect emphasized here. Legally, the essential issue is the attribution of sovereignty to a demos or collectivity of citizens. Empirically, as regards institutional design, the central issue is to specify the channels through which citizens can participate in the exercise of public authority. How are their diverse voices to be represented in the political realm, and what are to be the boundaries of their representation? A bottom-up perspective also involves looking

at how informal structures and practices shape political behavior and modify formal institutions. Normatively, in democratic theory the question is: What are the consequent rights and responsibilities of the demos and of institutionally empowered citizens? A clearly democratic regime is one in which these legal, institutional, and normative questions are settled in a relatively stable, coherent, and consensual manner. An outright authoritarian alternative is seen when political officeholders (whether national or subnational, elected or appointed) are not legally regulated by independent authorities answerable to the demos, when the channels of participation are manipulated or blocked, when diverse citizen voices are not freely heard, and, in general, when citizens are normatively disempowered. Between these two poles there is evident scope for a range of intermediate positions, and these can be summed up in terms of variations in democratic responsiveness (Morlino 2012).

The Size of the Polity

The size of the polity is a major consideration when examining how these bottom-up issues are addressed in any given democratization process. The effects of state size on democracy reach far beyond the threshold for recognition as a sovereign state. Some contemporary democracies are compact and unitary, whereas others are physically vast (the Russian Federation spreads across nine time zones) and demographically enormous (the population of India is 1.233 million).[1] More subnational variation is to be expected in large national polities. How democratic unevenness is overcome in the long term may be crucial to understanding why some democratization processes are more successful than others. From a top-down perspective it is possible to highlight characteristics that are shared by all contemporary sovereign national democracies, but from the bottom-up standpoint such structural commonalities are dwarfed by the contrasts arising from differences in state size.

Subnational Authoritarianism

In large federations, national-level legal, institutional, and normative provisions may qualify a regime as broadly "democratic," but what citizens encounter in terms of responsiveness at the second-tier level of government can nevertheless vary greatly and may, in some dimensions, come much closer to the authoritarian pole of the continuum. Such failings of responsiveness at the subnational level can be so widespread that many citizens may not

enjoy the minimum levels of empowerment that are normally associated with a democratic regime, even when democracy prevails at the federal level. Such cases deserve the "subnational authoritarianism" label. But if the federal regime is democratic, a high threshold must be passed in order to reach such a strong conclusion. Gibson (2012) identifies such a threshold in the case of subnational units that can use the federal structure to impose effective "boundary control," insulating the local from the national level of political responsiveness. This volume acknowledges the existence of such cases but expands Gibson's framework by considering that, even in their absence, local variations in citizen responsiveness can be so substantial and entrenched that they require analytical attention; in certain instances they may even condition the democratic status of the regime as a whole. At any rate, citizens' evaluations of their democracy can be downgraded by excessively unresponsive subnational political practices, even in the absence of outright subnational authoritarianism.

There are parallels between our emphasis on "illiberal structures and practices" and Migdal's two-level understanding of the state as "shaped by two elements, *image* and *practices* [, which] can be overlapping and reinforcing, or contradictory and mutually destructive" (Migdal 2001, 16, author's emphasis).[2] Although Migdal is referring to the varying political practices of different state agencies, his insight and emphasis on political practices that contradict formal rules (image) is readily applicable to our federal countries. The federal state is an entity formed by a group of provinces and states, each with its own agencies and institutions and varying political practices. In the best of cases, the federal state can promote a national image of democracy, but the various practices of its subnational constituent parts can clash with this image. In more severe cases, the federal state itself may not be coherent in its repudiation of such illiberal political practices and may even sustain them, as Gibson (2012) and Giraudy (2015) demonstrate.

Informal Politics and Competing Claims

Beyond these legal, institutional, and formal normative aspects or these procedural and formal considerations, democratization also raises core sociological questions: How do the rights and responsibilities of citizenship mesh with such other claims to allegiance as those of family, clan, class, doctrine, locality, or religion?

In most democracies, such informal aspects of political responsiveness and group representation are consequential for the citizenry. Large federal

systems, where the national officeholders are inevitably far removed from the daily lives of those they represent, are more subject than most to conflicting demands from such regional and group identifications. Subnational variations in political practices are often shaped by the distinctively parochial, linguistic, religious, or ethnic compositions of particular states or provinces. Indeed, it is not unusual for territorial units within federal systems to be demarcated with such group characteristics in mind (notably the Indian states, whose postindependence boundaries were redrawn to more closely reflect linguistic divisions). Even where subnational boundaries initially reflected purely geographical and not sociological features of the landscape, these political units tend to generate local identities and distinctive historical memories over time.[3] In consequence, informal territorial allegiances—and rivalries—may prove as relevant as formal political structures when seeking to explain subnational variations in responsiveness to citizenship demands.

The Case Studies

The contributors to this volume look at six very large federal democracies where such subnational variations in political responsiveness to citizen demands are particularly notable. They include older democracies such as the United States and India as well as countries that democratized at the end of the Cold War, such as the Latin American nations and Russia. The set shows that territorial unevenness is not exclusive to new democracies. Moreover, the inclusion of countries that have been democratic for a longer period of time allows us to analyze how they overcame or failed to overcome territorial variability. In her historical study of democratic unevenness in the United Kingdom and France, McMann (2014) speculates that one of the reasons for the democratic success of these countries may be their ability to overcome territorial unevenness over time. However, even if territorial unevenness is overcome, this is not guaranteed to last forever. Regional variations in democracy can reappear for diverse reasons. Nonetheless, how different countries manage to overcome territorial variations in the practice of democracy may be key to understanding what is needed to sustain democracy in the long run. This justifies the inclusion in our set of early democratizers like the United States and India, as well as latecomers like Russia. The Russian case is revealing of what can go wrong in democratization processes and, as Saikkonen's chapter demonstrates, how illiberal structures and practices at the subnational level can become the basis for an authoritarian regression at the national level.

There is another set of omitted cases on which the approach adopted in this volume could have a bearing. Some large and sociogeographically diverse democracies display huge variations in political responsiveness to citizen demands, although they are not formally constituted as federations. Bolivia, Colombia, Indonesia, Peru, the Philippines, the Ukraine, and Venezuela all merit consideration. In formal terms, the defining feature of a federation is that each level of government has an autonomous constitutional existence, but this is not a condition that applies to any of these seven. The formal side of the political balance sheet is not as robust in these countries as it is in Australia or Germany; indeed, informal power structures can play a critical role in determining who rules and how, at least in a significant subset of provinces or local jurisdictions. That makes these technically nonfederal cases more comparable to most of the six countries considered in this volume than are federal Australia and Germany, in particular, because the approach adopted here downplays formal aspects and emphasizes subnational political identities expressed through territorial divisions. It seems likely, therefore, that the illiberal structures and practices that feature in the six federal democracies examined here have fairly close counterparts in these seven large nonfederal democratic regimes.

Illiberal Structures and Practices

The illiberal structures and practices highlighted here are only a subset of a much larger universe. The concern here is to identify those features of political life that can generate large variations in democratic responsiveness among subunits in a large federal democracy. So the structures and practices in question will be territorially concentrated and not uniformly distributed. They also need to be locally embedded; otherwise they will not persist and "stand out" from centrally dictated standards of participation and accountability.

These concentrated and embedded features of local politics can take a variety of forms: for instance, they can be institutional or extrainstitutional, elite or popular, and clientelist or identity-based. And they may benefit from the protection of national-level allies or draw strength from the assertion of parochial claims against a hostile outer world.

In practice, durable illiberal structures will be managed so as to combine many of these resources and to adjust them over time to address new challenges. We refer to "structures and practices" in the plural because of this plasticity, without which territorial variance in democratic responsiveness

would fluctuate and erode under the pressure to conform to national norms. It is the embeddedness and plasticity of these practices that constrains local officeholders' responsiveness to standard expectations of citizen engagement in democratic politics and distorts or even suppresses the development of an autonomous demos at the second-tier level (even when democratic politics at the national level supports a demos that will have some local presence).

Political parties, for example, can be major vehicles for political democratization (although other channels may also be critical), helping to constrain the illiberal practices of copartisans in different provinces; they can also be prime sources of illiberal political practices.[4] The history of the US Democratic Party exemplifies these Janus-faced features, which are unsurprising considering that subnational party system dynamics may well diverge from national party system dynamics.[5] The literature on party systems shows how political parties competing for office at both the national and the subnational levels may need to appeal to different electorates by presenting inconsistent platforms. National parties need to run candidates nationwide if they want to ensure strong support, but, as the experience of the US Democratic Party, Argentine Peronism, and even the Workers' Party (PT) in Brazil shows, this can involve forging alliances with local politicians and political structures that deviate from national agendas. The literature on party system nationalization envisages the homogenization of the political practices of local actors and thus a more uniform political system. Yet the evidence on party systems in federal democracies indicates that such patterns are intermittent rather than unilinear. In the six countries studied here, there were periods of both nationalization *and* denationalization.[6] Indeed, Mickey (2015) considers that the reconciliation of state parties with the national party was a critical component of subnational democratization in the US Solid South. Several of the case studies in this volume explore the role of political parties in sustaining or eliminating subnational illiberal structures and practices.

Some examples may demonstrate why this matters and how it can work. An overly formal reasoning about subnational authoritarianism would be that once the electoral process produces an alternation between parties (say the victory of an opposition candidate for the governorship), the state or province in question will have fallen into line with the federal level of democratic responsiveness. However, evidence from the case studies shows that it is quite possible for an incoming officeholder to end up replicating the il-

liberal practices associated with a predecessor. Where informal structures and expectations are embedded, this outcome is easier to understand and more likely than the alternative of full acceptance of citizen autonomy. After all, whatever the initial democratic aspirations of the successful challenger, once that person is in office the problem becomes how to govern in the context of the inherited justice system, the media, economic pressure groups, and even the perhaps traditional dispositions of much of the electorate and of public opinion. If all these structures and practices are tightly integrated into an "illiberal configuration," a change of the party in office may not herald any substantial improvement in democratic performance. Under such conditions the terminology of "subnational authoritarianism" can convey a misleading impression of change, whereas the invocation of a broader set of illiberal continuities can provide a more realistic gauge of how citizens are actually experiencing political life.

A second illustration concerns variations between units as regards the effectiveness of law enforcement and the control of crime and corruption. This is a proxy for a more general variable—the strength of the state at the subnational level. There are enormous variations in some large democratic federations in this regard. In Mexico, for example, even under President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, when the authoritarian Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was still in the ascendancy in nearly all parts of the nation, the unexpected Zapatista uprising of New Year's Day 1994 demonstrated how little control was being exercised by either the federal or the state authorities in Chiapas. Over the ensuing two decades, the national-level transition to democracy has in no way spread high standards of law enforcement evenly across all jurisdictions. Although certain states and the Federal District remain reasonably law-abiding and well policed, drug-exporting criminal bands have drastically encroached on legitimate public policy areas in many others. At the time of this writing, the southern state of Michoacán in particular seems close to experiencing a complete breakdown of legal authority and at risk of a massive federal military intervention. It is hard to categorize this type of situation within the formal framework of democracy–authoritarian rule when there is such a vacuum of constituted political authority of either type. Even the most committed of democrats would need to condone quite exceptional (and in a sense "authoritarian") measures to address these extralegal threats; and the citizenry-demos would probably agree, at least on an interim basis. A looser analytical framework recognizing the centrality of a mixture of often extremely illiberal structures and

practices provides a more appropriate entry point that can also be used to map the resulting drastic variations in political responsiveness across the landscape of federal democratic Mexico.

Beyond these two illustrations, one might add a variety of other informal or sociostructural features that could generate embedded illiberal structures and practices in some jurisdictions but not in others. Racial or ethnic discrimination was a central feature of the Chiapas confrontation, for example (and the core issue in the US Solid South). In Kashmir, the issue in a strongly Muslim part of democratic India is democratic majoritarianism, which is aggravated by the national security dimension arising from the unresolved border dispute with Pakistan. In some provinces of Argentina and in certain territories of the Russian Federation, the overwhelming political dependence on oil, mining, or fiscal revenues is said to fuel illiberalism.[7] A "structures and practices" approach that is not confined solely to the formal aspects of institutional politics but is also attentive to the identity-based and political economy features of local cleavages and distributional patterns can add much to the explanatory mix here.

Both this theory and these illustrative examples indicate that accounting for subnational variations in democratic responsiveness in large federations requires a broad, long-term, process-based view of how the crucial features are embedded and adjusted over time in different localities. Comparative historical analysis may be less precise than large-*n* statistical correlations (although it can also use these to anchor discussion). But this broader method has the advantage of encompassing the multiplicity of interconnected factors that must work together if a particular subnational unit is to hold out in a sustained manner against pressures for conformity to uniform democratic standards coming from the national level.

At the same time, although informal structures and practices may provide most of the explanatory leverage, process-based views should not lose sight of the significance of the divided sovereignties and dual *demoi* that are built into all federal institutional designs. This is discussed in chapter 1 and need not be repeated here except for the point that, in a comparative historical analysis, what counts is not just the logic of the initial institutional design (which applies across all units in the federal system) but the subsequent manner in which these rules are differentially applied, experienced, and often selectively renegotiated over time and space.[8] It is these processes of learning and adaptation that can give rise to far more entrenched and illiberal applications in some subunits than in others. Federal rules interact

with subnational practices in different ways, depending on such factors as the strength of local loyalties, the veto power of pre-established elites, and the strength or weakness and nature of "civil society" interests in each location. Distance from the center and degrees of integration into the national-level demos (such as through the intermediation of political parties or public policies) also help us to determine the impact of the national democratic regime. Some of the large federal democracies examined here are very recent or incipient, so these comparative historical dynamics may not yet be set in stone; however, most have extended trajectories, with considerable path dependence.

Drivers of Democratic Variability and Prospects for Democracy

As noted at the outset, this is an exploratory volume, and further development is called for. The two big areas requiring much fuller elaboration are, first, what drives these differential democratization processes at the subnational level in large federal democracies and, second, where illiberal or authoritarian systems persist, how fuller democratization might eventually come about.

On the first issue, the starting point should be what we already know about sources of democratization at the national level. These range from long-term facilitating conditions (such as the spread of formal education and an expanding "middle class") to much more immediate "trigger" conditions (such as a succession crisis or the breakdown of a controlled liberalization). Also required is attention to helpful and obstructive features of institutional design, transitions by "pact" as well as through "rupture," and both domestic and international determinants. All this and more has been thoroughly elaborated elsewhere in the scholarly literature. For our purposes, the question is: Which of these contributory factors are most relevant as drivers of subnational variation, and how much difference does it make when democratization is directed against illiberal structures and practices embedded in second-tier jurisdictions within large federal democracies?

In his pioneering book, Gibson (2012, 9) rightly notes that "subnational democratization is not democratization in short pants" and that a different set of lenses is needed to understand how these processes come about. Some of the factors listed earlier can be transferred fairly readily to the subnational level, but pathways toward subnational democratization are bound to be different from those identified at the national level. High living standards, urbanization, a well-educated population, and a strongly articulated "civil society" are all likely to be conducive to democratization within as

well as between national political regimes; the converse is also plausible. This may help to explain contrasts between Chiapas and the Federal District of Mexico, between São Paulo and Alagoas in Brazil, between Bangalore and Bihar in India, or between Massachusetts and Mississippi in the United States. Such background conditions are relevant but not always decisive at both the national and the subnational level, and they operate through similar channels in both cases. There are also good parallels between many of the "trigger" conditions that can precipitate regime transitions nationally and those operating subnationally. In particular, where a locally dominant party or ruling group responds to criticism by attempting a controlled liberalization or tries to perpetuate its ascendancy during a succession crisis, much the same possibilities of loss of control arise as in the case of sovereign authoritarian regimes.

The obvious differences concern the "boundary control" issues highlighted by Gibson: Under what conditions does a subnational crisis of authority elicit intervention from the federal level or, alternatively, can the threatened local incumbents mobilize support from the capital to restore their dominance in their bailiwick? Part of the answer will be provided by the specific rules governing a given federal system: for example, the strong "states rights" of the United States, which are protected by an authoritative Supreme Court, versus the extensive powers of federal intervention that exist elsewhere (especially in Russia, where judicial restraints are lacking, but also in India, where the Supreme Court remains formidable).

Gibson's framework draws attention to the role of intergovernmental relations in the development and perpetuation of illiberal structures and practices and also in their dismantling. But this volume also draws attention to the broader and more informal aspects of authority maintenance in many subnational jurisdictions that are rooted in local conditions, be they economic (e.g., land and business ownership), historical/path-dependent, or agency-based. The case studies of Argentina and Mexico included in this volume, as well as recent work on the Philippines (Sidel 2014)—which is not federal but highly decentralized—illustrate the importance of taking into account the local sources of illiberal structures and practices, which may limit the effects of center-led democratizing initiatives. Here the dynamics of alliance-building and pact-making may play a decisive role; where provincial elites are too closed and unresponsive, democratic pressures may build up from below to the point at which "rupture" rather than "pact" shapes the course of democratization. Although there are evident parallels

here with the mainstream literature, there are also important differences. Pacts are almost invariably negotiated with input from the federal authorities; ruptures are liable to precipitate intervention from the center, given their destabilizing potential for the federation as a whole. Indeed, it is often the hope of eliciting a federal response that encourages local protesters to escalate their activities.

More recent work on democratization has tended to highlight the rise of "competitive authoritarian" regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010) and to draw attention to their durability and resilience. One key feature of this literature concerns the capacity of authoritarian coalitions under threat from new challengers to restructure and reposition themselves in order to preserve their ascendancy. They may learn how to write constitutions, convene elections, and tilt the rules of the game in order to combine outward forms of political competition (now *de rigeur* in many countries) with the persistence of old ruling strata and associated authoritarian practices.

There are evident parallels between this emerging cross-national pattern and the subnational phenomena studied in this volume. Regular electoral contests with more than one contender are a hallmark of a federal democracy. But, as our case studies amply demonstrate, in some provincial jurisdictions prior authoritarian elites may be historically so well entrenched, they may be sufficiently agile, or their "boundary control" defenses may be so robust that they are able to achieve the same kind of persistence and durability that is found among competitive authoritarian regimes. It is also possible that they may contribute to the maintenance (or reestablishment) of national-level forms of authoritarian politics, notwithstanding intervening democratic transitions. These parallels can be striking, although we do not regard the two processes as interchangeable. A national-level competitive authoritarian regime can invoke the claims of sovereignty and international legality to defend itself from democratic challenge, whereas a subnational unit will be more at risk of federal intervention if it gets too far out of line with national opinion.

Although we accept the view of some scholars that there can be "subnational authoritarian regimes," our perspective is that these are not the central case. Illiberal structures and practices can help to narrow political groupings to maintain—or to reestablish—undemocratic local ascendancies without necessarily meeting the full specifications of electoral authoritarianism. If national-level politics is conducted in accordance with more or less competitive rules, that imposes two constraints on local power monopolists: in

contrast to their counterparts in hybrid regimes, they need to make greater efforts to comply with the outward forms of the competitive game, and so they also need to be more agile in shoring up their informal sources of control (*gattopardismo*).

Pathways toward Subnational Democratization

These comparative reflections provide a starting point for answers to the second, much more speculative, question raised by the survey in this volume. Because large variations in democratic responsiveness are being reported in many large federations and because illiberal structures and practices are often sufficiently embedded to obstruct full democratization, how might such impediments eventually be overcome?

If national democratization is understood as a long-term, open-ended process of social construction that consists of progress toward a more rule-based, consensual, and participatory type of politics (Whitehead 2002), subnational democratization should be understood as a process of convergence toward the democratic standards that prevail in the rest of the federation. This does not necessarily mean wiping out local variation or reaching some absolute standard of perfection but rather striving for a realistic standard that society as a whole can attain. Since the range of illiberal structures and practices exhibited at the local level can vary from one subnational unit to another, subnational democratization will involve different pathways and staging posts toward convergence. Because the entrenchment of illiberal practices at the provincial level often involves building wider regional alliances and even securing sponsors at the national level, when they are dismantled it can alter the balance of power throughout the system. So convergence toward a national standard of democratic performance may well consist of mutual adjustments or protracted processes of reaccommodation among the different levels of government. All this makes for extended and multiple pathways rather than "one-shot" transitional shifts.

Gibson (2012) has traced two main routes to the elimination of outright subnational authoritarianism: one center-led and the other party-led. In Robert Mickey's recent (2015) study of the democratization of authoritarian enclaves in the US South, he expands Gibson's framework and distinguishes three types of center-led democratization: acquiescent, harnessed, and protracted. Although these are helpful proposals, their scope is restricted, and they apply better to the United States than to the other countries examined in this volume. In another recent effort at developing a framework for

subnational democratization that draws on old unitary democracies, Kelly McMann (2014) develops the notions of direction, collaboration, diffusion, and emergence.[9] Her framework allows for the possibility of the involvement of a foreign country in subnational democratization in the first three categories and for bottom-up initiatives in the last one. This is also helpful but needs to be modified when applied to contemporary federal democracies where democratic institutions are already in place, both structurally in the federal constitution and, in practice, in many local jurisdictions. So, drawing on these proposals, we develop a framework of three pathways toward subnational democratization that is inductively derived from the case studies in this volume: control/conditionality, contagion, and activation. Our framework includes the possibility of top-down democratization from the center but also of bottom-up processes that originate at the subnational level.

The merit of Gibson's analysis of center-led and party-led democratization is its clarity, and the foundation for that is its relatively narrow and formal focus on outright authoritarianism and on the supralocal causes of subnational authoritarian rule. However, the evidence presented in this volume indicates that a much wider array of entrenched illiberal features may account for the high observable degree of variance in democratic responsiveness. Gibson's framework assumes that national governments always have the power to alter local politics, but in our view the illiberal features mapped in this volume are often so rooted in the local political system that they are highly resistant to center-led initiatives. In extreme cases, the center may be able to force subnational democratization through federal intervention. But in other cases the central state may lack the capacity to force subnational political change (Behrend 2012) or to ensure the equal application of the rule of law throughout its territory (O'Donnell 1993). If subnational democratization is understood as the driver to overcome resistance to the observance of national standards of citizen participation and officeholder responsiveness (which is how mobilized citizens tend to view it), a broad array of additional possibilities arises.

Our comparative mapping demonstrates the wide distribution, deep entrenchment, and great diversity of forms displayed by illiberal structures and practices at the subnational level in many large federal democracies. But in the long run the potential exists to challenge and contest these illiberal arrangements, and in favorable circumstances (as elaborated below) even to democratize them. There are institutional pathways to contestation via the federal structures in the capital of the regime. There are also more

informal pathways that may powerfully transmit democratizing impulses from outside the locality—for instance, through the contagion (or demonstration effects) arising when news arrives of successful contestations in neighboring jurisdictions. And there are also other diffusion effects from without, such as when voter registration and electoral monitoring practices that have delivered legitimacy in other parts of the national territory are extended beyond their previous range. But how such impulses are received and implemented in a given subnational setting depends heavily on the local capacity for democratization in the face of resistance from the sorts of illiberal structures and practices outlined earlier. Such local reformist capacities vary over time and place quite as much as the illiberal obstacles they seek to overcome.

Obviously the first requirement for local pro-democratic activism is a sector of the population that is discontented with the prevailing configurations of local power. This could be an educated stratum (students and teachers are obvious examples), the inhabitants of a marginalized subregion (there are often certain municipalities known for their disconformity), or perhaps class, ethnic, linguistic, religious, or simply party-based groupings. Clearly, there are many diverse potential sources of democratizing reform to consider, with large divergences in staying power and "reform-mongering" capacity. One way or another such nuclei of potential resistance can be found in virtually all local political jurisdictions, no matter how effective or controlling the prevailing illiberal structures may be. But the existence of a discontented stratum is no guarantee of manifest contestation, let alone democratizing challenge. Opponents need resources, avenues of expression, and spaces in which they can mobilize. So, as McMann (2014) notes, even if sources of resistance exist, oppositions are not able to develop everywhere or under all conditions. The main purpose of the prevailing illiberal structures and practices is precisely to restrict or deny such conditions so that the potential for discontent can never become manifest, let alone well organized. In a straightforwardly authoritarian context that might be the end of the matter.

However, our concern here is with illiberal structures and practices at the local level that coexist with more actively pluralist and democratic structures in other parts of the national regime. This is a context in which unrestricted and outright suppression of local expressions of discontent can easily backfire. There are legal and procedural formalities that are best observed, at least in appearance. There are tacit understandings that help keep

bystanders from becoming involved. Although the illiberal system of domination may be customary and widely accepted (at least as a lesser evil), its architects and beneficiaries need skill and alertness to keep it in good working order and to ensure that the ruling coalition remains intact. In short, there are potential avenues of contestation and resources for challenge that need to be managed. If they are not, formal and informal modes of resistance (denunciations of abuse and corruption, appeals to latent civil society networks, electoral dissidence, or street protests, among others) are liable to overwhelm local systems of illiberal control. All these local possibilities for activation remain potentially available precisely because the situation we are describing is not one of outright authoritarian domination. Instead, opposition activists can make use of the spaces still available to them by virtue of the pluralist politics promised at the federal level and the incompleteness of illiberal domination in their locality. The playing field may well be very far from level, and yet there is a game that two sides can play. In this setting the preservation of local forms of domination requires political agility and a capacity to bargain with critics, not just a flat determination to suppress all dissent.

Clearly, these endogenous sources of challenge are disparate, and for the most part their chances of achieving a breakthrough are very low. That is just another way to make the point that illiberal structures and practices at the local level can be very durable and hard to dislodge. Nevertheless, our model of geographically uneven democratic development and of the multiple arenas of local contestation that can operate in large federal democracies highlights the presence of endogenous pathways toward broader participation. There are latent resources that can be activated. To some extent, this may also be true of many apparently outright authoritarian regimes. But the point is that it is especially relevant where local jurisdictions are governed in an illiberal but not exclusively repressive manner. We have tried to demonstrate the wide prevalence of such situations in today's large federal democracies.

In what follows we develop a framework of pathways toward subnational democratization based on the categories of control/conditionality, contagion, and activation. The first two are adapted from the literature on the international dimensions of democratization (Whitehead 1994), and the third builds on the literature on informal institutions (Levitsky and Murillo 2013). This broad framework allows us to incorporate Gibson's model of center-led and party-led democratization but extends our range by including the possibility of contagion/diffusion effects and the activation of existing

democratic institutions and local sources of opposition.[10] In this framework subnational democratization does not hinge *exclusively* on the strategic interaction between the national and local levels of government; the democratizing impulse can be local, supralocal, or a combination of both.

1. *Control/Conditionality*: Control and conditionality are inherent features of intergovernmental relations in a federal democracy. National authorities must have some extensive powers of control over the options available to second-tier entities.[11] The extreme form of control is federal intervention, and Gibson's centre-led transitions mostly focus on this form of control. But conditionality is also an essential component, in that the center must be able to offer powerful incentives to induce component units of a federation to work together and avoid cumulatively untenable veto games. From the standpoint adopted in this volume, the key issue is how far conditionality and control regulate the political responsiveness of second-tier jurisdictions. Some degree of political regulation will be indispensable if the federation as a whole is to have democratic characteristics. So there must be a federationwide electoral register, the justice system must have enforcement powers, and taxes and benefits must apply across the whole nation, among other features. At the same time, the provinces or states must also have their guaranteed realms of authority and their autonomous bargaining cards. So the politics of linkage and leverage is bound to involve a two-way interaction, with federal decision-makers linked to the secondary units (via a senate, for instance) and vice versa. Reverse leverage will also operate, as in practice it often does at the international level as well.
2. *Contagion:* The idea of contagion is that an example set in one political jurisdiction may inspire imitators in adjacent locations, even in the absence of any deliberate organized transmission mechanisms. The Arab Spring provides a recent example of contagion at the national level. Another example is the anticorruption protests that began in mid-2013 in São Paulo and quickly spread throughout Brazil, probably mainly through demonstration effects. Under suitable conditions, such contagion can be a powerful democratizing force inside any democratic federation. In addition to contagion, there are also some more intentional systems of diffusion—for example, when clean election or anticorruption campaigns spill over into the most recalcitrant jurisdictions.

3. *Activation*: Such spillover effects require local activation. Because democratic institutions are already in place, subnational democratization need not involve institutional change or the drafting of new rules; it may simply require the enforcement of existing laws, rules, or institutions. Here we draw on what Levitsky and Murillo (2013) term the "activation" of previously dormant institutions. In this case, political change leading to subnational democratization can occur through the activation of social mobilization, judicial activism, or the involvement of independent institutions acting out of their own initiative. Shadow institutions—schools, friendships, neighborhood associations, and other normally nonpolitical groupings—can enter the fray, disbanded opposition structures can be revived, and usually ineffective institutions (police, journalists, or accountability systems) can be activated unexpectedly and escape their usual fetters. What Gibson calls party-led transitions can occur when these local initiatives are led by political parties acting in conjunction with national parties. But as the earlier examples illustrate, there is a multiplicity of actors and institutions that can be activated in favor of subnational democratization. After all, anticorruption campaigns, communitarian demands for recognition and "dignity," the exposure of media collusion and information suppression, and legal reform initiatives to upgrade the justice system are all salient features of subnational politics in large federal democracies.

Table 10.1 illustrates with examples how these three pathways toward subnational democratization might develop. This table sketches out three major pathways that can be decisive for dismantling existing barriers to high-quality subnational democracy. These three need not develop in isolation. In reality, subnational democratization may be achieved by a combination of pathways, either simultaneously or in a sequential manner. Some degree of control/conditionality may be combined with some activation, or contagion effects from other provinces may trigger the activation of previously dormant institutions. Alternatively, subnational democratization could be triggered by direct control from the central government, as in cases of federal intervention.

We have concluded that such manifestations of contentious politics are liable to extend beyond the formal realm of territorial politics and may well involve protracted processes of conflict over an array of informal illiberal structures and practices, some of which may be more resilient and adaptable

TABLE 10.1.
Pathways toward subnational democratization

Control/conditionality	Contagion	Activation
Federal intervention	Successful contestation/ mobilization in other localities	Judicial activism, activation of previously dormant accountability institutions
Supreme Court rulings	Diffusion effects: extension of rights in other provinces that sparks demands for similar rights	Investigations of corruption, rights violations, or other denunciations by local media
Electoral monitoring	Replication of institutional reforms that deepen democracy in one province to other provinces	Development of local activism and/or mobilization
Withholding of federal transfers	Extension of electoral monitoring practices in one province to other provinces	Development of opposition political parties and/or alliances Local legal reform initiatives

than others. Interventions from outside can tilt the balance to some extent, but they are liable to backfire (or at least produce unintended consequences) if they do not mesh effectively with more local and informal sources of democratic pressure. So although they may correct relatively specific single-issue grievances, they may not produce straightforward step-changes from outright subnational authoritarianism to standardized democratic institutionality. Moreover, disruptive episodes of contentious local politics are more likely to redistribute opportunities within existing power structures than to wipe the slate clean of illiberal structures. Indeed it is not uncommon to observe local democratic challengers taking up aspects of the practices they had denounced once they emerge on top. Even so, such episodes are consequential, and their longer-term democratizing potential may well exceed their immediate gains. At the same time, it is even more important when studying subnational democratizations than when studying national-level democratic transitions to take the wider regional context and repercussions into account. The success (or failure) of a bid for more inclusive politics in Alagoas in Brazil, Mississippi in the United States, or Perm in Russia can resonate across neighboring jurisdictions and indeed at the federal level. In consequence, the issues we have focused on here merit as full and systematic a comparative examination as the national capital- focused transitions so dominant in the democratization literature.

In conclusion, we have directed our attention to a restricted set of federations that display major levels of territorial variation in democratic performance. This aspect of democratization merits more emphasis, given the huge numbers of citizens affected by it, even if only a few states are involved. These federations are all large (meaning that for most citizens the federal authorities are remote as compared to the local officeholders who regulate much of their affairs). They are all longstanding federations (even Russia, at least in formal terms), which means that they have long track records of constitutional commitment to representative government and division of powers, thus creating expectations of the even promotion of citizenship across the whole landmass, even though in practice much unevenness has persisted.

So these federations have all created political entitlements (at least on paper) that, in principle, provide democrats with space to challenge inequities and exclusions. (Our concern here is with broadly democratic large federations, and thus with locally concentrated failings and omissions that are at variance with the national self-description). But although they are *large* and *democratic*, they are just as importantly also *federal* systems. This means that their formal rules provide shelter not only for local diversities of political experience but also for a range of inherited informal structures and practices that may predate or in other ways negate the modern democratic standards prevailing at the national level. "Boundary control," malapportionment, and reciprocal deals between national and local elites are essential parts of this story, but so are localized "closed games," ruling families, subordinated justice systems, captive media, and so forth. Study of such situations requires a long-term historical perspective and needs to be comparative and to take into account the lived experiences and aspirations of citizen groups as much as the formal institutional rules of political process. Hence our emphasis on informal structures and practices.

Political institutions and democratic procedures certainly matter here, but they may interact with systems of economic privilege, local hierarchy and oligarchy, divided and/or disempowered majorities, and related structures of inequality strong enough to negate the effect of national legislation or policy choice. The starkest cases of subnational authoritarianism are the easiest to identify, understand, and contest, but in our view they account for only a limited part of the variance relevant to democratization. This volume has drawn attention to the wider and more fundamental factors perpetuating territorial unevenness in democratic performance and has outlined the multiple pathways through which it is being challenged and modified. This

is an exploratory survey that leaves ample space for further research and for more precise elaboration.

NOTES

1. However, we need to distinguish between the effects of the size of the polity on citizen access to representatives (which may be enhanced in a smaller polity) and contestation (another crucial component of democracy that tends to increase with the size of the polity). On the latter, see Gerring et al. (2015).
2. "In brief, the state . . . demands two levels of analysis, one that recognizes . . . its wholeness—expressed in its image—and one that dismantles this wholeness in favour of examining the reinforcing and contradictory practices and alliances of its disparate parts" (Migdal 2001, 22).
3. On this topic, see Escolar (2011).
4. The nonparty channels we consider can be equally Janus-faced (such as the media or the judiciary).
5. On the US Democratic Party and subnational democratization, see Mickey (2015). For a discussion of the differences between national and subnational party systems in federal democracies, see Gibson and Suárez Cao (2010).
6. On party system nationalization and denationalization, see Jones and Mainwaring (2003); Calvo and Escolar (2005); Leiras (2007); and Gibson and Suárez Cao (2010), among others.
7. On fiscal rentierism, see Gervasoni (2010).
8. Indeed, Catherine Boone (2012) proposes that territorial unevenness in state quality in some African countries is often "an artifact" of state-building rather than a sign of state failure.
9. The first includes Gibson's pathway of center-led democratization, the second his pathway of party-led democratization; the third and fourth are more bottom-up approaches to subnational democratization.
10. The notion of activation is somewhat similar to McMann's notion of emergence. However, they differ in that in our set of cases, democratic institutions are already in place, even if they are dormant, and don't need to be crafted; they don't need to "emerge" but simply need to be "activated."
11. If these are too weak, the system is confederal, but long experience indicates that such arrangements are unstable.

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Editors

JACQUELINE BEHREND is a professor of political science at the Universidad Nacional de San Martín in Argentina and a tenured researcher at the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET). She received her DPhil in politics at the University of Oxford in 2008, and her research has been published in *Latin American Research Review*, *Revista SAAP*, and *Revista PostData*, as well as in book chapters. Her current work focuses on subnational stateness and explores the relationship between economic actors and subnational states in Latin America.

LAURENCE WHITEHEAD is a senior research fellow in politics at Nuffield College, Oxford University, and a senior fellow of the college, where he has served as acting warden (2005–6). In 2011–12 he served as senior proctor of the university. His most recent books are *Latin America: A New Interpretation* (Palgrave 2006, second revised updated edition 2010) and *Democratization: Theory and Experience* (Oxford University Press 2002). His most recent edited publications are *The Obama Administration and the Americas: Shifting the Balance* (Brookings Institution Press 2010), which he produced jointly with Abraham F. Lowenthal and Theodore J. Piccone; *Democratization in America—A Comparative Historical Analysis* (Johns Hopkins University Press 2011), with Desmond King and others; and *Citizen Security in Latin America* (Notre Dame University Press 2009), with Marcelo Bergman. Among his recent articles are "The Westminster System: Model or Muddle?," in the *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, May 2013; "'Enlivening' the Concept of Democratisation: The Biological Metaphor," in *Perspectives on Politics*, July 2011; and "Losing 'the Force'? The Dark Side of Democratization after Iraq," in *Democratization*, April 2009. He is editor of the Oxford University Press series Studies in Democratization and President of the Conseil

Scientifique of the Institut des Ameriques in Paris, and he belongs to the steering committee of the Red Eurolatinoamericana de Gobernabilidad para el Desarrollo.

Authors

ANDRÉ BORGES is a professor at the Institute of Political Science at the Universidade de Brasilia. He received his DPhil in politics at the University of Oxford. His research has been published in *Latin American Research Review*, *Brazilian Political Science Review*, and *Revista SAAP*, among others.

JULIÁN DURAZO HERRMANN is a professor at the Université de Québec a Montréal and director of the political science department. He received his PhD in political science at McGill University, Canada. He has published articles in the *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, *Politiques et Sociétés*, and *Regional and Federal Studies*, among others.

CARLOS GERVASONI is an assistant professor of political science at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. He is a regional manager for the Varieties of Democracy project. His recent research has focused on federalism and on national and subnational democracy in Argentina. His articles have appeared in *Comparative Political Studies*, *Democratization*, *Journal of Democracy en Español*, *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, and *World Politics*. He is the coeditor of recent books on the political and economic consequences of fiscal federalism in Argentina (with Alberto Porto) and on the policy performance of the Kirchners' administrations (with Enrique Peruzzotti). He received his MA from Stanford University and his PhD from the University of Notre Dame.

EDWARD L. GIBSON is a professor of political science at Northwestern University. His current research focuses on conflicts and dynamics of democratization in Latin America and the United States. Previous work has addressed the politics of federalism, party politics, and market reform in Latin America. He has published three books, most recently *Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies* (Cambridge University Press 2012). His previous books are *Federalism and Democracy in Latin America* (Johns Hopkins University Press 2004) and *Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative Perspective* (Johns Hopkins University Press 1996). He has also published articles in edited volumes and journals, including *World Politics*, *Comparative Politics*, and *Studies in Comparative International Development*.

DESMOND KING is the Andrew W. Mellon Professor of American Government at the University of Oxford. He is a fellow of the British Academy, a member

of the Royal Irish Academy, and a fellow of the Royal Historical Society. His books include *Separate and Unequal: African Americans and the US Federal Government* (Oxford University Press 2007), *Making Americans: Immigration, Race, and the Origins of the Diverse Democracy* (Harvard University Press 2001), and, with Rogers M. Smith, *Still a House Divided: Race and Politics in Obama's America* (Princeton University Press 2011).

INGA A.-L. SAIKKONEN is a postdoctoral fellow and lecturer in the Yale Program on Democracy. She was previously an Academy of Finland postdoctoral researcher at Abo Akademi University, Finland, and received her DPhil in politics at the University of Oxford. She works on subnational politics, democratization, electoral authoritarian regimes, and patronage politics. Her work has been recently published in *Democratization*.

CELINA SOUZA is a research fellow at the Federal University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (Unirio), Brazil. Her primary research interests are federalism, subnational governments, and public policies in Brazil. Dr. Souza is the author of *Constitutional Engineering in Brazil: The Politics of Federalism and Decentralization* (St. Martin's Press 1997), and she has also written a number of journal articles and contributed to edited volumes in both English and Portuguese. Her most recent publications in English are "Brazil: From 'Isolated' Federalism to Hybridity," which was published in 2013 in the *Routledge Handbook of Regionalism and Federalism*, and "Modernisation of the State and Bureaucratic Capacity-Building in the Brazilian Federal Government," in *Policy Analysis in Brazil*.

MAYA TUDOR is an associate professor in politics and public policy at the University of Oxford. She was previously a pre-doctoral fellow at the JFK School of Government at Harvard University. She received her PhD in political science from Princeton University in 2010. Her book *The Promise of Power* (Cambridge University Press 2013) was based on her dissertation, which won the Gabriel Almond award for the best dissertation in comparative politics.

ADAM ZIEGFELD is the International Council Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the George Washington University. He is the author of a forthcoming book on regional political parties in India that will be published by Cambridge University Press, and his other research has been published in a number of journals, including *Comparative Politics*, *Electoral Studies*, and *Party Politics*. He received his PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and previously held postdoctoral positions at the University of Chicago and Nuffield College, Oxford.

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